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Abstract 
The main research problem of how we should understand the relationship between 
individuals, social structures in institutions, and cultural biases is approached from two 
different angles: from a study of migrant households as institutions and from 
several surveys that focus on cultural biases at the individual level. Cultural theory, 
building upon the work of Mary Douglas, describes four ways of organizing, also 
known as ways of life or cultures—namely hierarchical, egalitarian, individualistic, 
and fatalistic ways of organizing. 
Many concepts and stereotypes emphasize the differences between the majority 
population and migrants. In contrast to these, the present thesis shows how 
migrants’ ways of organizing their households are actually familiar to us, even when these 
migrants come from distant countries. The author suggests that this familiarity 
provides a common cultural basis for communication and interaction, even 
between peoples who are commonly seen as being radically different.  
The bulk of the argument given above is based on a qualitative study consisting of 
in-depth interviews of seventeen migrant households presently living in Norway. 
The households originate from Vietnam, Chile, and Sri Lanka, and eight of them 
are presented in detail. They are first described according to their internal 
organization (based on their economic decisions, their justifications for the division 
of housework, and their behaviors during interviews) and their external social 
relations (how they justify giving and receiving support from others). Households’ 
stated preferences are compared with theoretically-based predictions of attitudes 
toward institutions, trust, social support, the distribution of resources, blame, the 
view of democracy, and political decision making. Contrary to the expectations of 
mainstream political science, this study finds a strong relationship between a household’s 
way of organizing and its views on society and politics. Rather than relying on the country of 
origin as a basis for categorization, migrant households’ relations with the state and 
the majority society can be better understood by knowing how they organize their 
households. 
Cultural theory is primarily a theory about institutions, but sometimes it also makes 
claims about people. In addition to the arguments made about migrants, this thesis 
also argues that people are not just miniature institutions and suggests two 
theoretical improvements to cultural theory. First, people do not only support one 
cultural bias, they can also reject or support the other cultural biases. Second, at the 
level of the individual, the effects of cultural biases are not additive, nor are they 
independent of each other; biases must be studied in combinations. Biases are better 
understood as a package of meanings rather than existing as separate items. In 
short, cultural biases are patterns of meaning that are not easy to summarize and 
analyze numerically, and the relevant number of biases is of course an empirical 
question.  
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The argument presented here about cultural biases is based on quantitative data 
extracted from the 1999 Nordic Cultures Survey, which consists of representative 
samples from Norway, Denmark, Sweden, Finland, and Iceland (n=4833). Data are 
also extracted from the 1995 Norwegian Environmental Protection Survey, which 
consists of representative samples from 12 environmental organizations and from 
the general population in Norway (n=3106). 
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Preface 
I started my research on cultural theory as a graduate student back in 1992 with the 
idea that, for a variety of reasons, this theory must be wrong. Over the years, I have 
grown into the belief that cultural theory has got something right, even if the 
research methods are often not quite right. Therefore, I find myself repeatedly 
seeking out the problematic, gray areas where the assumptions made essentially 
hide some underlying lack of clarity. In light of this, I do not aim to explain political 
views, but to make a few methodological improvements and increase our 
understanding of the relationship between individuals and cultures. 
Part of the motivation that guides my research is based on the fact that those 
institutions that finance research, as well as the academic career system which is 
based on counting publications, require researchers to constantly generate research 
findings. This pushes researchers to select safe topics and safe research methods. I 
think there are too few publicized efforts at exploring the more problematic areas 
of inquiry, or areas where methodological standards do not yet exist. This kind of 
exploration often involves high degrees of uncertainty, as questions are raised about 
many of the assumptions that are commonly taken for granted. I have chosen to 
emphasize this type of exploration because I believe that the development of social 
science benefits when these kinds of explorations are made public. Displaying many 
of the uncertainties and choices opens up the text to a true peer review process. 
Since 2003, I have been working at the Center for Ethnic Discrimination and the 
Equality and Anti-Discrimination Ombud, and research on cultural theory has been 
a something between a hobby and an obsession. Cultural theory has given me a 
perspective that I believe could be valuable for many people working with migrants. 
This thesis is an attempt to put into place the foundations for a cultural theory that 
is based on research of individuals rather than just institutions. In cooperation with 
others, the next step will be to create real-life applications for cross-cultural 
communication and organization. 
 

  1 
C h a p t e r  1   
INTRODUCTION 
The Research Problem 
In previous research, I have suggested that a model which specifies the relationship 
between an individual on the one hand and a way of life on the other hand is 
necessary for a meaningful coding and analysis of survey data (For more 
information see Olli 1996). In addition, I have argued that the rejection of a cultural 
bias at the individual level is important, and suggested that cultural biases are not 
simply additive (Olli 1999). This thesis takes several steps further along the same 
path by asking the following: How should we understand the relationship between 
individuals, social structures in institutions, and cultural biases?  
Within the politically relevant arm of cultural theory, there are two main strands of 
research: The first one uses organizational-level data and successfully explains 
institutional stability, change, and conflicts. The second one uses representative 
sample surveys to explain individual perceptions of risks and political choices. The 
institutional research is mostly case-oriented and qualitative, while the survey 
research is quantitative. In this thesis, I will relate to both strands of research and 
suggest major improvements for the ways we should understand an individual’s 
relationship with cultural biases. 
The first part of the thesis is a qualitative study of migrant households. The study 
shows how the households’ political views are closely connected to the way the 
household is organized. This study allows me to apply the institutional strand of 
cultural theory to households in Norway. In addition, it demonstrates the use of a 
typology as an alternative to the nationality-based stereotypes of migrants. 
The second part of the thesis attempts to sort out some of the problems of using 
cultural theory in surveys by suggesting a better way of operationalizing cultural 
biases. I start by presenting a theoretical critique of how cultural theory is used at 
the individual level. I then explore a variety of ways in which cultural biases can be 
operationalized at the individual level, with the goal of developing a new 
operationalization of cultural biases as combinations at this level. Finally, I try this 
new operationalization out by using it to explain party preference in the Nordic 
countries. 
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The third part of the thesis uses this new operationalization to discuss several 
topics. First, I demonstrate that three of the assumptions commonly used in survey 
research on cultural biases receive so little empirical support that they should be 
seen as fallacies. Then I discuss the nature of rejection, in the light of the evidence 
available from a household study and surveys.  
In Figure 1 below, we can see an overview of the three parts of the thesis. The 
qualitative part uses the internal organization of households and the pattern of 
giving and receiving help through their social relations to explain political views, 
while the quantitative part uses cultural biases held by individuals to explain party 
preference as a proxy for political views.  
There are several reasons for combining qualitative and quantitative methods to 
improve the operationalization of cultural theory. First, using two different 
methods helps me to make assumptions and choices explicit, thus making it easier 
to criticize and improve the operationalizations by rendering them more 
transparent. The more common approach, where two or more theories are 
compared based on their abilities to explain political views, would typically hide 
much of the operationalization, thus making improvements difficult. 
Second, I firmly believe that operationalization should be a reflection of the theory 
and its intended use. The qualitative operationalization in Part I could have been 
much more formal, but my interest in cross-cultural communication and practical 
work with migrant families convinced me of the utility of having an 
operationalization where the researcher interacts with with the family. Why make it 
difficult if easy works? How simple can we make it and still use it on Vietnamese, 
Tamil, and Chilean households in Norway? The quantitative operationalization in 
Part II moves in the opposite direction, toward increasing complexity, because I 
believe that the operationalization of cultural bias at the individual level should 
reflect the way cultural biases actually work at the individual level. Because the 
individual-culture relationship is not well defined, I explore many different 
operationalizations in Part II. Since households are institutions, I can avoid many of 
these problems in Part I.  
Third, the use of two different methods allows for a triangulation that cannot be 
done from only one viewpoint. My two operationalizations are not an attempt to 
transfer or recreate the same operationalization with a different type of 
methodology (maximizing similarities). I am trying to create two different 
operationalizations independently of one another. In this sense, I am increasing the 
difference between the operationalizations in an effort to create two independent 
viewpoints that both stand on their own. The differences and similarities in findings 
tell us something more about how cultural biases work in institutions and in 
individuals. 
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Figure 1: Overview of the Research Design 
 
  
Before I present cultural theory in more detail, I will briefly sketch the research 
problems as they appear in the different parts of the thesis. 
Part I: A Qualitative Study of Migrant Households in Norway 
In the first part of the thesis, I will explore the importance of institutions for our 
political views by engaging in a qualitative study of migrant households from 
different ethnic backgrounds. The unit of study is the household, the most 
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Part II: Operationalization of Cultural bias in the 
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Individual 
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discussions 
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common institution found in society. This allows for a contextualized 
operationalization of cultural theory and avoids some of the pitfalls of 
methodological individualism. This part helps to formulate some new hypotheses 
by asking how a household’s view of politics and society is related to the way the household is 
organized. 
Cultural theory’s claim that there are only four fundamentally different, yet stable 
ways of organizing, the hierarchical, egalitarian, individualistic and fatalistic way of 
organizing, is interesting for both migration researchers and for political scientists. 
First, for migration researchers the novelty lies in a new perspective that can 
counteract the essentialism in many of the concepts used when dealing with 
migrants. It is an alternative way of conceptualizing migrants and our social interactions 
with them.1 I present cultural theory as a theoretical alternative, or addition to, the 
present thinking regarding immigrants, which seems in many ways to be locked into 
the concepts of ethnicity and nationality (or country of origin). 
The hierarchical household often uses traditional gender and role based division of 
labor. The egalitarian household is organized as a flat structure where all are equal, 
and participate in the decision-making. The individualistic household relies upon a 
network organization and bilateral agreements. The fatalistic household lacks a 
reliable support structure and copes with external events, rather than plans for 
future.  
These four ways of organizing can provide an explanation for the common 
elements that people use when they create social interactions with people they do 
know. If the application of cultural theory is simple enough, it can have sizable and 
practical use value for professionals who deal with migrants without knowing them 
personally.  
Second, the claim which points to only four ways of organizing is interesting for 
political scientists because it provides a partial explanation for the origin of political 
preferences. Part I of the thesis contributes to political science generally by 
proposing that household structure is an important source of people’s political views and a 
more important source than country of origin. To understand political culture, we 
must study how institutions are related to values (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 
1992:517). This attempt is general in nature, and not limited to migrants. 
The Research Council of Norway’s second research program on International 
Migration and Ethnic Relations (IMER) provided the financing for this household 
study. Therefore, I have written the first part of the thesis for a particular 
audience—i.e. people who study or deal with migrants in their daily lives.  
Migration research is most relevant for a general study of the individual-culture 
relationship. Migration places individuals in a new setting where the individual-
culture relationship is bound to change. In migration research, the individual-
                                                     
1  A joint introduction to current thinking about the internal and societal processes concerning 
migration can be found in Lithman and Sicakkan (2006, 2005).  
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culture relationship has been studied for decades. Cultural theory’s understanding 
of the individual-culture relationship can be strengthened by learning form the 
insights from migration research.2 In addition, I believe that the different origins of 
the households make my conclusions more general than if I had only studied 
ethnically Norwegian households. 
Cultural theory helps us to see the organizational commonalities among society’s 
most common institution, namely the household. In politics, and often in research, 
cultural differences between people from different countries are emphasized: 
Migrants are presented as some special kind of people or framed as the other, which 
we then use as means for defining who we are (Gullestad 2001, 2002). Stereotypes, 
or overly simplified images of a person based on their cultural background, are so 
strong that social contact does not automatically alter them (Durrheim and Dixon 
2005; Andersson 2000:294). By showing that the organizing principles in migrants’ 
households are familiar to us, rather than strange or different, I have chosen a 
research strategy that counters the tendency of stereotypes.  
Cultural theory, along with my analysis, gives us some guidance for how to deal 
with migrant households we do not know personally. Writing this introduction a 
few months after the 22/7 terror attacks in Oslo makes me even more certain in 
my conviction that it is useful to study what is common in households from many 
countries rather than simply emphasizing their differences. Culture is not just about 
difference and conflict; competence in the different ways of life makes it possible to 
communicate and interact with people from different backgrounds.  
By itself, the first part of the thesis is an operationalization of cultural theory that is 
designed to deal with households in Norway and to be useful for both practitioners 
and researchers in the field of migration. However, in relation to the rest of the 
thesis, Part I serves as a study of how the institutional version of cultural theory 
makes sense of the ways in which households are organized and their views on 
politics and institutions of the welfare state.  
Part II: Operationalizing Cultural Bias at the Individual Level 
The overarching goal of Part II is to find a working operationalization for cultural biases at 
the individual level, as measured through the use of survey techniques. Much of previous 
survey-based research on cultural theory has a rather unclear view of the 
relationship between individual and culture (Olli 1995, 1999). I believe that there 
are several theoretical problems that need to be solved before empirical research on 
the individual level will be successful.  
First, I try to answer the question of what is wrong with existing survey-based research on 
cultural theory. Since there are several problems, we should give up many of our 
assumptions and try to take as little as possible for granted. Second, I try to find out 
                                                     
2 In some ways, migration provides us with an real-life laboratory, where we can study what happens 
when an individual or family is inserted into in a new society and cultural setting. 
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how to measure cultural biases in two different surveys: one covering all five Nordic 
countries and the other covering the members of environmental organizations and 
the general public in Norway. Third, I explore a variety of possible ways to 
operationalize the relationship between individuals and cultural biases, and then 
present an empirical method for finding out which assumptions perform better than 
others. Based on this analysis, I suggest that a combination of two top-ranked 
cultural biases is probably a useful simplification of an individual’s cultural bias. 
However, before this new operationalization can be trusted enough to use in 
theoretical work, it must be evaluated. I do this by using it to explain preferences for 
Nordic party families.  
If you are not interested in the measurement and operationalization of cultural 
biases, then you can skip Part II. In doing so, however, you will just have to trust 
me when I say that the combination of two top-ranked biases is probably the best 
way to use cultural theory at the individual level.  
The main weakness of Part II is that I use only one variable, namely party 
preference, as the dependent variable. I have chosen this variable because it carries 
meaning in most countries and is not reducible to just one dimension in any of the 
Nordic countries. Choosing a one-dimensional variable would probably lead to a 
different operationalization of cultural biases. Nevertheless, I believe the multi-
dimensionality is necessary when studying the possibilities that lie in the use of 
cultural biases as combinations.  
In short, the second part is both an independent attempt to solve some 
methodological problems that have hampered survey research on cultural theory, 
and a necessary preparation for the analyses in the third part. Let us now take a 
look at Part III. 
Part III: Discussions 
The two first parts of the thesis prepare the grounds for the discussions in the third 
part of the thesis. The topics taken up in the discussions are closely connected to 
the problems presented in the beginning of part two. The household study is an 
institutional corrective to the tendency toward the implicit use of methodological 
individualism in the survey methods. I seek empirical evidence from all five samples 
in the 1999 Nordic Cultures Survey (NOS99) and from both samples in the 1995 
Norwegian Environmental Protection Survey (NEPS95), in addition to, evidence 
from the household study.  
By taking up two important discussions, Part III contributes to exploring the main 
research problem—i.e. the relationship between individuals, social structures, and 
cultural biases. First, I empirically test three major assumptions that underlie most survey-
based research on cultural theory: the dominant bias assumption, the independence 
assumption, and the additivity of effects assumptions. The lack of clarity about 
these assumptions will lead to several methodological flaws in the data analysis. 
Establishing the status of these assumptions is therefore important.  
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Second, I once again raise the question of what the rejection of cultural bias is all about. 
This discussion has both methodological and theoretical consequences insofar as 
our understanding of the nature of the rejection of cultural bias is intrinsically 
connected to our understanding of the individual-culture relationship.  
At this point, the research questions that guide the remainder of this volume have 
been laid out. As a recap, these questions are as follows: How should we 
understand the relationship between individuals, social structures, and cultural 
biases? Can cultural theory’s typology be an alternative way of conceptualizing 
migrants? How are a household’s views of politics and society related to the way 
the household is organized? What is wrong with existing survey-based research on 
cultural theory? How can cultural theory be operationalized at the level of 
individuals? Can we trust the three major assumptions that underlie survey-based 
research on cultural theory? Finally, what is the rejection of cultural bias all about? I 
will now move on to present cultural theory since it is the foundation this thesis 
rests upon.  
Introduction to Cultural Theory 
Cultural theory is based on the works of Mary Douglas,3 who created it as a tool for 
comparing religions and the societies where these religions appear (Douglas 1996a). 
An abstract conceptual framework depicts structural similarities across different 
societies, institutions, and cultures, which also makes it suitable for describing 
immigrants in today’s increasingly multicultural society. 
I will first draw quick images of four different types of households, and the political 
views that match these ways of organizing because these images can give the reader 
a sense for what the theory can be used for. Afterwards, I will present the theory 
behind the four different types of households. However, I will wait until Chapter 7 
(page 278) to present the individual-level problems in the theory since these 
problems are not relevant for the household study in Part I. 
Four Ways to Organize a Household 
This thesis proposes that cultural theory can be successfully used to understand 
how social interaction in some migrant households is constructed. Cultural theory is 
                                                     
3  One should note that “cultural theory” is not a label chosen by Mary Douglas herself, but by 
Thompson, Ellis and Wildavsky, who in the book Cultural Theory collected and summarized the 
ideas and arguments of those using Mary Douglas's heuristic grid-group schema as a fairly 
complete but still disputable theory (1991). There is no value judgement made on my part of other 
cultural approaches, even if the name “cultural theory” might sound somewhat totalitarian. It 
reflects the lack of cultural approaches in American political science at that time. 
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a theory about forms of institutionalized social interaction.4 It claims that there is a 
connection between social relations, behavioral patterns, and cultural biases (mental 
constructs), and that only certain combinations of these work well together, while 
the rest do not. These well-working combinations, which can be used to create 
long-lasting institutions, are called solidarities or ways of organizing. Many 
institutionalists have worked with two cases (market and hierarchy), and some have 
added a third one (club, clan, collegium, enclave, or clique) that is based on a small 
group with a flat structure.  
The smallest units in society that can be considered to be institutions are 
households.5 According to cultural theory, we make greater gains by using a 
typology of four different ways of organizing: hierarchical, egalitarian, 
individualistic, and fatalistic. I will here exemplify these by presenting four ways to 
organize a household and four different views of politics and society. No single 
household is likely to rely on just one solidarity, however, and often, one is more 
prevalent than the others. I will give a few examples that will hopefully help 
promote an understanding regarding the kind of role this theory can have in 
describing migrant households.  
A household that organizes itself based mainly upon the hierarchical way of 
organizing is likely to divide the world into different spheres, with different rules: 
hence, you get a division of labor based on gender, generation, and so forth. In 
these households the members know who does what and when it should be done. 
Traditions are important and are often used to justify and define roles and rules. A 
good person is one who lives up to these roles and rules. In this household, one 
might hear the mother say to her children, “You should do it because your father 
says so!” 
A household that organizes itself based mainly upon the egalitarian way of 
organizing is likely to have a division of labor that emphasizes equality: everyone is 
supposed to perform every task, at least sometimes. Their ideal household is a 
collective, with a flat structure, and a low level of role differentiation. The egali-
tarian way of organizing rejects the division of the world into different spheres; 
instead, it emphasizes the unity of the world. The household makes its own rules: in 
some sense it is sovereign; rules and roles are not just adopted from the outside, 
they are carefully created within the household. A good person maintains a 
consistent role across different contexts. Justification is often rooted in a collective 
decision. In these families, one might hear one of the parents inviting the children 
to a discussion: “Let us all talk about this…”  
                                                     
4 The references are omitted from the presentation of the theory for the sake of clarity. This 
relatively new version of cultural theory is best presented by Michael Thompson (2008, 1996; 
1999). In Chapter 3 due respect is paid to the original authors (Douglas 1982b, 1986; Gross and 
Rayner 1985; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990; Thompson 1996; Dake, Thompson, and Neff 
1994). 
5  However, cultural theory can also be applied to individuals with small modifications. More about 
this can be found in Bird Spotting Individuals (on page 93) and in Chapter 7. 
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A household that relies on the individualistic way of organizing is more flexible and 
dynamic. The social structure is more like a network of individuals, than a 
collective. Division of labor is based on skill. Rather than being governed by fixed 
rules, it is controlled by bilateral agreements. They do not care much about what 
makes a “good person,” as moral pondering is left to others. What matters is that 
things get done. Authority has only a minimal role, and parents bargain with their 
children. In these kinds of households one might hear the mother saying to her 
children: “If you do it, I will give you…”  
In a household where the fatalistic way of organizing is dominant, the division of 
labor is random. Their conception of time is guided by the short-term: the focus is 
on coping from day to day. Long-term plans are commonly unrealistic dreams, 
because outside forces have considerable influence on the household, even on daily 
routine tasks. Thus, the safety net provided by the fatalistic solidarity is not reliable. 
In this kind of household, one might overhear the mother saying to her children: 
“Not again! Haven’t I told you thousand times…” 
The individualistic, egalitarian, and hierarchical ways of organizing each form a 
social structure through which resources are distributed, hence forming safety nets 
based on different rules: individualistic solidarity prefers balanced exchange (I help 
you, you help me); hierarchical solidarity thrives on resource transfers that 
emphasize social roles and status differences (helping the deserving poor); while the 
egalitarian solidarity emphasizes in-group solidarity and equality (helping fellow 
humans) In contrast, the combination of unaccountability and asymmetry of 
transactions that defines the fatalistic solidarity usually means that one cannot 
demand help from others.  
Cultural theory is not just a typology of ways of organizing, but a systems theory, 
which shows how these different ways of organizing relate to each other in a social 
system and how they are simultaneously in conflict and dependent on each other. 
Common to other systems theories, there is no simple causation, but rather a 
system in perpetual change, which moves from one state of balance to another state 
of balance. In this thesis the systems theoretical aspects are downplayed, as more 
emphasis is put on the typology of four ways of organizing as a useful 
simplification. 
Four Different Views of Society and Politics 
These four ways of organizing emphasize different aspects of social interaction: 
they each have their strengths and weaknesses, forms of rationality, forms of 
solidarity, and ideas of justice. The value of cultural theory for a political scientist 
lies in its ability to predict people’s norms and values, their understanding of 
society, and their behavioral patterns. If we know a household’s preferred way of 
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organizing, we should be able to tell quite a lot about its political views and 
behavior.6 
A hierarchical household is likely to think of the society as a body. We all have our 
own important role to play, and it is important that everyone plays his or her role 
properly. Politics is about ruling and it is best left to those few with special skills. 
Democracy is mainly about choosing leaders. The hierarchical household is likely to 
divide the world into distinct public and private spheres. In the public sphere, the 
wise politicians should have all the power, whereas the private sphere belongs to 
the family (and perhaps to moral authorities like the Church). The hierarchical 
household believes that human nature is weak, so strong institutions are needed to 
teach people their proper place and to ensure that they stay there. The ideal state is 
like a strict father bringing up his children. Blame is often placed on victims and 
deviant individuals. Justice is viewed as procedural justice, and therefore doing 
things by the book is important. Social support should be properly regulated by 
experts, so that the deserving poor get the help they need, while deviant individuals 
(criminals, drug addicts, or whomever they choose to blame) are sorted out. 
The egalitarian household is likely to think positively of other people, while the 
blame is placed on the institutions and markets that corrupt people. They blame the 
harsh markets and the inhumane bureaucratic institutions when people end up 
unemployed or in the welfare queue. The ideal state is like a nurturing mother 
caring for her children. Everyone is equal and it makes no sense that one person is 
more qualified to make decisions than any other person. Where hierarchy trusts 
institutions, egalitarians trust collective decision-making. They value participatory 
democracy highly, and enjoy a roundtable discussion. The good thing about 
elections is that each person has only one vote, but unfortunately, money also rules 
here and public opinion can be manipulated. The egalitarian household wants to be 
part of as many decisions as possible and does not think that teachers are better 
qualified than parents to teach children. They believe that sharing the limited 
resources amongst everyone is only fair, since resources are finite and justice is 
about end-equality.  
The individualistic household is likely to look at resources as unlimited, were there 
not all of these public rules and regulations limiting their availability. Therefore, the 
state should not be that concerned with taxation and income redistribution, but 
should let human ingenuity roam free, so that we can increase the size of the cake, 
rather than argue about how to divide it. Individualistic households look at people 
as strong and resourceful, while the state is simultaneously keeping the best people 
down, and pampering the others. Social welfare recipients are viewed as lazy: they 
just have not tried hard enough; human nature is primarily selfish, and lucrative 
welfare systems remove the incentive to work. Individualistic households prefer a 
night watchman state, which only provides people with fundamental security. The 
                                                     
6  A very similar claim has been made by Wildavsky, who refers to grid and group, “these two ‘inches 
of facts’ enable individuals to ‘generate miles of preferences’ (quoted from Grendstad 1999b:464). 
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society is not viewed as a collective, but rather as a market-place where individuals 
compete with each other—the best ones should win. 
Fatalistic households are left alone to cope with their lives. Where the three 
previously described ways of organizing are active—their adherents believe that 
their way of organizing is best and would like to convince everyone else of it, too—
fatalism is a passive way of organizing. The world is a random and dangerous place, 
in which the best thing one can do is keep one’s head down, in order to avoid the 
hardest blows. Their plans fail and, consequently, their experience tells them that 
planning is futile. Where the three active ways of organizing have a form of 
solidarity that can be trusted, the fatalist lacks trust in his or her peers.  
“It doesn’t matter who you vote for,” they tell themselves, to the 
never-ending dismay of those who belong to the three other 
solidarities, “the government always gets in”. (Molenaers and 
Thompson 1999:192) 
Fatalists are likely to be a part of the growing population of non-voters, and their 
lack of trust makes cooperation and collective action difficult. Even reciprocal 
agreements, which the individualists prefer, are difficult to form because the level 
of trust is low. 
These ideal-type positions on political issues are much more informative than just 
knowing from which country people are. Now it is time look more closely at the 
theory behind these positions, and at the four ways of organizing a household. 
Social Relations, Cultural Biases, and Behavioral Patterns 
Cultural theory takes its starting point in an often-found match between social 
relations, behavioral patterns, and cultural biases—that is, norms, beliefs, and 
perceptions (see Figure 2). To uphold a particular set of social relations, a particular 
behavioral pattern is required, which, again, is easier with a supporting cultural bias.  
Values and social relations are mutually interdependent and 
reinforcing: Institutions generate distinctive sets of preferences, and 
adherence to certain values legitimizes corresponding institutional 
arrangements. Asking which comes first or which should be given 
causal priority is a nonstarter. (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 
1990:21) 
For example, if you want to sustain a group with a flat structure, everyone needs to 
behave in a manner that prevents uneven distribution of privileges, which is much 
easier if there is a shared belief in equality.  
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Figure 2:  Three Connected Aspects of Social Organization 
 
This correspondence can be observed on several levels: in the society, in 
organizations, and on the individual level. The claim is that a social system will be in 
a stable state7 only if social relations, peoples’ behavior, and cultural biases support 
each other. In other words, change is normal; what needs an explanation is stability.  
Four Ways of Organizing—Ideal Types of Social Organization 
According to the theory, there are four stabilizable states: the hierarchical, egali-
tarian, individualistic, and fatalistic ways of organizing, where social relations, 
behavioral patterns, and cultural biases support each other.  
Mary Douglas describes two analytical dimensions that can be used to describe both 
social relations and cultural biases: grid and group. Grid is the degree of all 
encompassiveness and specificity of social rules and regulation. Grid is closely 
related to Durkheim’s notion of regulation (Thompson, Grendstad, and Selle 
1999:4). In high-grid situations, very specific rules and norms govern many aspects 
of life. In low-grid situations, these rules and norms are few and non-specific. Group 
refers to the degree that the individual’s life is absorbed in and sustained by group 
membership. In an extremely high-group situation, the group is the only source of 
identity and membership is relevant for all aspects of life. Thus a person would join 
others in “common residence, shared work, shared resources and recreation” 
(Douglas 1982c:202). 
                                                     
7  Stability is always relative to the subject of study. Cultural theory is probably at its best in 
explaining institutions, which indicates that we are talking about changes that happen over years or 
months. There are, however, examples of rapid changes, where institutional structures collapse or 
are “taken over” by a competing cultural bias in matters of weeks or days (Price and Thompson 
1997; Schwarz and Thompson 1990; Thompson 1996:60).  
Social Structure 
Cultural bias 
Values, norms, world-view,  
and perception 
Behavioral Pattern 
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By intersecting these two dimensions, grid and group, we get a four-fold 
classification of ideal-typical ways of organizing: hierarchal, egalitarian, individualistic, 
and fatalistic. One should note that these four ideal-typical and stabilizable states of 
ways of organizing are not created by the grid and group dimensions, which are just 
tools to identify them. 
Supported by Social Structures and Social Relations 
Each way of organizing is characterized (or supported) by a particular type of social 
structure: hierarchy, enclave, ego-focused network, or isolation. 
In the high-grid-high-group corner, in Figure 3, we find hierarchy. It is characterized 
by a strong sense of belonging to a group, a well-defined boundary, clearly defined 
roles stating everyone’s duties and privileges, a clear division of labor, and an 
uneven division of power (and access to resources). Social contact is controlled by 
the various roles, in other words, hierarchies are ascription-oriented. Hierarchies are 
divided into different spheres of influence.  
In the low-grid-high-group corner, we find the enclave. It is a social structure defined 
by a strong sense of belonging to a group and a well-defined group boundary, but it 
differs from hierarchy in that it lacks the internal differentiation of roles, all 
members being more or less equal in several aspects. Social contacts are not 
restricted by roles, and any one member is allowed contact with any other member 
of the group. Therefore, the patterns of social contact are very similar within the 
same enclave.  
Figure 3: Two Dimensions and Four Social Structures  
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In the low-grid-low-group corner of the diagram, we find the ego-focused network, 
which is a social structure characterized by a lack of group boundaries. Everyone 
has their own network, and these differ from each other (i.e., the patterns of social 
contact differ from person to person). Contrary to hierarchies, where social status is 
defined by one’s social position (role), in ego-focused networks the size and quality 
of the network defines social status. Contacts who give access to new networks are 
especially valuable. In contrast to hierarchies, these networks are achievement 
oriented.  
In the high-grid-low-group corner of the diagram, we find isolation, which is a social 
structure characterized by social control inflicted by outsiders, combined with a lack 
of support within the group. The three other forms of social organization all 
provide support and help to their members, whereas isolates are left “outside.” This 
can happen as a result of exclusion from one of the three other ways of life, or by 
one’s own choice. This lack of support makes them vulnerable to all kinds of 
restrictions and manipulation by others, and they often perceive themselves as not 
being in control of their own lives.  
Supported by Four Different Behavioral Patterns or Strategies 
Cultural theory, with its four ways of organizing, can also be formulated with the 
help of concepts focusing on patterns of transactions and behavioral strategies. In 
Figure 4 we see how we can intersect degrees of competition with degrees of 
symmetry of transactions to get four different behavioral patterns.8 Behavioral 
patterns are very similar to behavioral strategies. No single act is enough to create a 
pattern, therefore, people are on one level free to act as they want. Nevertheless, 
cultural theory claims that unless people’s patterns of behavior support their 
preferred way of life, they are actually undermining it, and hence creating change 
(whether on purpose or not).  
The hierarchical behavioral strategy is characterized by little competition and asymmetric 
transactions. For example, a hierarchical shopkeeper might be required to provide a 
job for his cousin, instead of picking the person with the best qualifications. In this 
way, the rules governing behavior limit competition and create a difference in rank 
between the shopkeeper and the newly employed cousin. The cousin is perhaps not 
the best qualified, but he will be loyal to the honorable shopkeeper. In a hierarchy, 
the pay is dependent on the cousin’s situation in life: a married man with 
responsibilities obviously deserves more than a careless youngster. Transactions are 
used to define people as different, not similar; therefore, there is a distinctive 
division of labor. Hierarchies are good at getting things done by the book, and in 
large scale organizing. 
                                                     
8  Michael Thompson has, in his later work, replaced competition by degrees of accountability as the 
second dimension, and the four ways of life or organizing are presented as four solidarities. This 
new way of presenting the theory is more efficient. I do, however, find the division into social 
relations, behavior and cultural bias useful for my purposes. 
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Figure 4: Types of Behavioral Patterns 
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Similarly, the egalitarian behavioral strategy is also a strategy for collective organization, 
but instead of rules governing who is doing what and when, egalitarians trust in 
collective decision-making. In addition, the egalitarian behavioral strategy is 
characterized by limited competition, but here the transactions are symmetrical, as 
behavioral patterns help to define people as similar, not different. The egalitarian 
shopkeeper is not running the shop on his own, the whole family takes part, and 
they make decisions as a collective (Read more about how the Herreras run their 
business on page 190). Everybody does a bit of every task to emphasize his or her 
equality and lack of rank.9 Another example would be the egalitarian work crew at 
the dock, moving cargo in and out of the ships: the group shares work and pay, and 
they organize the work themselves. Each member of the crew is dependent on his 
fellow worker for safety and future employment (Mars 1994). The egalitarian way 
of organizing is in many cases less effective than the hierarchical and the 
individualistic, because of the commonly high use of time spent in collective 
decision-making. However, it has an advantage in rapidly changing environments, 
where collective action is needed, but where doing things the same old way does 
not work anymore.  
The individualistic behavioral strategy relies on competition and symmetrical 
transactions. As there are few rules to govern behavior, the individualistic 
shopkeeper does not need to consider the family’s opinion, but can pick and 
choose freely among the applicants. The relationship between the worker and the 
shopkeeper is a reciprocal relation: work is traded for money. Honor, loyalty, and 
tradition are of less importance here. If somebody offers the worker a better 
                                                     
9  There are of course also power differences within an egalitarian organization, but they are likely to 
be hidden from the view of outsiders. 
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position, or if the shopkeeper finds a better worker, new negotiations are likely to 
take place. Gerald Mars presents many salesmen working in individualistic jobs, 
where they are free to organize their work as they want, and where co-workers are 
actually competitors, as only the one who makes the sale gets rewarded. The 
individualistic behavioral strategy is effective in getting things done, even if the 
other ways of organizing are often appalled by the consequences (for example, by 
the unintended social and environmental costs). 
The fatalistic behavioral strategy is to keep one’s head down, as unfettered competition 
and asymmetrical transactions leave the fatalistic worker vulnerable. There is no 
shopkeeper cousin providing a secure job, nor a collective that shares the burdens. 
Gerald Mars has described some jobs that are governed by fatalism, like the 
supermarket cashier, who does not have any freedom in his or her work (1994). 
There are many different mechanisms of control to ensure that the work is done 
correctly: customers treated politely, no money is missing or any merchandise 
taken. There are no possibilities for socializing or trying to organize the work 
differently—you either do it the way management has decided or not at all.  
Four Different Cultural Biases 
Cultural biases are the values, norms, worldviews, and other mental constructs that 
give people guidance in their lives. Cultural theory characterizes four different 
cultural biases that are supportive of the previously mentioned four ways of 
organizing. These four cultural biases can be seen in Figure 5.  
The hierarchical cultural bias is characterized by orderly, well-defined concepts and 
traditional social roles, which justify the elaborate division of labor. Nature is seen 
as a place that can be understood, if properly studied, thus making it possible for 
experts to understand and predict risk. The year is divided into seasons, months 
and days, every season marked by specific festivities and rules. People are seen as 
weak, and strong institutions are seen as necessary in their ability to provide 
guidance for people and order in society. Institutions are trusted more than people. 
Honor, tradition, and sacrifice for the greater good are hierarchical values. 
The egalitarian cultural bias is characterized by its rejection of the hierarchical 
differentiation. Egalitarian cultural bias sees all people as one, and traditions and 
rules that create walls between people (or lift some people higher up) are seen as 
unjust and ready for demolition. Humans are good by nature, and corrupted by 
hierarchical institutions or exploited by markets. People are trusted more than 
institutions; however, those who associate themselves with the wrong kind of 
institutions, are not to be trusted. Therefore, in some egalitarian groups there is 
suspicion and distrust of outsiders, and strong trust of insiders. Nature is seen as 
fragile, and expert knowledge is usually connected to institutions that cannot be 
trusted, therefore environmental risks are seen as high. Small changes can produce 
large and potentially catastrophic changes in the natural balance. Equality, 
empowerment, playing it safe, and collective unity are typical egalitarian values. 
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Figure 5: Four Cultural Biases—A Typology 
The individualistic cultural bias is characterized by rejection of both the hierarchical 
emphasis on tradition and order and the egalitarian emphasis on community. 
Community is seen as a false promise of safety: in the end, it is every man for 
himself. Fair exchange10 is the true basis for cooperation—everyone should 
contribute and receive in equal amounts. Individualists are the prototypical 
entrepreneurs. They not only see new business opportunities but, for several 
reasons, also have the courage to act upon them. Firstly, because there are fewer 
rules governing behavior than typically exist in a hierarchy, and since there is no 
need to ensure that everyone behaves in the same way, as there is in egalitarianism, 
individualists see more opportunities around them. Secondly, nature is seen as 
robust and predictable. Third, risks are perceived as low, regardless of whether they 
are social, environmental, or economic. Fourthly, there is really no need to wait for 
the hierarchical experts to tell a person what to do—people know themselves best. 
Individualists are likely to trust anyone, until they prove themselves to be 
untrustworthy. Moreover, as most transactions are completed in a short time the 
required level of trust needed for cooperation is lower than in egalitarianism and 
hierarchy. A common belief is that everybody who tries hard enough will succeed. 
Similarly, present results are the true measure of a person’s value—“you are only as 
good as your last one.” High rewards for taking chances and succeeding, accepting 
failure, and importance of balanced exchange are typical individualistic values. 
The fatalistic cultural bias is characterized by some randomness and belief in sheer 
luck. Where the hierarchical, egalitarian, and individualistic cultural biases are easy 
to describe, the fatalistic cultural bias is more elusive. Because external events have 
a big influence on people’s lives, there is not much belief in planning for the future. 
                                                     
10  I previously called this for reciprocity, which was not precise enough. In the context of household 
interviews the typical balanced exchange resembles what Sahlins calls balanced reciprocity, between 
generalized and negative reciprocity (Sahlins 1972), but individualistic bias does not limit it self to 
balanced reciprocity. In extremely competitive individualistic contexts, negative reciprocity is likely 
to be the ideal. All these forms of reciprocity are covered by what Polanyi calles exchange (Polanyi 
1957) 
 Fatalistic  
Individualistic 
 Hierarchical 
 Egalitarian 
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Random traits from the other ways of life are used as a way to dress up. A fatalistic 
household might borrow from the hierarchical bias by arguing for the importance 
of upholding traditional Christmas dinner and then present a long list of excuses 
for why they have served something else the last years. There is only a low 
correlation between trying hard and succeeding—some people are just luckier than 
others. As life is seen as a lottery, the most likely way to riches is through some 
form of lottery.  
Keeping track of Different Dimensions  
It is easy to lose track of the different dimensions and aspects involved. If we are 
studying social relations, we operate with grid and group and denote the items in 
the typology as hierarchy, ego-focused networks, enclaves, and isolation. If we are 
studying behavior, we borrow the dimensions from transaction theory: degree of 
competition and symmetry of transactions. If we are interested of mental 
constructs, we usually talk more about the four cultural biases—hierarchical, 
individualistic, egalitarian, and fatalistic biases—and less about the dimensions. This 
division is partly a result from different approaches to the data.  If one’s interest is 
in institutions, social relations tend to be emphasized. If one’s interest is in 
discourses and the logic of arguments, cultural biases tend to be emphasized. 
Similarly, survey data is relies on the measurement of cultural biases, rather than 
social relations.  
There are also alternative ways to present the theory, where the dimensions forming 
the four ways of organizing are not from purely analytical dimensions like grid and 
group. I share Michael Thompson’s view of the different ways of organizing as the 
theoretical starting point for claiming that grid-and-group are not necessary 
components of the theory (Thompson 2008:137).11 Earlier he has presented the 
degrees of accountability and degrees of symmetry of the transactions as an 
alternative to the grid-and-group dimensions (Thompson 1996).  
Because the most important claim in the theory concerns how behavioral strategies, 
social relations, and cultural biases go together, the strongest applications of the 
theory are the ones that manage to collect data from all three aspects. A relatively 
stable combination of matching behavioral strategy, social relations, and cultural 
bias is called a way of organizing, type of social organization, form of solidarity, or just 
culture by people who work with cultural theory. Even if it can be useful to 
conceptualize the ways of organizing as cultures, in the field of migration research it 
would create unnecessary misunderstandings. I prefer to use “way of organizing,” 
because the term “culture” is used as component of “ethnic culture,” “sub-culture,” 
and many other terms.  
                                                     
11 See page 289 for alternatives to grid and group.  
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In Figure 6, below, we can see a summary of the four ways of organizing. Each 
small circle or triangle is a person, while the arrows depict social relations. The 
hierarchical way of organizing consists of several spheres of life, each supplying the 
people with different roles and social relations. We have the egalitarian way of 
organizing, which consists of an enclave with a boundary separating it from the 
others, and symmetrical social relations that do not give a power privilege to 
anyone. We have the individualistic way of organizing, consisting of ego-focused 
networks, where everyone has their own private social network, which then 
together creates a social web. Last, we have the isolate way of organizing, consisting 
of people with social relations that do not carry well-defined obligations of support 
and help.  
Figure 6: Four Ways of Organizing 
On the macro-level these four ways of organizing are in conflict with each other, by 
default, because they define themselves in opposition to the others and they 
distribute blame to the others. On the other hand, each one of them has 
weaknesses, which makes them vulnerable and dependent on the other ways of 
organizing (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:4). This creates a pattern of 
change in search of a balance, and a tug of war between the four ways of 
organizing.  
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Now, one should not take these four ways of organizing to be anything more than a 
typology that can be more or less useful. The usefulness in this case is connected to 
a way of describing households and their relations with the rest of society that is 
independent of ethnicity and country of origin, and in their ability to explain 
political views. 
So What? 
So, what is the point—why do we need another perspective or another typology for 
this study? So far, the empirical field of migration studies has been dominated by 
perspectives connected to flows of people (inflows, outflows, push and pull 
factors), or ethnicity, culture, race, and identity, all of which emphasize the 
difference between “them” and “us.”  
As Portes points out:  
Theoretical breakthroughs do not arise out of additional data, but 
out of the ability to reconstitute a perceptual field identifying 
connections previously not seen. (Portes 1997:803)  
Cultural theory is important as a new perspective, which enables one to see the 
world in a new light, less clouded by ethnicity, race, and religion. It is a new way to 
look at the people living here, allowing them the possibility to change who they are. 
Nevertheless, pure novelty is not enough. 
A strategic problem in building scientific explanation is to decide on 
the most important dimensions of analysis.  Progress is made when 
we discover that certain dimensions are more productive than 
others. (Kemper and Collins 1990:32)  
One of the most important characteristics of social life is its inherent richness and 
variability, a fact that calls for “thick description,” as societies are rich in detail and 
information. Part I of this thesis is an exploratory attempt to avoid this thick 
description when dealing with migrants, even if they have a cultural background 
unfamiliar to us. Non-familiarity does not imply difference. My main empirical 
finding is that, with the tools provided by cultural theory, migrant households do 
not look that different from majority households. Being minorities these 
households are of course under different structural conditions, and sometimes 
subjected to direct, unintended, systemic, or structural discrimination.12  
I believe that cultural theory can be useful for the study of migrants, even if, as 
Caulkins contends  
                                                     
12  Discrimination is not the topic of this thesis. Good discussions and definitions can be found 
elsewhere (Olli and Kofod Olsen 2006; Blank, Dabady, and Citro 2004; Craig 2005).  
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… much remains to be done before grid/group theory can become 
a convincing tool for cross-cultural research. (Caulkins 1999:125) 
The biggest challenge for cultural theory, in my opinion, is operationalization, that 
is, how to measure cultural theory in surveys (see Part II), and how to measure the 
ways of organizing in different contexts.13 In Part I will operationalize cultural 
theory for the use in households. Tamils, Chileans, and Vietnamese come from 
different societies, from different social conditions, for different reasons, and with 
varied personal backgrounds (education, language skills, work experience, religious 
beliefs and affiliations). If I can use the operationalization on so diverse 
households, it probably can be used on households with other backgrounds, too. 
The theoretical starting point for cultural theory is not atomistic individuals, but 
rather social relationships between individuals—an approach that is also shared by 
many sociologists (see Kemper and Collins 1990:33).  
It is not exaggeration to say that the main task in theorizing, 
analyzing, or explaining is what to leave out.  The power of a theory 
is determined by how much is accounted for by how little. 
(Wildavsky 1989b:61) 
The great potential in cultural theory lies in its ability to overlook some aspects of 
life, while allowing us to focus on others that might be more familiar to us. Thus 
we might be able to bridge the gap between “us” and the “other.” Or, to be more 
precise, it is a tool for jumping over the gap. It does not provide any clear-cut 
answers, but can be used to grasp the lifestyle and behavior of the “others.” 
Moreover, if we are able to overlook the aspects of race, funny accents, and limited 
Norwegian skills perhaps we are able to meet the “others” more as people, rather 
than representatives of an ethnic group.  
What Has and What Could Cultural Theory Be Used to Explain? 
“So what—another typology” is a common and justified response. A theory gains 
its worth from its ability to explain phenomena. As Douglas writes, the grid and 
group dimensions are very general:  
All the arguments taking place in families, churches and sports clubs 
are about whether the institution shall draw its group boundary 
closer, or relax it, apply its rules more strictly, create more rules, or 
relax them all. (Douglas 1982a:5) 
                                                     
13  Caulkins’s study was based on a survey. Creating a cross-cultural survey with high validity, 
regardless of the topic, is a very difficult task, because of the necessity of standardization of 
questions. I have chosen, in the household study in Part I, to use face-to-face interviews in order to 
adapt my questions during the interviews. Nevertheless, in Part II of the thesis, I will examine a 
operationalization from a Nordic, five country survey, which is a cross-cultural, multi-lingual 
survey, even if the cultural differences between the Nordic countries are small in the global scale.  
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Because cultural theory is quite abstract, and because it defines the relations 
between the concepts rather than the content of the concepts, it can be adapted to 
quite various topics. For me it seems a great advantage that the theory takes 
account of both macro- and micro-phenomena. Douglas has used it to analyze 
religious practices and beliefs, as well as the inner life of organizations, and on 
topics like consumption styles (1996a, 1986, 1996c). By deconstructing the battle 
between environmentalists, governments, and corporations, Schwartz and 
Thompson show how the competing worldviews, arguments, and modes of action 
are logically connected to the type of organization (Schwarz and Thompson 1990). 
The theory has proven itself useful for topics ranging from risk perception to 
various political and environmental issues14 and on many fundamental aspects of 
human life, some of which are not normally considered social constructions.15 
Even if the theory is primarily about social institutions and organizing, it has been 
used on individuals, for one of the elements in the theory, behavioral strategies, can 
be studied through what people actually do. I will give here three examples of 
studies that are concerned with the way people behave. First, poor people are often 
lumped together into one category. Wildavsky and Thompson show how the poor 
make use of different behavioral strategies, thus creating a need for variation in 
policies designed to help them (Thompson and Wildavsky 1986a). Second, we often 
think of cheating as something that is not predictable, but Gerald Mars shows us 
how the strategies people use to cheat in their jobs are closely related to the way the 
job is structured (Mars 1994). Third, Dake and Thompson have studied British 
households and show how common household tasks, social relations, and resource 
management follows a pattern characterized by cultural theory (Dake and 
Thompson 1999, 1993).  
What Could Cultural Theory Be Used for in the Study of Migration?   
The old racism which focused on biological race has been replaced by a new form 
of racism, or cultural racism, which emphasizes the incompatibility of some cultural 
forms or religions.16 I show how the cultural traits of migrant households are 
neither connected to the country they are coming from, nor are they that different 
                                                     
14  There are many available examples of these (Dake and Wildavsky 1991; Douglas 1982c; Ellis 1993; 
Grendstad 1995b, 1995a; Grendstad and Selle 1996; Grendstad 2008; Ney and Thompson 1999; 
Ney 2009; Olli 1999; Rayner and Malone 1998; Schwarz and Thompson 1990; Thompson 1996, 
1997a; Thompson, Grendstad, and Selle 1999; Thompson, Verweij, and Ellis 2006; Thompson 
2008; Wildavsky 1989a, 1987, 1985; Wildavsky and Dake 1990; Kahan, Braman, et al. 2010; 
Verweij and Thompson 2006; 6 and Mars 2008; 6 2011) 
15  Examples of these are taboos (Douglas 2002b); form and structure of religious belief (Douglas 
1996a); human needs and wants (Douglas 1998a, 1996c); what is acceptable risk (Douglas 1985, 
1992); perception (Douglas 1982c); eating and drinking habits (Douglas and Gross 1981); fairness 
(Wildavsky 1989b); what is a legitimate argument (Frølich 1996); esthetics (Douglas 1996b); and 
view of nature (Schwarz and Thompson 1990). 
16 New racism is discussed in by many researchers (Hernes and Knudsen 1990; Schierup 1992; Brox 
1997b; Back and Solomos 2000; Christensen 2001; Romm 2010). 
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from the ways of life we know from the households of the majority. This can 
provide a theoretical and practical platform to combat cultural racism.  
The four ways of organizing could be used as the core of an introductory course in 
cross-cultural understanding and communication, because they emphasize the 
commonalities between cultures, while the more common approaches to culture 
emphasize the differences that make each culture special: language, religion, 
traditions, et cetera (Kim and Ofori-Dankwa 1995). Focusing on differences is not 
necessarily the best starting point for improving the quality of social interaction and 
policymaking. It is difficult to create social interaction if one does not understand 
which common principles are available for use. Possessing information only about 
differences can lead to paralysis, as one loses sight of the common points of 
departure. 
If there are an infinite and unrelated number of cultures, hence, of 
cultural premises, no intelligible answer to the question of 
preference formation can be given except “it depends.” History is 
uniqueness. However, if the types of viable cultures are limited in 
number and interconnected, formed and reformed along the same 
dimensions, a comprehensible answer can be given: people 
continuously construct and reconstruct their culture through 
decision making. The values people prefer and their beliefs about 
the world are woven together in their institutions. By conceiving 
cultures as theories about conceptions of the good life (desired 
values) and the way the world works (beliefs about facts), [that] are 
related to patterns of social relations, we can begin to connect 
cultures to preferences. (Wildavsky 1989b:60)17 
One of the theory’s main advantages is its high degree of abstraction. It helps us to gaze 
behind the level of cultural symbols and thereby shift the focus from the content of 
symbols to the structure and working of social systems. Therefore, all households 
can be compared regardless of language, religion, size, goals, and so forth, if the 
right information is available. 
One of cultural theory’s strongest points is that it assumes that people are rational, 
that a person’s behavior ultimately makes sense to that individual in one way or 
other. In addition, cultural theory insists that there are multiple rationalities. Each 
of the four ways of organizing has its own rationality, its own way of reasoning and 
perceiving the world. This is an improvement compared to the single-minded 
approach of rational choice, which corresponds closely to the logic of individualism 
in cultural theory. In addition, the way cultural theory limits the rationalities to only 
the four ways of life makes the variation large enough to be useful (see the 
empirical material starting on page 145), while it saves us from problems connected 
with the singular not-in-my-tribe kind of arguments.  
                                                     
17 The quote above is checked, and the original contains an error. I have added [that].  
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As a community organizer once stated, cross-cultural meetings create anxiety and 
uncertainty in people.  
Both we, and the new residents with different backgrounds are 
afraid when we are going to meet new people. It is a social situation 
with high uncertainty. We are scared to death to say something 
wrong. But we must be honest, I believe. It is difficult to come 
alone to a group for everyone. It is not easy to organize in a 
multicultural context because people with different backgrounds 
have different views of organizing. (Loga 2011:105) 
There seems to be some difficulties with organizing across ethnic boundaries.18 
There is a whole range of possible misunderstandings connected to community 
organizing (Loga 2011:110-114). This is unfortunate, as sometimes experiences of 
misunderstanding lead to less trust and less willingness to participate in the local 
community. I suggest that the four ways of organizing, as stereotypes of organizing, 
can be helpful for communicating in a ethnically diverse context on how a 
particular task or project is organized.  
Cultural theory can be used to build trust in local communities by demonstrating how 
the lifestyles of the ‘other’ are not that different from the lifestyles found among 
‘us’. There is a large body of American literature pointing out how increasing ethnic 
diversity leads to a reduction of generalized trust (Putnam 2007), while the 
European literature largely rejects this.19 Many different explanations have been 
proposed for what is the true cause of the reduction in trust. However, the general 
impression is that contact with people different from us is avoided as long as 
possible, and it is in the presence of some mechanisms that create pressure toward 
social contact when we first start to learn from each other (Frølund Thomsen 2012; 
Wood and Landry 2008). I suggest that the four ways of organizing are a source for 
trust that can be utilized to build predictable interaction across what are commonly 
seen as cultural or ethnic boundaries. What Putnam calls ‘hunkering down’ in these 
ethnically diverse communities, looks to me very much like increasing fatalism.20 
Cultural theory allows us to reformulate common conflicts. Let us say that two 
families with different cultural backgrounds become neighbors and eventually find 
themselves in a conflict. Instead of framing it just as a cultural conflict (which 
suggests that the solution is either the assimilation of the minority family into the 
mainstream culture or that the Norwegian family becomes more tolerant), with the 
help of cultural theory we can portray the actors in a different manner. If they 
adhere to two different ways of organizing, “negotiations” between them will be 
difficult, regardless of their ethnic background. Cultural theory can predict what 
                                                     
18 Many authors mention such problems (Hagelund and Loga 2009; Loga 2011; Ødegård 2010, 2011; 
Segaard 2011; Wollebaek and Segaard 2011; Selle, Semb, and Strømsnes 2011).  
19 Putnam’s claim has been tested in Europe by many (Torpe 2003; Gesthuizen, Van Der Meer, and 
Scheepers 2009; Rothstein 2011; Lolle and Torpe 2011; Ivarsflåten and Strømsnes 2011). 
20 "Diversity seems to trigger not in-group/out-group division, but anomie or social isolation.” 
(Putnam 2007:149) 
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traits these families find problematic in each other and what they can find in 
common, given that we know what kind of way of organizing they prefer.  
Cultural theory’s typology is quite extraordinary, for it allows us to study how 
migrants relate to the majority society with regard to cultural issues, behavior, and 
social relations. In addition, it claims that all of these are related to each other. So it 
becomes possible to understand why differences in belief systems lead to 
differences in behavior, or why the lack of social contact inhibits migrants’ 
integration into the majority society, or why certain aspects of the majority society’s 
culture just do not fit into a household’s way of organizing. In addition, cultural 
theory offers suggestions as to which sections of the majority society a migrant 
household will find familiar and easier to relate to, thus offering some guidance 
toward improving integration. 
The Content of the Thesis 
The main goal of this thesis is to develop our understanding of the individual-
culture relationship. This book is divided into three parts: the migrant household 
study, the operationalization for survey use, and the discussions. 
Part I: A Qualitative Study of Migrant Households  
Part I is a study of migrant households in Norway. It starts with Chapter 2, where I 
contextualize my research in relation to the field of migration studies. I take up 
several discussions concerning the conceptualization of migrants, including the 
difference between them and us, the essentialism in nationality-based stereotypes, 
and how the majority population uses social stereotypes. In Chapter 3, I 
operationalize cultural theory for a qualitative study of households’ internal 
organizations, and make theoretically-based predictions about their political views. 
Chapter 4 is the methods chapter for the household study. It starts out with a 
summary of research design and then moves on to discuss the household samples 
by looking at how they were sampled and gained access to, how the interviews were 
conducted, and how the analysis was prepared and reflected upon. The chapter 
ends with a discussion on validity and reliability. 
Chapter 5 is a presentation of eight households, where I show how cultural theory 
allows us to describe and categorize how a household is organized internally and how they give and 
receive help through their social relations. I analyze their ways of organizing: their history, 
their division of labor, their manner of making decisions and making ends meet, 
their social relations, and their ways of receiving and giving help. I compare the way 
of organizing in each household with their own stories about the institutions of the 
welfare state, politics, and society in general. In addition to introducing empirical 
evidence to the theory, the intention of this chapter is to create images of 
households that the reader can relate to, regardless of his or her national 
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background. When described in this manner, these households seem rather familiar, 
as most of us have experiences with several ways of organizing. 
Part I of the thesis ends in Chapter 6, where I present three different analyses that 
all confirm the strong relationship between a household’s way of organizing and its 
statements concerning politics and society. In every one of the eight households, 
one way of life dominated. I show that knowing how a household is organized 
helps us to predict and understand how that household relates to the state in terms 
of norms, values, understandings, and behaviors, regardless of the household’s 
ethnic origin. To a large degree, each household expressed political views that are consistent with 
the way their household is organized. Country of origin does not seem to be closely 
related to either a household’s way of organizing or its views of politics and society.  
When interviewed as households, the political views of the migrants were quite 
coherent. I suggest that when the questions are presented in a real-life context, 
these views are more coherent than some survey research suggests. In addition, I 
suggest that the coherency in a person’s opinions follows the four ways of 
organizing rather than following a political ideology. Organizing a household can 
provide its members with social skills, social relations, and social experiences that 
influence their relations with the rest of the society. Moreover, the way a household 
is organized can shape its members’ understanding of concepts like human nature, 
democracy, trust, institutions, resources, roles of the state, justice, blame, and social 
support. However, I cannot establish the causal direction with this data. 
Part II: Operationalizing Cultural Bias in the Surveys 
Based on survey data using Dake’s cultural bias items, Part II is an 
operationalization of cultural theory. In Chapter 7, I discuss the unfinished business 
that cultural theory has at the micro-level. First, we lack good measurements of 
concepts that are central to cultural theory. Second, cultural bias is measured 
without a model of the individual-culture relationship. Third, there is some 
confusion about the appropriate level of analysis, which sometimes leads to 
jumping between levels of analysis. Fourth, the meaning carried by cultural biases is 
assumed to behave like a number in statistical analyses.  
In Chapter 8, I construct scales for measuring cultural biases from data found in a 
1999 survey of the general population in each of the five Nordic counties. In this 
chapter, I will discuss reliability, construct validity, and the acquiescence problem as 
they relate to the Nordic-level survey. In the end, I give some suggestions for 
improvement.  
In Chapter 9, and based upon the choices made in the Chapter 8, I construct a scale 
for measuring cultural biases from the 1995 Norwegian Environmental Protection 
Survey, which contains a large sample of members of environmental organizations 
and a general population sample. Unfortunately, reliable scales could not be made 
from this survey because it failed to contain enough items for measuring cultural 
biases. Therefore, based on the suggestions given in the previous chapter, I make 
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new scales by adding items not originally intended for the cultural bias scales. The 
new scales include items on growth, trust, and the environment, and thus cover 
more domains than the original scales. Despite of this, they have acceptable levels 
of reliability. In addition, they are less influenced by acquiescence.  
Chapter 10 presents the use of individual-level cultural combinations as a possible 
solution to the micro-level problems. Since using cultural bias combinations is still a 
new approach, I conduct an empirical exploration to find the set of choices that 
works best. I use a broad approach in this chapter. Instead of choosing one set of 
assumptions and moving into depth in light of these assumptions, I remain open 
and examine multiple assumptions. I make hundreds of versions of the same cross 
table, one for each possible set of choices, and thus empirically explore the various 
predictive abilities of the different assumptions. I discuss the different assumptions 
and demonstrate that the combinations using rejection perform better than those 
that only deal with support; that knowledge of indifference does not increase the 
power of the explanation if we already have knowledge of rejection and support; 
and that sometimes two biases is enough for a good explanation, while sometimes 
all four biases are needed. 
Based on the findings in Chapter 10, I suggest using two different 
operationalizations of cultural bias combinations: cultural space, which uses all four 
biases, and the two top-ranked biases, which uses those two cultural biases where the 
respondent deviates most from the country average. 
Chapter 11 is about applying the two suggested cultural bias combinations as an 
explanation for party preferences. First, I discuss the Nordic party family 
preferences by focusing on a series of figures of cultural space that use all four 
biases simultaneously. This opens up for some new questions and insights 
concerning party families. Second, I use the two top-ranked biases to predict party 
family preferences at the Nordic level. This gives new insights into how cultural 
biases are used for generating political preferences. The cultural space differentiates 
between 81 cultural combinations, which makes it rather impractical to use because 
several thousand respondents would be needed for establishing reliable results. 
Therefore, the two top-ranked biases approach seems to be a better choice, as it 
can be used in surveys with only one-thousand respondents.  
Cultural biases give meaning to the world around us. Overall, both of these cultural 
bias combination variables make sense of people’s party family preferences. This 
strengthens my belief in the operationalization of cultural biases as cultural 
combinations rather than as four additive and continuous scales. By the end of 
Chapter 11, the preparations for the analysis are completed, and we have a tool that 
can be used for further analyses. 
Part III - Discussions 
Part III turns the gaze back toward cultural theory and uses the empirical material 
from the household study and the surveys to discuss theoretical matters. In Chapter 
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12, I empirically test three assumptions that are commonly used in analyses based 
on survey data about cultural biases. Since there is always a random element in 
sample surveys, I perform these tests in seven separate samples from five different 
countries as a way to increase our trust in the findings. Cultural theory was once 
expected to give great explanations of people’s political preferences. However, 20 
years of survey research has not yielded the expected results. I suggest that the 
reason for this has been the reliance on analytical techniques that rely on three 
fallacies.  
First, the dominant bias assumption does not receive empirical support and should be 
considered a fallacy. People do not have one bias that dominates over the other 
biases. Therefore, we should avoid calling and thinking about people as hierarchical, 
egalitarian, individualistic, and fatalistic. 
Second, the additivity of effects assumption does not receive empirical support and 
should be considered a fallacy. Even if people have and use several biases, we 
cannot simply add together the effects of two biases. Cultural biases do not behave 
like numbers. The process of adding together two meanings can create a third 
meaning, which is different from the simple sum of the first two meanings.  
Third, the independence of effects assumption does not receive empirical support and 
should be considered a fallacy. The effect of a bias depends on the other biases. 
Therefore, we should avoid analyzing the effects of a bias one at the time. Given 
these fallacies, I suggest that the best way to use cultural biases at the individual 
level is through the use of combinations of cultural biases, which I have explored in 
Part II.  
I Chapter 13, I discuss what rejection is when found in institutions and in people. 
Rejection is easily found in the household interviews. Households use it in their 
stories to make sure that I understand what kind of household they are. Rejection is 
used as a way to emphasize the dominant way of organizing within the household. 
In addition, there is rejection based on previous negative experiences. In 
households, rejection is clearly less important than support for cultural biases, as 
rejection does not seem to serve as a basis for organizing. 
Based on the surveys alone, I have information only about cultural biases. In both 
the Nordic sample and in the NEPS95, people commonly reject one or several 
cultural biases. Interestingly, the environmentalists reject a larger number of biases 
when compared to the rest of the population.  
Rejection allows individuals to relate to institutions. I suggest that the inclusion of 
rejection in cultural combinations can be a good way to deal with four cultural 
biases at the individual level. In addition, the measurement of cultural biases should 
allow for rejection. 
Cultural theory, in its present form, is mostly about institutions, and it has great 
potential for including individuals when the theory incorporates at the institutional 
and the individual levels the idea of rejecting cultural biases. I hope that by creating 
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a theoretical opening toward individuals, we can utilize the present developments in 
cognitive and social psychology without giving away the importance of institutions. 
Finally, in Chapter 14, I summarize selected findings and make some final remarks 
about the individual-culture relationship, the meaning of rejection, and the use of 
stereotypes from cultural theory in the field of migration. I close the thesis by 
giving some directions for future research.  
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PART I: A QUALITATIVE STUDY OF 
MIGRANT HOUSEHOLDS  
Part I is a study of migrant households, which serves four purposes. First, it is a 
proposal for an alternative way of classifying migrant households by using cultural 
theory. Cultural theory can help to break down stereotypes based on nationality or 
ethnicity, and provide us with an alternative classification as a basis for building 
social interaction with strangers.  
Second, cultural theory makes claims about a required compatibility between social 
relations and cultural biases. In this study, the households’ internal organization and 
their social relations are compared with the households’ views of politics and 
society. The connection is strong and confirms the predictions made by cultural 
theory. This suggests that political scientists should remember to look at the 
household and family as sources of values and opinions.  
Third, this is a study of one particular type of institution, namely households. All 
households included in this study are actually small family units consisting of a 
mother, a father, and their children. Since cultural theory is about institutions, it 
should work well on households. This institutional angle will work as an empirical 
corrective to the survey research in Parts II and III. Although surveys deal with 
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only a small slice of reality, it is still easy to be carried away with the results from 
statistical analyses. 
Fourth, this study broadens the scope for using cultural theory as a way to 
empirically study households. The most recent and relevant household study was 
done in Great Britain by Dake, Thompson, and Neff (1994). My study shows that 
their approach can be transferred to the Norwegian context and to migrant 
households from different continents, thus suggesting that their approach can be 
applied in many different settings.  
In Chapter 2, entitled Making Sense of Migrants, I give an overview of how migrants 
are conceptualized by the majority and in the media during public debates. These 
conceptualizations point to a tendency towards essentialism when we use ethnicity 
on the level of nation-states to label migrants. However unfortunate, social 
stereotyping is necessary, and the four ways of organizing can provide us with an 
alternative stereotype. 
Entitled Operationalizing Cultural Theory, Chapter 3 transforms cultural theory from 
an abstract theory to a particular context so that it can be used on households in 
Norway. Similarly, I present a number of predictions about the connection between 
political views and the different ways of organizing. I then move on to Chapter 4, 
entitled Doing Research on Migrant households, where I present the qualitative research 
methods that have guided my research on the migrant households.  
In Chapter 5, which is appropriately called Eight Households, I present and discuss 
eight households in detail. Each household is given 10 to 18 pages of space for 
discussion. I present a selection of their own stories about the internal organization 
of their households, stories about their social relations, and accounts of their views 
of politics and society. Each story is given an interpretation. In the end of each 
household interview, I provide a summary where I count the number of internal 
traits and compare these traits with the predictions made concerning their political 
views.  
Finally, Chapter 6, entitled Findings from the Household Study, wraps up Part I by 
analyzing and summarizing the findings from the household interviews. First, I go 
through what we learned about life and social relations within each household. 
Second, I compare these with the predictions made about political views. Third, I 
discuss how these findings can be used to improve how we deal with migrants. 
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C h a p t e r  2   
MAKING SENSE OF MIGRANTS 
The Need to Understand 
One of the most central needs for human beings is to make sense of the world and 
people around us.21 However, society is in flux, and the world around us changes 
rapidly. Migrants bring these global changes right into our own neighborhoods.22 
Civil wars and other atrocities in countries far away have consequences here in our 
community, as there are people, thousands of them, who have moved here over the 
years and made Norway their new home.  
We cannot pretend that the people living in Norway are ethnically homogeneous. 
We no longer live in isolated nation-states, if we ever did.23 This thesis contributes 
to an understanding of “them”—those people we assume are different from us—
by offering an alternative perspective, and by presenting some concepts for a 
rudimentary understanding and communication between individuals with different 
cultural backgrounds.  
Cultural theory centers on the different ways social interaction can be organized 
and institutionalized. This thesis proposes that cultural theory can be used to 
unravel some of these inter-cultural knots and function as a toolkit that helps us to 
relate to and to interact with people we do not know much about.  
In this chapter, I will argue that we need new ways of thinking about migrants, and 
that cultural theory provides one promising alternative. I will not attempt to present 
an overview of migration literature as this has been done by many others.24 I will 
                                                     
21  “Tajfel was proposing that it was human nature to wish to understand the human world and that 
the simplifications of categorization were necessary to do so” (Billig 2002:176). 
22  Fuglerud represents here a common view of fluidity: “Migration and exile are today phenomena 
with significance beyond themselves. Even for us, who are still permanent residents, they reflect 
feelings we can recognize: insecurity, loss, quest, and homelessness. Perhaps that is why migrants 
today are a ‘symptom’ of the state of the world in general, and express a fragmentation and fluidity 
that is common for everybody” (Fuglerud 2001:218  translation by EO). However, I believe there 
to be order in the chaos, and hope that this thesis will demonstrate the presence of order that can 
be found in households and society.  
23 http://www.ssb.no/emner/02/01/10/innvbef/tab-2011-04-28-06.html 
24  There are several good overviews of Norwegian research literature (NFR 1993; Knudsen, Aase, 
and Akman 1995; Fuglerud 2001; Fuglerud and Eriksen 2007; Holm-Hansen, Haaland, and 
Myrvold 2007; Hagelund and Loga 2009; Rogstad and Midtbøen 2009; Brekke et al. 2010; Seeberg 
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mainly relate to migration research done in Norway, as there are dangers in 
importing concepts, descriptions of problems and solutions from the rather 
hegemonic American research literature (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1999).  
A second goal for this chapter, which mainly deals with questions related to our 
thinking about and knowledge of migrants, is to create a context for the household 
interviews conducted in 2001 and 2002. Therefore, I have chosen to present some 
information that is relevant for the whole period my informants are telling about, 
sometimes going ten or twenty years back, rather than just the situation today.  
I will start with a critical note by presenting some false assumptions about culture 
and migrants, and how the concepts of ‘them’ and ‘us’ are more important than we 
like to think. Second, I present concepts one needs to know in order to follow the 
public debate or read policy documents. Third, I will discuss labeling migrants in 
more general, and ask if new labels can make any difference. Fourth, as I believe 
social stereotyping is necessary I will present how the majority population sees 
immigrants, how media portrays migrants, and how the concept of immigrant 
household is used in everyday language. Fifth, I look at the essentialism in 
nationality and ethnicity, connect these with myths of similarity, and ask what is 
normal in Norway.  
False Assumptions about Culture and Migrants 
In general discussions, culture refers to those aspects of human life that can be 
learned and transferred from person to person (Korsnes, Brante, and Andersen 
1997).25 Obviously, there are cultural differences between people from different 
countries. The interesting question is how we respond to these differences. Selmer 
describes three incorrect assumptions that the Danes often make about migrants. I 
believe that Norwegians tend to make the same assumptions. First, culture and 
traditions are static, do not change, and consist of a set of rules that determines 
how an individual should handle any situation. Second, there is a consensus 
regarding a culture. In other words, a given group of people will share it and agree 
upon it. Third, each culture is separate from any other culture. Minority cultures are 
like islands in a sea of the Majority culture (Selmer 1992:188-189). These three 
assumptions should be considered incorrect, or at least, as making communication 
across cultural borders difficult. In addition, these assumptions will lead to research 
in which all minority behavior can be at least partially explained by minority culture, 
                                                                                                                                   
2011; Norsk nettverk for migrasjonsforskning  2012), overviews and analyses of migrants living 
conditions (Bjørnstad 1990; Djuve and Hagen 1995; Aasen 1996; Blom and Ritland 1997; Gulløy, 
Blom, and Ritland 1997; Dahl 2002; Kirkeberg 2003; Dahl 2004; Østby 2004; Øia, Grødem, and 
Krange 2006; Aalandslid 2007; Bråthen et al. 2007; Henriksen 2007; Blom 2008b; Blom and 
Henriksen 2008; Løwe 2008; Aalandslid 2009; Blom 2010; Henriksen 2010; Hirsch 2010; Løwe 
2011; Olsen 2011), and analyses and overviews of the majority populations attitudes towards 
minorities (Ritland 1996; Brox 1997b, 1997a; Blom 1998, 2004; Carlsen and Langset 2005; Blom 
2006; IMDi 2007a; Blom 2008a; Ellingsen, Henriksen, and Østby 2010; Hellevik 2010; IMDi 2010, 
2011). 
25  “Culture” also has a more specific usage within cultural theory. See pages 18 and 96.  
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which in the age of nation states is often understood to be identical with country of 
origin.  
A much more useful set of assumptions would rely on the understanding, first, that 
ethnic and national culture and traditions are dynamic and ever-changing, and do 
not provide guidance in all situations (cf. Werbner 1990). Second, that people share 
a culture to a varying degree and can disagree about its content. Third, cultures 
borrow content from each other and the influence can be in any direction. Fourth, 
one’s culture and national origin are not identical: One’s birthplace does not 
change, but one’s’ cultural make-up will change with experiences; we have only one 
birthplace, whereas we can participate in several cultures.  
To learn to coexist peacefully and cooperate with our new neighbors and co-
workers we have to learn more about them and their patterns of social interaction. 
One possible approach is to construct new concepts and typologies that can help to 
create order and understanding.26 
In addition to integration in general, I believe that ways of organizing have a high 
use value, if it is possible to operationalize them in a way that allows practitioners 
(teachers, social workers, doctors, etc.) to interact more effectively with immigrants. 
Similarly, it could be used to improve communication about organizing in culturally 
diverse local communities. However, this is something that must be done in 
cooperation with the practitioners, and will not be part of this thesis. 
Them and Us  
The categories presently used to describe our migrants have both weaknesses and 
strengths. The biggest weakness in my view is the distinction made between them 
and us.27 The following quote by Gullestad is one of the intellectual cornerstones of 
my work: 
Simultaneously, while the dichotomized division into “them” and 
“us” now seems natural and self-explanatory, there are many 
situations open for new metaphors, new categories, and new 
interpretations. (Gullestad 2002:119) 
                                                     
26  Lithman presentes this as a question:  
Is it possible to construct typologies, and hence move towards an understanding of 
modalities? The answer to this question relates to another—is it possible to arrive at a 
more systematic understanding of the relationship between culture, meaning building, 
on the one hand, and social relationships, as depicted in the form [network analysis] 
above, on the other hand. It is anticipated that work along these lines will lead to a 
better understanding of migrant situations (Lithman 1988:262). 
27  Everyone interested in how images of the Other permeate European culture, customs and beliefs 
should have a look at Said’s Orientalism (2003). Anderson has analyzed how being labeled as the 
other, influences the immigrant youth (2000). 
•    Making Sense of Migrants 
 
36 
Gullestad is explicitly suggesting that there are other alternatives. However, even if 
her criticisms of the present categorization are elegant and necessary, the alternative 
she presents is not useful for policy purposes.  
What is needed are not new and substantial categories to put people 
into, or any new labels to stamp them with, but rather new forms of 
social musicality. I define social musicality as the ability to listen, and to 
form one’s responses based on what one hears. It is a 
presupposition to be able to treat each other with dignity. (Gullestad 
2002:216) 
Gullestad’s suggestion is insufficient for policy-makers who need help organizing 
the world. Social musicality can be a good metaphor, but it does not provide us 
with an alternative to ethnic categorization.  
What kinds of conceptual alternatives are there? There are authors who suggest that 
we should dispose of essentialized conceptualizations and learn to live with the 
ambiguity present in the postmodern world (for some examples of this, see 
Bauman 1996; Gressgård 2003). This is a suggestion appropriate for academics, 
who make a living from their ability to deal with ambiguities and distinctions (or the 
lack of them) in our surroundings. Similarly, there are suggestions for how we must 
give up our stereotypes and treat every person as a true individual. Both of these 
suggestions put demands on people that are difficult, if not impossible, to meet in 
real life situations. Teachers, doctors, social workers, and other professionals have 
only limited time and resources to invest in each case.  
Conceptualizing Migrants 
There are some concepts concerning migration and migrants that must be 
understood in order to participate in and understand the debate.28 The first ones 
relate to categorizing individuals, while the second set of concepts relates to the 
minority-majority relationship.  
Migration refers to the process of relocation from one country to another and the 
changes in social structures this brings along. Migrants are the people who move 
from one country to another. If focus is on the leaving of a country, they are 
labeled and counted as emigrants. If focus is on the receiving country, the people 
moving in are labeled and counted as immigrants. I often prefer to use the concept 
of migrant, rather than immigrant, even if those I have interviewed are in Norway 
to stay permanently, because it contains internal tension—these households are 
both emigrants and immigrants. In addition, the concept of immigrant seems to 
                                                     
28  A recent Official Norwegian Report gave an authorative overview of how these concepts are used 
in official policy documents (NOU 2011:14: 26).  
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suggest the insertion of something new or something strange into the majority 
society. Here the built-in tension seems to be between the internal and the external. 
We need to distinguish between citizens and non-citizens, which is the distinction 
made by the public authorities. For the state, all citizens presumably have the same 
rights. This concept emphasizes the relationship an individual has to the state: we 
live in a democracy where citizens govern themselves. Non-citizens are a residual 
category consisting of people with residency permits (refugees, family reunion, 
work permit, study permit, etc.) and those who do not have residency permits 
(tourists, asylum seekers, illegal residents, etc.). Non-citizens do not have a 
complete range of political rights; however, many of them have a wide range of 
social rights.  
It is important to be aware that nationality is not the same as citizenship. Nationality 
refers to “membership” in a nation, which “is an imagined political community—
and imagined as both inherently limited and sovereign” (Anderson 1991:6). 
However, as a collectively imagined community it is as real as any other social 
construct. Because of the success of nationalism, and the subsequent standardi-
zation as a part of state and nation building in Europe (Rokkan 1987), there is 
confusion regarding the meaning of these two concepts. This confusion can be 
removed by accepting the partial overlap between citizenship and nationality as 
concepts. Having citizenship and a passport are the obvious official signals of 
nationality, but not all citizens are nationals or all nationals citizens.29 In other 
words, migrants granted Norwegian citizenship are not automatically included in 
the social life as nationals, even if they have full rights in the eyes of the state.  
The same phenomena can be seen if one looks at how this concept is used in the 
media. In Norway, norsk (Norwegian) refers to a person who has both citizenship 
and nationality, etnisk norsk (ethnically Norwegian) refers to both cultural 
background and whiteness (Vassenden 2007:20-21), and norsk statsborger (Norwegian 
citizen) is used, more and more, to distinguish the majority population from those 
who have citizenship, but who are not nationals.30  
                                                     
29  Sicakkan and Lithman explain how these terms have different meanings in different languages:  
The English language has a distinction between nationals and citizens, the later being 
the wider term. If being a national connotates having a nationality, being a citizen 
relates to being fully vested with rights to participate in the political life. In Swedish, 
the term medborgerskap (in spite of its historical roots tying it to rights in the medieval 
city) denotes nationality, as does the Norwegian term, statsborgerskap. The French 
citoyen, while like citizenship building on the legacy of the city, is permeated by the 
republican heritage of the French revolution, and has even more clearly than 
citizenship allusions to everybody's claim to political participation. (Sicakkan and 
Lithman 2002:19) 
30  An example is the following quote from Dagbladet (a national newspaper) describing a second-
generation migrant: “The 25-year-old, born in Norway, with Norwegian citizenship, has only 
contempt for the values in the Norwegian society (Hultgreen 2002).”  
 This person is not part of the imagined community, as he demonstratively removes himself from it 
by rejecting its values. This is something he can do because his identity and loyalty is connected to 
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The second set of concepts relates to the minority-majority relationship: Assimilation 
refers either to a process, or an ideal, of creating a homogeneous population, where 
the minorities gradually become identical to the majority population in terms of 
language, religion, economy, self-identity, and cultural traditions. Segregation refers to 
a practice, or an ideal, in which different populations are kept separate in order to 
prevent them from mixing with each other. Racial segregation was the public policy 
in the southern United States until the 1960s and in South Africa until the 1990s. 
Religious segregation is practiced by Israel in the occupied territories. Integration 
often refers to an ideal, or a process, in which minorities keep their identity and 
some of their cultural traits, while they become full participants in the majority 
society’s economic, political, and social life. The content of these concepts is highly 
politicized and contested.31  
Ethnicity as the Starting Point for Integration? 
There are some real problems connected with immigration and the adaptation of 
immigrants into the majority society. During the summer of 2011, the terrorist 
bombings in Oslo have spread their shadow over Norway. I am afraid that 
uncertainty and the level of conflict between the minorities and the majority 
population could grow in the future. In a situation where political violence in the 
Middle East and European cities is practically a daily news issue, it is vital for the 
future of democracy that the state be able to create confidence in the population of 
its ability to deal with the integration of minorities.  
Both the majority population and the minorities need to feel secure and safe. The 
universal welfare state is an important safety net that also helps to create strong 
legitimacy for the state and its interventions. The future of the universal welfare 
state also depends on its legitimacy among all population groups. If one or more 
large voter group loses faith in the welfare state as a fair and reliable means to 
distribute privileges and burdens, we may see some reductions in its degree of 
universality, which could further a society of first and second class citizens and a 
harsher political climate within the society.  
                                                                                                                                   
another ethnicity. In Norway, there is a common expectation of a collective loyalty to the 
Norwegian nation, whereas people with a non-Norwegian ethnic background might have problems 
with this, even if they are loyal to the Norwegian state. This points toward a way out of the 
traditional thinking concerning national states and into new forms of belonging in our increasingly 
globalized society. The meaning and boundaries of being Norwegian have become unclear. 
31  Many political philosophers and ideologues use these concepts, but give them a content that 
reflects the rest of their concepts. An overview of these different views of integration can be found 
in Høibø (2004). Another way to define a concept is to list subtypes. Diaz, for example, divides 
integration into 1) Communicative integration (language skills and mass media consumption), 2) 
Structural integration (participation in economic life), 3) Political integration (political participation 
+ naturalization), 4) Social integration (social contact with majority population), 5) Family 
integration (family networks that cross nationality boundaries), 6) Residential integration, 7) 
Personal integration (personal satisfaction with life in a new community) (Diaz 1995).  
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Last year the government published two important official reports concerning 
migration: Welfare and Migration and Better Integration: Goals, Strategies, and Policy. The 
first one discusses the sustainability of the welfare state in light of global migration. 
The main conclusion is that as long as migrants are working in sufficient numbers, 
they will not challenge the economic base of the welfare state, nor its legitimacy in 
the majority population. When attempts are made to differentiate between migrant 
groups, the approach taken is largely economic, and migrants are treated as 
individuals whose behavior is influenced by their resources and opportunities, and 
only in minor degrees by culture (NOU 2011:7). The second report discusses 
integration policy, and the immigrants’ situations in much greater detail. When 
attempts are made to differentiate between migrant groups, it is largely done by 
differentiating groupings based on country of origin, since this is the categorization 
available in the data. Common for these is that cultural diversity is presented as 
enriching the society, but as a potential threat to the welfare state to the degree the 
majority perceives the migrants to represent cultural difference (NOU 2011:7:12). 
Nevertheless, the policies do not deal with this perception of cultural difference in 
the majority population; instead they target employment, housing, social welfare, 
and other sectors. However, it is suggested that dialogue should be used as a 
strategy for dealing with conflicts early, and locally. This is promising, particularly as 
the goal is not to solve disagreements, but to find ways to live with the differences 
(NOU 2011:14:352).  
In the political debate in Norway, the goal of assimilation was dropped in the 
1970s. Since then the official policy has been integration. Brochmann describes the 
assumptions behind this approach: 
The starting point is that society is divided into different groups that 
are in a relation to the society as a whole. Migrants are seen as 
members of ethnic groups, not just individuals, which also means 
that one intends to integrate whole groups, and not—as in the 
assimilation school—only equal individuals. Individuals also get 
rights connected to the group they are members of (or are assigned 
to). (2002:32)32 
In many ways, this kind of approach reproduces the national stereotypes and 
reinforces the nation-state’s grip over its population. An individual’s degree of 
belonging in one of these ethnic groups varies more than the integrationists like to 
think. In Norway, what the majority society considers to be an ethnic group is 
usually defined by the country of origin, regardless of any internal divisions within 
that country. Similarly, the local myth is that Norway is traditionally an ethnically 
homogenous country.33 
                                                     
32  Unless otherwise noted all quotes and citations, and particularly those marked with ”Original text” 
in the footnote are translated by me. 
33  The Sami and the Finns are excluded when the myth of Norwegianess is constructed. Even if the 
Sami are considered a native minority and the Finns (kvener and skogfinner) a more recent one, 
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A few years later, the integration policy started to emphasize diversity through 
inclusion and participation, and officially targeted the whole population, not just the 
migrants. A major improvement was that the decedents of migrants are no longer 
considered immigrants; nevertheless, the ethnic groups are still defined by their 
country of origin (St.Meld.nr. 49 2003-2004). 
Professor Stein Ringen writes: “First, we are fumbling for understanding. We have 
not yet managed to formulate a reassuring idea of multicultural and mutual 
integration. Secondly, we are fumbling for how to do it (2005).” Perhaps it would 
be positive for the future of democracy in Norway to change the assumptions 
behind policies of integration. Is it necessary to assume that ethnicity or religion is 
the starting place for group formation and integration? Some authors even believe 
that sustaining ethnic groups will lead to marginalization (Favell 1999:220). I am 
not suggesting that we deny a person’s right of ethnic belonging, but merely 
questioning the necessity of prioritizing this assumption in policy formulation. This 
is particularly important in Norway, where we can find an ethnically segregated 
labor market combined with the notion of equality as a dominating principle in the 
policies of the welfare state. Otherwise, one ends in a paradox: all groups are 
different and unique, and have the right to sustain their own cultures, but people 
should be treated as if they were the same—in this case, Norwegian—in all 
respects. Why not, instead, use cultural theory as a structuring perspective? Given 
that a household’s view of politics and society is related closer to the way it is 
organized than its ethnicity or country of origin, it would make more sense to start 
our thinking and conceptualization from the different ways to organize a 
household. This is especially true since we know that the different ways of 
organizing create different responses to the same policy (Thompson and Wildavsky 
1986a). In addition, a person can choose a way of organizing, allowing for a 
classification that encompasses change instead of locking people into a pre-defined 
category. 
Thoughts about Labeling Immigrants 
Immigrants are commonly categorized, analyzed, and understood in terms of their 
country of origin. This is particularly useful in understanding how the push factors 
in forced migration are closely connected to the activities of nation-states (wars, 
violent conflicts, different forms of oppression and mistreatment) or lack of action, 
like failing to provide protection to vulnerable groups. Thus, categorization based 
on countries is clearly useful in trying to understand causes for migration. However, 
after migrants are in their receiving country—in this case, Norway—one should 
take time to ask if this categorization is useful for the purposes of understanding 
these people and their present lives? It is a common error to assume that the 
                                                                                                                                   
they have been subject to a similar assimilationist policy, which tries to eradicate their language and 
identity (Kjeldstadli 2003:446).  
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national state equals society (Andersson 2007). For many reasons, other levels in 
the society are more appropriate. 
Does it matter what we call immigrants? Willy Shanti, a migrant himself, expressed 
his frustration with labeling, in a newspaper interview, after participating in the 
documentary film Velkommen hjem (Welcome home): 
I participate in the movie because it is important for me to get 
people to understand that migrants are not a homogeneous group. 
We are individuals; different people. I hope the media will stop 
using the “immigrant” concept—it is so negatively charged … 
Immigrants are people who breath and struggle with the same 
problems as Norwegians: bank loan, income tax arrears and such. 
(Garvik 2002) 
Writing about migrants is not easy. It is an area filled with prejudices and value-
loaded concepts. Examples of these are all concepts connected to race and the 
previously much used Norwegian concepts “foreigncultural,” in the sense of 
“strange,” (fremmedkulturell) and “remote-cultural” (fjernkulturell).34 On the one hand, 
we researchers want to picture a certain group of people, but at the same time we 
know that no group of people is actually uniform and easily subjected to 
description. Moreover, migrants as a group are much more diverse than the 
majority population when it comes to regular background variables and their 
experiences of different political and social systems are more varied.35  
The question is, thus, how can one exchange information and 
knowledge that enriches, rather than cements, our stereotype 
attitudes about each other. (Sørheim 2001:199)  
The labeling of phenomena or people is an important practice that influences how 
we think and what kind of information we are able to convey and understand. 
There is a long-lasting interest in conceptual discussions within the field of 
comparative politics. One of these philosophically loaded discussions can be 
roughly summarized by dividing the academics into two camps: the lumpers and the 
splitters. The lumpers believe that it is useful to include many similar items under the 
same label, as they basically refer to the same thing anyway. The splitters react 
strongly against this kind of lumping together of disparate items. They believe that 
it is better to create very specific categories and then divide these into increasingly 
                                                     
34  A good presentation of these concepts is provided by Gullestad. She claims that the fremmedkulturell 
was born in the end of the 1980s and, during the first years, used mainly by right wing extremists. 
Now both concepts seem to have become part of the general vocabulary (2002:92-93). However, I 
have found a student paper from Kristiansand Lærerhøgskole with the title Fremmedkulturelle 
innvandrere that dates back to 1978 (Hoven 1978). 
35 Migrants are diverse (SSB 2001a; Djuve and Hagen 1995; Byberg 2002; Gulløy, Blom, and Ritland 
1997; Tronstad 2004; 2006; IMDi 2006; Bråthen et al. 2007; IMDi 2007b; Aalandslid 2008; Blom 
2008b; Blom and Henriksen 2008; IMDi 2009; Søholt and Astrup 2009). 
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detailed subcategories, until we are able to locate the uniqueness of the subject of 
the research (Hexter 1979). 
A third technique for dealing with labeling is to try to increase understanding with 
respect to what the process of labeling entails. 
An increased awareness of how and why we label people and 
generalize, and the consequences this can have in practice, is 
necessary to understanding the society we all are a part of. (Sørheim 
2001:189)   
How do lumping, splitting, and increasing the awareness about labeling apply in this 
thesis? The utility of lumping and splitting as concepts lies in their ability to help us 
see the negative consequences of our concepts. These negative consequences 
cannot be totally avoided, but one should try to find a good balance between 
lumping and splitting. The concept of immigrant (innvandrer) suffers from lumping 
together people with very different backgrounds, who do not form a social group, 
but who are often subjected to treatment as members of a group. Therefore, this is 
a concept that can be useful in understanding the way they are treated by others, 
but of little use for addressing any of the issues migrants themselves have. If we 
then narrow our focus to country of origin and talk about people originating from 
Chile, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka, who are currently staying in Norway, we should be 
very aware that each of these countries, internally, consists of several ethnically 
distinct groups. Most migrants from Chile come from the “majority” population, 
but not all. Most migrants from Vietnam belong to the ethnically Vietnamese 
majority population and not to the Chinese minority. However, many of the 
migrants from Vietnam, living in Norway, belong to Vietnam’s small Catholic 
minority, but again, not all, as the Buddhists are almost as numerous, and we can 
even find a few Protestants among them. Most of the people in Norway who come 
from Sri Lanka belong to the Tamil minority group and have fled civil war and 
discrimination in Sri Lanka. However, there are also Singhalese people who came 
here as labor migrants before 1975. In addition, Tamils have varying religious 
affinities; they are divided into Catholic and Hindu communities. As such, one 
should always keep in mind that country of origin is not the same as ethnicity, nor 
does it tell us much about a person’s religious or social background.  
One could also rely on ethnicity as a concept and talk about the Vietnamese, 
Chileans, and Tamils, but this also has weaknesses. It seems to convey that 
everyone under these labels is the same in some important respects. It is difficult to 
keep in mind that not all Vietnamese are the same, if we first use the same label. 
Similarly, it will undercommunicate any changes after their arrivial to Norway. It is 
conceivable that some of these people—for example, from Chile—do not have a 
Chilean self-identity, do not socialize with their former compatriots, and have a 
lifestyle similar to the Norwegian majority population. Ethnic labeling implies 
belonging to a community (Anderson 1991). Is it then still right to label this person 
Chilean if it only signifies a person who once was Chilean? In addition, many of the 
people in my sample are refugees, some of them political refugees, and have an 
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ambiguous relationship to their “nation”—some of them are proud of their 
ancestry, while others rather distance themselves from it.36 
The third alternative—increasing awareness—can be achieved by several means. 
Scholars may carefully state the definitions and limitations they use and write a text 
that conveys their meaning in a precise manner. Unfortunately, this seems to be an 
option only within academic discourse. Public discourse has neither the space nor 
the interest for this kind of subtlety. Therefore, it seems that one viable solution is 
to develop new stereotypes that can supplement or replace the old stereotypes. 
Can New Labels Make a Difference?  
The issue of creating new stereotypes is raised in this thesis, which tries to fill the 
gap left by the literature that shows the perils of ethnic stereotypes but fails to come 
up with any alternative. We need stereotypes; it is impossible to deal with people 
who are not close and familiar to us without stereotypes (Macrae, Stangor, and 
Hewstone 1996). Cultural theory is able to provide stereotypes that are practical 
(that help us to simplify the world enough to make intentional actions possible) and 
simultaneously open enough to allow people to move within and between these 
stereotypes.  
There is also an important epistemological difference between stereotypes that are 
static and unchanging (as ethnic stereotypes easily become) and stereotypes that are 
dynamic by nature. Static stereotypes contain a permanent set of characteristics, and 
therefore a closer inquiry into the carrier of the stereotype is unnecessary by default. 
In contrast, dynamic stereotypes are only guides and in no way make superfluous 
further inquiry.  
Someone could argue that, given this difference, the categories of cultural theory 
are not true stereotypes, as the main function of a stereotype is to simplify 
observation and reasoning. However, already in the 1980s researchers 
demonstrated that cultural theory’s categories are intimately connected to the 
processes of perception, reasoning, and making judgments (for details see Douglas 
1982c; Douglas and Wildavsky 1982; Bloor 1982). What matters is that cultural 
theory can replace ethnic and other stereotypes in a person’s mind with categories 
that are simplified enough to be useful, while flexible enough to make room for 
variation.  
Can new labeling actually change how minorities are treated or is it purely an 
academic exercise? One answer is given by Eriksen: 
                                                     
36  The concepts of exit, voice, and loyalty (Hirschman 1970) could be applied: The loyalty of political 
refugees has often been directed toward their “nation” rather than state. They have tried using 
voice, but were forced to exit. These could lead us to expect that their sense of ethnic belonging is 
strong.  
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Historically, prejudices have been most effectively fought by groups 
labeled less worthy, who have protested and demanded their rights. 
(Eriksen 2001:69) 
Eriksen is probably referring to well documented cases, like the Civil Rights 
movement in the United States, in the 1960s. Blacks in the southern U.S. shared a 
great deal: they had a shared social status, a similar work situation, a shared history 
of enslaved ancestors, and they were collectively subjected to discrimination. 
Migrants in Norway are not in a similar situation, even if they are subjected to 
discrimination. They are not one group with a shared history: their internal 
differences make it very difficult for them to organize and represent themselves as 
migrants; the only thing they have in common is that they live in Norway and are 
treated by the majority population as migrants. In addition, there is no reason to 
believe that migrants themselves have any fewer prejudices about each other than 
Norwegians have about them.  
Migrants often use ethnic or national characteristics as a basis for organizing, but 
most of these ethnic groups are too small to have sufficient influence. 
Simultaneously, the organizations that represent migrants37 are unfortunately too 
dispersed, and therefore have difficulties mobilising for collective action.38 For how 
does one represent people with backgrounds ranging from army generals to 
pacifists; from communists to right wing populists; from professors to analphabets; 
from state treasury managers to beggars; from those who have different religions 
and believe in different Gods to those who believe in no God at all; those with 
different sexual preferences and family patterns; those who speak different 
languages and write using different alphabets, those who left their homes in urban 
conglomerate cities to those who hail from the barely inhabited high mountains. 
What kind of voice can such a mass of people have and, perhaps most importantly, 
what kinds of voices will disappear? Who are the minorities within the minorities 
that cannot make themselves heard? 
However rosy the dream of finding new labels is, one should not forget the realities 
of life. Merely having new labels and categories that on paper can be proved 
preferable to the old ones does not yet mean much. One has to assume that change 
will be difficult.  
                                                     
37  An example of this would be Kontaktutvalget mellom innvandrerbefolkningen og myndighetene, which 
represents migrants in many public matters, especially in public hearings. In 2004 there were eight 
national organizations empowering and representing migrants interests (Svein Ingve Nødland 
2005).  
38  Migrant women in Norway are poorly represented, and use unformal channels (Predelli 2003). 
Language skills are considered the most important threshold for invidiual participation in 
organizational life in Norway (Enjolras and Wollebæk 2010). 
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It is probably possible for all of us to see through our cultural 
prejudices if we are honest with ourselves, but it takes much 
stronger medicine to change them.  Even if the head says yes, it is 
often possible that the body will say no. (Eriksen 2001:64)39 
Many concepts are so deeply socialized that changing them takes time and 
conscious effort. New concepts find their way into everyday language only if they 
are commonly found useful.  
There are many ways to deal with people different from “us,” and there are many 
ways to find out who is different from “us.” In the United States race has 
traditionally been used as a way to distinguish between people, and still today they 
have a research tradition in the social sciences that focuses on racial issues: are 
people discriminated against on the basis of their race and, if so, in which ways, and 
what can be done about it (Blank, Dabady, and Citro 2004). For those of us who 
have grown up in what we like to think of as the color-blind north it is difficult to 
accept the categories of African-American, Latino, Native-American, or white as 
legitimate, or even useful, in our everyday lives.40  
The state of affairs in Norway, however, is not any better, even if race is firmly 
rejected by practically everyone in the public debate. Unfortunately, in the 
Norwegian debate, we have merely replaced race with country of origin, which then 
works as a proxy for having a cultural heritage vastly different from ours.  
Policymakers cannot change the migrant’s situation through simple allocations of 
funds or changes to laws. The most important changes needed have to do with the 
way the majority (and the minority) relates to the “other,” which is the next topic 
under scrutiny.  
Social Stereotyping is Necessary 
Social stereotypes are part of our everyday lives whether we like it or not. We rely 
on the use of social stereotypes when we meet people and try to find out who they 
are, what kind of role they play, and how we should respond.  
                                                     
39  Original text: ”Det er nok mulig for oss alle å gjennomskue våre kulturelle fordommer dersom vi 
er ærlige overfor oss selv, men det skal atskillig sterkere lut til å for å forandre dem. Selv om hodet 
sier ja, kan det ofte være at kroppen sier nei.” 
40  European researchers have been critized for accepting American problems as a staring point for 
their own research (Andersson 2007; Bourdieu and Wacquant 1999).  
•    Making Sense of Migrants 
 
46 
Information about the individual helps to define the situation, 
enabling others to know what they may expect of him. (….) If 
unacquainted with the individual, observers can glean clues from his 
conduct and appearance which allows them to apply their previous 
experience with individuals roughly similar to the one before them 
or, more important, to apply untested stereotypes to him. (Goffman 
1990:13) 
In contrast to everyday language, where stereotype has a negative connotation—
because it implies that something is an oversimplification—social psychologists 
view it as an extremely useful and even necessary mechanism of thought and 
perception. A social stereotype can be defined without a normative implication as 
a cognitive structure containing the perceiver’s knowledge, beliefs 
and expectancies about some human social group. (Mackie et al. 
1996:42) 
Stereotypes are important because they influence many aspects of our daily lives: 
they influence what information we look for, what gets our attention, what we 
remember about others, as well as how we behave. In addition to influencing our 
thinking, the stereotypes we use in an effort to define others influences how they 
respond to us. Usually this is quite unproblematic. However, the majority 
population often has the power to caricature minorities into stereotypical characters 
and roles against those people’s own definitions or interests.  
Stereotypes have long been studied by social psychologists, who use two different 
but complementary approaches: the first is individually-oriented and focuses on 
what is going on inside the mind of a single individual; the second, collectively-
oriented, considers stereotypes to be part of the fabric of the society, shared by 
people with a particular culture. These two approaches span one of the most 
common discussions within the social sciences, the relative balance between 
individual and culture: 
Rather the pivotal point of distinction between individual and 
collective approaches lies in the assumed importance of shared 
social beliefs, above and beyond that of individual beliefs, as 
determinants of social behavior. (Stangor and Schaller 1996:5) 
However, social psychology has not been able to develop a single approach that 
unifies these individualistic and the collective approaches.41 That is why I turn to 
cultural theory to give a theoretically and empirically founded alternative to 
commonly used stereotypes about migrants. At the same time, even if the ways of 
organizing could be seen as sub-types of ethnic stereotypes, they are probably more 
                                                     
41  There are of course attempts to build bridges between these two approaches, like Tajfel’s 
“Cognitive aspects of prejudice” (1969), but the two approaches have still only few points in 
common. Another example is Lakoff’s work within cognitive linguistics (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; 
Lakoff 1987, 1996).  
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useful as an alternative source for stereotyping. It then becomes an empirical 
question as to which contexts the ethnic stereotypes are triggered and which 
contexts the stereotypes based on cultural theory are triggered.42  
Being an Immigrant in the Eyes of the Majority 
There is little research available regarding how the majority population thinks about 
and relates to immigrants, except for studies of problematic areas like racism. There 
are a few fresh exceptions like Sandbu’s study of what the majority knows of the 
muslim minority (2007) and Vassenden’s study of how the majority population in 
an ethnically diverse neighborhood conceptualize diversity and being Norwegian 
(2007).43  
Nevertheless, I will try to establish a chain of thought, even if it is somewhat 
indirect. I will first look at where the majority population gets their information 
about immigrants—information which influences what kind of stereotypes they 
use. Second, I will argue for the necessity of stereotypes as practical tools for 
simplifying the world. Third, I will argue that because we use Nationality, Ethnicity, 
and Country of Origin, this leads to an invalid and unhelpful essentialism in our 
thinking about immigrants.  
Here, I am not aiming to provide a full account of either the people’s or the public 
institutions’ principles of categorization. I only wish to create a backdrop for the 
household interviews and point to some problems connected with these concepts. 
The Majority Population’s Sources of Information about Immigrants 
Our ideas about cultural differences are heavily influenced by our contact with 
immigrants and by the sources of information about them that we have available. I 
will use Hernes and Knudsen’s analysis from 1990 because it refers to the same 
time period as my household interviews. They show that Norwegians have only 
limited contact with immigrants in their own neighborhood, as only three out of 
ten actually share a neighborhood with immigrants (Hernes and Knudsen 
                                                     
42  Social stereotyping vs. Framing: Framing is a cognitive process that is difficult to influence, 
whereas social stereotypes should be possible to change.  
43  Since 2005, IMDi has conducted an annual survey of opinions toward migrants and integration, 
and some of the questions within the surveys are relevant for my purposes (IMDi 2011). On an 
annual basis, SSB has, since 1993, included in an omnibus four questions that measure attitudes 
toward migration policy and immigrants, but I find them to be mostly irrelevant (Lie 2002). A 
larger set of questions were presented in several European countries (Blom 2006). There are also 
several studies of local communities, which are much more fruitful for my purposes because the 
studies adopt a more open qualitative approach (Høgmo 1997; Eidheim 1997; Aasen 1996; Bø 
1984; Ritland 1996 ; Seeberg 2007; Vassenden 2007; Ødegård 2010; Loga 2011). 
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1990:50).44 In addition, and more importantly, of those who actually have 
immigrants in their neighborhood, 52 percent had never had any contact with 
them, while 30 percent had contact daily or weekly (Hernes and Knudsen 1990:51). 
This indicates to me that even if it were possible to have contact, one or both 
parties often reject this opportunity.45  
If many Norwegians do not have much face-to-face contact with immigrants, 
where do they get their information concerning them? As we can see in Table 1, the 
mass media is by far the most important self-reported source for the large majority 
of the population in 1990.46 Only relatively few people report that they get 
significant amounts of information directly from immigrants themselves. This is an 
important indicator of what kind of contact the majority population has with the 
immigrants. Only 16 percent have so much personal contact that they consider it a 
sufficient source for at least some of their information regarding immigrants and 
their situation. By implication, the rest—84 percent of the population—have either 
no contact or else the nature of the contact is so impersonal that it does not give 
them information about immigrants.47  
                                                     
44  This number is declining. In 2005 and 2010, 22 percent and 12 percent of the population, 
respectively, say they have no migrants in their neighborhood. (tnsGallup 2011:52). Yet the 
number of immigrants in Norway roughly doubled between 1990 and 2005, from 170,000 to 
350,000 (Tronstad et al. 2006 Figure 1). In 1980 in the greater Oslo region, there were 14,000 non-
European, first generation migrants. By 2011, this number has increased to 110,000. Similarly, in 
the greater Bergen region in 1980, there were 2,000 non-European first generation migrants and 
17,000 in 2011 (SSB statistikkbanken Table 07110).  
45  The same conclusion can be drawn from Ritland’s study of the mechanisms behind residential 
segregation in Oslo (1996). She demonstrates that the majority population’s attitudes toward 
migrants influence whether they want to live in a part of Oslo with a high or low proportion of 
migrants. Similar conclusion can be made about participation in voluntary organizations in local 
neighborhoods (Loga 2011:104, 105, 111). 
46  Because the relative number of migrants is rising it is likely that the relative number of people who 
have direct contact with migrants is also rising. Jarl Stave Botnen, a Norwegian historian, claims 
that Norwegians are much more positive to migrants in 2003 than in 1972, because people have 
more direct contact, which allows them to see that what is written in the media is not always 
correct (Bore and Seglem 2003). The proportion of the majority population that has no contact 
with immigrants has decreased from 28 percent in 2005 to 14 percent in 2010 (IMDi 2011).  
47 A similar situation can be found in Denmark: “When we consider that 85% of the Danish 
population has no or only little contact with migrants, one can assume that the reception of 
stereotype stories of migrants in the media helps to create stable images for consumers of these 
stories.” (Fuglerud 2001:128). 
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Table 1: Majority Population’s Sources of Information 
Concerning Immigrants 
Question: We receive information concerning immigrants and their situation from many 
sources.  Have the following sources given you much, some, a little, or no information 
about migrants and their situation? 
 Source Proportion answering 
much or some.  Percent. 
 TV  77.1  
 Newspapers  71.0  
 Radio  60.3  
 Magazines  22.2  
 Norwegian friends and acquaintances  21.1  
 Through work  18.6  
 Weekly papers  17.5  
 Migrants themselves  16.3  
 Books  12.7  
 Education at school    6.2  
N=2045 for all sources (Hernes and Knudsen 1990:51 Table 3.3.). 
 
The low level of personal contact makes stereotyping even more important, 
because there will be only few possibilities to collect empirical evidence that would 
allow one to reconsider the stereotypes one is carrying. However, the media do not 
determine the stereotypes used. In a Danish study the author claims that public 
discourse does not determine our views, but that it delivers and filters information 
about the migrants (Fuglerud 2001:128). 
What does it mean to be an immigrant? What do Norwegians think of when they 
use or hear the concept “immigrant”? In Table 2 we see how the majority 
population determines whether a person is an immigrant. 
These answers reveal only a little about the cognitive processes underlying the 
identification of immigrants. However, it is an excellent source of information on 
what constitutes an immigrant. What distinguishes an immigrant from the majority 
population in a person’s mind? Skin color and language are the two most important 
distinguishing traits. Language skills are likely to improve, making immigrants more 
like the majority population year by year. However, their skin color will change only 
very little, and so people with a dark complexion will always be identified as 
immigrants, even if they may have been adopted as children or were born in 
Norway of parents who have become Norwegian citizens. 
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Table 2: Identifying Immigrants 
Question: How do you determine if a person is an immigrant?   
No alternatives are given to respondent.  The mentioned alternatives are marked. 
 Indicator Percent.  
 Color of skin, dark   86.0  
 Language, do not speak Norwegian   66.1  
 Clothing  20.6  
 Color of hair, facial features  18.3  
 Way of being, behavior  11.6  
 Other aspects of appearance  9.0  
 Other  4.8  
 Do not know, cannot mention any  2.6  
N=2045 for all sources  (Hernes and Knudsen 1990:172 Table A2.1.) 
 
Skin color is such an important signifier of being an immigrant that Norwegians 
tend not to consider other Scandinavians and Western Europeans as immigrants.48 
Bergens Tidende (a regional newspaper) published a large story about the British being 
the largest minority group in Bergen (2003:front page and p.2). This was 
newsworthy mainly because the public tend not see the British as immigrants. 
Nevertheless, during the last few years, more than a hundred-thousand labor 
migrants from the old Eastern Europe have moved to Norway.49 This is likely to 
reduce the significance of race as more and more of the migrants look just like the 
majority population. 
Another example shows how immigrants and Norwegians are used as mutually 
exclusive categories. In the autumn of 2003 there were two local Progress Party 
(Frp) chapters in Spain: Foreningen Alfaz del Pi Frp and Foreningen Torrevieja Frp (Frp 
2003).50 The following story is from the time before these local party chapters were 
established during the spring of 2003. The Norwegian community in Spain is 
mainly located in three villages, where they have their own local radio channel in 
Norwegian and a bakery delivering typical Norwegian baked goods. The people 
interviewed appeared not to be interested in local Spanish politics. The main 
political issue seemed to center on the question of “allowing the funds to follow the 
patient”—or, more precisely, the possibility of transferring their pensions and 
health care rights in Norway to their new home. 
                                                     
48  This applies, not just to Norwegians, but probably also to most Western migrants in Norway. I 
have been told that SSB has never received as much negative feedback from respondents as they 
got for their special migrant quality of life survey in 1996. The negative feedback came from 
Western migrants (French, British, Scandinavian and US citizens) who rejected being categorized 
as “migrants” (Results from this survey are published in Blom and Ritland 1997; Gulløy, Blom, and 
Ritland 1997). 
49  Citizens of EU member countries have the right to move to Norway as labor migrants. In 2010 
there are 138,000 migrants living in Norway, from the old Eastern Europe or from countries that 
were accepted into EU in 2004.  
50  The Progress Party is represented in the parliament. They are usually described as a right-wing 
party with populist tendencies.  
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In a radio interview for NRK, one of the Norwegians behind the plan for a local 
Progress Party chapter in Spain reveals some insight into how he understands the 
concept of immigrant: 
Journalist:  But you are immigrants.  Is it not a paradox to support the 
Progress Party so strongly and simultaneously be an immigrant?  
Man:    Am I an immigrant?  
Journalist:  In Spain you are an immigrant.  
Man:   ((laughter)) I do not feel myself like an immigrant.  I have come to 
Spain to be able to enjoy the winter in a comfortable climate. 
(Frøysa 2003:02:30-02:50)51 
I find it deeply fascinating that this Norwegian living in Spain is unable to see 
himself as an immigrant. One would think that living in Spain would give him 
personal experiences that would make this connection natural. He positions himself 
as a non-migrant through one claim: his motivation for migration was to enjoy the 
comfortable climate, which he apparently believes excludes him from the category 
of immigrant. There are other possible interpretations: immigrants are commonly 
seen as having non-Norwegian ethnicity and darker skin color, which makes it 
difficult for him to conceptualize that Norwegians, too, can be immigrants.52  
The ambiguity and insecurity surrounding the question of how to deal with and 
relate to people who are not originally from Norway has increased because today’s 
migrants come from many parts of the world. The world is changing faster than 
people’s social competence, which often relies on images in the media.53 
Images in the Media 
In the public debate in 1990’s Norway, the generalized migrant is increasingly a 
marginalized asylum-seeker, rather than the hardworking labor migrant from the 
1970s (Fuglerud 1996). Typically when immigrants are presented in the Norwegian 
media in a positive light, their migrant status is under-communicated, while if the 
story has a negative spin, they are presented as migrants (Lindestad and Fjeldstad 
2005).  
                                                     
51  Original text: Journalist: Men dere er innvandrere. Er det ikke en paradoks å være så tilhenger av 
Fremskritsspartiet og samtidig være innvandrere?  M: Er jeg innvandrer?  Journalist: I Spania er du 
innvandrer.  M: ((latter)) Jeg føler meg ikke som innvandrer. Jeg har reist til Spania for å nyde 
vinteren i behagelig klima." (Frøysa 2003: 02:30-02:50). 
52  There are other authors who make the same, or very similar, claims: Gullestad claims that “visible 
differences” are a starting point for continuing discrimination (2002:70). In addition, Lindestand 
and Fjelstad (1999) report that people with origins in the United States and Europe react if they are 
considered “migrants” in Norway, because the concept has negative connotations and is usually 
used only of people from “non-western countries” (Gullestad 2002). 
53  According to Fuglerud (2001:120), Reidar Grønhaug (1979) uses differences in social competence 
to explain discrimination of migrants. The driving forces are social rules and individual social 
competence.  
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Norwegian media present only a few different images of migrant families. One 
stereotypical presentation is the “authoritarian family,” which has become 
associated with many of the negative aspects connected with the oppression of 
women and the second generation’s lack of freedom to make important choices. 
This stereotype has been exploited by people who dislike immigrants and is often 
used in arguments against family reunions and in support of increasing efforts to 
control immigration. In circles more positive to immigration this stereotype is 
rejected, with the consequence that some of the conflicts—first versus second 
generation, for instance—that can arise in this kind of household have not been 
taken seriously. The exception to this is the public attention toward forced 
marriages and honor-related violence.54 
In 2002, Trond Kvist made a documentary film, Welcome home (Velkommen hjem), in 
order to bring greater nuance into the migration debate, and to display, among 
other things, conflicts in migrant communities. He says that, 
the authority structure in families is often extreme. It is dangerous, 
because many youth are struggling in their relation to the 
Norwegian society, at the same time as they are trying to relate to 
their parents who do not even want to be “Norwegian” (Garvik 
2002).55 
With the help of cultural theory it is possible to reformulate this problem as a 
conflict between two ways of organizing: a hierarchically organized household, 
where the parents emphasize authority, honor, respect for the elders, and so forth; 
and an anti-hierarchical way of organizing, preferred by the children, who have 
been influenced by the individualistic segments of Norwegian society. Therefore, 
the conflict within the family can be seen as a conflict between two styles of 
organizing that tend to conflict. By reformulating the conflict this way, it is possible 
to move away from the paradoxical situation in which one is supposed to have 
respect both for the parents’ culture and the children’s right to choose for 
themselves (which the hierarchical culture does not allow). This opens the way for 
interventions that do not disrespect the religion or culture of the parents. 
Cultural theory helps us to understand that some of these conflicts are not cultural 
or ethnic conflicts but rather structural conflicts. If the media would portray these 
conflicts by using concepts from cultural theory, we might witness a reduction in 
the anxiety that people have with diversity, as well as an increase in the trust that 
people have in their own social competence. 
                                                     
54  (IMDi 2008; Bredal and Skjerven 2007; Bredal 2006, 1998; BFD 1998; BLD 2003, 2007) 
55  Translation by EO. 
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 “Immigrant Household” in Everyday Language  
The concepts we invoke in our everyday language carry meanings and internal 
structures that influence the way we think and argue. However, we seldom stop to 
think how this influences us in practice. The concept of an “immigrant” is not just 
a category on its own; it is also a part of, for example, an “immigrant household.” A 
closer look to the structure and use of this concept is warranted.  
A prototypical structure refers to a conceptualization of the abstract term through a 
prototypical case (Lakoff 1987, 1996:74; Lakoff and Johnson 1980): A sparrow 
would be a prototypical bird. It resembles a bird more than a penguin or a duck 
does, though all undoubtedly are birds. When we think and argue, we often use a 
prototypical case to judge whether the argument is valid. For example, practically 
everybody would claim that the statement “birds can fly” is true, even though it is 
common knowledge that penguins cannot fly. Membership in a category can be 
gradual, and a sparrow is just more of a bird than a penguin is. 
I would claim that, in Norway, the prototypical household is a family consisting of 
a couple and one or more children. This becomes apparent if we think of the 
modifications used: “single-parent household” is often used, but there is seldom a 
need to explain that something is a two-parent household. Linguists call this 
markedness. The normal meaning does not need to be marked, whereas deviations 
from the norm must have a mark (Lakoff 1996:59). In this case, the marker is 
needed to describe a “one-parent household.” By default, when “parent” is used, 
children are assumed to live with that parent.  
A different, but equally interesting, case is the “immigrant household,” where 
“immigrant” is the marker. “Immigrant household” suggests to many minds a large 
family. The expectation is that there are more children, and perhaps even several 
generations under the same roof (this in addition to the previously demonstrated 
expectations that go together with “immigrant”, like darker color of skin and poor 
language skills). The non-marked case would be a household which by implication 
refers to a majority household.  
Reasoning about households is likely to have a bias toward majority households 
consisting of two parents and one or more children. This bias can be avoided as 
long as we are aware of it, which is just as well, since in my thesis I am trying to 
break some of our inherent expectations concerning minority households. 
However, mindful of the difficulties involved, I have decided not to deal with 
households composed of fewer than two parents, despite having interviewed two 
single parent households, one full-time and one part-time father.  
By choosing not to present these single-parent households among the ones 
included here, I am coming into line with the stereotype of immigrant households 
as two-parent households. This is unfortunate, in that it strengthens the image of 
immigrant households as consisting of two parents and their children, but it had to 
be done in order to limit the variation in my inevitably small sample. In my first 
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round of interviews, in the spring of 1999, which I used as a pilot study, I 
interviewed different kinds of Kurdish households, but the variation in age and the 
composition of the households was so great that it was difficult to compare their 
ways of life with each other, as they were in different stages in their lives and their 
life-projects.  
Essentialism in Nationality and Ethnicity 
There are several essentialistic traits in our thinking about nationality and ethnicity. 
When we talk about the majority population, we take it for granted that our 
searches for identity, and the choices that form whom we are, are for the most part 
completed during youth and early adulthood. We make important choices about 
what to study, where to live, what kind of work to apply for, and who we would 
like to have as our friends. These choices heavily influence who we are and how we 
will live our lives. It is easy to forget that immigrants have to make several of these 
choices during their first years in Norway.  
An example of this kind of false essentialistic reasoning runs like this: There is one 
Vietnamese culture. One’s culture is given by place of birth. This culture 
determines how people live. As a result, for the Vietnamese, the way they live is 
determined by their culture, and it is impossible to change this. 
The false conclusion is that migrants are what they are and should be left alone, 
because they cannot be changed. Additionally, there seems to be no possibility for 
people to cross cultural borders. Fortunately, none of the three premises holds, and 
therefore the conclusion is also erroneous. 
Another example of how culture has become essentialized in the Norwegian debate 
over immigrants is provided by Gullestad, whose analysis of the much used and 
innocent-sounding phrase “secure about one’s own” shows how it has several fixed 
traits: 
To be “secure about one’s own” [culture] implies holding to 
something which is not chosen, and which is relatively constant.  Security is 
connected to stability and represents a form of resistance toward 
comprehensive changes in society. (Gullestad 2002:66)56 
Similarly, the commonly used phrase “living between two cultures”, which 
describes the tension that the decedents of migrants live in, assumes that there are 
two monolithic cultures. According to Gressgård, this is actually a dilemma 
between two values—namely freedom and community, even if the nation-state is 
used to frame the debate as if it were about culture (Gressgård 2007). 
                                                     
56  Original text: ”Å være 'trygg i sitt eget' er underforstått å holde fast ved noe som ikke er valgt, og som 
er forholdsvis uforandrelig. Trygghet er knyttet til stabilitet og representerer en form for motstand 
mot omfattende samfunnsendringer" (Gullestad 2002:66). 
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Thus, it looks like the tendency to essentialize national culture and ethnicity is 
present in the Norwegian debate. One way to examine this essentialism is to shift 
our attention from leaving a country or culture to becoming a citizen or member of 
the receiving society. 
Norwegian Myths of Similarity 
One would think that the importance of equality in Norway would create 
conditions in which the integration of immigrants into civil society would be easy 
and straightforward. Unfortunately, the reality is rather the opposite. Marianne 
Gullestad shows how “in the hegemonic thinking in Norway, immigrant is in 
conceptual opposition to Norwegian and this has become during the last years a 
central and organizing conceptual contrast. (2002:71)” 57  
After the Second World War, there was a long period of social democratic 
dominance in Norwegian politics and a significant reduction in the differences in 
living conditions between the socio-economic classes. Today, Norway is one of the 
countries in the world with the smallest disparity in conditions of living between 
the rich and the poor.58 According to Gullestad:  
While cleavages between different social classes have become more 
unclear, the cleavage between “us” and “immigrants” has become 
more clear and fixed on the conceptual level. (Gullestad 2002:84) 59 
Social Democratic ideals about equality and the importance of welfare have been 
important for the development of the welfare state and have helped shape the 
society during the last century. However, it looks like there has been a price to pay. 
While in English one can separate between equality and similarity, this is difficult in 
Norwegian, because the one word, likhet, is used for both denotations. This creates 
a pressure towards being similar, as on some level equality is also about similarity, 
and those dissimilar cannot be equal to the majority.  
The logic of similarity means that people in many informal settings 
have to consider themselves similar, in order to feel themselves 
equal. (Gullestad 2002:82)  
Gullestad argues that there are two basic strategies for dealing with difference. First, 
people try to emphasize the similarities and downplay the differences. Second, they 
will try to avoid whatever is considered too different. Gullestad’s own fieldwork in 
Bergen demonstrates how city dwellers consider people living in the countryside, 
outside Bergen, as too different to be included in social life. There is, then, a 
                                                     
57  Original text: ”I den hegemoniske tenkning i Norge står 'innvandrer' i begrepsmessig motsetning til 
'nordmann', og at dette i de senere årene er blitt en sentral og organiserende begrepskontrast.” 
58  UNDP ranked Norway first on Human Development Index and second on Human Poverty Index 
(UNDP 2001:tables 1 and 4). 
59  Original text: "Mens skillelinjene mellom ulike samfunnsklasser er blitt mer utydelige, er 
skillelinjene mellom 'oss' og 'innvandrere' blitt mer tydelige og bastante på begrepsplanet." 
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tradition of exclusion directed at persons considered different that it is not limited 
to the immigrant. However, in today’s society immigrants embody difference and 
are often the subject of exclusion.  
According to cultural theory each of the four ways of organizing does exclude 
someone or some groups, either for explicit reasons or as an unintended 
consequence of behavioral patterns.60 However, that does not mean that we should 
accept the systematic marginalization of and discrimination against large groups in 
society. If one accepts the systemic aspects of cultural theory, the best one can 
hope for is the following: first, to distribute the exclusion more evenly (different 
groups are excluded in different arenas, so that no single group carries the sole 
burden of exclusion), and second, to have social mobility (groups that have been 
excluded and discriminated against have the possibility to improve their conditions 
over time). 
What is Normal?   
There is no such thing as the “typical Sami,” or the “typical 
immigrant.”  It just looks like that to us who are not familiar with 
the variation within. (Hovland 2001:251) 
We often use our ideas about normality to form useful stereotypes of other people. 
We construct these stereotypes around our notions of what is normal, and in this 
context, normality has several different flavors.  
First, our idea of what is normal among “Norwegians” is related to how we 
perceive the majority population. However, since we have knowledge of many 
different lifestyles, we are hesitant to claim that there is only one way to be normal 
in Norway.  
It has been pointed out (Appadurai 1998) that anthropologists, 
journalists, and the like, have a tendency to ascribe persons born 
under distant skies a higher degree of cultural authenticity than 
persons in modern, Western countries.  “Natives”—a designation 
almost exclusively used of persons born outside the industrialized 
part of the world—are assumed to represent their culture and 
history in its original, true form.  While we understand ourselves as 
formed by complexity, diversity, and historical turbulence, the native 
is assumed to represent tradition and continuity. (Fuglerud 
2001:196)  
                                                     
60  Groups defined by one the three active ways of organizing would reject groups defined by the 
other three active ways of organizing. If the groups are not defined by ways of organizing, the 
pattern of exclusion is an empirical question. 
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Therefore, our stereotype of Norwegianess is related to aspects of life that are 
perhaps not so important! It is related to things like nistepakke, nisselue,61 and, 
perhaps, a love for homogeneous equality. The national symbols are essential for us 
when constructing a national identity, but they do not tell us how Norwegians 
actually live and what they do, or what kinds of values and preferences they have 
(except a liking for lefse62 or for skiing under the blue sky in the intense Easter sun).  
Secondly, the notion of normality becomes something different when connected to 
our stereotypes of minorities: let us say, people who come to Norway from 
Vietnam. Because most of us have very little contact with people from Vietnam, we 
form our stereotypes based on what we have learned from the media and perhaps 
heard from friends and acquaintances (who might or might not actually know 
anyone “Vietnamese”). But because we have no knowledge of the variations within 
the group, we tend to assume that the stereotype actually represents what is normal, 
which makes the media image of immigrants perhaps more important than the 
media image of the majority population (as most people in Norway can compare 
their stereotype of a Norwegian with several real persons). 
It will be completely meaningless to write a “cookbook” about 
immigrants.  Migrant population is definitely more diverse within 
than between many immigrants and Norwegians.  Similarities and 
differences, significant for social interaction, are not dependent on 
whether one is an immigrant or ethnically Norwegian. (Sørheim 
2001:191) 
If we were able to give more weight to how people live—their lifestyles and ways of 
organizing—perhaps our ideas of normality would also change. There are many 
ways to be normal in Norway, and perhaps cultural theory’s concepts can be used 
to create a typology (or range) of normal families that we can use to describe this 
variation. 
In some ways, this search for lifestyles is also a movement toward lifeworlds.63 
Fuglerud has stated that if you want to get to the core of globalization, you have to 
study a person’s lifeworld, consisting of home, family, and social network.64 I agree 
with him, even if I do not apply the phenomenological perspective. However, I do 
share the belief that social scientists should pay more attention to people’s everyday 
                                                     
61  Nistepakke is a “lunch pack” of sandwiches, wrapped in paper, made at home in the morning. 
Nisselue is a red stocking cap, made of wool, with a sharp pointed top, that children wear for 
Christmas.  
62  Lefse is an old-fashioned, large, thin, sweet wheat tortilla usually filled with butter, sugar, and 
cinnamon, before it is folded and cut into sandwich size pieces. It is very mild and delicate both in 
taste and texture, which I find fairly typical of Norwegian cooking. 
63  “Lifeworld” refers to a person’s experience of his or her social and physical environment. This is a 
phenomenological concept derived originally from Husserl, brought into sociology by Schütz, and 
later developed further by Berger and Luckmann (who emphasize it as a social construction), and 
by Habermas (who emphasizes its connection with language and as a prerequisite of 
understanding) (Lübcke 1989; Korsnes, Brante, and Andersen 1997; Habermas 1998).  
64  See Fuglerud’s presentation at the Metropolis Conference, in Oslo, 9th-12th April 2002. 
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life experiences—which are indeed at the core of the empirical material collected 
for this thesis, even if I, unlike the phenomenologists, rely on cultural theory as an 
organizing perspective.  
What Should We Demand of a Better Classification? 
I present here my five criteria for a good classification of migrants. Any theory that 
fulfills these criteria can be a promising alternative to the present categories or 
stereotypes. The criteria are laid out in the open, so that readers can form their own 
conclusion. These five criteria are based on my personal academic viewpoint. I 
could have argued in a more academic manner for these. However, just because it is 
possible to find references to authors or books where similar issues are dealt with, 
the choice of these is still first and foremost a personal academic viewpoint. Social 
scientists too often try to hide their personal choices behind scientific jargon. 
Human unity. The first criterion states that the same categorization should be used 
for all members of the society, and not separate “us” from “them” without a 
justification. In other words, the categorization should transcend our present 
categorizations based on country of origin, ethnicity, culture or religion which lead 
easily to discrimination. 
Content change. Second, the categories should not be fixed in content. In other 
words, their content should be able to change and evolve together with the rest of 
the society.  
People change. Third, the categories should not lock people into them. These 
categories must allow for and reflect that people change their beliefs, behavior, and 
friends over time. Therefore, re-categorization must be possible.  
Gradual Membership. Fourth, the categories should not be mutually exclusive. There 
should be no need for old-fashioned either/or categorization. Rather, we must 
embrace the utility of categories based on family resemblance or gradual 
membership (Floor 1989; Lakoff 1987). If we cannot allow for changes in content, 
people, and gradual membership, the categories will increase essentialism, rather 
than reduce it. 
Helpful in everyday situations. Fifth, the categories should help us to make sense of 
what people do. The whole idea of stereotypes relies upon their utility. If they guide 
us in the wrong direction, we should dispose of them. We should use a particular 
stereotype only if we do better with it than without it.  
In our increasingly global world, there is an ever growing need for tools that allow 
us to relate to people and cultures we do not know intimately. Cultural theory can 
be one of those tools. The first four of the above criteria are theoretical and will be 
evaluated in the next chapter (see summary on page 103). The fifth criterion, being 
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helpful in everyday situations, is an empirical criterion, which will be demonstrated 
through the presentation of households in Chapter 5.  
Low Politics 
Political scientists are sometimes accused of preferring high politics over low 
politics as an area of research. High politics has very few direct consequences on 
most people’s welfare in Oslo or Bergen, with the exception of the processes that 
lead to forced migration and, potentially, a residency permit in Norway.65 However, 
even for the present situation, it is important what immigrants themselves do to 
cope economically and socially. Therefore, efforts should be made to find out how 
immigrants view and use some major public institutions. The households will be 
queried about their experiences with schools, the municipality, the social welfare 
office, the police, the UDI,66 political parties and the parliament, and citizenship.  
Even though migration research is often done by researchers who genuinely believe 
that they are contributing to a better society by collecting and analyzing information 
about immigrants, there are some critical voices: 
In Norway, the author Naushad Ali Qureshi and the journalist Atta 
Ansari. (1996) have pointed out that migration researchers are 
almost never immigrants themselves, and typically choose to 
concentrate upon “problematic” immigrants.  The understanding of 
who are the problematic ones and who not is derived from the 
official migration policy (Fuglerud 2001) 
Qureshi and Ansari do have a point, as the funding for research is more easily 
available for topics that aim to present a solution to a “problem.” This makes 
absolute sense from the viewpoint of providing “useful” research to the 
community. Unfortunately, this “usefulness” can also create a skewed image of 
immigrants as people with difficulties and special needs. My thesis focuses on 
regular households in Norway and their ways of solving everyday life problems, 
such as finding a job, making ends meet, helping friends, taking care of children, 
and their experiences with the institutions of the welfare state. These households 
will hopefully appear familiar and rather boring in their lack of exoticism, as their 
ways of solving problems are probably not different from what can be found in 
many ”Norwegian” families. 
                                                     
65  There are many indirect consequences related to the finances of the state and the institutions of the 
welfare state.  
66  The Norwegian Directorate of Immigration. 
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Writing about Real People 
However, we must not only look at the migrants from the outside. The migrant’s 
own understanding is crucial for increasing the success of any policy interventions 
(Sørheim 2001:203). How can we hope for any policy to work as long as we fail to 
understand the lives of the people these policies address?  
The main sources of information in the first part of this thesis are the in-depth 
interviews with migrant households. By talking with real people, instead of dealing 
with people hidden in statistical figures, theories that normally stand alone in their 
brightness and clarity become tarnished by real life issues. Theoretical models 
become muddled by peoples’ choices that follow their own creative minds instead 
of the paths neatly laid down by academics.  
One difficulty in writing about real people and their lives is that they will always 
know more than the interviewer. In several ways, they have epistemologically 
privileged knowledge about their own lives, and a few hours of interview is not 
going to grant more insight into their lives than they themselves already possess. 
Even if one takes into account that I interview several families, and have a 
theoretical perspective that opens the material for analysis, my newly gained 
knowledge is about something else: it is theoretical and conceptual knowledge; it is 
not about them and their lives.  
Primarily, my ideas and interpretations are part of a social scientific and policy 
related discourse. Even if there is potential for creating change in the ways we treat 
immigrant households, this is dependent on others accepting the ideas put forth 
here and using them actively. Contrasted with my informants’ understanding of 
their own lives, my understanding is of lesser importance, as their own 
understanding and choices have immediate and real consequences in their lives. 
The value and importance of my research lies not in changing the lives of the 
people I have interviewed, but, instead, in transforming it into general knowledge. 
New knowledge is often old knowledge in a new context, with new packaging, 
delivered to a new audience.  
Now that my research is contextualized and related to some of the central topics of 
research in migration studies, it is time to operationalize cultural theory in detail so 
that it can be used to study migrant households in Norway. 
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C h a p t e r  3   
OPERATIONALIZING 
CULTURAL THEORY 
In the introduction, I presented sketches of hierarchical, egalitarian, individualistic, 
and fatalistic households. This chapter presents an operationalization of how the 
four ways of organizing can be observed in a household’s internal organization, in 
the patterns of help in their external social relations, and how it can be used to 
create predictions of a household’s views of society and politics. There is also a 
discussion of some principles regarding the use of the theory and how it is related 
to other theories about culture, and how well it fits to my five criteria for a better 
classification. 
 
Four Ways to Organize a Household 
Cultural theory is a theory focused on institutions, and households are treated in 
this thesis as small institutions. The following presentation is an operationalization 
of cultural theory used on households in the Norwegian context. I have utilized 
previous household research based on cultural theory67 and empirical observations 
from majority households I know and from migrant households I have interviewed 
for this thesis.68 
                                                     
67  I am indebted to Dake, Thompson and Neff, who conducted a large research project in Great 
Britain, where they studied household consumption patterns for Unilever (Dake, Thompson, and 
Neff 1994). They studied 128 households and used a triangulation of methods to ensure a reliable 
classification based on cultural theory. Each of the three researchers collected data and classified 
the same households in order to evaluate the reliability of their classification, which proved to be 
very good. Unfortunately, the report they wrote was for internal use in Unilever, but a summary of 
their findings and research methods is published (Dake and Thompson 1999). 
68  Because households are the unit of analysis, I am writing of them here as if they were one actor, 
but obviously a household does not think or act. The real actors are the people, thus my approach 
hides some of the internal differences and conflicts within the household, which is positive, as my 
interest is in the institutionalized patterns of action and the justifications used to uphold them on a 
household level. However, the internal differences are of importance and could be utilized to study 
conflicts between generations, or conflicts between the spouses, both of which are excluded from 
this thesis.  
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The following ideal-typical households represent a contextualized version of 
cultural theory, that is how two-parent families with children, living in Norway, in 
the beginning of the 2000s, can construct their family life based on four different 
ways of organizing. Other family constallations are excluded in order to allow for a 
well-controlled comparison during analysis.   
Table 3 contains an overview of four different types of households’ characteristics 
as predicted by cultural theory. On top of the table are theoretical aspects that 
characterize the ways of organizing. Further down are characteristics of households. 
In this table it is very easy to see how the ways of organizing differ from each other. 
However, I will present each way of organizing on its own, because it makes it 
easier to see how they have an internal consistency.  
The Hierarchical Household   
A household that relies predominately on the hierarchical way of organizing, 
hereafter called simply a hierarchical household often has a gender-based division of 
labor.69 The hierarchical household divides the world into different spheres of life, 
which determine the division of labor and the division of competence and power. 
People are bound by social roles—like father, mother, son, and daughter—which 
define who they are and how they should act toward each other in any particular 
situation. Tradition is usually important, as it both defines roles as well as the 
behavior that goes with them. Tradition is also a guideline for a family’s life and 
organization at large. Therefore, the society strongly influences how a hierarchical 
household lives. They are seldom isolated from the society; however, they are 
probably very conscious of which part of society represents the “good” tradition. 
In many situations the hierarchical household would behave in a way that 
emphasizes the order within the household, for example, at meal times they would 
have clear duties and fixed seats.70 Some activities, like meals, are for the whole 
family, while other spare time activities are chosen to fit their roles: football for the 
boys, swimming for the girls, and card games for the father. 
The hierarchical household’s life is orderly, and their use of time is often fixed. 
They prefer regular working hours, habitual activities in the evening, and know each 
other’s weekly program by heart: Every Sunday we go to church and on Saturdays we visit 
someone. When I call to make an interview appointment, even the children know 
who the person in the family is that I need to talk with, and this person can make 
an appointment with me on behalf of the rest of the family without consulting 
them. 
                                                     
69  Dividing household work according to traditional gender roles helps to sustain the hierarchical way 
of organizing, whereas the other ways of dividing household work would reduce hierarchy in a 
household, both immediately and even more over time. 
70  Mary Douglas has written extensively about meal times in Food at Social Order (1984). 
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Table 3: Four Ways to Organize a Household 
 
                                                     
71  Douglas has presented the idea of dividing the world into separate spheres (2001). 
72  The main source for these indicators is Cultural Theory (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990) and 
the household study (Dake, Thompson, and Neff 1994; Dake and Thompson 1999). 
73  Division of housework, time use and Justification for women’s participation in labor force, are 
from Dake, Thompson and Neff (1994 ch.8 pp.12-20).  
Grid-Group High-grid-high-group 
Low-grid-high-
group 
Low-grid- 
low-group 
High-grid- 
low-group 
Accountability High High Low Low 
Transactions Asymmetrical Symmetrical Symmetrical Asymmetrical 
Social structure Hierarchical group Enclave,  flat group 
Ego-focused 
network 
Isolation 
World 
Divided into 
spheres with 
different rules71 
One inter-
connected unity 
A flexible resource, 
personalized  Unpredictable 
Moral Differentiated by spheres 
Universal but 
limited by 
collective 
decision 
Liberal, keeping 
contracts Not in this world 
Characteristic72 Hierarchical Egalitarian Individualistic Fatalistic 
Division of 
housework 
Traditional gender 
roles Equal tasks Skill, negotiations Random 
Time use Fixed pattern Shared Appointments Random 
Use of space Specialized, orderly Shared Practical Random 
Basis for a 
legitimate decision 
Positional 
authority  Consensus 
Act first, talk later.  
Bilateral agreement 
Does not exist = 
power 
Responsibility 
High, but 
restricted by 
different 
roles/spheres 
Shared Low, only from contracts Low 
Ascribed roles & 
positions Respected Critical Down-played Wanted/feared 
Attitude towards 
achievements Down-played Critical Important ? 
Measure of auccess Social positions 
Internal criteria,  
moral life, 
consistency 
Results, size and 
centrality of social 
networks, income 
Any of the 
mentioned 
Justification for 
women’s parti-
cipation in labor 
force73 
Critical, necessity Equality Self-realization Necessity (?) 
 
Pet name Traditional 1940’s 
Hippies 
1960’s 
Yuppies 
1990’s 
? 
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Typically, if the household can afford it, one can find the father in wage labor, 
hence filling the man’s role as the provider of the family, while the mother stays at 
home taking care of the children, hence emphasizing her role as caretaker.  
The separation of life into different spheres is often visible in the hierarchical 
household’s use of space: there is one area for children and one for adults; there is 
one place for eating dinner and another for watching TV; there are areas that are 
available for “outsiders” and there are areas that are private; most items seem to 
have their own place; and keeping the house neat and well organized is a high 
priority. Especial care is placed in the presentation of the house to guests and 
outsiders. 
The legitimacy of a decision is dependent on a correct procedure, which often 
includes finding the right person (defined by their roles) to make the decision. 
Different roles entail different areas of authority and expertise, as the world is 
divided into different spheres of life, which have only limited contact with each 
other. Thus, men make certain decisions, women make others. If the household is 
struggling with a difficult moral issue, they might solicit help from a priest (or 
somebody else), who is an “expert” on the issue. 
Responsibility is defined in detail by their roles. Parents have a responsibility to 
raise their children to become good members of the society, which often entails 
being respectful of authority. Children are expected to be respectful of their 
parents. Because roles are important, it is more important to fulfill every detail of 
one’s role than to try to achieve success in other ways. Honor is a concept used to 
describe a person who lives up to his or her role. One of the worst things that can 
happen is the loss of honor, which equals being seen unfit for a social role or 
position. If you lose your honor, you are actually losing your role—you simply no 
longer know who you are, and neither do others quite know how to behave around 
you.74  
Success is connected to the possession of social roles that are highly valued by the 
society. For example, to be a doctor or a priest would be a great success. The 
success of one family member rubs off on other family members. Having a doctor 
in the family will raise the whole family’s social status. Additionally, in some 
situations the roles build upon each other: fathers are ranked higher than their sons, 
thus, being the father of a doctor is better than being a doctor (in certain 
situations). Consequently, if possible, many hierarchical households send their 
offspring on to higher education, where their children work hard, as they are not 
studying just for themselves but on behalf of the whole family.75 
                                                     
74  It is possible that a person who loses his honor then becomes taboo for the rest of the society (for 
taboos see Douglas 2002b). 
75  Honor and shame are concepts that can be important in a hierarchical household, whereas the 
egalitarian and individualistic households cannot understand what it all is about. Particularly, the 
idea of one household member’s actions bringing shame upon the whole household is not present 
in individualism.  
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Examples would be the modern working-father-housewife-and-two-children house-
hold that was viewed as ideal by many in Norway in the 1940s and 1950s, and 
Parson’s ideal of the industrial family from 1955 (Leira 2002:15-23). Where the 
concept head of household76 is used, whether in research, public statistics, or public 
policies, it seems to be a normative statement claiming that the hierarchical house-
hold is the norm, a proper household, and all other forms are deviations. In 
contrast, cultural theory does not give any of the four ways of organizing a 
priviledged position, they are all ideal.  
I will later present two households which use, predominately, the hierarchical way 
of organizing: the Nguyen household from Vietnam (see page 147) and the Natan 
household from Sri Lanka (see page 160). 
The Egalitarian Household  
Egalitarian households are characterized by equality and lack of social 
differentiation.77 Instead of emphasizing roles of father and mother, and their 
authority over their children, everybody is an equal member of the family. 
Therefore, where the hierarchical household uses a division of labor to emphasize 
its members’ separate social roles, the egalitarian household’s members boost their 
equality by sharing the work evenly among themselves. Preferably, everyone does a 
bit of every task.  
Members of the egalitarian households prefer to do things together, hence they 
spend a lot of time together. Similar to the hierarchical household, they like to share 
their meals, but they are not likely to have fixed seats or the same person preparing 
the meal every time. They act regularly as one unit: they go, for example, camping 
together or they visit other households together.  
Inside the egalitarian household the unity of behavior is visible: spatially the home 
is one unit, there is no clear separation between private and public parts of a 
                                                     
76  “Much confusion has resulted from the use of the term 'head of household' to cover a range of 
different but often overlapping concepts. The term has been used variously to identify: (a) a census 
reference person; (b) the household's chief decision-maker; (c) the person who is entitled to claim 
certain benefits such as land or membership in a co-operative on behalf of the household; and (d) 
the person whose characteristics provide the best indication of the status of the household as a 
whole. ... In order to avoid confusion in the future the term 'head of household' should be replaced 
by a more specific term, wherever practicable” (Saradamoni 1992:237). 
77  The egalitarian household presented here is probably lower on the group dimension than what has 
been typical for cultural theory. These households are not located in the extreme lower right-hand 
corner of the grid-group diagram, but rather a bit toward the middle (See the discussion in Douglas 
2003). This is probably due to the general individualistic characters in the society. It is also possible 
that the extreme egalitarian households have so strong a boundary around their household that it 
would make it difficult for them to trust an outsider, and thus by self-selection they are opting out 
of the research project. 
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home;78 children can play almost anywhere; because everybody does everything, the 
results are sometimes mediocre;79 there is less emphasis on order, and more on 
displaying the family itself (nostalgic80 mementos from holidays).  
The egalitarian household often presents itself in opposition to the hierarchical and 
individualistic households’ ways of organizing. It often considers the hierarchical 
households hypocritical for their lack of personal consistency—as the reliance on 
social roles in a hierarchy reduces the personal involvement in decision-making, 
and, what is worse, the idea of different spheres of life allows one to have 
conflicting roles (if lived out in the same context). The individualistic households 
are considered inferior in moral issues and lacking the all-important collective 
quality, to the degree, that they seem to be falling apart.  
Where the hierarchical household is guided by tradition, the egalitarian household 
rejects tradition, and is instead guided by its own internal discussions. Typically, 
traditions that emphasize differentiation and rank are rejected or changed in a way 
that emphasizes their unity and equality. Even roles like father and mother are 
subjected to a critical re-evaluation. However, it is quite possible that they end up 
following some traditions, but they would emphasize that it is their own decision.  
The legitimate form of decision-making is a consensual round table discussion—
everybody must be heard, and they prefer to argue until they can obtain agreement. 
The rules and decisions within the egalitarian household are made by its members 
as a collective. Therefore, responsibility is also shared. If things go wrong, they all 
have a part in it.  
The parents consider it positive that the children are included in the decision-
making. It is important that the children internalize the rules and behave because 
they “want” to, and not because they are afraid (as they suspect the children in the 
neighboring hierarchical household to be). However, it is fine to manipulate the 
children into this collective agreement.  
When I call to make an interview appointment, both spouses can talk on behalf of 
the family, and have an overview of the other person’s schedule, but before we can 
make a decision about the time and day, they need to consult their spouse—“Dear, 
is Wednesday evening a good day for us?” 
Success is connected to moral issues—being a good person who lives a morally 
worthy and consistent life. Acceptance in the eyes of the rest of the society is not 
important. As the household is an enclave, it becomes its own judge as to the 
criteria of success and the ultimate source of moral code. Whatever moral code the 
                                                     
78  Where the hierarchical households would have been horrified by the idea of showing their 
bedrooms to me, the egalitarian households took me on a tour showing me every room of the 
house. 
79  Even if one of the family members has better skills in one area, which could result in either higher 
quality or more efficiency, the egalitarian household finds it preferable to share the work.  
80  Caulkins describes nostalgia for places and people as typical of egalitarianism (Caulkins and Weiner 
1998). 
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household follows, it should not contribute to differentiation within the household. 
Therefore, it would actually be a bad thing for one of the members to be more 
moral than the others in the household. It is better to be just as moral as everybody 
else is. 
Where hierarchy is concerned with rank, the egalitarian household is concerned 
with intimacy or closeness. It is a privilege for a guest to be treated as a family 
member (and special treatment would define one as a stranger). They would not put 
much extra care in organizing and cleaning before the guests arrive: it would be like 
putting on a false face. Similarly, as an additional means of underlining everyone’s 
equality, there should not be a large difference between meals served for members 
of the household and meals served for guests.  
The egalitarian household would typically justify women’s equal participation in 
wage labor—it promotes equality both in terms of money and career, but it also 
chances to bring the father back into the house, allowing him greater participation 
in childcare. In Scandinavia, the growth of the welfare state, particularly public 
schooling and provisions for childcare and care of the elderly, allowed women to 
enter the labor market in large numbers. In the 1970s several of these “new” 
families appeared in Norway.  
The egalitarian household is not just an ideal-type, it resembles the ideal household 
of some feminist researchers, for example, the new “shared-roles dual-earner 
family” first presented by Liljestrøm in 1978 (Leira 2002:15-23). Since politics is a 
struggle between the different ways of organizing, family policies typically favor one 
type of household over the three others. From a cultural theoretical viewpoint, 
successful policies cater for all four types of households. 
I will later present two households that rely predominately on the egalitarian way of 
organizing: the Garcia household from Chile (see page 178) and the Herrera 
household, also from Chile (see page 190).  
The Individualistic Household   
The individualistic household is characterized by its looseness—there are few rules 
and few permanent patterns. The household members value their personal freedom 
too much be held back by too many rules. Each member of the household has its 
own social relations—its own social network. Thus, family life has a less privileged 
position in people’s life than in the hierarchical and egalitarian households. They are 
likely to spend less time together with the whole family than the egalitarians, 
because they have their own hobbies and friends.  
Household work is divided according to people’s skills, based on the idea of 
efficiency (results count, not who is doing the job). Therefore, if the mother is the 
best cook, let her cook; if the father is the best mechanic, let him fix the car. 
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However, the opposite could apply, too, if father is the best cook. Nevertheless, the 
division of labor is negotiated between the involved parties. It is not just a tradition 
as in hierarchical households or a collective decision as in egalitarian households. 
Ultimately, household work is subject to negotiations. “What do I get for doing 
these chores?” is a question that would be inappropriate in both hierarchical and 
egalitarian households (though for different reasons). 
While egalitarian households are concerned with equality, individualistic households 
are concerned with self-realization: each and everyone should have the right to live 
out their full potential. Therefore, the mother’s participation in wage labor is 
justified by her right to a career, and, in addition, by the emerging possibilities for 
personal development. 
Where the hierarchical household has a strict division between work and private 
life, the individualists’ social networks do not separate clearly between work and 
leisure. Contacts are things that requires you keep them alive—an occasional cup of 
tea, game of tennis, or trip to the mountain will ensure a good work relationship 
too.  
In individualistic household, the content of most roles is a question of individual 
preference and negotiation, not tradition. Individualistic households share the egali-
tarian household’s preference for making their own choices, and defining their own 
lives as they themselves please.  
Legitimate decisions are bilateral agreements—contracts between the involved 
parties. Everyone should be responsible for themselves and for themselves only. 
The willingness to take responsibility without prior agreement is less frequent than 
in hierarchical and egalitarian households, where you can rely on social roles or 
moral arguments. 
Individualistic household finds results to be important, whereas many rules and 
regulations are nuisances on its path. It often utilizes an “act first, talk later” 
principle. Individualists consider themselves special, worthy of special treatment, 
and, consequently, not deeply bound by rules made by others. Therefore, bending 
the rules a little is not such a bad thing, especially if it produces the best results.  
Success is not connected to roles, as within the hierarchical household, but to good 
results and size and type of social network. Therefore, where the proud hierarchical 
mother would mention that her son is a doctor, the individualistic mother would 
rather qualify her son as a “good” doctor: a successful one, one that gets results, or 
makes money, as money is believed to be a proxy of success.  
Success lacks permanency, and it needs to be displayed constantly. There are two 
principle ways to display success. First, one needs to display the social relations. 
Therefore, being seen with the right people at the right places can be important. 
Second, consumption must be conspicuous If you make lots of money, you must 
be successful; therefore, this money should be spent in a way that is visible to 
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others. Egalitarian household is likely to view this cornucopian consumption style 
as immoral, while the hierarchical one is appalled by the lack of good taste. 
When I call to make an interview appointment, the person on the phone would 
have to check in his or hers calender for a vacant time slot, and the spouse would 
not automatically be included in the interview. “Dear, I have said yes to an 
interview next Wednesday. You can join us if you want.”  
An example of this kind of household would be “the yuppies” in the 1990s. It does 
not seem to represent an ideal for most people, but rather how things have become 
for many families in the majority population in Norway: Parents have their jobs; the 
children have their hobbies. The family eats together if and when their tight 
schedules allow for it, as everybody is busy trying to make as much out of every day 
as possible. Parents do not have direct authority over their children; they cut deals 
with them instead—“If you clean your room, you will get a new cash-card for your 
mobile phone.”  
Research on this kind of household is available in the writings of Becker (1991), 
who looks at the household’s economic behavior, and Verdon (1998), who rejects 
all kinds of collectivistic approaches and takes atomism as an axiomatic principle 
for reasearch on households. However, it is a mistake to assume that all households 
behave like the individualistic household—a view that is supported by research 
pointing toward the development of increasingly different types of families, as 
opposed to a single dominant type (Boh 1989; Syltevik 2000).  
In this thesis three households are presented, who rely predominately on the 
individualistic way of organizing: the Nga household from Vietnam (see page 206), 
the Lorca household from Chile (see page 218), and the Maheswaran household 
from Sri Lanka (see page 231).  
The Fatalistic Household  
The fatalistic household is characterized by being controlled by external events and 
by the randomness of its behavior. It might use rhetoric from one of the other ways 
of life, but if one observes its behavior, it is somewhat random. Typically, this 
happens when forces outside the household control their lives more than they 
themselves manage to do. In these situations, it is rational not to try to stay in 
control, as the costs would be high and the benefits negligible (it knows from 
experience that their plans tend to fail).  
The use of time in a fatalistic household is somewhat random, because of the low 
interest in planning and the low priority assigned to keeping even those few plans 
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they devise. Consequently, it can be very difficult to make interview appointments 
with them.81  
A typical trait is a discrepancy between actual and claimed behavior. The members 
of the household can talk about one kind of division of labor, but in the end it is 
random who does what. They might talk warmly about the traditional holiday meal 
(perhaps indicating hierarchy), but when shopping they fail to get all the ingredients 
and end up making something similar. Inside a fatalist household, one would find 
abandoned projects that are still there taking up space (i.e., a visible of lack of 
completion), lack of order, no clear division of space by activity, and the TV in a 
prominent place (rather than the dining table or another space for people to 
interact). 
One of the households I interviewed, the Siva household, uses the space in their 
apartment in a fatalistic and happily random manner. In the dining room, half of 
the dining table was buried beneath piles of stuff, while the other half was actually 
used for dining, and in the corner of the room stood two large rolled-up carpets. 
Clearly, this room was not just a dining room, it also served as a storage space. In 
addition, a footstool rested upside down (Siva 2002). A hierarchical household 
would never allow for this lack of “order,” especially in the presence of a stranger. 
A busy individualistic household might also be cluttered with ongoing projects, but 
there would be a reason or explanation given. 
The fatalistic household is not very concerned with legitimizing their decision-
making, as decision-making is not a priority—what happens happens. In the same 
manner, the members deflect responsibility by referencing outside events—since it 
was not their own decision, they can hardly be blamed for it, can they?  
Fatalistic household has, in its own view, a healthy fear of social positions and 
power, and contrary to hierarchical and individualistic households, it tries to keep 
its distance.  
Hierarchy puts its faith in systems and skills; egalitarians trust in each other and in 
high moral standards; individualists, on the other hand, count on their own self-
reliance; fatalists, though, trust in luck, as the most likely way to make significant 
progress in life is lottery.  
Planning and economic management, the ability to channel the necessary resources 
to a task, is often seen as a precondition for avoiding problems: 
                                                     
81  As an example, one of the families I interviewed, failed to be at home when I arrived for the 
second interview (Siva 2002). I rescheduled the next day, making a new appointment with the 
father in the house. However, when I arrived the mother in the house greeted me and hoped that it 
would be okay for me to do the interview with her instead. She explained that the mishap the 
previous day was “caused” by their having forgotten to buy something, whereupon remembering 
they had to rush out to the shops before they closed. Lack of trust and low accountability is typical 
for fatalistic cultural bias. 
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Households that have the habit of planning are likely also to be 
future oriented, and to be reasonably confident that they have the 
resources necessary to bring their plans about.  …  Households that 
do not have the confidence to plan at all are probably “problem 
households” not, like these, able to manage a succession of ordinary 
problems one way or another by pulling their various resources 
together. (Wallman 1984:217) 
Fatalistic household is characterized by a lack of trust in the future; there is often a 
lack of planning, or if there are plans, it does not manage to put enough resources 
behind the plans for them to succeed. 
Often fatalistic households are described as focusing on survival, without the luxury 
of having power over their own life. Hence, women’s participation in wage labor is 
not a question of equality or self-realization, but one of necessity. However, I 
believe that this image of fatalism is too pessimistic. Not all fatalistic households are 
struggling to make ends meet; nevertheless, they do share an unpredictable 
environment. 
Fatalistic household is easily considered a failure by the rest of the society, and the 
rate of “failure” is probably higher than in the other ways of life. It might even 
think of itself as failures in life, like the Truongs, who are the only fatalistic 
household presented in this thesis (starting on page 243). However, the fatalistic 
household would more often put the blame on the unpredictability of circumstance 
and the various hardships of the world. Nevertheless, failure is not a defining 
characteristic of a fatalistic household. Rather, failure is one of many sources of 
randomness (and a way to conceptualize external pressures upon the household). 
Another source is the lack of predictable income, common, for example, to many 
artists. They do not know when they are going to sell their next work of art, or how 
many gigs they are playing next month. They might be successful in their line of 
work but the inevitable unpredictability makes it difficult to plan ahead. Instead, 
each day is lived as it comes. 
Fatalism is a fully functional strategy, just like the four other ways of organizing, 
and in some situations the best adaptation to outside events. Particularly, I would 
expect people who become long term clients of the state (dependent on the social 
welfare office) to, little by little, become more and more fatalistic, as significant 
elements of control over their own lives are taken over by social workers. This was 
one of the theoretical hypotheses I wanted to explore, but in my sample, the house-
holds are doing well, and hence their experiences with the social welfare office are 
limited.  
Even if it is not fair, one could draw a caricature of the fatalistic household as the 
lottery-loving, TV-watching, non-voting (what is the point anyway?) household. 
These are the people manipulated by institutions based on to the other ways of 
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organizing82 and often ignored by political scientists (because they neither vote nor 
respond to surveys).  
What is fatalism? 
Fatalism requires a more detailed presentation than the three active ways of 
organizing, because it is less familiar to most people. I will present here two 
discussions regarding fatalism. Firstly, a discussion about the role of belief in fate, 
and, secondly, a discussion about distinguishing fatalism from a subordinate 
position in a hierarcy. 
There has been disagreement amongst cultural theorists concerning the content of 
fatalism: specifically, what is the nature of the isolates—are they really fatalists or 
not? 
Douglas claims that labeling isolates as fatalists masks the real causal direction:  
Their belief that nothing that they can do will change events, is a 
ploy, a justification for their not having views and not going out to 
demonstrate or take political office.  The symptoms of fatalism are claims 
to justify withdrawal, they result from isolation and they uphold it.  At some 
point everyone has to be a fatalist (Douglas 1998b:12. Italics by EO) 
The counter position is taken by Wildavsky: 
It was Wildavsky who insisted that the cognitive style of what Mary 
[Douglas] calls isolates or “atomized subordinates” is always and 
everywhere fatalism, strictu senso.  In much of her writing, Mary has 
suggested that isolates’ thought styles are eclectic, non-coherent, 
limited in reflexivity, conservative in tastes only through lack of 
experience rather than principle, difficult to generalize about, and so 
on… 83  
The belief in fate does not seem to be the most important trait; rather, it is the 
randomness, which could be explained by several factors. First, isolates, or fatalists, 
are heavily influenced or controlled by outside forces, so their plans often fail. 
Second, since it makes less sense to make plans, they plan less (or just in the very 
short term). Third, since they lack the power to enforce commitments they are 
likely to avoid social commitments. In sum, there is less order and more 
randomness.  
                                                     
82  The hierarchical social welfare system justifies its own existence by providing help for these 
“needy” people. The individualistic businesses create afternoon soap operas to capture the fatalistic 
housewives as a special market segment. And the egalitarian moralists complain about the fatalists 
being exploited by the immoral individualists and falling through the bureaucratic safety net. (Thus, 
if there were no fatalits, the egalitarians would have invented some, in order to blame the others). 
83  Email from Perry 6 to the cultural theory discussion group at November 22nd 2002. 
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Thompson, in agreement with Douglas, claims that isolate households often try to 
present themselves to the outside world as if they belong to one of the three other 
ways of life.84 For example, they might talk a lot about the importance of upholding 
traditions, but if you look closely enough at what they actually do, they do not 
succeed in this. Their lives have too many little random episodes that change the 
content of the traditions. In some sense, the will is there, but the ability is not 
(either through a lack of “self-discipline” or they are controlled too much by 
outside forces).  
To summarize, today’s understanding of isolates is in conflict with Wildavsky’s 
understanding, which saw belief in fate as the key. Isolates are better understood as 
random in behavior and opinion, non-coherent in tastes and styles, and as having 
social relations with low levels of internal commitment, which leaves them without 
reliable support. Belief in fate does occur among isolates, but it should not be used 
as the only trait distinguishing them from other ways of organizing, as it is 
something used to justify their present situation.  
The second discussion focuses on the fatalistic belief in a lack of personal control. 
How is this kind of position different from the lowest rank in a hierarchical social 
organization, where people constantly tell you what to do, how to dress and so 
forth? 
One difference has to do with social solidarities, or helping each other. You can ask 
a fatalistic household for help, but you do not know if you will get any. If he or she 
has the possibility to help, they often will, but it is an option, not something 
mandatory. In a hierarchical social structure, the social relations and roles one 
possesses also define the rights and obligations one has. It should be clear to 
everyone what kinds of claims for help can be made, by whom, and in which 
situations. If one does not help, when help is mandated, one’s social position is 
endangered, which creates a strong incentive to help (or to fulfill any commitment). 
For an isolate, the situation is asymmetric: they have obligations, but only few 
rights. They might be forced to fulfill obligations (by the other ways of life), but 
they are left without the means to force others to fulfill their obligations. In some 
sense, each person is on his or her own.  
There are hence several distinctions between a low rank hierarchy and isolate social 
positions. During a change, one can also imagine a situation where the group starts 
to break apart either from the top or the bottom. This could happen starting from 
the top if the higher ranks do not fulfill their obligations. For example, the higher 
ranks can decide to cut off their obligations towards some lower ranks, making 
them unwilling but de facto isolates. An example of bottom-up breakdown would 
be the corrosion of trust: if the lower ranks do not believe that they are taken care 
of, they might stop fulfilling their part of the commitments. This particular 
variation can be seen as a perverted form of hierarchy. Based on cultural theory, I 
would expect that such social organization is not stable, and strong measures are 
                                                     
84  Personal communication 18.11.2002. 
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needed to keep it working, which in extreme cases could mean the use of violence 
to ensure compliance.  
Four Kinds of Helping Relations—the Four Solidarities  
Social relations can be described in many ways. I narrow the discussion concerning 
social relations by focusing on the social rules guiding the flow of help through 
external social relations. Cultural theory claims that the obligations and rights 
people have rise out of their social relations. Social relations have embedded in 
them sets of rules and norms, which define responsibilities and rights, and which 
channel and control the flow of help. In short, social relations carry help. These 
helping relations can be structured in several ways. Each of the four ways of 
organizing carries its particular form of solidarity, which defines who is eligible for 
what kind of help and for what reasons. Hence, my use of the concept of solidarity 
is more narrow than Thompson and Rayner’s, as they present the four solidarities 
and four ways of life as interchangeable concepts (1998).85 Nevertheless, I have 
chosen to use the term way of organizing to describe the households’ internal 
organization and the organization of the flow of help through external social 
relations. Therefore, in my use of the term, solidarities are a component of a 
household’s way of organizing.  
The stratified collectives (hierarchies) use hierarchical solidarity. It is one’s social status 
that determines who is helping whom and in what ways. There is no need for 
symmetrical exchanges because the collective takes care of its own (provided each 
member acts appropriately; that is, in the manner specified by his or her rank and 
stature). The participants contributing resources do so because it is the right thing 
to do; they are helping others in order to build or sustain a community. They do 
not expect repayment, and will deny that they are helping others in order to gain 
repayment. However, it is likely that the people who can control significant 
resources in the community will soon have a high status position in this 
community. In this sense, repayment is in the form of status and respect from other 
community members. This kind of help is also ritualized in various ways. People 
will know what is required of them to be eligible for help, and the helpers know 
when they “have to help.” 
The bounded collectives (enclaves) use egalitarian solidarity. Membership in the group 
is the important trait for releasing resources. All members are treated equally, thus 
position is not important. The group members help each other collectively; there is 
                                                     
85  There is a discussion concerning what is at the core of cultural theory. Mary Douglas claims that 
the social relations have primacy (even if only in a modest degree), whereas Thompson and Rayner 
(1998) claim that social relations do not have primacy. The latter have proposed the use of the 
term solidarity instead of the term way of life, because emphasizes cultural theory’s focus on 
process and its the dynamic character, and it ties cultural theory to the tradition of Durkheim, 
Maine, and Tönnies. 
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a form of internal altruism. There is no expectation of repayment, because helping 
group members is like an investment, it will contribute to the common good. 
Moreover, because the difference between common good and private good is not 
that great, the “cost” of participation does not become apparent. Providing help 
outside the primary group is a way to express equality—we are all the same. 
The individualistic solidarity is characterized by ego-focused networks. There is no 
“membership” that grants access to the resources; access is based on personalized 
contacts and symmetrical exchange. Behavior here is more instrumental, as the role 
of the collective is marginal. Even if there is not an elaborate social stratification as 
in the hierarchical solidarity, social status is sought. Not all transactions are between 
equals. The network size and one’s network-centrality create the basis for an 
individual’s success and social status. Even if the relations here resemble market 
relations, one should distinguish them from regular trade, because in a regular 
market, the means of trade are monetary. In an individualistic social system, other 
mechanisms often apply. People do help each other, and they expect something in 
return, but the time frame is looser and the form of return is not necessarily 
determined when the first transfer of resources takes place. Trust, therefore, is 
important. A good business relationship between two merchants can build up 
individualistic solidarity between them. However, we can find this kind of solidarity 
almost everywhere where small services between friends are exchanged; it is by no 
means limited to markets. We all have done small deals between friends: “I will 
baby-sit your children, if I can use your car.”  
The isolates have a problem with solidarity; at least that is how fatalistic solidarity 
looks from the outside, as the level of voluntary commitment in social relations is 
low. Their lives are largely controlled by outside forces, and their opportunities to 
make their own choices are limited. Therefore, making commitments becomes 
impossible; or, rather, it becomes impossible to keep commitments. Consequently, 
they do not expect others to their keep commitments either. This does not mean 
that there are not resources that flow between households; just that the obligations 
regarding who should help who and how much are not fixed. The starting 
assumption is that one’s choices are restricted. However, if there is an opening 
when help is called for, help might be given. There is no reason to assume that 
isolates are any less generous than those in the other ways of life, which stories of 
extreme generosity by isolates confirm. The important aspect is that you cannot 
trust that your friends will be there for you when you need them. It is possible that 
they will help, but you just do not know—maybe they will, maybe they will not. 
There is research pointing toward this kind of social support system. Wellman 
writes, “many community ties are not supportive. … These ties are purely 
sociable—or even destructive” (Wellman 1982:75). 
Fatalistic solidarity is characterized by the lack of dependable social support. 
Isolates do, of course, have friends and ties to other people, but these ties do not 
translate into obligations.  
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Therefore, each of the four ways of life corresponds with one form of solidarity 
that determines who helps who, in which ways, as well as what triggers such help 
and how it is justified. These mechanisms are important in defining the social 
relations people have. All of us have experienced discussions where there is 
disagreement concerning help and its repayment. Let us say that person A helps 
person B. Person B can suggest a suitable repayment. If A accepts this it could 
indicate individualistic solidarity. If A refuses, A is trying to convert the transferred 
resource into a social bond and obligation upon B, which could then pull B into a 
system of hierarchical or egalitarian solidarity. It is also possible that B does not 
offer a repayment, hence rejecting the individualistic solidarity and implicitly 
claiming that the relation between A and B is such that either egalitarian or 
hierarchical solidarity should be applied. All these alternatives are likely to create 
tension and make the relation between A and B unstable over time. 
Negative Consequences of Social Capital 
One of Portes’ important additions to the Social Capital literature86 is the emphasis 
on the negative consequences of Social Capital. Most studies, so far, have 
emphasized the positive aspects of Social Capital and downplayed that social 
relations also have negative aspects.87  
Recent studies have identified at least four negative consequences of 
social capital: exclusion of outsiders, excess claims on group 
members, restrictions on individual freedoms, and downward 
leveling of norms. (Portes 1998:15) 
How do these four negative consequences relate to cultural theory? First, the 
exclusion of outsiders is a negative consequence connected to the hierarchical and 
egalitarian solidarity, both of which are based upon the formation of groups or 
collectives. It is impossible to create an us without simultaneously excluding them. 
There are of course different degrees of exclusion and different rules governing 
entry into the group, and it is these that one should look at, not at the principle of 
exclusion itself, if one hopes to improve the situation for those presently excluded.  
Second, the excessive claims aspect is recognized in relation to entrepreneurship in 
that it makes it difficult to create successful firms. In cultural theory terms, it is an 
argument claiming that individualistic behavior is difficult when crowded by social 
relations that are hierarchical or egalitarian:  
                                                     
86  The origins of social capital is often contributed to Bourdieu, Loury, Coleman and Putnam (Portes 
1995; Putnam 2000; Woolcock 1998; Woolcock and Narayan 2000) 
87  Portes attributes this to sociologists wanting to fix positive traits to our sociability and negative 
traits to “homo economicus” (Portes 1998:15). 
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Weber … stressed the importance of impersonal economic 
transactions guided by the principle of universalism as one of the 
major reasons for Puritan entrepreneurial success.  Thus, cozy 
intergroup relation of the kind found in highly solidary communities 
can give rise to a gigantic free-riding problem, as less diligent 
members enforce on the more successful all kinds of demands 
backed by a shared normative structure. (Portes 1998:16) 
Granovetter similarly recognizes the negative effects of social relations: Excessive 
claims can be detrimental to entrepreneurship, as it heavily limits the possibility of 
reinvesting any profit.  
More generally, immigrants have an advantage over natives in 
achieving the right balance between what might be called “coupling” 
and “decoupling”.  Chinese in China, despite the obvious presence 
of Chinese culture, can suffer from excessive claims [from kin].  
Thus Won suggest that it has been typical of entrepreneurs in China 
to “leave their native homes to conduct business” so that “relatives 
will not be abundant in the communities in which they work” 
(Granovetter 1995:145). 
A firm that has to employ a large number of relatives might be burdened by 
employees who are loyal, but not necessarily the best ones for the job at hand. 
Relatives are also more difficult to get rid of, making it more difficult to adapt to 
changes in the market situation. In addition, as in the case of the Herreras, 
excessive claims from relatives make it tempting to hide one’s wealth (see page 
194).  
Third, the limits on individual freedom are integral to both isolation and 
hierarchies. These social relations put many demands upon the ways people should 
behave. That is what high-grid is about. One could also ask whether egalitarian 
groups put lots of limitations on individual freedom. Typically, in an unstructured 
group, the limitations are few, or at least they are consensual. One can hardly 
consider self-made rules to be severe limitations on individual freedom. However, 
in extreme egalitarian enclaves, like some religious sects (Sivan 1995), there are 
severe constrains on individual freedoms. 
The fourth negative consequence—downward leveling of norms—is typical for 
enclaves. An example could be a socially excluded ethnic group that creates its own 
measures of success that separate it even further from the majority population.  
While the development of social relations that carry obligations is needed to create 
predictability in the flow of resources, which again has numerous positive 
consequences, one should not fall into the pastoral syndrome, where researchers 
… nostalgically compare contemporary community networks with 
the well-integrated solidarity networks supposed prevalent in pre-
industrial communities. (Wellman 1982:69)  
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There is nothing inherently better about any type of solidarity or way of organizing, 
as there are many ways to build a good community. Nevertheless, one should keep 
in mind that there are always negative consequences to social organization. 
Wellman pointedly reminds us that “Communities are not necessarily nice things” 
(1982:78). 
Cultural theory subsumes the different sources of social capital (Portes 1995). 
Enforcable trust is a result of the hierarchical way of organizing. Bounded solidarity 
results from egalitarian organizing. Reciprocity is typical for individualistic way of 
organizing. Value introjection is part of cultural biases in every way of life. Now 
that we have seen how ways of organizing can be operationalized in relation to 
households’ internal life and their helping relations, it is time to turn to their views 
of politics and society. 
Predicting Views about Society and Politics 
People’s values, opinions, and understandings of how society and politics work are 
central topics in political science. Cultural theory gives many predictions about 
these issues, and the main goal for Part I of this thesis is to study how much we can 
understand of migrant households’ views about politics, society, justice and so 
forth, if we know their way of organizing the household. Cultural theory claims that 
the origin of preferences are the social relations people have:  
Preferences are formed from the most basic desire of human 
beings—how we wish to live with other people and others to live 
with us.  ”The real moment of choosing,” as Mary Douglas puts it, 
”is ... choice of comrades and their way of life.”  From this choice 
about how to relate to other people are derived the myriad 
preferences that make up everyday life. (Thompson, Ellis, and 
Wildavsky 1990:57)  
There are empirical and theoretical reasons to expect that households’ relations to 
public and political institutions are influenced by their way of organizing. Lotte 
Jensen, who has studied social housing in Denmark, emphasizes how different ways 
of organizing provide people with democratic skills and experiences:  
Experiencing a specific way of life is at the same time learning its 
techniques and mastering the skills needed to cope with particular 
social interactions and situations  (Jensen 1999:174). 
I claim that home is perhaps the most important arena for learning these skills. By 
understanding the migrants’ ways of organizing at home, we have much better tools 
for understanding their behavior in the society at large. A study of migrant 
households is a necessary step in understanding the processes involved in adapting 
to life in a new country and becoming a member of the civic society and polity. 
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Ways of organizing can be used to describe a households’ preferences, which are 
then confronted with its experiences with the welfare states institutions. 
Experiences must be interpreted and made sense of, a process influenced by 
cultural bias. Therefore, the four ways of organizing are intermeshed with political 
behavior on many levels: they influence preferences, they define common sense, 
they teach people social skills, and they influence the interpretation of their 
experiences. 
Patterns of Common Sense  
Political ideologies are sometimes defined as consisting of a view of human nature 
and the ideal society, a description of the present society, and roadmap for how to 
get from the present society to the ideal society. Even if I have no aspirations to 
describe the four cultural biases as political ideologies, cultural biases cover many of 
the same topics and offer an alternative approach for describing how regular people 
reason.  
Reasoning about political issues is often based more on common sense than deep 
or detailed knowledge of the issues (Lakoff 2006, 1996, 1987; Douglas 1986). 
Common sense is shared; which makes it a phenomenon that can be described with 
the help of cultural theory. In order to narrow the discussion I will present, under 
four headings, predictions based on the four ways of organizing. Under the first 
heading I discuss views of human nature, understanding of the role of institutions, 
source of sovereignty and trust. The second encompasses the scope and nature of 
the democratic game and the private-public boundary. Under the third heading I 
discuss what constitutes justice and fairness. And the fourth heading contains views 
concerning distribution of resources, social support, and blame. 
Some of these predictions are based solely on theoretical arguments about cultural 
biases, while others have solid empirical evidence backing them up. My role is to 
select some previously stated ideas, systematize them, and use them to make 
predictions about how migrant households look at the world outside. I am 
particularly indebted to the compilation, by Hofstetter, of fifty-seven predictions 
based on cultural theory (1998:55).  
Human Nature, Role of Institutions, Sovereignty and Trust 
For a political scientist, perhaps the most useful predictions concern human nature 
and the role of institutions, in that these are central features of many political 
arguments. The predictions I have mentioned in the first chapter (on page 9), will 
be here laid out in more detail. As the reader will see, the four ways of organizing 
supply four quite different views concerning human nature, the role of institutions, 
what is the sovereign, and what can be trusted. 
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Table 4: Human Nature, Institutions and Trust 
Predictions Hierarchical Egalitarian Individualistic Fatalistic 
Concept of human 
nature (1) 
Sinful, but 
malleable 
Born good  Self-seeking March of 
destiny 
View of institutions Trusting Skeptical Limiting private 
freedom 
Careful 
Trust (2) Procedures Participation Successful 
individuals 
Low 
Sovereignty (2) Institution Collective Consumer Who cares? 
Source: Hofstetter (1998:55) refers to (1) Thompson, Ellis , and Wildavsky (1990) and (2) Rayner (1991). 
 
Hierarchical 
The hierarchical household is likely to view human nature as weak. As some might 
say, “we are born sinful.” A lack of trust in human nature could be a problem, if 
there were not trust in strong institutions. Because human nature is weak, we need 
to subject ourselves to the control of strong institutions that form us into good 
citizens and “loyal subjects to the crown,” as some might say. Institutions teach 
people what their proper place in society is (something that some people need help 
to understand) and help to enforce order in society. Without institutions like 
churches, schools, courts, police, and the army the country would be in chaos.  
Hierarchists trust authority.  They trust the wisdom and knowledge 
of those who fill the clearly demarcated positions within the 
stratified whole, confident that they will do all they can not to 
disgrace those positions (and that they will get their well-deserved 
come-uppances if they do).  ...  Trust is thus primarily directed 
upwards, thereby granting its downward counterpart, deference.  
Institutions, rules and procedures that work with this vertical 
grain—maintaining status distinctions, order and stability, thereby 
shaping citizens into responsible and loyal subjects—are trusted, 
and those that work against this grain—those that seek to institute 
equality of opportunity (individualism) or equality of outcome (egali-
tarianism)—are distrusted. (Molenaers and Thompson 1999:191) 
Institutions are the carriers of sovereignty. No single individual should be given 
powers that can threaten institutional traditions. Institutions and rules are there to 
limit people’s power and freedom, and to ensure that even the King does the “right 
thing”—the King is an institution—not a person with large powers.  
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A hierarchy installs countervailing powers: the husband balanced by 
the wife, the lord by the bishop, Emperor’s secular power balancing 
Pope’s spiritual authority, Registrar and Matron facing each other in 
the hospital.  A big school may have two or more heads of houses 
who can combine to confront the headmaster.  Industrial units may 
have the general manager balanced by the project manager. 
(Douglas 2002a:18) 
Obviously a hierarchical household is expected to trust institutions and the 
guidance given by institutions. The solution to many problems is to increase the 
power of institutions. Collective action is trusted under proper leadership. 
Egalitarian 
The egalitarian household is quite different. It believes that humans are born good, 
but corrupted by institutions—overly competitive markets and rigid hierarchical 
institutions break down the good in people. Institutions are evaluated according to 
how they promote equality through ideology and practice. Most institutions are not 
to be trusted; they are effective tools in the wrong hands.  
Egalitarians trust those who have not been corrupted by inequitable 
and power-hungry institutions: markets and hierarchies.  Convinced 
that humans are essentially caring and sharing, they strive to 
promote conditions where these qualities can blossom: equality of 
condition, decentralization, symmetrical exchanges, small-scale 
enterprises and so on.  Anything that is seen as horizontalising is 
trusted; anything that is seen as working against that horizontal 
grain—markets, top-down structures, concentrations of wealth and 
power, and ”bench science” (”you can never change just one thing” 
is the founding assumption in the holistic science that upholds egali-
tarianism) —are distrusted. (Molenaers and Thompson 1999:192) 
Egalitarian household is a believer in collective action, just like a hierarchical 
household, but it prefers a direct form of collective action, which it sees as the only 
reliable way of getting things done. Sovereignty belongs to the collective, not an 
institution with traditions, but the group of people that together form the 
collective.88 The collective can make their own rules, and they are not bound by 
traditions or rules that limit their powers. Egalitarians will often see increasing 
equality as the solution to problems, and would like to convert many hierarchical 
institutions to more their own liking.  
                                                     
88  There are also other, more extreme, forms of egalitarian institution building, like some religious 
sects that manage to institutionalize their egalitarian structure (Sivan 1995). 
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Individualistic 
The individualistic household is expected to view people as strong, resourceful, and 
fundamentally selfish, while institutions and the numerous rules limit people’s 
freedom to make use of the available resources.  
Individualists trust others until they give them reason not to: the 
”tit-for-tat” strategy that is uninvadeable in the iterated Prisoner’s 
Dilemma game.  They are therefore great cooperators, which makes 
nonsense of the idea that there is a polarity between competition 
and cooperation.  In consequence, individualists are inclined to 
distrust the state when it is perceived as an intervening, freedom-
limiting force.  Indeed, they distrust all forces (they can be egali-
tarian as well as hierarchical) that tend to solve problems through 
extensive regulation and control.  Individualists trust experts on the 
basis of their ”track-records” rather than their diplomas, degrees 
and certificates and, most of all, they will trust those arrangements 
that seek to harness man’s self-seeking nature for the benefit of all: 
markets.  They are happiest with guidance from the hidden hand, 
rather than the all-too-visible hands of hierarchy and egalitarianism.  
However, some non-market institutions are trusted by individualists: 
those that enforce the law of contract, without which transaction 
costs would spiral to the point where their beloved markets failed.  
An alliance between individualism and hierarchy is therefore quite 
workable, provided that the hierarchical solidarity confines itself to 
this law enforcing role (which, of course, it won’t). (Molenaers and 
Thompson 1999:191) 
The individualistic household is not a believer in collective action. It believes, 
ultimately, as Margaret Thatcher put it: “There is no such thing as society” 
(Thatcher 1987). The individualists trust the market and Adam Smith’s hidden 
hand, which ensures that the added up results of these private acts are for the 
common good. Their main solution is to increase competition and let the market 
sort things out. This is their method for evaluating institutions based on their 
results. Traditions that are not effective should be allowed to die out. In this sense, 
the true sovereign within the individualistic way of organizing is the individual 
consumer/producer acting in his own self-interest.  
Fatalistic 
Where each of these three active ways of organizing look on their own solution as 
the best one, the fatalistic household is likely to view them all as equally misguided, 
as it knows that the world is a random and dangerous place that cannot be trusted. 
Its views are more random, and it is difficult to find characteristics that can be used 
to define it. One candidate is low levels of trust in other people. If you cannot trust 
your own ability to implement your plans, you expect the same of your fellow 
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humans, too. Thus, the importance of voluntary commitments is low. It is only 
natural to expect that others also suffer from similar unexpected blows of bad luck, 
or conversely, strokes of good luck. Consequently, collective action is a waste of 
time; it is better to just stay home.  
Fatalists are ”fickle isolates,” convinced that people are not to be 
trusted and that nature operates without rhyme or reason.  “Defect 
first”—winning strategy in the one-off Prisoners dilemma game—
makes perfect sense in the fatalist’s social context.  ”It doesn’t 
matter who you vote for,” they tell themselves, to the never-ending 
dismay of those who belong to the three other solidarities, ”the 
government always gets in.” (Molenaers and Thompson 1999:192) 
Institutions are not built upon the fatalistic logic, therefore they are something 
different and strange that cannot be trusted. Institutions are powerful actors that 
can at any time turn their attention toward the household, which is not likely to be 
positive—getting the attention of the headmaster, police, or tax-revenue service 
never leads to any good, or have you heard of anyone who got his money back after 
a tax audit. The best course of action is to keep one’s head down. Questions of 
sovereignty are irrelevant for the fatalist, as the only thing that one can really trust is 
the unpredictability of the world. 
The Scope and Nature of the Democratic Game, and the Private-
Public Boundary 
Each of the four ways of organizing has a different view of what democracy is 
about, and where the boundary between the private and public should be. An 
overview of this is presented in Table 5. 
Hierarchical 
The hierarchical view of political decision-making is captured by Jensen in the 
following manner: “We are entitled to decide what they must do.  They are entitled to 
decide what we must do.” (Jensen 1999:177)  
The differentiation of roles does include differentiation of political decision-
making, which gives two different views, depending on one’s position in life. The 
authority to make decisions belongs to only a few people, who can legitimately 
make decisions about what others must do.  
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Table 5: The Scope and Nature of the Democratic Game  
 Hierarchical Egalitarian Individualistic Fatalistic 
Collective 
action 
Under proper 
leadership 
Only reliable way What is in it for 
me?  
Inefficient, 
carrying dead 
weight 
No point 
Political 
decision-
making89 
We are entitled to 
decide what they 
must do, 
They are entitled 
to decide what we 
must do 
We decide what we 
want to do 
I decide what I 
want to do 
They decide 
what I must 
do 
Scope of 
democratic 
game90 
Limited to the 
public sphere 
As encompassing 
as possible to 
minimize influence 
of others 
As limited as 
possible to 
maximize 
individual 
influence 
As limited as 
possible to 
minimize the 
influence of 
others 
Actor role Rule-based 
decision maker 
Participate in 
collective 
decisions, mediate 
individual ideas 
and communal 
purposes,  create a 
communal sprit 
Make individual 
decisions, 
alliances, or exit 
Wait for 
decisions 
made by 
others 
Capabilities 
required 
Formal authority, 
knowledge of 
roles and rules 
and their 
appropriate 
interpretation 
Empathy, ability to 
grasp complex 
information, 
formulate views, 
and negotiate 
Entry fee, self-
confidence, 
bargaining skills 
Obedience, 
indifference 
 
For the same reasons that they approve putting people and products 
in their properly ordered place, hierarchists approve of 
differentiating the public and private spheres.  They frequently 
harbor an expansive view of state functions, hence their conflict 
with individualists, but they insist, contra the egalitarians, that 
politics is not for everyone and everyday for the rest of us, but 
rather reserved for a qualified and privileged few full-timers and for 
one day every four or five years.  Where hierarchists draw the line 
between the public and private will vary, but the boundary is likely 
to be well defined. (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:217) 
Politics is seen as a set of rules that everyone must follow, which ensures that 
decisions are made in a proper manner. The role of the actor is that of rules-based 
decision-maker. The capabilities required by the participants are possession of 
formal authority, knowledge of roles, rules and their appropriate interpretation 
(Jensen 1999:177).  
                                                     
89  (Jensen 1999:174) 
90  The source is Jensen (1999:177). However, because of an improved understanding of hierarchy 
since her publication, I have changed the hierarchy from all encompassing, to a limited scope.  
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I believe that Jensen’s view of hierarchical politics as all encompassing (Jensen 
1999:177) is not precisely formulated, as a hierarchical household divides the world 
into different spheres with different rules. Hierarchical politics can indeed reach 
most areas of life, but there are clear limits for the reach of political powers—there 
are other sources of authority in society, like religious authorities, who have their 
own independent areas of power.  
Egalitarian 
The egalitarian take on political decision-making can be summarized as follows: 
“We are entitled to decide what we want to do.” (Jensen 1999:177) 
As sovereignty is given to the collective, the collective becomes the only legitimate 
body that can make decisions on their behalf.  
Egalitarianism is characterized by the absence of externally defined 
mechanisms for conflict mediation.  Since there are no externally 
imposed rules to justify preferring one perspective over others, or to 
define one role as more authorative than another, the only road to 
group coherence is negotiation. (Jensen 1999:175) 
The lack of rules and dependence on negotiations often leads to long and difficult 
discussions. According to Jensen, the participants are required to involve 
themselves in collective decisions, mediate individual ideas and communal 
purposes. The capabilities required for participation are, firstly, the capacity to 
empathize, as well as the ability to grasp complex information, articulate views, and 
negotiate. Participation is indeed challenging. However, there is one important 
mechanism that helps the group to achieve consensus—the norms of equality—
there is a strong pressure in the group for conformity.  
Where hierarchy divides the world into several spheres, each with their own set of 
rules, egalitarians reject this: 
Egalitarians desire to reduce the distinction between the political 
and nonpolitical.  Defining the family or firm as nonpolitical or 
private, egalitarians believe, is a way of concealing and hence 
perpetuating unequal power relations.  Egalitarians view the public 
sphere, in which all can actively participate and give their consent to 
collective decisions, as the realm in which the good life can best be 
realized. (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:216) 
Because egalitarians give the collective sovereignty, and reject rules limiting the use 
of powers, they can aspire to control all areas of life in society. In other words, the 
boundary between public and private becomes unclear and the public sphere can, at 
least in theory, grow to overtake private spaces. The scope of the democratic game 
is as encompassing as possible to minimize the influence of others. 
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Individualistic 
The individualistic idea of political decision-making can be summarized as: “I 
decide what I want to do.” (Jensen 1999:177) 
Collective decision-making is discarded and replaced with individual self-regulation. 
Because the individualists seek to replace authority with self-
regulation they are continually accusing others of politicizing issues.  
Their interest is in defining politics as narrowly as possible so as to 
maximize behavior that is considered private, and thus beyond the 
reach of governmental regulation.  Hence their reluctance to admit 
that the egalitarian charge that private resources influence public 
decision making, for this admission would imply capitulation. 
(Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:216) 
The individualistic view of the proper scope for the democratic game is that 
political decision-making should be limited as much as possible to the maximization 
of individual influence and freedom.  
The individualistic households want to keep their options open: they prefer to make 
individual decisions, and to make their own alliances, instead of being told what to 
do. At the same time, they like to keep an exit open, just in case. A primary 
capability required for an individualistic form of democratic participation is the 
ability to pay the entry fee (nobody should be joining the game for free). In 
addition, you need a good portion of self-confidence to make your own alliances 
and decisions, and you need bargaining skills in order to cut the best deals (Jensen 
1999:177).  
Fatalistic 
The fatalistic view of political decision-making is that “They decide what we must 
do.”  (Jensen 1999:177)  
While the three previous views of political decision-making provided at least some 
impetus for political participation, here people do not have much reason for even 
selecting their representatives.  
Fatalism and individualism are forms of individualized action.  
Individualism builds on the active choice of personal alliances.  
Fatalism, by contrast, builds on the absence of choice, the absence 
of alliances, and hence the absence of supportive networks.  (Jensen 
1999:175) 
It is a rather dark view, and all the other ways of organizing are trying to “help” the 
fatalists to change their lives, while the fatalists see no point in this project. 
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If egalitarians see the political sphere as the realm in which human 
beings most fully realize their potential, fatalists regard the political 
with nothing but fear and dread.  Fatalists respond to their plight by 
trying to get as far away from the harm’s way as possible.  Unlike 
individualists, however, fatalists do not discriminate sharply between 
the private and the public spheres.  Whether called public or private, 
the blows come without apparent pattern or meaning.  The task of 
fatalists becomes  personal or at most familial survival, and they 
cope as best they can without trying to distinguish between the 
sources of their difficulties. (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 
1990:217) 
The fatalists would prefer to keep the scope of politics as limited as possible to 
minimize the influence others have on their lives. The fatalistic citizens do one 
thing—they wait for others to make the decisions. The capabilities needed for a 
fatalistic style of democratic participation are obedience and indifference (Jensen 
1999:177).  
Ideas of Justice and Fairness 
Ideas of justice and fairness are central elements in a cultural bias, which justifies 
both behavioral patterns and the social relations.  
Hierarchy views fairness as equality before the law. As long as everybody is treated 
according to the rules, they are treated properly. People are not necessarily treated 
the same, for it is quite possible that several sets of rules might apply. Justice is 
about applying the rules without bias. Laws are contracts we are bound by.  
The egalitarian collectives find this view unjust, as they consider justice to be equality 
of result. People have different abilities to act upon their rights. Rules that in reality 
sustain inequalities are not fair. People have rights that are more fundamental than 
the contractual approach promoted by hierarchy. 
The individualistic view of fairness posits an equality of opportunity. Everybody should 
have a fair chance, and those who work hard should, obviously, be rewarded. 
People are lazy and one must not reward laziness. Justification is based on results—
not rights or contracts—and removing incentives will lead to the decline of society.  
The fatalistic bias lacks a consistent view of fairness and justice. However, one 
could say that neither is expected. 
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Distribution of Resources, Social Support and Blame 
Political beliefs concerning the distribution of resources are connected to beliefs 
about nature and to the understanding of what is a resource. Norway is a welfare 
state known for taking care of the weak. I will focus on the households’ views of 
social support: who should get it, how do they justify giving it, who should receive 
it, and what kind of consequences does it have for the receiver. Justifying the 
provision of support is closely connected to blaming. These two arguments enforce 
each other—it is when one can point out the source of a problem, that one knows 
what kind of support needs to be given. 
Table 6:  Distribution of Resources, Social Support and Blame  
 Hierarchical Egalitarian Individualistic Fatalistic 
View of 
Nature 
Robust within 
boundaries 
Fragile Robust Unpredictable 
Scope of 
knowledge 
Almost complete 
and organized 
Imperfect 
but holistic 
Sufficient and 
timely 
Irrelevant 
Distribution of 
resources 
Carefully planned 
according to 
one’s position 
and 
responsibilities 
Resources 
are limited.  
Therefore, it 
is important 
to share 
them equally 
Resources are 
limited only by 
human ingenuity 
and public 
regulations.  Free 
enterprise and 
production is 
more important 
than distribution 
 
Social Support For the deserving 
poor only.  I am 
an accountable 
citizen 
Positive Makes people lazy Yes, please 
Blame (5) The victim The system The non-
productive 
individual (or 
extreme 
distortions of the 
market) 
It is the poor 
that get the 
blame 
 
Hierarchical 
Hierarchy views nature as having boundaries, and as the source of resources. Both 
nature and society are orderly entities that can be understood by experts. Therefore, 
it is a sound course of action to allow experts to make solid plans regarding how to 
harvest resources from nature without destroying it, and to have experts to draft 
plans for how the resources should be distributed in the society. We know from 
earlier that hierarchy is keen on differentiation, using rules to limit competition and 
to create order, and justice is about following the rules. People are not merely 
acting their roles; they are living them. It should not come as a surprise then that 
hierarchy blames those individuals who break the rules: deviant individuals who do 
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not follow the rules, and even worse, who by their behavior demonstrate that the 
roles and rules that are so central in the hierarchical construction of the world are 
not absolute. Who is looked upon as deviant differs from society to society, but a 
hierarchy needs its deviants. This is one way to understand why so many 
fundamentalist religious groups—whether Christian, Islamic, or Jewish—have 
problems with homosexuals, single mothers, or others that do not fit neatly into the 
“order.”  
In a hierarchy, it becomes natural to support those people who are not breaking the 
rules, and to punish those who are eroding the social order. Giving and receiving 
help is one way to emphasize peoples’ positions and responsibilities. The other 
ways of organizing sometimes accuse hierarchy of blaming the victim. Hierarchy 
has a strong moral commitment to helping the deserving poor (like widows, 
orphans, and morally worthy individuals who have lost their jobs), while those 
deviants who have brought the misery upon themselves (like drug addicts, 
criminals, and weirdoes) should not get help. Therefore, you need an elaborate 
system of rules to determine who should get help and who should not, and of 
course, you need the professional helpers who enforce these rules. We can see how 
hierarchy prefers to create a strong institution to help the weak. 
Sacrifices for the greater good are viewed as a triumph by hierarchy. A good person 
should always put the good of the collective, which usually equals the good of the 
institutions, before his or her own good. 
Egalitarian 
The egalitarian view of nature is that it is fragile and limited. Fragility means that it 
can easily lose its balance, while it is practically impossible to know the limits for a 
safe utilization of resources. Therefore, caution is necessary, and one should err on 
the safe side.  
Similarly, resources in a society are limited, and since justice is about end-equality, 
they should be shared justly, which, of course, is equally. Everybody should be able 
to have their share, regardless of their starting point in society. Because everyone is 
equal, it does not make any sense that some people are more qualified than others 
to make decisions about distribution. This power belongs to the collective, not to a 
set of rules created by some distant expert behind his desk who does not 
understand what is going on in people’s lives. 
Blame is not placed on deviants, but on systems, oftentimes on harsh markets and 
on the inhumane bureaucratical institutions that corrupt people. The naturally good 
humans can hence be corrupted by the promises of better life based on hard 
competition, which creates many losers and few winners, or they can be brought 
down by the overly rigid demands put on them by institutions.  
The egalitarian triumph is fellowship of man—the real life displays that prove we 
are all the same. 
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Individualistic 
The individualistic view of nature is that nature is robust. Therefore, you need 
neither the experts to tell you what to do, nor the caution called for by the egali-
tarians. More importantly, resources are not limited to natural resources. The true 
resource is human ingenuity and labor. Absolutely anything can be a resource. 
Resources are thus infinite. The only limits are the rules and regulations put there 
by the state. Therefore, the focus should be on setting free human ingenuity and 
hence increasing enterprise, rather than trying to share the resources—“instead of 
fighting about how to share the cake, let’s make a bigger one, large enough for 
everyone.” The proper role for the state is to provide the best possible conditions 
for human ingenuity, so that the resource pool can be maximized. Everything else, 
like taxes, labor unions, environmental regulation, and so forth, is just slowing 
growth and the inevitable progress. Individualistic politics are not about distributing 
limited resources, they are about creating growth. 
I think we have gone through a period when too many children and 
people have been given to understand “I have a problem, it is the 
Government’s job to cope with it!” or “I have a problem, I will go 
and get a grant to cope with it!”  “I am homeless, the Government 
must house me!” and so they are casting their problems on society 
and who is society?  There is no such thing!  There are individual 
men and women and there are families and no government can do 
anything except through people and people look to themselves first. 
(Thatcher 1987) 
Individualists do not care much about social support, as they believe that everyone 
who tries hard enough will succeed, and that humans are selfish by nature. In 
addition, social support destroys the incentives for people to get out and make a 
living. Social support is actually a problem, because it is a disturbance in an 
otherwise perfect market. The individualists do not see any fairness in taking money 
from those who have earned it themselves through hard work, risk-taking, and 
ingenuity, and then giving it to those who are too lazy to work. It is a form of 
collective action forced upon people against their will, and not in the best interest 
of society. Therefore, we are beginning to see the targets of individualism’s blame: 
the non-productive individuals living off of others, as well as the rules and 
regulations that distort the infallible hidden hand.  
Fatalistic 
Similar to the other ways of life, the fatalistic ideas about distribution of resources 
are also connected to their views of nature. As nature is seen as a random, 
unpredictable place, so is the distribution of resources seen as random and 
unpredictable. Therefore, you do not really need any kind of rule-based institutions, 
collective decision-making, or markets to take care of the distribution of resources. 
While the other ways of life are competing in order to make the world the kind of 
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place they believe it to be, the fatalists do not have the need. The world is already a 
random and unpredictable place; it does not need any help by the fatalists. In this 
sense their views, just like all of the other ways of life, justify a course of action, 
which, in this case, is a lack of action.  
Distribution of resources is something that others do, and in the same manner, 
social support is something that is handed out, not earned. A fatalistic household is 
more than happy to receive social support; which is just like any other source of 
money. For households relying on the other ways of organizing, living off of social 
support creates problems for them: hierarchical households abhor the breach of 
role it entails (unless the receivers are cast in the role of the victim); for the egali-
tarian household it demonstrates a pitiful lack of collective support; and for the 
individualistic household it proves a lack of the required personal skill and initiative. 
For the fatalistic household, receiving social support does not destroy their social 
relations; it is behavior that proves to the household that the world is the way it 
expected it to be. 
The fatalistic households are in some sense less specific in their blaming. Where the 
other ways of life blame parts of society, the fatalistic household blames bad luck. 
The ways of bad luck are mysterious and work in many ways, hence, practically 
anything can be the cause of its miseries. However, since it really is about bad luck, 
you cannot really blame people personally. This way the fatalistic household can 
reduce the responsibilities it and others have—it was just bad luck.  
Now that I have presented some theoretical aspects of cultural theory and 
operationalized it in relation to households, social relations that carry help, and their 
views of politics and society, it is time to look at some guidance regarding how to 
use the theory properly, before I show how it relates to other theories about 
culture. 
Using Cultural Theory  
This subchapter will focus on how to use cultural theory properly. I will first show 
that it is not about identifying and putting people or households into four boxes. 
Then I will discuss how cultural theory relates to causal explanations, and finally, 
whether it is about organizations or ways of organizing.  
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Using Cultural Theory to Describe Systems Rather Than Labeling 
Boxes  
Since cultural theory names four ways of organizing, perhaps one can use it to label 
individuals or households, just like spotting species of birds. I do not believe so, for 
several reasons.  
There are some applications of cultural theory in which the assumption seems to be 
that the four cultures are out there, and all we need to do is rigorous analysis to 
unravel the hidden structures in society. Personally, I am in favor of an 
ontologically more open approach. I would rather see cultural theory as a useful 
tool able to help us create different viewpoints that can help us to understand what 
people do with their lives, and how they give meaning to the world around them. 
One can look at this is as an attempt to exchange the underlying Durkheimian 
ontological structuralism in cultural theory with Weberian epistemological 
stereotypes, following the example given by Innvær (1999).  
Sometimes cultural theory has been used merely to recognize the four different 
types, which would be a serious case of lumping, as Hexter would call it:  
… historians who are splitters like to point out divergences, to 
perceive differences, to draw distinctions.  They shrink away from 
systems of history and from general rules, and carry around in their 
heads lists of exceptions to almost any rule they are likely to 
encounter.  They do not mind untidiness and accident in the past; 
they rather like them. 
Lumpers do not like accidents; they would prefer to have them 
vanish.  They tend to ascribe apparent accidents not the untidiness 
of the past itself but to the untidiness of the record of the past or 
the untidiness of the mind of splitting historians who are willing to 
leave the temple of Clio in shambles.  Instead of noting differences, 
lumpers note likenesses; instead of separateness, connection.  The 
lumping historian wants to put the past into boxes, all of it, and not 
too many boxes at that, and then tie all the boxes together into a 
nice shapely bundle.  The latter operation turns out to be quite easy, 
since any practiced lumper will have so selected his boxes in the first 
place that they will fit together in a seemly way. (Hexter 1979:242) 
If the theory would not go any further than providing a typology of four types, it 
would probably be of less use, especially if the internal cohesion is arrived at 
through observing only what fits into the boxes. The value of the theory lies in its 
ability to present the different ways of organizing in interaction with each other, in 
informing us about the requisites needed for each type of household to thrive, and 
in the predictions we can make about these households’ preferences and behavior 
in the society.  
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Bird Spotting Individuals 
Bird spotting individuals91 is likely to be useless, because individuals are part of 
several social settings, and one should not assume that individuals are consistent 
across different social contexts.92  
People, in cultural theory, are not dense little spheres—hierarchical, 
individualist, egalitarian, fatalist or autonomous to the core; they are 
every bit as plural as the other scale levels. (Thompson, Grendstad, 
and Selle 1999:13) 
There is no reason one cannot have roles based on the different types of social 
organization. Only seldom do roles conflict. An example of a conflict like this could 
be a parent who behaves according to different logics when at work and at home, 
and then meets a spouse or a child at the workplace. Nevertheless, the theory 
works, because these are understood to be two different settings, with two different 
sets of rules, and a family member’s visit at the workplace is not likely to have any 
long term consequences for the organization of the workplace or at home.  
A second way to think about cultural theory is that it can represent different voices 
in a discussion.93 Individuals can choose to use whichever voice they want to bring 
into a discussion.  
Cultural theory is originally about institutions, not individuals, and should therefore 
be used with utmost care on individuals.94 When applied to individuals it can be 
understood as a combination of preference for and competence of the four ways of 
life and their actual social relations. I will come back to how to use cultural theory 
on individuals in Chapter 7. In my previous work, I have demonstrated how this 
kind of shift in perspective is necessary when one changes the level of analysis from 
institutions down to individuals (Olli 1996, 1999). Therefore, trying to fit a person 
into one of the four boxes is not advisable.  
Bird Spotting Households 
Bird spotting households can be tempting, but is not recommended. If the theory is 
only used to label households according to their preferred way of organizing, one is 
likely to make several misjudgments. First, there is no strong reason why a 
household should use only one logic of organizing (see figure on page 257). 
Perhaps a single logic dominates one part of the household’s life, without having 
                                                     
91  For example Lockahart and Coughlin have attempted to establish people as individualists, 
hierarchists, egalitarians and fatalists (Boyle and Coughlin 1994:  196)  
92  The exemption being fanatics who are trying to force the whole world to fit only one way of 
organizing (Lockhart 1997). 
93  There is a body of work based on this kind of approach of various types of discourse analysis 
(Harrison and Burgess 1994; Hoppe 1993; Pollock, Lilie, and Vittes 1993; Thompson and Rayner 
1998; Frølich 2001).  
94  Steve Rayner believes that we should refrain from using concepts like individualist or hierarchist 
altogether (Thompson, Grendstad, and Selle 1999:12).  
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the same importance in other areas. Second, it is also likely that households change: 
their social relations change; their situation in the labor market changes; children 
are born and grow older; parents grow older; and there is a continuous process of 
learning. Change often starts in a single area, before spreading into other areas of a 
household’s life. Change is an inherent part of social life, and one should not make 
the mistake of assuming that one knows what kind of household one is dealing 
with, based on answers to only a few questions. Third, it is possible that the 
households “resent” the ongoing change and try to cling to the way of organizing 
that has dominated in the past. This is likely to occur when events outside the 
family can push the family in a new direction. I have seen how a family’s answers 
bear a slight inconsistency, and there are attempts to give reasons for the new 
behavior based on the old cultural bias (Lorca 2002b). The family in question 
recognizes these changes, and welcomes them, but at the same time is unwilling to 
let go of their previous justifications.95 One can still describe households in terms 
of cultural theory, it is just not as simple as spotting the species of a bird, as species 
are mutually excluding by definition, while households can utilize several ways of 
organizing.  
Trying to identify an individual or household as belonging to one of the four ways 
of organizing does not utilize the potential in cultural theory. 96 Just because there 
are four labels, does not mean that that is all there is. Cultural theory is a systems 
theory, which opens for a study of institutions as dynamic systems. Attaching fixed 
labels is a type of simplification that can be useful and even necessary in some 
situations, but often not sufficient for understanding what is going on. The real 
utility of cultural theory lies in trying to understand the households’ choices, 
preferences, and interaction with their surroundings.  
When I advocate the use of the four ways of organizing as stereotypes, it is because 
I believe they will be useful as stereotypes. However, one must always keep in mind 
that using stereotypes is not the same as using a theory. Even if one borrows labels 
or categories from a theory, one does not automatically apply the theory.  
High Complexity Defies Explanation of States 
One typical trait of cultural theory is the complexity of description that it is possible 
to utilize in almost any social situation. We have the three elements: social relations, 
cultural biases, and behavioral patterns. These three can be in concert with each 
                                                     
95  This could be a case of “stolen rhetoric”: that is, using arguments that actually support another way 
of life, which can be either conscious (to achieve short-term gain) or unconscious (often 
problematic). 
96  This is a topic repeatedly brought up on the e-mail discussion list for topics related to cultural 
theory (http://groups.yahoo.com/group/culturaltheory/) by Steven Rayner, Steven Nay and 
others who believe that the value of cultural theory lies in its ability to explain rather than just 
typologize. 
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other, forming the four different combinations also known as ways of organizing. 
These four ways of organizing are mutually dependent and in conflict with each 
other. Thus, the possibilities for clash and change are numerous. When we also add 
the differences caused by language, religion, values, norms, and habits, there is a 
plethora of future possibilities available.  
Thompson has laid out the consequences of treating cultural theory as a theory 
about complex systems (1996). In a situation with high complexity, explanations no 
longer look as they do in a situation of low complexity. Social science (and 
especially quantitative methods) has long used models that are best characterized by 
simplicity. The statistical techniques are complicated and require professional 
training to be used, but this has nothing to do with complexity. In quantitative 
methods the question is still, basically, how much does A effect B. By adding causal 
factors, the complexity of the model does not change. It remains only two points in 
time, and B is assumed to have only one path of change, and, in addition, multiple 
regression typically assumes that all the causal factors are additive (See pages 428 
and 441).  
What Is It About—Organizations or Ways of Organizing? 
There are several accounts concerning the exact nature the content of the low-grid-
high-group corner of cultural theory’s two-dimensional space. The core issue seems 
to be what cultural theory is about. Mary Douglas emphasizes organizations and 
considers cultural theory a theory about organizations and institutions (Douglas 
1986). Therefore, the label enclave, and the understanding of this way of life, is 
connected to a particular form of social organization. Michael Thompson considers 
cultural theory, in its newest form, which focuses on social solidarities, to be a 
theory about ways of organizing, rather than a theory of organizations, for in any 
organization one is likely to encounter more than one solidarity, and the 
organization itself is best described through the dynamic between these 
solidarities.97 In other words, where Mary Douglas in her work emphasizes social 
relations, Mike Thompson emphasizes cultural bias and behavior, hence effectively 
downplaying social relations. It is difficult to settle this discussion, as both 
approaches have merits and weaknesses, and the usefulness is dependent on the 
research problem, making this a pragmatic choice of placing emphasis rather than a 
substantial one.  
My own understanding has changed during this research project. Presently, I am in 
favor of using ways of organizing as a central concept. Most people can handle 
more than one way of organizing, and they can separate areas of life into different 
contexts each organized according to its own rules. When dealing with households 
and their everyday lives, it is more useful to consider the four ways of life as 
                                                     
97  Personal communication 17.12.2002. 
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principles of organization that can be applied within the same household, and 
perhaps many of the domestic disputes are actually disputes about which way of 
organizing should be used to define a situation.  
Now that we have learned what kind of theory cultural theory is, it is time to look 
at how it is related to other theories about culture. 
Relating to Other Theories about Culture 
What about Culture?  
What has cultural theory to do with culture? Most readers are probably, by now, 
baffled by the use of the concept culture as it is often understood, as consisting of 
language, religion, beliefs, and so forth. Particularly because the way cultural theory 
portrays people does not seem to fit into the regular view of culture. In the 
following, I will try to relate cultural theory to mainstream views of culture.  
Among social anthropologists, views of culture can be divided in many other ways, 
but I believe Eriksen’s presentation of the two opposing views of what culture is, 
captures the main debate. According to the first view 
Culture can be defined simply as those customs, values, and ways of 
being, which are transmitted, even if in somewhat changed form, from 
generation to generation. (Eriksen 2001:60 emphasis by EO) 
In order to understand how cultural theory relates to both of these definitions we 
need to specify the concept of culture somewhat more. The Norwegian Dictionary 
of Sociology uses two distinctions to classify this first type of culture (transmitted 
customs, values, etc.) into further subcategories (Ekegren 1997): nature-culture and 
culture-society.  
The nature-culture distinction uses culture to refer to everything created by 
humans: anything that is not biological, physical, or “natural” in some way. This is 
obviously too wide a definition for practical use, but there are many variations 
based on this one. We have the national cultures: Norwegian culture, Vietnamese 
culture, and so forth. These concepts are used often, and without enough thought 
with respect to what is behind them. Other much used variations based on this 
view of culture are the subcultures, which can be distinguished from others (the 
mainstream culture) by their “cultural” traits. Examples of this kind of subculture 
are youth culture or organizational culture. Common to these is the inclusion of 
society in some ways into the culture. Cultural theory also includes social relations, 
but it would claim that these national cultures are too wide as concepts, as the 
“real” cultural units are smaller, since every society is divided into institutions which 
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often compete or are in conflict with each other over resources and influence in 
society.98 
According to this view of culture, customs are one type of behavioral pattern, 
values are one part of a cultural bias, and ways of being are probably not far away 
from a way of organizing. According to cultural theory, a viable way of organizing 
is formed by three components: behavioral patterns, cultural biases, and social 
relations, which is not mentioned in the first definition (even if it is implicitly 
included, as society is not nature). Cultural theory thus departs from the most 
common theories about culture by including social relations as an integral part of 
the theory. In many theories, culture explains social relations, but in cultural theory, 
the social relations are part of the framework itself, and are understood as having 
an effect on both cultural biases and behavioral patterns. This is invaluable in my 
view in trying to get rid of explanations based on peoples’ origins.99  
The culture-society distinction gives us concepts like popular culture or high 
culture. This usage of the concept culture is in sharp contrast with the way it is used 
in cultural theory. Cultural theory is not about separating culture from society; 
rather, it claims that social relations, cultural biases, and behavioral patterns form a 
whole, a self-sustaining institution, and where changes in any one of the three will 
have consequences upon the two others.  
So far, we have discussed culture in terms of customs and values that are 
transmitted from generation to generation. Let us turn our focus to the second 
competing view of culture, which focuses on communication: 
Another definition says that culture is what makes communication possible; 
in other words that culture are those patterns of thought, habits and 
experiences that a people have in common, and that permit 
understanding of each other. (Eriksen 2001:60 emphasis by EO) 
This definition is based on the semantic view of culture, which emphasizes the 
communicative potential of a culture.100 This has some theoretically interesting 
aspects for the field of migration research. According to the Durkheimian 
structuralism underlying cultural theory, there are hidden structures that influence 
how we organize our lives, and there is a limited number of different types of 
structures (in contrast to a common use of ethnic or nationalistic cultures that 
allows for hundreds of different cultures). If there are only a limited number of 
structures, cross-cultural communication would be easier, as there would be some 
common elements that can be used as a basis for communication.  
                                                     
98  There are descriptions of national cultures based on surveys, as the levels of support for the 
different ways of life do vary between countries (Grendstad 1995a, 2001). In addition, national 
political cultures (and ideologies) can be described with concepts from cultural theory (Mamadouh 
1999).  
99 “The Vietnamese, they do…” is a type of explanation that displays a lack of understanding rather 
than a scientific explanation. 
100  Badie (1983) has pointed out how the works of Mary Douglas can be used based on this view of 
culture (according to Frølich 2001:66). 
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“How is communication possible?” has been one of the main research problems 
for philosophers of language. To oversimplify, the answer is usually based either on 
a commonly shared culture or in pragmatism, which focuses on the repeated acts of 
communication that allow for learning and feedback. Cultural theory encompasses 
both directions by claiming, firstly, that the theory is not about individuals, but 
about social organization and cultural biases that are more or less shared. Secondly, 
it is the behavioral patterns, these repeated behaviors that sustain and build social 
relations and cultural biases. Therefore, cultural theory can be used to study 
behavior and focus on the acts instead of the symbols. I believe that the similarity 
between pragmatics and cultural theory is more than just superficial, as cultural 
theory would claim that “culture” exists only as long as it is lived or acted upon. It 
is in the face-to-face interaction that meaning is created and sustained. The 
existence of a symbolic level is not sufficient for a way of organizing (or culture) to 
be present, according to cultural theory.  
When we meet foreigners, we often try to establish a common 
starting point by asking each other about work, family, and other 
factors that can make further communication possible, common 
cultural denominators. (Eriksen 2001:64)101 
These common cultural denominators are often thought of as education, job, 
family situation, and other common experiences. I would suggest another set of 
common cultural denominators to be added to the list: the four cultural stereotypes 
from cultural theory. If it is, as I believe, that there are different cultural logics 
(ways of organizing) out there, then recognizing the cultural logic the other person 
is using is perhaps the second best possible tool, after sharing a common language, 
for improving communication. Ways of organizing can be seen as social languages. 
It is possible to translate between them, but obviously, people speaking the same 
language are more likely to succeed in any organizational task.  
To summarize, cultural theory is related to both main traditions of research on 
culture. Cultural theory challenges the first tradition, which focuses on norms, 
values, and behavior, by claiming that it is necessary to include social relations into 
the theoretical framework. Cultural theory supplements the second tradition, which 
focuses on communication, by suggesting that the four ways of organizing provide 
alternative platforms for communication, as four different forms of social language. 
                                                     
101  Original text: "Når vi treffer utlendinger, forsøker vi ofte å etablere en felles plattform ved å spørre 
hverandre ut om jobb, familieforhold og andre faktorer som kan gjøre videre kommunikasjon 
mulig, altså kulturelle fellesnevnere.” 
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Cultures in Change 
There is a scholarly debate that questions how static and how changing culture is.102 
One of the strengths of cultural theory is that it is a theory about the dynamics in a 
cultural system, and it defines how different ways of organizing will relate to each 
other. Cultural theory claims that change is the normal state of affairs. The four 
stable ways of organizing do not really exist in pure and static forms, but are, rather, 
under constant pressure from both internal and external sources. Therefore, what 
needs an explanation is not change, but the fact that sometimes cultural forms 
appear relatively stable. Hence, my second criterion for better classification, 
contents change, seems to be possible to meet. 
Cultural theory is concerned with the internal dynamics in such a system, and how 
the different ways of organizing will try to overpower each other. The theory does 
not try to explain who wins the competition, rather it claims that in a well balanced 
society all four ways of organizing are in a healthy competition, thus helping to 
counter the weaknesses each one of these ways of organizing would have on its 
own (Schwarz and Thompson 1990; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990; Ney 
and Thompson 1999).  
One explanatory variable that is on the border of being left out of the theory is 
economic survival. It is often present, but somehow it is not part of the “system.” I 
believe that this is because, as I mention above, the theory does not try to explain 
who wins the competition. Nevertheless, institutions and organizations based on 
the four ways of organizing are competing with each other and the way they utilize 
resources differs. Barth has described how culture and “survival” go hand in hand:  
Simple cultural traits are useful as adaptations to particular 
surroundings and means for providing a living.  Groups with 
different cultural traits can thus live in the same area, and still depart 
culturally from each other, because these cultural differences 
represent an adaptation to each group’s utilization of resources in 
the area.  On the other side, competition concerning resources 
between the populations with different cultural traits, can set in 
motion a mobilization of collective action on the basis of ethnicity. 
(Barth 1994:181)  
There is a similarity between “adaptations” used by Barth and by Douglas. In some 
of her later work Douglas seems to incorporate the idea that the way of organizing 
depends on what one wants to achieve:  
                                                     
102  See (Alexander and Seidman 1990; Ehn and Löfgren 1982; Eckstein 1996; Wuthnow et al. 1984; 
Barth 1980; Hinton 2000).  
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Each culture is good for different organizatorial purposes.  When a 
complex coordination has advantages, it makes sense to develop the 
top right pattern and cultivate the values and attitudes that justify it.  
When individual initiative is needed, it makes sense to develop the 
bottom left pattern and the values that go with it.  When concerted 
protest is needed, it makes sense to sink individual differences and 
go for the egalitarian group.  And so on. (Douglas and Ney 
1998:103) 
By combining these two, one could then hypothesize that a minority group would 
choose for its basis of organization that one of the four ways of organizing that 
maximizes their gain. However, which one this will be is dependent on a 
combination of factors. First, what is that minority group’s situation in the society, 
in other words, what are they trying to achieve by organizing as an ethnic group? 
Second, what enables them to see themselves as a unit or group, as some ways of 
organizing might be difficult to combine with their original basis for organizing. 
Third, how their opponents are organized. 
While Barth claims that competition for resources is the basis for ethnic 
mobilization, cultural theory helps us to understand the forms ethnic mobilization 
can take in a given situation.  
Majority vs. Minority Culture  
A minority society is constituted as a minority in relation to the majority (and 
sometimes to other minorities). Therefore, the minority’s social organization should 
not be studied only on its own, as long as there are social bonds and connections to 
the majority society.  
Cultural theory is a neo-Durkheimian theory, which claims that the structures do 
matter. The four ways of organizing are in an inherent conflict, but often also 
dependent on each other. These four ways of organizing are not connected to any 
particular ethnicity; rather, the theory claims that in any society we are likely to find 
all four present, which for a social scientist can be a preposterous claim, especially 
since this argument is presented as a postulate without much support (Thompson, 
Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). For many years, this was the part of the theory that I 
could not accept. Recently I have started to think of it more as of a toolbox that 
can be used on any society, similar to the economists’ ideas of supply and demand. 
Most economists would claim that mechanisms of supply and demand are present 
in all societies (although in very different forms and degrees), and at very least, any 
system of transactions can be described through the analytical concepts of supply 
and demand. In the same way, these four ways of organizing can be observed in 
any society. They are what they are only in relation to each other, and they are 
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formed by each other’s presence, just as supply is formed by the presence of 
demand. 
Therefore, in theory, it is possible to find all four in the majority population, which 
in this case is Norwegian, and all four in each of the minorities, which in this case 
are Chilean, Vietnamese and Tamil. However, it is an empirical question whether 
one or several can be found, but one should not hide the fact that one’s 
expectations easily influence the findings. I am not expecting to find all four ways 
of life within each minority, since the minority’s ways of organizing have to relate 
to the majority’s institutions (and ways of organizing). In other words, the minority 
can substitute missing forms of social organization within their own ranks with 
majority institutions. For example, the egalitarian households often blame the 
system (hierarchical or individualistic institutions) for peoples’ problems, but this 
only makes sense if there are institutions present to which blame can be attributed. 
For a minority it would be easier (and much more credible) to blame such majority 
society institutions. 
The relative importance of the four ways of organizing in the important institutions 
of society is an empirical question, which would be interesting to study even if it is 
outside the scope of this thesis. I would hypothesize that the relationship between 
the minority and the majority populations could be better explained if we knew the 
composition of the major social institutions in both the majority and minority 
institutions. There are several theoretically interesting possibilities. The stereotypes 
one group holds of another are likely to be formed by the dominant way of 
organizing (if such exists in the majority and/or the minority). Let us just assume, 
for the sake of argument, that some institutions in Norwegian society are based 
upon the egalitarian way of organizing, whereas we have a minority that is heavily 
hierarchical. One could understand the relation between these two social groups 
better if we knew what kind of problems hierarchical institutions have with egali-
tarian institutions. Perhaps many of the problems considered ethnic or religious can 
be better understood as structural problems. This does not reduce their ethnic or 
religious qualities, but it opens up a new way to approach these problems, and, 
potentially, to find new and better-crafted solutions.  
Similarly, there can be several fractions based on competing ways of organizing 
within an ethicic minority group. The ethnic majority is likely to overlook these 
minorities-within-the-minority and treat the ethnic minority as if it were a single 
institution, following only one way of organizing. If we then build upon the 
example from above, there could be a significant individualistic segment of the 
population within a predominately hierarchical minority. For example, 
individualistic migrant entrepreneurs can be mistakenly treated by the majority as 
hierarchical (and similar to the rest of the ethnic group). These entrepreneurs are 
also likely to be in potential conflict within the dominant, hierarchical, way of 
organizing within their own community (for not keeping the traditions), as well as 
with the hierarchical institutions in the majority society (for not adhering to rules 
and regulations). However, at the same time, these entrepreneurs are likely to be an 
•    Operationalizing Cultural Theory 
 
102 
important source of resources within the minority community, providing it with 
jobs, income, and services. The entrepreneurs are likely to be dependent on the 
unity within the migrant community for inexpensive labor, startup capital, and 
perhaps a market for their products. This is a built-in paradoxical relation within 
cultural theory: The different forms of organizing are in conflict with each other, 
but they cannot in the long run do without each other. 
The interesting questions thus become how these complex relationships are 
organized in a particular case, how they are sustained, and how they change over 
time.  
People have multiple and overlapping group memberships. We all belong to many 
different communities: our ancestry, the country and city where we live, our 
neighborhood, our workplace and professional guilds, our religion, and our pastime 
hobbies can provide us with a myriad of belongings. Each of these could be 
described in terms of grid-group or as more or less based on one of the four ways 
of organizing.  
Each large social unit can contain traits of all four ways of organizing, and the 
larger the unit the more likely it is that all four ways of organizing are present.103 
The authors of Cultural Theory postulate that each society must have at least five104 
ways of organizing present (see the requisite variability condition in Thompson, 
Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:4). The argument is based on deficiencies in each way of 
organizing: each one is too single-minded to create a well functioning society 
without the presence of the others and the correction they can provide.105 In this 
sense, cultural theory supports a normative position embracing conflicts and liberal 
democracy as a way to institutionalize these conflicts.  
                                                     
103  Nevertheless, there are some attempts to find the cultural position of a nation (Grendstad 1995a; 
Mamadouh 1999) or of minority groups (Caulkins and Peters 2002).  
104  The authors come to five ways of life because they include the hermit, who is in a reflexive 
position in relation to all four ways of life, seeing them all, but not being bound by any one of 
them. I have excluded it because it is not really a way of organizing, as there are no rules. Hermits 
are voyeurs, more than participants. They do not engage in power relations; they do not allow 
themselves to be subjected to power used by others, nor will they enforce their will upon others 
(Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:10-11). 
105  The authors argue, theoretically, that each way of life has something unique to provide for the 
others. In addition, there is an empirical argument later in the book, which shows how a lack of a 
way of life will lead to the collapse of a society. However, this argument relies on a selection of 
cases: societies that did collapse. Despite, my scepticism, I am not able to come up with any good 
counter examples of societies that have lacked one or several ways of life. I suspect that there is 
something tautological about the argument, especially if one compares the four ways of life to 
concepts like demand and supply. The fact that one can find them in all societies is not empirical 
evidence of the theory being right. It is rather a consequence of the way the theory has been 
constructed.  
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How Does Cultural Theory Match the Five Criteria for 
Better Classification? 
In Chapter 2, I listed five criteria that a better classification of migrants should 
meet. Four of these can be answered theoretically: The first criterion—human 
unity—can be met by cultural theory, at least on the level of theoretical ambitions. 
Wildavsky writes:  
The predictions made in the preceding pages—to the extent people 
adhere to these four ways of life, they will view the world from the 
corresponding, culturally induced frames of reference and therefore 
arrive at the preferences ascribed to them—are meant to be 
universal.  No matter what the material or technological position of 
people, or where they are located geographically, or in what 
historical time they live, their objectives can be derived from their 
cultural frames of reference. (Wildavsky 1989b:72) 
Cultural theory ultimately treats all people the same: anybody can live their lives 
according to one of the ways of organizing; however, the theory does not claim that 
it knows what it means in the different societies.  
The second criterion—allowing the concepts to change their content—is also 
matched. 
This claim of universality manifestly does not mean that history is 
irrelevant.  On the contrary, only history can give us the cultural 
context.  Only history can tell us as well which means or 
instruments of policy are available and which ones will, based on the 
experience of these particular people be, seen as relevant to their 
circumstances. (Wildavsky 1989b:72)  
The ways of organizing are relational and abstract concepts that must be 
contextualized in a society. Over time their content will change—what constituted 
egalitarian behavior in the time of the Vikings might not strike us today as egali-
tarian, but seen in its own time and society it carries a particular meaning.  
The third criterion demands that people must not become locked into one 
category—they need to be able to switch from one way of organizing to another, or 
else ways of organizing become essentialized categories, similar to ethnicity. As we 
have seen, and I will later show, people and households can slowly move from one 
dominant way of organizing into another.  
A description of a person’s position based on cultural theory is based on 
knowledge, preferences, and social relations. Few would argue against the 
assumption that knowledge and preferences change over time. Changing social 
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relations, however, requires a serious effort. It might not sound like a difficult 
demand, but on the household level it would mean finding new friends and a 
change in the way the household’s internal life is organized. All of us who have 
been married know how difficult it can be to make these kinds of changes. 
Nevertheless, it is possible, and so it is that cultural theory also meets the third 
criterion; people are not locked into one category, and they can change.  
The fourth criterion—allowing for gradual membership—is also met by cultural 
theory, as it is not about putting people or households into boxes. Households 
apply the different ways of organizing in different degrees, and they mix them in 
different proportions. Cultural theory says that mixing two ways of organizing is a 
more unstable constellation than relying on only one, but there are situations where 
it actually is the best choice.  
Households can be presented as having different degrees of the four ways of 
organizing, and they can thus be drawn on map with the four cultural biases (Figure 
7 on page 146). The four corners represent the ideal-typical cases of hierarchy, 
egalitarian, individualistic and fatalistic ways of organizing, whereas most real life 
cases are not in the extreme corners but somewhere in-between.106 Hence, gradual 
membership is ensured, and essentialism is easier to avoid.107 
Cultural theory has a categorization that is flexible enough to encompass people 
from different cultural backgrounds, while it gives specific guidance as to how to 
translate knowledge (or experiences) from one context to another. Therefore, it 
provides us with a better balance between theoretical simplicity and practical use-
value than its alternatives. In addition, membership is not fixed, people can 
gradually move from one category to another, in contrast to other stereotypes 
based on ethnicity, skin color, or country of origin. 
                                                     
106  This map is only two dimensional, just like a grid-group diagram. If the cultural biases really are a 
four dimensional cultural system then presenting them on a flat, two dimensional surface will mask 
some of the differences. For example a location somewhere between hierarchical and 
individualistic bias, will on this map always determine the relation to fatalism and egalitarian bias. 
In a four dimensional space, there is a independent relation to each of the four cultural biases. 
107  However, not all authors using cultural theory agree that there are dimensions that form a 
continuum:  
Some readers may want to know why we use the term “discriminator” rather than the 
more straightforward “dimension.” Those already familiar with cultural theory may 
wonder what has become of the labels “group” and “grid,” that for many years, have 
been associated with these two “dimensions of sociality.” The reason for our change 
is that dimension signifies a continuum, while discriminator signifies two qualitatively 
different states. If, as we are now arguing, it is the different patterns of relationships 
that are crucial, then it would be wrong to speak of dimensions. If, as can easily be 
demonstrated, you have to first dismantle one pattern before you can put together 
another, then that transition from a highly patterned state, through an unpatterned 
one, to another highly patterned state. This is not a transition that can be represented 
in dimensional terms, because the midpoint in a dimensional transition would be a 
mix of the two patterns, not a total absence of them both. (Dake and Thompson 
1993:footnote 14) 
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The fifth criterion—requiring the categorization to be helpful in everyday 
situations—is the most difficult to answer, and can be answered only through an 
empirical study. I hope that after the reader has read the rest of Part I, she will 
agree with me, that cultural theory’s classification is definitely helpful. However, 
before I present the households we must have a look on the research methods 
used. 
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C h a p t e r  4   
DOING RESEARCH ON 
MIGRANT HOUSEHOLDS 
Interviews, or even social science it self, are sometimes motivated by assumptions 
like this: 
There is among us [researchers] a vogue of the assumption that the 
hinterlands of the mind are more variegated and colorful than its 
surfaces, that what a person hides from the world will somehow be 
less dull than what he shows. (Reisman and Benney 2004:16) 
However, cultural theory being a neo-structuralist theory, what is shown is just as 
important, and perhaps even more interesting, that what is hidden. I have in my 
operationalization of cultural theory attempted to utilize what the interview subjects 
want to share and show, reducing thus the requirements to enter the realm of 
things hidden. Nevertheless, cultural theory is also interested in the hidden, the 
hidden structures that become so apparent when brought into the light, but which 
we fail to see, until they are pointed out to us.  
This chapter will present a more detailed account of the research process, in order to 
allow for an evaluation of my work by others. I will start by giving a short summary 
of my research design and methodology, after which I will go into more details about 
sampling households, gaining access to them, interviewing, preparing for the analysis, 
reflections over the analysis and, finally, discussing the validity and reliability of my 
research.  
Summary of Research Design and Methodology 
To answer my research question, how is a household’s view of politics and society related to 
its way of organizing, I use a household’s internal organization and its social relations 
carrying help as a source to determine its way of organizing, and compare its views 
of politics and society with the predictions given in cultural theory.  
I have interviewed seventeen migrant households from Vietnam, Chile, and Sri 
Lanka. Common to all households is that they live presently in Oslo or Bergen, and 
still have, or had in the recent past, children in a local school, and speak good 
enough Norwegian to be able to communicate with me without an interpreter. 
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Usually two visits to each household were required to cover all the questions I 
wanted answers to: In the first interview, I focused on work and housing history, as 
well as the household’s internal life (including division of household work, recourse 
management strategies, and ways of making important decisions). In the second 
interview, the focus was on the household’s external social relations, patterns of 
assistance, and their relation to and use of the welfare state’s institutions. 
Commonly a visit would take a whole evening, resulting in two hours of taped, and 
later transcribed, interview. A few households refused the use of a recorder, and 
from these I only have my notes.  
In my thesis, I do not present all seventeen households. In an effort to show how 
the ways of organizing work in practice I present eight households in detail. Each 
household is allocated twelve to eighteen pages, which should be enough to show 
how the different parts of a household’s life are connected to each other. I have left 
out households that are “duplicates” of these eight, and two divorced households.  
I have gained access to these households mainly through two sources: either by 
directly addressed letters or by letters delivered by trusted persons in the Chilean, 
Vietnamese, and Tamil communities.  
Presentation of the Development of a Research Problem 
This research project is inspired by some unconnected observations regarding 
nationality and background, including my own. My own background is somewhat 
cross-cultural: My father is Finnish, my mother Norwegian. I grew up in a Swedish-
speaking region on the southern coast of Finland. I spent my childhood summer 
holidays in Norway, and at the age of eighteen I moved to Norway to study. I am in 
a fortunate position in that I can choose my identity and affiliation according to 
what suits me and my needs best in most situations.  
The first observation concerns the people with whom I am expected to socialize. In 
Norway, I tend to be lumped together with other Finns, because of my name. 
Norwegians assume that I have a lot in common with other Finns, and that I would 
love to spend more time with fellow Finns. However, I do not!  
The second observation is connected to the unfortunate tendency to explain too 
many of the immigrants’ choices and too much of their behavior by their country 
of origin. Like most other Finns, I make my own choices and have my own 
preferences and interests that have formed my life history. I sincerely believe that 
my background has influenced my choices, and who I am, but I do not think that it 
is the key to understanding my life history, apart from the obvious—emigration is 
easier and Norway is the easy choice for a receiving country.  
The third observation is connected to mistaken exotics. Somehow, people who are 
not part of the majority population are seen as carriers of their respective national 
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symbols, like music, literature, clothing, flags, and sports, but they are not seen as 
regular households and families whose main concern is making ends meet. Most 
minority families face the same challenges and worry about the same things as 
majority families. Unfortunately, the public discourse and most of the research 
seems to focus on the exotic and special, rather than on what is common and 
mundane.  
I have worked previously with survey methods and cultural theory, but this theory 
does not easily translate into reliable measurements on an individual level, as the 
theory’s core statements are concerned with social institutions. Therefore, I was 
also interested in finding out how cultural theory can be observed in people’s daily 
life, instead of using a non-contextual survey that removes people from their social 
setting into an imaginary social laboratory. 
My first research problem asked, in its simplified form, why do some migrant 
families in Norway succeed in making a living and becoming a part of the society, 
whereas others struggle and have problems? This was the theme I received funding 
for, and which has formed my research design.  
Among the households I gained access to, none is struggling, and therefore I could 
not supply an answer to my first research problem. As long as there is no variation 
in the phenomena to be explained in the data one cannot, and should not, use the 
material to explain why some families make it and others do not.108  
For three years, I worked on this project as an explorative project, until I decided 
that I should use these households’ views of politics and society as the dependent 
variable. This lead to the formation of the current research question. 
Choice of Methodology 
Originally, one of my intentions was to create a test of cultural theory, a promising 
theory that my own research had shown is not yet very well suited to survey 
research (Olli 1996, 1999). Therefore, it seemed that qualitative methods would give 
                                                     
108 This is a principle firmly established in Comparative Politics literature.  
We can also learn nothing about the causal effect from a study, which selects 
observations so that the dependent variable does not vary. (King, Keohane, and 
Verba 1994:147)  
  The argument made by King, Keohane, and Verba is difficult to refute. Thus, to my 
disappointment, I had to abandon the scrutiny of this causal explanation. Fortunately, there are 
other scientific endeavors than testing of causality, as Geddes points out:  
This is not to say that studies of cases selected on the dependent variable have no 
place in comparative politics. They are ideal for digging into the details of how 
phenomena come about and for developing insights. (Geddes 1990:149) 
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a better picture of what the theory really can do, until the problems with 
operationalization of cultural theory for survey research are solved.  
By comparing households with different ethnic backgrounds, it should be possible 
to create a relatively general test of cultural theory. As some of the authors behind 
the theory make claims of universality, it must prove useful in such cross-ethnic 
sample, if these claims have any merit. Cultural theory is much more than just a 
typology, but if this typology allows us to see beyond the ethnic boundaries, one 
important step toward understanding the process of integration has been achieved.  
In addition, the choice of putting households in the focus is an attempt to press 
cultural theory to its limits. Households are among the smallest social units that 
could be called institutions. Simultaneously, households are also clearly created and 
sustained by individual choices. Can we really see the structural traits specified by 
cultural theory working within the households? If not, the obvious conclusion 
would be that there is something wrong with either cultural theory or my research.  
Qualitative research often favors a more open approach, more congruent with the 
ethnographic method, where theorization is usually done after the collection of data 
(Holstein and Gubrium 1994). In addition, sometimes the role of theory is rather 
modest: 
The theory or concept of interest at best may be considered a 
conceptual template with which to compare and contrast results, 
rather than to use as a priori categories into which to force the 
analysis. (Morse 1994, p.221)  
However, in my view, this kind of approach has some weaknesses. First, it is 
difficult to create cumulative research, if every research project creates its own 
concepts and categories. I have chosen to examine the use-value and the 
boundaries of cultural theory’s applicability, rather than try to create a theory that 
fits my data. Second, this kind of research often lacks transparency, which can make 
it difficult for others to evaluate. I find it intellectually more appealing to start with 
a clearly formulated theory, which guides the design, the collection of data, and the 
subsequent analysis. My project is based on cultural theory as a perspective, and it 
should be evaluated based on the use-value of the research, rather than its 
theoretical refinement or for the intellectual challenge it poses. 
My research problem concerning whether ways of organizing can be used to 
categorize migrants in Norway, and how they can help us to understand the 
households’ internal life, social relations, and use of welfare states institutions, 
requires some understanding of the way migrants look at the world. I need to 
understand what options they see available, and how they justify their own choices. 
These considerations are practically impossible to fulfill with the help of 
quantitative methods. Only qualitative methods give enough room for people's own 
understanding and logic (Fontana and Frey 1994).  
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However, I was never inclined to do the kind of fieldwork typical to anthropology, 
for something similar to network analysis is probably better suited in an urban 
setting.  
There is often in our societies a close correspondence between 
spatial frame, recruitment of personnel to the interaction in this 
frame and the interaction itself.  “Family life in the apartment” may 
be a label of one example of this, and a guest, a stranger, transforms 
the situation into an event which can be labeled as “having guests.” 
(Lithman 1988:242) 
It would be very difficult to become a “genuine part” of a social setting. Lithman 
points out that there are few non-defined action spaces available in an urban 
setting, thus the researcher needs a more formal entry into almost all social settings. 
In addition, I wanted to compare three different ethnic groups, but to do so would 
have placed excessive demands upon me to learn their respective languages. 
Therefore I have chosen to remain a “guest” and utilize this to my advantage by 
also analyzing how they treat me. 
Reasons to Study Households  
I believe there are at least three good reasons to study households: they are units in 
which resources are shared; they are social agents with strategies; and the safety net 
provided by the welfare state is for households, not individuals. 
First, in much of political science the starting point is an assumption that we can 
understand a great deal of what goes on in a society just by studying individuals. I 
believe that households are an important social unit for the exchange of material 
and informational resources that influences the process by which individuals relate 
to and integrate into the rest of the society.109 A household is a social unit that 
brings the individual into contact with the society, and vice versa, in terms of 
sharing both material and informational resources.110 Therefore, if we do not 
understand what kind of role households play it is difficult to have a proper 
understanding of how the process of integration works. 
Secondly, households are agents with strategies that need to be studied:  
                                                     
109 One example of this can be found in Werbner’s study of Pakistani entrepreneurship in a declining 
industrial city in Britain (Werbner 1990). 
110 A great example of research showing the household-society interaction is in Sandra Wallman's 
Eight London Households, where she and her research team present results both from a survey-based 
study of an urban community and in-depth studies of a number of households (1984). 
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Undoubtedly, men, women and children within a household may 
differ and even struggle with conflicting goals.  But exclusive focus 
on these internal disagreements makes us lose sight of two other 
important considerations.  First, households can still act as units 
despite internal differences.  Hence, it is possible to theorize at the 
level of household strategies.  An exclusive consideration on 
individual motivations would do away at the possibility of 
understanding how these small social units pull resources to 
organize a process as complex as international migration. (Portes 
1997:816) 
I believe that the households’ strategies are significant, and the four ways of 
organizing a household are useful in describing and understanding these strategies.  
Thirdly, we often think of the welfare state as a safety net for individuals, but the 
safety net is for households, not individuals. Social support is only given when the 
household as a whole is unable to sustain itself and has depleted any valuables, like 
property or a car, that they might have had.  
A Typological Comparison—Not a Cultural or Ethnic Study 
Rath and Kloosterman are critical of studies that only contain one ethnic group; 
they would rather study single actors and their social embeddedness (among other 
things).  
…  [Many] researchers have approached these important questions 
from an ethno-cultural perspective showing a certain preference for 
case studies of ethnic groups.  This more parochial approach to 
immigrant entrepreneurs and to immigrants in general, will—in the 
end—primarily re-ascertain essentialists conceptions of ethnicity and 
not contribute to the interrelationship between immigration and its 
wider context. (Rath and Kloosterman 2000:13) 
I will try to go beyond these ethnic studies by using a typological comparison. 
Instead of focusing on ethnical groups and comparing them with each other, I use 
cultural theory’s typology to create categories of households that can be compared 
with each other. There are thus several layers of comparison: first, between the 
categories of cultural theory—comparing hierarchical households with non-
hierarchical households and so forth; second, comparing within the categories of 
cultural theory (i.e. comparing one hierarchical household with other hierarchical 
households); third, comparing households with the same ethnic background. This 
design makes it possible to understand how ways of organizing interact with ethnic 
background. 
This is not a study about ethnicity or ethnic groups. Many studies are interested in 
how “groups” like Roma or Pakistanis adapt to the society as a “group,” whereas I 
am more concerned with the household’s present life than their origins. Their 
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origins should not be forgotten, because it affects their social relations and the 
choices they have made, but I am trying to turn the focus away from phenomena 
like language, religion, and ethnic traits back to peoples’ choices and the structures 
they have to relate to. I agree with Barth’s old claim that ethnic relations are formed 
partly by their usefulness for groups in trying to survive economically in a society 
(1994:181). Ethnicity is not the ultimate cause—the uncaused cause—it is 
something that is used to mobilize collective action when needed.  
Simultaneously, there is a strong individualistic tendency in our society, both in 
politics and in research, especially since the 1980s, and a lot of weight is placed on 
our own choices and their consequences. In this sense, I am part of my own time, 
wanting to study people behaving within structural constraints, which of course do 
not disappear even if they are not in focus. There are several important constraints 
present in migrants’ lives, starting with the laws and practices regulating their 
entrance into Norway, the rights and obligations put in place by the government, 
the economic situation, and last but not least, the way Norwegians treat immigrants 
in their private and professional life, sometimes creating situations best 
characterized by exclusion and discrimination. None of these structural constraints 
are in the focus, and I am not trying to evaluate their relative importance in the 
migrants’ lives. I am more interested in how the households have dealt with these 
constraints. 
However, I should confess my preference for a form of neo-structuralism, present 
in cultural theory, evident in a search for structural aspects of social life, that 
transcend national, ethnic or racial categorizations. It is also evident in my belief 
that there are very few elements of human life that can be properly understood in 
isolation, rather these elements “only make sense in relationships with other elements 
(Bloch 2003:531).” Therefore, I have opted to cover a rather large number of 
aspects in each household’s life.  
Household—Setting the Boundaries  
This is a study about households and their lifestyles. Therefore, an understanding of 
the concept of household is paramount. There are numerous possible definitions, 
and as Berge says in his thorough discussion of the concept: “It is difficult to 
imagine that one simple definition of household would satisfy all interests” (Berge 
1988:7). 
My definition follows one of the standard definitions: A household is one or several 
people who live in the same housing unit (Korsnes, Brante, and Andersen 
1997:121). Notice that a household and a family are not necessarily identical, 
especially migrant families, as most of them have very close family members in 
other countries. Therefore, sometimes, when they talk about their family, it is 
difficult to tell whether they live under the same roof or are separated by an ocean.  
Berge narrows the discussion around the household to two main points:  
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… one is to identify the members of the household.  The other is 
… how large changes in a household can be accepted before one 
has to consider it a new household. (Berge 1988:9) 
These two points, membership and continuity, are central issues, and I have chosen 
to allow the households to declare themselves who belongs to the household, and 
where and when is the origin of the household.  
The person or persons I interview are allowed to define who belongs to this 
particular household. There is very little disagreement about what is the core of the 
household, but the fringes of the household are often something that needs to be 
defined for the household to run smoothly. For example, imagine a person who 
sleeps in the guestroom regularly. At what point will he or she be counted as a 
member of the household? For most households, membership is connected to 
kinship (either you are born into a family or you marry into one), but there are 
several gray areas: The first aspect concerns meals. If one’s definition of household 
membership is connected to sharing meals (which used to be common), one will 
soon face problems with people who live under the same roof but do not share 
meals, a practice that has become increasingly common in Norway, and has 
prompted cries for saving the family as a structure.111 The second important aspect 
of a household that can be used to constitute membership is the degree of 
resources shared or contributed. Thus, a person who simply sleeps there, but does 
not contribute any resources (food, time, money) to the household, is not a 
member, but rather a guest. The third aspect used to define membership in a 
household is permanency. How long must the guestroom lodger stay until he or she 
is counted as a member of the family? The fourth aspect used centers on the type 
of bond between the household members. A lodger in the guestroom can stay a 
lodger if there is a contract that stays a contract, without becoming a social bond 
with obligations beyond the original contract. He or she will bring a fixed amount 
of resources into the household over many years but cannot expect much loyalty or 
help from the other members of the household, and vice versa. 
Since this is not a study of how households construct their boundaries, I have not 
explicitly explored these gray areas in the households. I have relied upon their 
answers regarding who lives there, and I have tried in the interviews, at the same 
time that I approach their history of housing, to ask questions about how many 
people there were and who was living there at the time. Instead of my defining 
rigidly who are members and who are not, I have chosen to listen to their own 
                                                     
111 Time use surveys that households spend less and less time together and eat fewer and fewer meals 
together (Lømo 1999). This has prompted media attention: “Especially from cities there are 
reports of families falling apart because the parents are not able to stretch themselves far enough. 
When parents have to choose between overtime and family time, they often pick what gives 
economic results, and that is not the family” (Apenes and Engh 1999). The Norwegian state began, 
in 1998, to support families through “cash for home care” policy (kontantstøtte). Some of the 
proponents of this policy argued for it to be a policy to counteract the present trend of families 
falling apart.  
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definitions and ask, rather, what does it tell me about a particular family that they 
describe a certain person inside or outside the household.  
Berge’s second point, the question of the continuity of a household, is equally 
important. I allow my informants to define where the household started. As my 
sample consists of households with children, they consistently define their 
household around the children, usually starting from their marriage, which is not 
surprising if we consider procreation one of the main functions of a household: 
The most important task of a household is maybe to provide 
security for and distribute welfare among its members.  It also 
provides the immediate environment for family life and the 
procreation and socialization of new members of the society. (Berge 
1988:7) 
In my interviews the households themselves emphasize continuity, rather than 
discontinuity, even if for me it seems like there are several discontinuities present. A 
somewhat typical life history is one in which they marry each other after finishing 
their studies and work for a few years, but because of their political activities they 
are forced to flee. Then follows a few years long disruption: leaving their country of 
origin; possibly spending some time in a refugee camp; perhaps enduring a 
separation from spouse and children; and possibly a long waiting time in a refuge 
center in Norway. The family starts to rebuild itself either when they find normal 
housing in Norway or after a family reunion, if they were separated. In some sense, 
the household as a unit fails to provide its members with security before the 
migration and during the migration (a time period of one to four years). If they had 
been safe and secure they would not be forced to leave. On the other hand, the 
household has acted together in a time of hardships and left in search of security. 
Perhaps the fact that they ended up in Norway shows that these households are 
able to provide security to their members by exiting under an external threat.  
For practical purposes several of my households are establishing themselves for the 
second time. When they arrive in Norway, they usually have no or very few 
possessions that will help them to establish a home, and the introductory programs 
for refugees and social services assist them in establishing their new homes. They 
themselves view it as the same household in a new home and in a new society. 
None of the interviews pointed toward the establishment of a new household in 
Norway.  
In one of the households, the couple had once been close to divorce: she moved 
back to their country of origin, with one of the children, but came back to Norway 
after a year. In this case, too, continuity was emphasized, and it took some active 
probing on my part to establish what had actually happened. Not that they were 
trying to hide the facts, but I had difficulties in understanding their story, because 
they framed it in terms of continuity.  
It seems to me that in most of my cases family unity is strengthened by migration, 
whether it is forced or voluntary. One could argue that these households will hide 
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their internal disputes from me, something I find likely. Nevertheless, I was asking 
many “non-dangerous” questions about everyday decision-making, which did bring 
up tension in several cases. In addition, the migration is often presented as a story 
of heroic undertaking by the family. How many Norwegian families can present 
such deeds that help them to see their family in a good light? I therefore choose to 
believe that the internal disputes are probably downplayed but not completely 
hidden.  
As a counter argument, one could say that only the strong families succeed in 
migration, or that it is only the families with few internal problems who choose to 
talk to me. If the first argument is correct, the causal relation I am suggesting does 
not hold. If the second argument is correct, the causal relation can hold, for the 
families with internal problems can also have their unity boosted by the migration. 
Since I cannot evaluate these claims, I leave this issue for others to solve.  
Sampling Households 
In order to effectively compare households, they must have some similarities that 
can be controlled for. The choice of these commonalities will influence the 
possibilities for theorization later in the project (Ragin 1987). The sampling process 
can be divided into three stages (Flick 1998:63): first, households are sampled for 
interviewing (my seventeen households); second, transcribed interviews are selected 
for a closer presentation and analysis (the eight cases that are presented more 
closely); and third, particular stories and aspects of the households’ lives are 
selected for presentation and analysis.  
The Sampling Criterion 
This thesis uses theoretical sampling with a gradual definition of the sample 
structure (Flick 1998:65). The aim is to get maximum variation in the ways of 
organizing among households from three different countries of origin. 
Table 7: The Theoretical Sampling Population 
Household’s Dominant Way of Organizing  
Hierarchy Egalitarian Individualistic Fatalistic 
Sri Lanka     
Chile     Country of Origin Vietnam     
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In Table 7 we can see the theoretical sampling population that will later serve as a 
guide for comparisons. Since this thesis is about the ways of organizing, it is 
necessary to try to get as much variation in these as possible.  
How many cases do I need? In Table 7 we see how the theoretical sampling 
population consists of a cross-tabulation of twelve different possibilities, however, 
it is not certain that they all are present in a local community.112 In an ideal research 
project, I would have four to eight cases for each of these possibilities, as a way to 
exhaust the variation within each one, but this kind of “total” research is not 
possible within the limits of a PhD. My aim is to explore this theoretical space as 
widely as possible, and my cases should thus be seen as cases exemplifying one 
combination within the theoretical sampling population.  
My interest is not in the countries of origin but in the ways of organizing. I have 
enough cases within each way of organizing to show how there is some variation 
within each way of organizing, but at the same time many commonalities. The fact 
that the cases come from different countries of origin does not weaken my 
argument, quite the contrary. However, it is impossible for me to tell what part of 
the variation is connected to the country of origin and what is specific to the 
particular household. Therefore, one should not try to read any of my statements 
about singular households as claims about “Chileans,” “Vietnamese,” or “Tamils” 
in Norway.  
Country of Origin: Country of origin influences migrants in several ways. It is used as 
a proxy for past experiences in the country of origin, and for membership in a more 
or less coherent ethnic group. Country of origin is also connected to large 
differences in unemployment and use of social services (Djuve and Hagen 1995). 
At the same time, it is important to realize that people with the same ethnic 
background can be very different in many aspects. In the Norwegian debate, 
perceived racial characteristics are usually not mentioned at all, as it would implicate 
the majority population in politically incorrect thinking and behavior. These 
perceived racial characteristics are often included under the heading of ethnic 
background.113 
I chose to focus on people from Chile, Vietnam, and Sri Lanka, because they have 
communities consisting of several hundred to a few thousands people in both Oslo 
and Bergen, and they, in general, arrived a long time ago.114 I declined to use 
                                                     
112 Cultural theory would expect that in their countries of origin all four ways of organizing are 
represented among households. However, reasons for deciding to leave, and actually succeeding in 
migration, can be connected to ways of organising, leading to the absence of one or more ways of 
organizing among the households in Norway.  
113 This is so dominant a perspective that it was even visible in the name of the previous government 
body charged with dealing with racial, religious, and ethnic discrimination: the Centre for 
Combating Ethnic Discrimination (SMED 1999). 
114  The source for information about Oslo is Oslo Statistikken, while for Bergen, I have been able to 
obtain some statistics through the City of Bergen that are based on the public registers at 1.1.1999.  
The public registers (Folkeregisteret) have been read by SSB and processed further by City of 
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European migrants, in order to challenge cultural theory as much as possible. These 
three countries belong to the Latino, Chinese, and Indian cultural spheres. Today, 
having completed the final stages of the research, I wish I had included Norwegian 
households in my sample, as it would have helped to emphasize the similarity of 
households across the “us” vs. “them” dichotomization.  
Other Requirements for Participation 
I have tried to reduce variation in the following variables: life cycle and location, 
time in Norway, and language skills. 
Life cycle and Location: I have selected households that have, or recently have had, 
childrens in school in Bergen or Oslo and still have one or several children living at 
home. Having children puts certain demands upon the tasks a household needs to 
perform. In addition, this gives me households that are similar in age composition, 
and hence potentially able to participate in the labor force, and it ensures that they 
have had similar contact with the institutions of the welfare state.  
I started this research project by conducting during the spring of 1999 a pilot study 
in which I interviewed Kurdish households in Oslo. I had hoped to use these 
interviews later, but a few problems indicated otherwise. The members of the 
households were of different ages: there were young single men, couples with 
children, and elderly couples without children. They were in different stages of their 
life cycle, which made it difficult to compare the justifications they used, as they 
were justifying different acts and choices.  
Time in Norway: I want informants who have been in Norway for more than ten 
years. This is long enough to establish social networks and become familiar with a 
new location. Since I am not examining the early-arrivals-do-it-well hypothesis, 
there was no particular reason to study groups who have arrived to Norway later.  
Language skills: I interviewed only people who speak sufficient Norwegian to 
complete an interview in the language. I have done all of my interviews without an 
interpreter present, which, on the one hand, ensures the household’s anonymity 
and privacy and can give me a more “honest” look into the household’s internal 
life. On the other hand, an interpreter can also lend a hand in elucidating what 
people “actually mean” by their statements.  
The following influential aspects are not standardized for:  
                                                                                                                                   
Bergen and by the author. Migrant populations consist of persons with two parents born abroad, 
in other words, the children of first generation migrants are counted as migrants. 
The number of  migrants living in Oslo and Bergen 
 In Oslo 1.1.1998 In Bergen 1.1.1999 
From Sri Lanka 3721 736 
From Vietnam 3667 1091  
From Chile 1538 1070   
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Type of visa: Several researchers in the field have suggested to me that I should 
choose either refugees or non-refugees. I find this dichotomy hard to apply. It is a 
formal categorization used by the Directorate of Migration, and not necessarily a 
precise description of the migrants’ experiences. The migration by Tamils, Chileans, 
and Vietnamese can be characterized for the most part as forced migration. 
However, some of the people I have talked with have arrived in Norway later as a 
result of a family reunion, which blurs the line. Many of the Tamils originally 
arrived on a student visa, but subsequent events made it impossible to return. 
Originally, they did not fulfill the criterion for refugee status, but knew that it was 
possible to obtain a student visa, if one was able to pay the school fees. 
Nevertheless, the reason they wanted to leave was more connected to the need to 
get out of a country where they were oppressed, rather than wanting to come to 
Norway. To conclude, one can look at my sample, for the most part, as being a 
result of forced migration, even if some have never had an official refugee status.  
Family in town: For me one of the interesting aspects of migration is how people are 
inserted into a new society and how they try to find their new place. There are big 
differences in the kind of ethnic or family based social network a migrant arrives to. 
Some people have a large family who can help them adjust to life in Norway, while 
others do not.  
Foreign Citizens Are Less Willing to Participate in Research 
There is a decreased willingness to participate in research among foreign citizens 
than there is in the majority population, according to Kval and Bjørklund, who 
completed a nationwide survey on participation in the 1995 local election (1996). 
Migrants who have Norwegian citizenship did not have a low response rate (Kval 
and Bjørklund 1996:54). The participation rate (people who sent back at least a 
partially completed survey) was 42 percent. If we only look at the citizens of 
countries included in my research, they are even lower: Sri Lanka 30 percent, 
Vietnam 39 percent and Chile 36 percent (Kval and Bjørklund 1996:55). Kval and 
Bjørklund suggest that the low response rate is caused by skepticism toward this 
type of registration, which sounds reasonable to me, as a history of problems with 
the authorities is often part of the reason for leaving a country. The low response 
rate is not caused by language problems, as the questionnaire was translated into 
many languages, including, Spanish, Vietnamese, and Tamil.  
There is also some conflicting evidence. Rogstad found, in a recent phone survey 
conducted in several languages, that Pakistani, Bosnian, and Turkish (which were 
the only three included) migrant groups had a higher participation rate than the 
majority population (Rogstad 2004). However, this phone survey did not include 
migrants from Sri Lanka, Vietnam, or Chile. In addition, Rogstad is focusing on 
people’s country of origin, not on their present citizenship.  
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There are several possible explanations for the finding by Kval and Bjørklund. 
First, perhaps the citizens have been socialized through a longer stay in Norway to 
fill forms and voluntarily give information. A counter argument to this is that the 
response rate has dropped from 1991 to 1995: for Sri Lankans by 19 percent, for 
Vietnamese 11 percent, and for Chileans 12 percent. This suggests that it is 
probably not a socialization effect, but rather something else. Second, it is possible 
that trusting the Norwegian state increases the propensity to apply for citizenship. 
In other words, if you do not trust the state, you might not want to apply for a 
citizenship either. Third, it is possible that it is a “wearing out effect.” One might be 
inclined to fill out one questionnaire, but after a few years in the country, and with 
countless forms to complete, one is less likely to be willing to contribute. This 
wearing out effect can also explain the low participation by the majority population 
in the Rogstad phone survey, as it seems likely that the majority population is more 
often approached by pollsters and sales people than migrants are. Unfortunately, 
these questions are not possible to answer here.  
Gaining Access to Households 
The process of gaining access to households has been difficult. I will therefore 
present the approaches I tried, failed, discarded, and succeeded with. The two most 
important channels for gaining access to the households in this thesis have been 
schools and snowballing. I will, then, in the following, call these the school sample 
and the snowballing sample.  
The first school I contacted cooperated in all possible manners, and I mistakenly 
ssumed that it would be as easy with the other schools. Some other schools I 
contacted sent my request up the ladder, to the city’s school administration, which 
was fully preoccupied reorganizing their administrative structure. I received a reply, 
in which they politely made it clear that they do not wish to facilitate research that 
focuses on migrants only. Unfortunately, at that stage in the research project 
including a significant number of Norwegian households in the interview process 
was not an option. 
The school sample was collected by sending letters115 to thirty-nine parents with 
names indicating Vietnamese, Chilean or Tamil origin. This resulted, after mailing 
one reminder, in eight households that were willing to participate and matched the 
sampling requirements.  
It offers some comfort that Elisabeth Both, the author of the classic text in family 
research, Family and Social Network, also had difficulties finding households to 
interview. In order to get interviews with twenty households, their research team 
contacted forty-two different agencies, ranging from medical offices to churches 
                                                     
115 I have provided an example of the introductory letter in the appendix on page 511. 
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for referrals (1971:15). Had I known the difficulty of the task earlier in the research 
process I would probably have opted for a different method of selection. 
I received a low rate of acceptance to participate, as expected. Participation in this 
kind of research (to share one’s life history, including details about one’s social and 
family life) takes both time and courage. In addition, it is not in people’s direct self-
interest, even if there can be positive experiences connected to being a subject for 
research.116  
To get access to more households I had to make new plans. Two parallel processes 
were started: one formal approach and one snowballing approach. The formal 
approach was to gain use of the official records of addresses. I defined a sample 
and managed to get the necessary permission from the national privacy protection 
agency (Datatilsynet).117 The work of selecting the addresses is privatized out of the 
national record office (Folkeregisteret) to three companies that charge an arm and a 
leg for a half a day’s work.  
Simultaneously, I worked with snowballing—that is, finding households through 
social networks. I made appearances at different “ethnic” arrangements, like large 
parties, social gatherings after the Sunday mass at a Catholic Church, parents 
meetings with their childrens mother language teachers, and so forth. My goal was 
to spread information about myself and my project in settings where levels of trust 
were already high. In addition, I have enlisted help from people who are themselves 
part of these ethnic communities. These intermediaries would give a few selected 
households an envelope containing the same information that was sent to the 
school sample. These households would then mail a pre-stamped letter back to me, 
confirming or denying their participation, hence making it possible to avoid 
contacting households that have already been contacted.  
Because the snowballing approach was already producing results, when the time 
came to hire one of the companies to make the list of addresses, the formal 
approach became the backup plan. Another reason for dropping the formal 
approach was its similarity to the procedure used with the school sample. Whereas, 
with snowballing, I could target specific cases to fill gaps in my theoretical sample 
population: I needed fatalistic households and Chilean households. In addition, 
after I had done my first initial analysis of the school sample, I realized that too 
many of these people were community leaders or else otherwise very successful in 
their lives. Later on I tried to correct this self-selection bias toward success by 
asking intermediaries to avoid these community leaders and to focus on “regular” 
families. The snowballing method produced nine of the interviewed households. 
                                                     
116 There are at least two immediate positive experiences. First, there is somebody who is willing to 
listen for hours to what one has to say. Second, being subject to research means that somehow one 
is framed in a social setting as interesting, or important. Because of the anonymity, it mainly applies 
to the interview setting, but I would expect many of the families to talk about it with their close 
friends. 
117 The official translation is the Data Inspectorate, which does not help to understand what they do. 
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The proportion of positive responses through the snowballing was much higher (77 
percent) than through the school (21 percent). The numbers are not quite 
comparable though, because the response rate for the school sample is calculated 
based on all contacted households (lack of response is counted as a decline to 
participate), while the snowball sample includes only received letters. Nevertheless, 
it seems likely that the snowball sample has a much higher positive response rate: 
these households were initially contacted by someone they knew, they felt perhaps 
social pressure to participate and more trust to my research. In addition, because 
the intermediaries knew my selection criteria, they could decide against inviting 
households that did not fit my sampling criteria, which I was unable to do with the 
school sample. In other words, in the school sample, some of the lack of replies, i.e. 
declines of participation, are probably cases that did not fit the explicitly stated 
criteria for participation. Unfortunately, I do not have more information about this.  
Table 8: The Sample  
 Answer Chile Tamil Vietnam Total  % 
Yes 1 4 3 8 47  School 
No or no reply 13 8 10 31   
 Proportion yes 7 % 33 % 23 % 21 %  
         
Yes 3 5 1 9 53  Middlemen/Snowball 
No 1 0 2 3   
 Proportion yes 75 % 100 % 33 % 75 %  
  Total yes 4 9 4 17  
 
After I had conducted the first round of interviews with the Tamils, I could see that 
many of the Tamil households were hierarchical, but there were also individualistic 
and fatalistic households. Through an intermediary, I was able to find one Tamil 
household that was a good candidate for the fatalistic category, but, unfortunately, I 
was never able to complete this interview (it is not included among the seventeen 
households). At this point, I could see how much time each household took, and I 
decided to cut down on the number of households to interview. My four 
Vietnamese households use three different ways of organizing, which is a sufficient 
spread. In the Chilean community, I targeted different households in order to get 
high variation with as low a number of cases as possible. I ended up with four 
Chilean households divided between three ways of organizing.  
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Selection Bias and Representativeness 
I have not followed the principle of randomness, because in qualititative research it 
does not make much sense. Case selection is based on how much can be learned 
from each case.  
In Table 9 the combinations present in my material are marked with an X. We can 
see how the households I have interviewed do not cover the complete theoretical 
sample population, despite my attempts to gain maximum variation. However, as it 
is not known if all the ways of organizing are present in each of the three migrant 
communities, it is impossible to know if open cells are an indicator of a lack of 
representativeness or an indicator of how common certain ways of organizing are 
in migrant communities.  
Table 9: Representativeness in Relation to Theoretical Sample 
Population 
Household’s dominant way of organizing  
Hierarchy Egalitarian Individualistic Fatalistic 
Sri Lanka X X X  
Chile  X X  
Country 
of origin 
Vietnam X  X X 
 
Nevertheless, we can see that the material is rich in information, as the number of 
possible comparisons is high. If we try to keep either country of origin or way of 
organizing constant during comparison, each case can be compared with other cells 
on the same line or same column. The obvious limitation in my material is the 
presence of only one fatalistic household. At one point during my research, I had 
reasons to believe that I had three fatalistic households in my sample, one from 
each country, unfortunately, two of them dropped out during the process. One of 
them told me that they did not want to participate anymore when I tried to make an 
appointment for the second interview. Their first interview is now excluded from 
analysis and the transcript deleted. The second fatalistic household that dropped 
out agreed originally to be interviewed, but I gave them up after ten to twelve failed 
attempts to make an appointment.  
The isolate households are characterized by their short-term planning of time use. 
For my part, trying to make an appointment for an interview proved a major 
obstacle. If there was a specific person to whom I should speak, usually no one 
could tell me when he or she would be available. Because others “control” their 
lives, life becomes unpredictable. When I finally managed to get the right person on 
the phone, some actually refused to make plans for the next week, because they did 
not yet know what would be going on next week. If I want an appointment on 
Wednesday, I should call back on Tuesday (but it is of course unknown if he or she 
will be in on Tuesday, and nobody else has the competence or the authority to 
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answer on his or her behalf). From a purely theoretical view, the remedy is simple. 
They expect the world to make decisions on their behalf, so I should just announce 
that “I will come Wednesday at 7 pm. If you are not home I will wait.” Most likely 
they would be home waiting for me.  
I find it difficult to force people into an interview. In addition, and supporting my 
private view, my license for the use of sensitive data for research purposes requires explicit 
written statements of voluntarily consent from the households, prohibiting any 
kinds of aggressive interview practices.118 I believe that I, therefore, have a slight 
systematic self-selection bias, reducing the number of fatalistic households.  
Making Interviews  
Evaluation of qualitative interviewing requires that the researcher give a description 
and offer some reflections on the process. In the following, I will discuss the 
interview situations and the style I have chosen to conduct them in, discuss the 
topics I have chosen for the interviews, and discuss the fact that I have performed 
the interviews in Norwegian, not in the native languages of the households. 
The Interview Situation and Style 
The definition of my role in the field influences the kind of information I am able to 
get access to (Flick 1998). I believe that the best I can do is to present myself as a 
migrant from Finland and as a researcher who is genuinely interested in their 
experiences and opinions. My own migrant experience gives me an outsider's view 
of Norwegians, to which my informants can often relate. In addition, I have chosen 
to make my informants experts, and present myself as a learner (Fontana and Frey 
1994:367). I am counting on their having had more experience of Norwegians than 
I have had of them. In other words, they are in a better position to know what 
needs to be explained to a “dumb Norwegian.” The challenge is to balance the role 
of the researcher, who is to be taken seriously, and the learner, who needs 
everything explained to him. 
My experience, so far, has shown that two processes influence the interview in 
opposing directions. On the one hand, there is a lack of trust. Some of the migrants 
come from countries where there is no clear limit to the authority of the state 
(consequently, there is also no clear separation between public and private); where 
corruption is the norm, not the exception; where there is no separation of powers; 
and perhaps they have fled from the use or abuse of public force. In these cases I 
cannot win their trust by referring to the legal protection of data collected for 
                                                     
118 Lisence of permit by Datatilsynet, dated 19th of February 1999.  
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research purposes, or other formal mechanisms. I believe that the trust must be 
won on a personal level; I hope this can be achieved through presenting myself as a 
migrant trying to help other migrants. On the other hand, several have been very 
interested to talk to me. I believe that they appreciate being taken a serious interest 
in, and being able to explain what life in Norway is like.  
There are several different types of interviews and, subsequently, a need to make a 
choice between them (Flick 1998). Because of the large number of questions, most 
likely, two (or more) separate interviews are needed, which allows me to utilize 
different strategies.  
The researcher should keep the first interviews with participants 
broad, letting the participants “tell their stories.”  He or she can then 
use subsequent interviews to obtain more targeted information and 
to fill gaps left by the earlier interviews.  When the researcher no 
longer feels uncomfortable in the setting and can relax and focus on 
what is happening, instead of on him- or herself, then the stage of 
productive data collection begins. (Morse 1994:229) 
In my pilot study, I collected life histories, which was not as helpful to me as I had 
hoped, because the information available for analysis was too unfocused. I have 
therefore chosen to utilize a narrative oriented technique, Episodic interviews, as 
presented by Flick, which  
use[s] the interviewee's competence to present experiences in their 
course and context as narratives.  Episodes as an object of such 
narratives and as an approach to the experiences relevant to the 
subject under study allow a more concrete approach than does the 
narrative of a life history.  On the other hand, and in contrast to the 
narrative interview, routines and normal everyday phenomena can 
be analyzed with this procedure. (1998:111) 
This way I, as researcher, can influence the creation of stories during the interview, 
while allowing the storytelling to flow as freely as possible. The tool used by the 
research is the invitation to present narratives of situations.  
Special attention is paid in the interview to situations or episodes 
where the interviewee has had experiences that seem to be relevant 
to the question of the study.  …  In several domains, the episodic 
interview facilitates the presentations of the experiences in a general, 
comparative form and at the same time it ensures that those 
situations and episodes are told in their specificity. (Flick 1998:107) 
For example, I could ask a household to tell me of situations where they have 
helped somebody else and where they are being helped. The completion of the life 
history schema and the social relations schema help me to ask a series of questions 
connected to a particular time period or particular persons. This style of 
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interviewing requires that the questions be formed in the interview situation, while 
the interview guide is reduced to something akin to a checklist.119  
Questions Covering Three Domains 
In most cases a few months passed between the first and second interview of a 
household, which allowed me to analyze some of the material before the second 
interview. Thus, the second interview contained some follow-up questions tailored 
to each household based on their previous answers. 
The interviews focus on three different domains of life: the household’s internal 
way of organizing, their external social relations, and their experiences with and 
views of institutions of the welfare state. To adequately cover these three domains, 
a the large number of topics needs to be discussed: first, their life, work, and 
housing histories, their reasoning concerning household economics, decision-
making, and division of labor; second, the social network of family, friends, and 
neighbors, the flow of resources in social networks, and the justifications used for 
helping people; third, their experiences with and views of public institutions, like 
schools, migration officials, police, parliamentary politics, local politics, the 
municipality, the social welfare office, and so forth. By covering a wide range of 
topics, it is possible to understand more of the choices these migrants have made, 
and how these issues influence each other. The downside is that it has been 
impossible to exhaust any of the topics. For example, networks could have been 
studied in much more detail,120 but the time these families are willing to spend with 
me sets a practical upper limit of around four hours of taped discussion for each 
family. I believe that I have found a good balance between detail and depth, in 
covering three interrelated domains with enough detail to be able to see patterns 
and connections beyond the singular narratives given to me. 
The appendix contains examples of my interview guides and the household history 
schema, and the schema used to register their social relations. 
In survey research there is often a focus on a few variables, for example, on how a 
particular attitude influences voting behavior. In a situation where still little is 
known about how migrant households adapt to their life in Norway, how they 
behave and look at themselves as new citizens, it is probably more important to 
know how and why the family has bought their new house, how and why they have 
changed jobs. I believe that major singular events in peoples' lives give them 
experiences that influence how they think and what they do, and to get a grasp of 
these experiences can give us a much more realistic understanding of the processes 
political scientists are interested in. Unfortunately, more realistic is also less 
                                                     
119 These schemas and the interview guides are available in the appendix. 
120 See the appendix in Finset (1981) for an example of a more thorough interview guide for network 
analysis. 
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theoretical, messier, and less generalizable. However, cultural theory offers us one 
alternative way to organize the information, allowing us to deal with people, 
simultaneously, on a detailed and on a theoretical level. 
Do We Really Understand Each Other? 
What Level of Language Skill is Sufficient? 
As I have stated earlier, I have used sufficient language skills as a selection criterion. 
Partly because if one looks at the interview as a dialogue that develops between two 
people, a good understanding of the issues and concepts that are of interest is of 
major importance for the interviewer (Fog 1994). This raises the question: what 
level of language skill is sufficient to qualify for participation? The question is 
academic, as I have not needed to drop any households due to a lack of language 
skills.  
Some households were difficult to understand. To my surprise, however, the 
household that I considered to have the poorest language skills was actually one of 
my best informants. However, it required careful, repetitive listening to appreciate 
the richness of information conveyed. These stories were rich in detail and 
contained insightful reflections about migrants’ positions in Norway.  
How can I know that I actually understand what they say? It is not given that the 
meaning of a word is identical for the participants, even if the sound of the word is 
the same.121 One possible answer is that participation in the dialogue, and more 
particularly in the turn-taking in the conversation,122 allows for a means of checking 
the level of understanding in a dialogue. When the participants in a conversation 
agree upon whose turn it is to speak, and when the turn is given to the next 
speaker, there must be some common understanding present. Hence, even if 
understanding is not perfect, it is possible to evaluate to what degree participants in 
a dialogue understand one another, given that one is willing to accept a pragmatic 
view of the nature of language (Olli 2001). 
It has been claimed that narrative competence is fairly universal. In other words, 
everybody uses stories and should therefore understand the underlying structure in 
a narrative: the beginning; the presentation of a context or setting; the presentation 
of the actors, who do something meaningful; the ending. It might sound trivial, but 
when interviewing individuals with different cultural backgrounds and varying 
competence in Norwegian, it is a useful structure to focus upon. Thus, if I do not 
                                                     
121 One of the central postulates in semiotics is that the relationship between the signifier (sound/ 
word) and the signified (meaning) is free. Hence, one needs to question what seems obvious. 
122 Turn-taking is a discourse analytical concept refering to how the participants in a conversation take 
turns in talking and listening. Usually one conversation consists of many turns.  
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understand the narrative structure in a story, I know that clarifying questions are 
needed.123 Understanding the narrative structure can be seen as a prerequisite for 
understanding the actors’ motivations. 
In summary, even though it is possible to doubt whether two people understand 
each other in conversation, at least two sources can be used to confirm the 
presence of at least some mutual understanding: the shared turn-taking in a 
conversation and the presence of a narrative structure.  
Preparing for the Analysis 
Anonymization of the Households 
Providing anonymity for a household, anonymization, is difficult when one is 
dealing with real communities consisting of a few thousand people or less. The 
number of families and households is much lower. If one then tries to match these 
to level and type of education, type of family members in Norway, the number of 
children, work history, housing history, or any other facts that are presented, only 
families without any minority social contacts are able to keep their anonymity. 
Therefore, it is necessary for me to change many basic facts, as their combination 
gives away the household’s true identity. 
In social science that involves personal contact with the research subjects, the 
researcher has a dual obligation. On the one hand, the researcher has respon-
sibilities toward the research subjects, who have volunteered information and 
allowed the researcher to establish a relationship with them. On the other hand, 
there are demands that must be fulfilled for a work to be scientific. There are 
ethical obligations that must be balanced against each other. I will show how this 
balance has been achieved in this thesis, and its potential consequences.  
Self-censorship, the practice of omitting selected facts and features 
of one's research findings, has been practiced by data gatherers for 
as long as the ethnographic tradition has existed for normative 
reasons.  This usually involves deleting experiences that reveal 
personal, sensitive, or compromising features about researchers or 
their subjects. (Adler and Adler 1993:250)  
Self-censorship can pressure the researcher to reduce the cumulative value of his or 
her research. It can also reduce the possibilities for control, reanalysis and critique 
by other researchers. Research that uses self-censorship can itself be cumulative, 
but it will be of less cumulative value for other researchers. The only solution here 
                                                     
123 One should note, though, that even if the narrative structure is clear, it is not given that I 
understand why people do what they do, which is perhaps an equally interesting question.  
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is to be open about what kind of characteristics are subject to changes due to 
anonymization, and perhaps more importantly, what kind of principles are used 
when these characteristics are changed.  
Fortunately, self-censorship is not the only option. Adler and Adler present four 
alternatives to self-censorship (1993:263). The first alternative is to disguise the 
informants by changing the attributes that can be used to identify them. I will use this 
technique extensively. In Table 10 below, characteristics of households and people 
that can be changed are listed. Names of households and other informants are 
always changed. Names of politicians and other public figures, are not changed. I 
would like to add one important technique to this list of disguising, namely, 
omission. By omitting information, it is possible to hide features that I view as 
inessential to the central argument of this thesis, but which would, if disclosed, 
reveal the identity of my informant to the informed reader. Almost anything can be 
omitted: information about the part of the city where they live, hobbies, 
organizational involvement, the type of car they drive, and so forth. Obviously 
most of the information I have about a household is omitted, but it is important to 
be aware that this is intentional.  
Second, and a less used alternative for anonymization, is to create fictitious 
pseudonymical characters to which real people's thoughts or behaviors could be 
attributed. I did seriously consider to create fictitious households that are 
composites of several households, but rejected this as it would make the evaluation 
of the analysis in chapter 5 difficult.  
The third alternative for anonymization is to attribute the opinions to less vulnerable 
characters. This is a solution that I believe will conflict with the norm of truthfulness 
and will not be practiced here.  
The fourth alternative is to involve the subjects in the decision-making. This is 
potentially a good solution, but subjects might not be the most competent to make 
this decision, because the circumstances in which the subjects make the decision 
might change, even if they do not see it as a possibility. In addition, the subjects do 
not know how the published research will be used by others. In addition, it will 
reduce the researcher's responsibility, and put it instead on the research subject. 
Even if they have given me permission to use their name, I have chosen not to, 
because what they say can be taken out of context and used against them. It is, 
quite simply, an unnecessary cost for participating in research.  
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Table 10: Attributes Changed in Anonymization 
Information Anonymization through Example 
Names of 
informants 
Pseudonyms for households, 
no use of first names 
Mr. and Mrs. Natan 
Important 
dates 
Approximations  
Small changes are possible124 
1983 = (mid 1980s) 
1983 = 82, 83 or 1984 
Number of 
children 
Can be changed by 1 1 = 1 or 2 
2 = 1, 2 or 3 
Education Change branch/profession, 
keep level of education 
Janitor = painter 
political scientist = lawyer 
Teacher = midwife 
Medical engineer = electrical engineer 
Occupation Change employer 
Keep white-collar, blue-collar, 
service, management, self-
employment and full-time 
housewife as status 
Hydro becomes Statoil 
Accountant = computer support 
Bakery worker = fishery worker 
Health  Change type of problems but 
keep consequences 
Back problems = knee problems 
Relatives Small change in numbers 
Changes in gender 
4 cousins = 3, 4 or 5 cousins 
Brother = sister 
Father = mother 
Locations Change to similar part of city, 
city, town, or country with 
regard to size, distance, and 
perceived social status 
Åsane = Fyllingsdalen 
Stavanger = Trondheim 
Ørsta = Volda 
Sweden = Denmark 
Canada = USA 
 
The Transcription of the Interviews 
All interviews were recorded, later transferred to a computer as sound files for 
transcription by my assistant, Jon Audun Kvalbein. These trancripts were checked 
against the recordings by me.125 These twenty-five transcripts describe seventeen 
different households.126 In addition, I have detailed notes from some interviews 
where the household did not allow me to use a recorder.  
The required precision of the transcripts should determine the choice of 
transcription rules. There are obvious differences between speech and written text, 
and these rules allow for a predetermined and controllable way of transferring oral 
                                                     
124 It might look insignificant, but there are large fluctuations, for example, in the number of people 
admitted from year to year. Some years only two people from a particular country moved to 
Bergen. 
125 Details about the equipment used are in the appendix on page 519. 
126 Eleven consist of both a first and second interview, while six contain the first interview only, as I 
decided against using these households further, before completing the second interview. (See more 
about case selection on page 137).  
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presentations into written texts. Silverman presents a precise method for 
transcription (Silverman 1993:118), whereas Kvale (Kvale 1997:105) emphasizes the 
intended form of analyses as a criterion. Too many details can make the transcript 
hard to read, and too few will lead to the loss of information. However, the 
purpose is simplification, as removing unnecessary information facilitates analysis.  
The level of precision needed for the analyses in this project is not quite the same 
as in psychology, but on the other hand, information about turn-taking and 
hesitation is important. I have chosen to use a simplified version of the system 
described by Silverman.  
In Table 11, below, the reader can see the meaning of the layout and some special 
characters. Transcription notation is used to describe speech, and the meaning it 
conveys, not grammar.  
Table 11:  Notation Used in Transcription 
Talk Notation used in writing 
The end of one unit of speech . 
A change, small insertions and the like , 
A question ? 
Always note when:  
Two people talk at the same time, start of overlap While [A says this 
           [B says this  
A new speaker takes over without a normal break  
between the speakers  
= 
Transcriber could not understand what was said (  ) 
Transcriber guesses a word (enter the guess) 
Register only when it seems to have a meaning:  
One second pause  # 
Three second pause.  Use one # for each second of 
pause.  
###  
LOUD SPEACH  CAPITALIZE 
Talk that is emphasized by other means Underline 
There is a lo:nger sound than what is normal : 
Audible inhale  .hhh 
Audible exhale, very long Hhhhhh 
  
Comments on other things ((Children make lots of 
noise)) 
Parts removed by the author (…) 
 
 
One example is needed to clarify.  
Mr:  Norwegians are always quite ##[difficult, but  
Mrs:                                                    [nice and  easy.  When we lived in Oslo 
Mr:  = our neighbors would not help us. 
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We can see, in the first line, how the husband hesitates for two seconds and, in the 
second line, how the wife steps in to try to help. They both talk at the same time, 
which is indicated by the two “[“. In the third line, we see how the husband takes 
over without any pause after the wife’s speach. From the absence of a period sign 
after “Oslo,” we can see that the wife was not done, while the equal sign on the 
third line shows that the normal pause between two turns in a dialogue was not 
present. Even if the husband hesitated to bring up a problematic aspect, he insisted 
on presenting his version of the story. 
This notation technique reveals the household’s behavior in an interview situation 
in a manner that cannot be accomplished with a regular presentation of what was 
said. 
The language has been changed slightly, in order to make the quotes easier to read. 
Their use of imagery and most of their syntax is preserved, without changing their 
level of language proficiency. In addition, I have removed the small sounds people 
make while searching for the right word, and the sounds used to keep the 
conversation going (“aa…”). This kind of “polishing” is a normal part of 
transferring language from oral to written form. Only very few professionals, such 
as skilled politicians and bureaucrats, are able to talk using “written language,” 
which, of course, is horrible in conversation, but lends itself to precise quotations in 
transcription.  
All quotes have been translated from Norwegian into English by me.  
Reflections on the Analysis 
The analysis is an integral part of the thesis, particularly Chapter 5, where the eight 
households and the results from the analysis are presented (pages 107 to 254). Here 
I will only present some reflections on the analytical process itself. 
Analytical Steps during the Reading of the Transcripts  
I have explored different analytical schemes and tools, and ended up working on a 
folder for each of the households, which contains the transcript, the year-by-year 
overview of their life-history, the social relations schema, photographs and other 
printed materials. The printout of the transcript is then, little by little, filled with 
comments and analytical remarks. In addition, I have used, extensively, a single 
document containing full transcripts of all the interviews, because it allows me 
easily to search and compare particular aspects across the households.  
The process of analysis goes in small circles. I usually read the interviews many 
times, with a different aim and focus each time. This presentation is just to give a 
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sample of how the process has been, as the readings and my methods of working 
have also changed during the research process. Some households were analyzed in 
this manner rather soon after the interviews were completed, whereas other 
households were placed on hold and the reading spread out over months, 
depending on which chapter I was working on. In addition, analysis of one 
household often gave me new ideas, which required tracing back and rereading 
sections of other interviews, which in turn frequently forced me to change one of 
the earlier interpretations. Each of these readings is cumulative in nature, as the 
results of the previous readings are available to me in the process of interpretation. 
Tools for Interpretation 
Ehn and Löfgren present techniques for interpreting data, which are useful to 
discipline and stimulate interpretation (Ehn and Löfgren 1982:107). Here I will try 
to show how these apply to my interpretation of the interviews. However, in the 
analytical section I will just apply them, without explaining what I am doing.  
This first technique is perspectivation, looking at the same text from different 
viewpoints. I have not really used this, as I have positioned myself as a learner in 
the interviews, and during the interpretation I try to keep in mind that they are 
treating me as a learner. 
The second technique is contrasting, which I use frequently in this thesis. Particular 
aspects of the household’s life stand out when seen in contrast to other households. 
I typically contrast across one of two analytical dimensions: country of origin or 
ways of organizing. This makes it very obvious that the same thing can be done in 
several ways.  
The next technique is homologization (i.e., making things similar). I group and present 
the households according to their way of organizing. For example, by presenting 
the Maheswaran, Nga and Lorca families as three individualistic households, I 
highlight their similarities, despite their country of origin.  
The last one, testing,127 as an interpretative technique, is applied by trying out 
different interpretations on a particular episode told to me. An example of this can 
be seen in my reading of Mr. Natan’s story of helping an old man, on page 165.  
Mostly I have to rely on what the households tell me: for cultural bias this is fine, as 
these kinds of mental constructs are easiest to approach directly through what my 
informants tell me; for households’ external social relations, it would have been 
better if I had other sources or other types of information than just what they tell 
me; for the households’ internal behavior, I obviously use what they tell me, but 
also what I can observe during the interview and analysis. Discourse analysis is well 
suited to this, because it defines speech acts as a form of behavior. Thus, the 
transcripts are analyzed for certain aspects of the household’s behavior during the 
                                                     
127 Original text: ”Prövning” in Swedish. 
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interview.128 Discourse analysis can, according to Engeström, be simplified into the 
following sequenses:129 First, one selects sequences to be analyzed. Second, actions 
with these sequences are described. Third, planning of turn-taking and packaging of 
actions is studied. Fourth, the timing and taking of turns is analyzed. These phases 
lead to a study of the kinds of identities or roles present, given the empirical 
evidence (Engeström 2002). In this way, the transcripts allow me to see whether the 
household has one person who controls the topics and the manner in which the 
stories are told, if there is a specific person to tell a particular story based on role or 
skill, or if the household shares the telling of stories. 
Otherness 
Researchers doing research on migrants face one of the most fundamental 
questions in the philosophy of social sciences:  
How can others, especially quite different from us, know us better 
than we know ourselves?  (Fay 1996:21) 
Some people argue that it would be better if Tamils did research on Tamils, 
Vietnamese on Vietnamese, and so forth. I disagree with such a position and agree 
with the following four counter arguments put forward by Faye: First, we are too 
enmeshed in our own activity to reflect and understand what is going on. Second, 
the activities and feelings involved are often confusing and contradictory, allowing 
an outsider a better perspective. Third, others can more easily grasp the 
connections and causal patterns in our lives. Fourth, self-deception is common: we 
will rather not know what is going on. Hence, “being one” is neither a necessary 
nor a sufficient condition to “know one”.  
… the deep assumption of the thesis “you have to be one to know 
one” is mistaken: no strict connection exists between knowing and 
being. (Fay 1996:22) 
Actually, some of the best social science research has been written from the 
position of other. An example of this is Democracy in America, written by Alexis de 
Tocqueville (1997), who, in being French, was able to see what was particular to the 
American form of democracy in early 19th century. In this manner, otherness 
becomes something that I can carefully utilize for research purposes rather than an 
obstacle for gaining knowledge. 
                                                     
128 I am assuming that their behavior during the interview tells me something about the patterns of 
behavior when I am not present. 
129 This is a simplified presentation. Readers who are interested should consult other applications or a 
introduction to discourse analysis (Gumperz 1992; Vagle, Sandvik, and Svennevig 1994; Scollon 
and Scollon 1995; Mathisen 1997). 
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Narratives and Judgment 
My interviews provide me with some factual information, but primarily they are a 
narrative about a household: its history and current form and function. Therefore, 
some attention to narratives is needed. The following two quotes by Fay can 
provide a starting point for discussion: 
We do not impose a narrative form onto our lives: in the first place, 
the experiences of agency are inescapably narrative in form; in the 
second place, our acts are acts only in so far as we see them 
embodying some narrative. (Fay 1996:197) 
Thus, narratives are used to give behavior meaning. Acts are intentional behavior, 
and it is the presence of a narrative structure that allows us to impose intention 
upon an act. Narratives have, thereby, a double relationship with life: 
We tell stories in acting and we continue to tell stories afterwards 
about the actions we have performed. (Fay 1996:197) 
In my interviews, I try to get the actors themselves to present fragments of their 
own life history through a series of small focused narratives. The informants are 
hence allowed to present themselves in their own narrative constructions, which 
convey their own understanding. 
Narratives are of high value because they involve justifications and moral 
positioning:  
Interviews share with any account an involvement in moral realities.  
They offer a rich source of data which provide access to how people 
account for both their troubles and good fortune. (Silverman 
1993:114) 
I probably focus more on the justifications given than the acts themselves, because 
the justifications are so closely connected to cultural bias. In addition, justifications 
of one’s own acts require that the storyteller see himself from several positions.  
… the storyteller's point of view remains within the world, moving 
from one particular place or person to an other, and resisting all 
claims to ultimate Truth by reminding us that truth is relative to 
where we situate ourselves, to where we stand. (Arendt 1965:52 
quoted from Jackson 2000:56) 
Therefore justifications, understood as providing reasons for passing a positive 
judgment over one’s own behavior, require an awareness of others and their 
reasoning. Without this awareness, there would be no need to justify.  
… judging requires active social engagement—thinking one's own 
thoughts  in contexts other than one's own" (Jackson 2000:59)  
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Justifying is an act that requires positioning in relation to others. In this way their 
justifications are not just information about themselves, they are simultaneously 
information about their relation to the rest of the society.  
In addition, because usually more than one person from the household participates 
in the interview, the narratives can be treated as joint narratives. Families “jointly 
narrate and thus restructure and reconstruct domains of their everyday life” (Flick 
1998:124). The stories told are the “official” versions of what has happened and 
how the family views its own past. There is also a group dynamic present, which 
helps to crystallize the household’s position. If the storyteller does not succeed in 
presenting the household’s moral position precisely, the other members can help 
with details or even with a new story. 
Being a Participant  
I have tried to systematically record my observations concerning the layout of the 
home, use of space, et cetera. In addition to these readily observed aspects, there 
are some aspects of the interview available to me because I am one of the 
participants. 
The transcripts are not complete recordings of an event. It happens sometimes, 
when I look at a transcript and compare it with an interpretation of the interview, 
that I cannot pinpoint my understanding of the story and its deeper meaning to one 
particular quote or even a series of quotes. My understanding can be based more on 
the gut feeling of a participant, rather than the reading of hidden messages in 
between the lines. The migrants are not hiding the messages; the interview situation 
is a situation for sharing the stories and meanings that go beyond the possibilities of 
a transcript.  
This is a powerful means of checking the quality of transcription. Quite often, 
when my original interpretation is in conflict with the transcription, a careful 
listening to the recorded interview reveals small clues of meaning that have been 
discarded in the transcription. In these cases a careful re-transcription is always 
performed.  
Even if cultural theory is a neo-structuralistic theory, I have allowed myself to bring 
in observations and experiences that are quite phenomenological in nature, and 
cannot be separated from my own participation in the events. I believe that this will 
help the reader to understand my interpretation of the events. Nevertheless, I do 
believe that a careful analysis of transcripts will reveal much of what is relevant for 
a cultural theoretical interpretation, even if some other aspects are available only to 
the participants, as cultural theory relies upon the existence of shared (and 
sometimes contested) structures. However, one should not assume that there is 
only one correct interpretation, as in almost any situation even the participants 
themselves can disagree about what is really going on.  
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Selection of Cases and Stories for Analysis and Presentation  
Here I will argue for reasons selecting the cases I did, or more precisely, argue for 
reasons for excluding certain cases. In the end of this section I will argue for why I 
have selected the particular stories within the cases for presentation.  
The issue that still needs to be addressed concerns how I picked my eight cases out of 
the seventeen households interviewed? I have chosen to explore the theoretical 
sampling population as widely as possible (see Table 7). There are, therefore, cases I 
can leave out of the thesis. Because I did not standardize for the number of adults 
in a household to begin with, I have two single parent households, one two-
generational household, and one mixed marriage that can be excluded.  
I interviewed two ex-husbands, who have custody of their children either full or 
part time. The most important reason for excluding them is the lack of the same 
options for the internal organization of the household, which the rest of my 
households have. Even if single parent households are also institutions, and can be 
studied with the help of cultural theory, a new theoretical discussion and 
operationalization would be warranted.  
One of the households I interviewed consisted of two parents, their children, and 
two grandparents, who owned the apartment they lived in. Even if there were many 
interesting dynamics to study, they were clearly different from the other 
households, and are excluded to keep the comparisons as simple as possible. 
I have also excluded households that consist of mixed ethnic origins. I have 
excluded one household in which the mother was from Norway. Moreover, two of 
the already excluded single parent households had been mixed marriages. These 
mixed marriages were quite interesting, as they brought a new dimension into the 
analysis of households’ external social relations, and one could potentially study the 
differences in social relations between husband and wife. Nevertheless, I have 
chosen to keep my focus on two-parent households in order to facilitate 
comparisons. 
The last one of the totally excluded households is a household that asked to be 
excluded. In these excluded households only the first interview was performed, as 
this already gave enough information to rule out them. None of these above 
mentioned five households are used in analysis or presentation.  
In addition to these excluded households, there are Tamil households that are 
analyzed, but not presented in full, because I did not need more Tamil households. 
Typically, these households resemble in many ways households that are already 
included in the presentation and analysis. In addition, two of these households were 
difficult to anonymize because of their life history or their present position in the 
community.  
To summarize, I believe that my selection of cases for analysis and presentation is 
justifiable. I had only four Vietnamese and four Chilean households, and I ended 
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up excluding one of each. The rest of the excluded households are Tamils. The 
principles used for exclusion are related to household structure (single parents, 
mixed households, two-generation households) or the households being more or 
less duplicates of the presented households. Selection bias does not seem to be 
relevant as long as the exclusion criterion is based on household structure. 
However, this can reduce the direct applicability of the results from my research to 
households that are not typical two-parent households.130  
Selection bias could result from my excluding the duplicate cases. However, I 
believe, not to the degree that it poses any problems. The main reason for not using 
these cases more is that I did not need several hierarchical Tamil cases. I have 
picked the one hierarchical case with the richest stories and best quotes. I have also 
chosen not to use a Tamil household that was a borderline case between hierarchy 
and fatalism, even if the fatalistic traits presented were of theoretical interest. 
Including borderline cases would add realism, but also make the analysis less clear.  
Selection bias may also enter when stories for presentation are selected. Because the 
number of aspects covered regarding the households internal life and the list of 
predictions about society and politics are quite long (see page 78), I have been 
forced to include most of the relevant stories and statements. Whenever possible, I 
have selected the stories and aspects of the households’ lives that can be interpreted 
in terms of cultural theory. However, I have not systematically selected stories that 
support my interpretation of a family’s way of organizing. Stories that point to a 
competing way of organizing are always included! In other words, stories and 
statements with no clear interpretation in terms of cultural theory are excluded 
when the same topic can be covered by a story that has a cultural theoretical 
interpretation.  
This will lead to a systematic overrepresentation of stories that can be interpreted in 
terms of cultural theory, which will make the theory look more present in peoples' 
lives than it would if all stories were included. Nevertheless, the high frequency and 
range of statements that can be interpreted in terms of cultural theory leaves me 
with no doubt that cultural theory is a useful tool.  
Having a selection bias in favor of a theory is not a problem as long as the thesis is 
explorative in nature. Actually, I prefer to think that by excluding non-relevant 
statements I have managed to keep the focus on my research problem.  
                                                     
130 There are many new family constallations, like single-mother and part-time dad families, 
stepfamilies, same-sex famlies, and transnational families) that are increasingly important and 
common (Bäck-Wiklund and Johansson 2003). However, including different family constallations 
would have added one more analytical dimension, which would have recuired many more cases.  
Evaluating Research—Validity and Reliability     • 
 
139 
Evaluating Research—Validity and Reliability 
Validity and reliability are much-used criteria in the evaluation of research, even if 
their usage and definitions are contested. Therefore, clarification of my own usage 
and understanding of these concepts is necessary.  
A Question of Validity 
There are two different arguments for not explicitly reporting the methodological 
steps in research. First, the quality is obvious argument: 
Ideally, the quality of the research will give knowledge so strong and 
convincing in itself that it carries its own validity, like a beautiful 
work of art.  In such cases, the research procedures are transparent, 
results obvious and the conclusions from the study are convincingly 
true, beautiful and sound.  External certification or official proofs of 
validity become then secondary.  Relevant or valid research will then 
be research that makes questions concerning validity unnecessary. 
(Kvale 1997:177)131  
Second, the lack of criteria argument:  
We have the unappealing double bind whereby qualitative studies 
can't be verified because researchers don't report their methodology, 
and they don't report their methodology because there are no 
established canons or conventions for doing so. (Miles and 
Huberman 1984:244) 
These arguments can easily lead to a situation in which evaluation becomes 
impossible, because not enough information about the research process has been 
reported. What should be reported is thus dependent on the research tradition and 
the perspective one applies. 
Denzin and Lincoln categorize the dominant methodological paradigms or 
perspectives for evaluation of qualitative research into four different positions: 
positivism, postpositivism, postmodernism and poststructuralism (Denzin and 
Lincoln 1994:479-481). I will, in the following, position my research in relation to 
these perspectives, and present briefly what I consider the best way to evaluate the 
qualities of this thesis. 
Positivism claims that the criteria for evaluating research should be the same whether 
it is quantitative or qualitative. Commonly these criteria can be reduced to internal 
validity, external validity, reliability, and objectivity (Denzin and Lincoln 1994:480). 
                                                     
131 My translation. 
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While these criteria are central in the evaluation of quantitative research, I believe 
that they do not give enough credit to the strong sides of qualititative method. One 
of the more interesting attempts within this tradition is by King, Keohane and 
Verba, who show how causal inference can also be applied in qualitative research 
(King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).  
The postpositivists claim that qualitative research must be evaluated from its own 
premises. The most central representative of postpositivism is grounded theory 
methodology (Glaser and Strauss 1967; Strauss and Corbin 1990, 1994; Corbin and 
Strauss 1997), which according to Denzin, is the most used qualitative interpretative 
framework in the social sciences today (1994:508). The authors of grounded theory 
methodology are trying to create a several step system that allows the attachment of 
qualititative methods to “good science” models. I find this approach unsuitable for 
my purposes, as they emphasize how the theory should grow from empirical 
observations, through careful conceptualization and interpretation. My own 
approach is too rooted in one theoretical perspective to truly follow their lead. This 
should not come as a surprise, as the grounded theory methodology was originally 
created as a reaction against functionalistic and structuralistic theories (Strauss and 
Corbin 1990:275), which are the intellectual roots of cultural theory. However, I 
find the authors insistence on rooting knowledge in time and space, and their 
questioning as it pertains to how the theoretical concepts apply in a given situation, 
most valuable. 
According to Hammersley, postmodernism rejects criteria of validity:  
… the character of qualitative research implies that there can be no 
criteria for judging its products. (Hammersley 1992:58; quoted from 
Denzin and Lincoln 1994:480) 
However, there are other moderate postmodernists, like Kvale, who argue that  
even if the idea of an objective, universal truth is rejected, the 
possibility of local, personal and societal forms of truth, which focus 
on everyday life and the localized narratives, is embraced.  … 
Reliable observations, generalizations from one case to another and 
valid arguments are elements of our daily social interaction. (Kvale 
1997:160) 
I find Kvale’s epistemologically modest position in many ways more credible than 
the alternative positions. 
The fourth paradigm or perspective, poststructuralism, distances itself from the other 
perspectives and demands an entirely new set of criteria, like “subjectivity, 
emotionality, feeling and other antifoundational factors” (Denzin and Lincoln 
1994:480). Cultural theory is a neostructuralist theory and does not easily fit into 
this kind of emotional framework.132  
                                                     
132 Mary Douglas has explicitly rejected the use of emotions in theory building (Douglas 1998b) 
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I have tried to follow the advice given by many, and make the research process as 
transparent as possible.133 My own position is close to Kvale’s, who has worked on 
these issues in connection with interview methods over many years (Kvale 1997, 
1996, 1995, 1989). Kvale argues for building seven stages of validation into the 
research process itself: thematization, planning, interviewing, transcription, analysis, 
validating, and reporting (Kvale 1997:165). The reader should already be familiar 
with how I have thematized, planned, interviewed, and transcribed my material. 
The analysis is presented in the fifth chapter (see page 145), and will not be 
discussed here beyond the reflections I have already made (on page 132). Here I 
will just present my view on validating. 
The competing perspectives are present not just in the field of qualititative research 
in general but also in my own research practice. While doing my interviews, 
analysis, and writing of the thesis, I have leaned upon two particular ideas of what is 
a legitimate basis for validation, that is how my research should be evaluated. First, 
this thesis needs to be accepted by the research community, represented by a 
committee, because it will be submitted as a part of my PhD. This has influenced 
both the form and the style of my writing. However, I hope that my research has 
validity beyond the demonstration of solid craftsmanship. Second, as for myself, 
pragmatic validity is the ultimate criterion for validity (Kvale 1997:173). In other 
words, I consider my own research valid to the degree that the theories and ideas 
presented can be used for practical purposes. The potential value lies in the ability 
of cultural theory to provide a perspective that practitioners and policy makers can 
use to solve their daily tasks. This kind of pragmatic validity criterion does not 
require that cultural theory is the only perspective, or that it is the best perspective, 
but it requires that it proves its usefulness repeatedly in everyday situations.  
A Question of Reliability 
Reliability is more straight forward to deal with than validity. Reliability is about 
consistency in my work, during interviewing, transcription and analysis. The 
combination of taping the interviews and performing two interviews with each 
household has allowed me to review the interviews, change my approach, and tailor 
questions to each household. In addition, in some cases, I arranged a third 
interview to check some issues I was uncertain about, or if I first in the aftermath 
realized, what the question was that I really should have asked.  
The quality and consistency of transcription has been dealt with earlier (starting on 
page 130), so I will just summarize here that all interviews used for analysis have 
been transcribed by an assistant following my written guidelines, and checked by 
me for consistency.  
                                                     
133 Similar advice is given by several authors in the Handbook of Qualitative Research by Denzin and 
Lincoln. See, for example, Miles and Huberman (1994:439) 
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The reliability of the analysis a more difficult issue to address, as it depends on a 
combination of many aspects of my work: which households are included and 
which are excluded, which stories within each household are included and excluded, 
whether the operationalization of the theoretical concepts is applied in a consistent 
manner, and so forth. The selection of households and stories has been dealt with 
previously, and I will leave the reader to be the judge of whether the 
operationalizations rising from the theoretical chapters are used wisely in Chapter 5, 
where the analyzed households are presented. 
My households are representatives of themselves, and not informants giving me 
more or less true accounts of a social reality. Therefore, traditional issues 
concerning the reliability of my sources are not much of a concern, however, I will 
try to address this in the following.  
Trusting the Sources? 
For many the reliability of the sources is a valid concern, and should therefore be 
given some attention. Especially since I do not have information from several 
sources, it is impossible to evaluate their “factuality.” However, the interview 
situation itself is structured around a few important principles that can give some 
guidance. 
First, the principle of anonymity: The informants are promised full anonymity, and 
I believe that the ones who have decided to participate trust me on this issue.  
Second, the principle of no-consequence: I have made it clear in the letter of 
introduction that there are no positive or negative personal consequences resulting 
from the interview. Because of the anonymity, no authorities will know about their 
participation and they will not be rewarded nor punished for anything they will tell 
me.  
These two principles together should remove most important hidden instrumental 
interests for participation and for telling me a “false” version of what has 
happened.  
So, why would a household participate at all if there were nothing to gain? I have in 
the introductory letter emphasized the chance to present their version of the story: to 
be able to give a personal account of their lives in Norway. Being part of a research 
program, their own stories can then influence the way the majority population will 
think about them.  
It seems to me that the threshold for accepting to be interviewed is high, but once I 
am “inside,” they volunteer information gladly. Therefore, I believe that the 
selection bias is a more serious concern than the possibility of households 
misinforming me.  
I focus in the interviews on concrete actions and events: housing, work, division of 
labor at home, management of household economy, social relations, and public 
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institutions. This reduces the possibility of misunderstanding as the talk is centered 
on concrete events, institutions, and behaviors. Is it possible that they misrepresent 
issues like this? The large majority of the information I am getting is likely to be 
reliable, but it is possible that information is omitted or polished for any number of 
reasons.  
It is also possible that events went wrong for reasons other than they give me. 
Fortunately, this is also a minor reliability problem in the analysis as long as the 
households themselves believe in what they tell me. I am analyzing the logic people 
use, and even if it would be possible to construct competing historical accounts and 
explanations for some events, what matters for my purposes is the account they 
themselves use. Some households have pointed out how they have reinterpreted an 
event afterwards. In these cases, it can be difficult for me to give a reliable account 
of their logic in the past, if they themselves do not point out the change for me.  
People often want to make a good impression in an interview. I suspect, therefore, 
that there are stories that are not told. I try to counteract this by asking probing 
questions, within the boundaries of politeness, when I notice holes and gaps in 
their stories. A second consequence of trying to make a good impression is the 
possibility of exaggerating the hardships and one’s own ability to solve them. 
However, this is not a problem, because it just makes the moral aspect in the stories 
clearer and, hence, easier to recognize what kind of self they are constructing in 
their stories. 
Interviews are Social Constructions 
Ehn and Löfgren point out how 
“Soft data” are simply soft, diffuse, and often as contradictory as life 
itself; memoirs, interviews and observed behavior have an authentic 
character, which should not make us forget that even they are 
constructions or models of reality. (Ehn and Löfgren 1982:119)134 
Similarly, my transcripts consist of several layers of social construction. The first is 
the household’s own active presentation of themselves and the behavior they 
display for me during the interview. The household is actively presenting to me an 
image of themselves, and their manner of doing this is interesting information. In 
other words, I am interested here in what Goffman calls the front stage (1990).  
The second layer of social construction enters through my own participation in the 
interview. Being a political scientist, it is easy to forget that the interview is a social 
happening, in which I, as a researcher, am an active participant. In other words, the 
interview should be seen as an joint construct (Mishler 1986:ix). I am actively 
                                                     
134 Original text: ”Mjukdata” är just mjuka, diffusa och ofta motsäkelsefulla som livet sjävt; memoarer, 
intervjuer och observerade handlingar har en autentisk karaktär, som dock inte bör få oss att 
glömma att även de är konstruktioner eller modeller av verkligheten. 
•    Doing Research on Migrant households 
 
144 
forming the situation to something I understand to be an interview, even if I allow 
the household the freedom to present themselves.  
The third layer of social construction is inserted into the the material during the 
process of transcription by my assistant and during the analysis by me. Hence, the 
material is again being formed and influenced by me. However, I do not see this as 
a weakness. Without such structuring processes, the material would not be better 
suited for my research purposes. Thus, the question to pose is not how accurately 
the transcripts reflect reality, but how well suited they are to answer my research 
question.  
Overall, I do believe that the reliability of my research is sufficient for my research 
purposes. This is not to say that the data is reliable for all research purposes, as the 
data is formed and structured by me for the needs of my research problem. The 
conclusions made based on my research have, therefore, hopefully at least, the kind 
of trustworthiness that arises from good artisanship.  
Now that I have presented my research design, how the sample has been put 
together, how I gained access to the households, how the interviews were done, 
how the material has been transferred from speech to transcripts, my reflections 
over the analysis, and the validity and reliability of my research, it is time to move 
on. I will not attempt any conclusions at this stage, but trust that benevolent 
readers will read the rest of my analysis before passing their judgment. It is finally 
time to look more closely at the eight households.  
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C h a p t e r  5   
EIGHT HOUSEHOLDS  
Similarity and Difference 
In this chapter, eight migrant households are presented in more detail. Three 
aspects are focused on: first, a household’s internal organization; second, its helping 
relations with the society outside the household, with emphasis on who it knows and 
who is helping whom. These two aspects are used to establish each household’s 
way of organizing. Third, I present each household’s views about politics and society as 
expressed in relation to its experiences, and evaluate whether these fit the 
predictions given its way of organizing. The goal of this chapter is to make these 
eight households come alive for readers, and let them see how cultural theory can 
be used both to describe and conceptualize the similarities between households and 
the differences between them. 
Previously, I have claimed that one should not look at a household as if it belonged 
in one of cultural theory’s boxes. At the same time, it is useful for the comparison 
and overview to present all eight households simultaneously, on a cultural bias 
scheme (see Figure 7), which allows for gradual membership. As I have repeatedly 
pointed out, none of the households are consistent across all arenas.135 Moreover, 
this figure ignores many of the internal tensions (assuming that cultural theory is 
right) or the lack of fit between theory and data (assuming that cultural theory is 
wrong).  
The social mobility of these households, after their migration, has been mostly 
upwards, or else they have been able to maintain their pre-migration position. 
However, for many households it has taken ten to fifteen years to arrive in a social 
position it feels comfortable with, and which matches its aspirations and 
experiences from its country of origin. Only one household has experienced a 
downward shift; nevertheless, it seems to be quite happy with its situation. It views 
migration as a clear break with their past, and it emphasizes its present safety and 
the richness of its family life.  
                                                     
135 Choosing different arenas of life could have changed my interpretation of them. However, I 
believe that the ones I have picked are simultaneously central in their lives and accessible for me as 
a researcher. 
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Figure 7: Overview of the Households’ Position  
 
 
The family histories presented here are just small glimpses into their life stories. It is 
by no means an attempt to recreate the world the way they see it: rather it is a mix 
of facts concerning their lives, with some analytical comments. Most of the 
transcripts are long (typically 30-40 pages with single spaced text), so each 
presentation here can be only a brief summary, to give the reader an idea of what 
kind of family it is.  
Statements, stories and observations are not exclusively about a household’s 
internal life, its external social relations, or its relation to politics and the institutions 
of the welfare state. Therefore, the reader should not expect these categories to be 
mutually exclusive in the presentations. Placing a statement under one heading is 
caused by my belief that it can be used to illuminate this particular category, but I 
will use it to throw light upon the other categories, too, if possible.  
The households are described in a clockwise sequence as seen, above, in Figure 7, 
starting in the top right quadrant—that is, first households that have many 
hierarchical, then egalitarian, individualistic and finally many fatalistic traits. 
Presented next to one another households with similar ways of organizing but 
different ethnic backgrounds helps us see how treating these, or any other, 
households solely based on their ethnic origin is not sufficient. 
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The Nguyens: Loyalty and Stability 
The Nguyen household is a typical example of a household in which the 
hierarchical way of organizing dominates. 
Quick Summary 
The Nguyen household fled their home in Vietnam in 1978 and, after a hazardous 
boat trip, ended up in a refugee camp, where their first child was born. In the early 
1980s, they were sent to town, where Mr. Nguyen had a brother. Mr. Nguyen 
found a job very soon after his arrival, and the family bought their first apartment. 
Mrs. Nguyen studied, and took care of their several children. Now she has a 
permanent position in a health care institution, while he is still in his original job. In 
the early 1990s they built a house with more space, and soon after this, his mother, 
from Vietnam, moved in. 
The Household’s Internal Life  
Clarity and order are the two words I would use to describe both their house, and 
the interview situation itself. 
The house they live in is large, orderly, and conspicuously clean (which probably 
says as much about me as about them). I have the feeling that everything has its 
place: the collection of good brandy is displayed in a glass cabinet, for instance, and 
the elegantly framed pictures of the family on the wall.  
The house seems to be divided into a public part and a more private part. The 
layout is such that there are parts of the house I did not see on my way to the living 
room, where the interview took place. Both Mr. and Mrs. Nguyen participated in 
the interview from the beginning to the end. In addition, it was very clear when the 
interview started and when it ended. The children were presented to me, and then 
sent back to the more private parts of the house.  
Household Economy 
The Nguyens share a bank account and have a good overview of their 
consumption, thanks to the care with which they plan their spending. When they 
are getting something expensive, they prefer to save first and then buy: they are 
willing to wait. Nevertheless, they have taken out loans, for example, to buy a car. 
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Now their economic situation is good, whereas soon after they bought their house 
their economy was much tighter. During that period they both tried to cut back on 
their expenses, and to work more overtime, so as to make ends meet (Nguyen 
2001:00:57-00:59).136 
One of the big expenses last year was a nearly two month trip to Vietnam for the 
whole family, which required a lot of saving beforehand and required that the 
parents take an unpaid leave from work.  
The Nguyens are already saving for their retirement through a private pension plan, 
and they have a life insurance policy. They pay tuition for the private school their 
children attend, and they hope that their children will help them after they are done 
with their studies (Nguyen 2001:00:49). There is, thus, an emphasis on long-term 
financial stability. 
Making Decisions 
Mr. and Mrs. Nguyen give slightly diverging accounts of how they make decisions. 
Mr. Nguyen says that they discuss and always come to an agreement; Mrs. Nguyen 
says she cannot decide alone:  
Mr: Always when we have problems, we must sit together and find a 
solution.  
Mrs: I cannot decide on my own.  If I really want something: 
— Oh, I really want that beautiful jacket.   
I never decide alone.  I often ask my husband.   
— Very beautiful, he says, but would you mind waiting for a while? 
— OK, wait a little bit.   
And then we do it.  I get it anyway, but I often talk with my husband, 
and then we both agree. (Nguyen 2001:01:25) 
Mrs. Nguyen’s last line matches her husband’s in the statement “and then we both 
agree,” and it is important for them to find this agreement. However, it sounds like 
a ritual they go through. She knows that she will probably get what she wants, but 
she does not want to do it without her husband’s approval. Needs are not adjusted 
downwards; they are just postponed, until they have the resources to fulfill them: 
careful planning and a long view. 
Tradition and Respect  
The Nguyens emphasize tradition. When I asked if they were Catholic, he replied: 
Mr: Yes, we are.  I would say that we are real Catholics, because our relatives, 
her parent’s congregation in Vietnam is Catholic. (Nguyen 2001:00:25) 
                                                     
136 References to interviews contain information about time given in hours and minutes, which makes 
it possible to find these quotes both in the transcript and on the corresponding soundfile.  
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Being Catholic is not just a question of faith and conversion; it is also about lineage 
and tradition. He is thus separating the Nguyens from others who have converted 
more recently.  
They are also proud that their children still respect their parents 
Mr: He has never acted against me.  Yes, it is true.  Because I have taught 
that to all my children since they were small.  He can do like this, do like 
this, and do like this.  NEVER would I give them money [ (  ) 
Mrs:                                                                                                 [ (are 
not that strict with them) but they are like that.137  
EO: They still have respect. 
Mrs: Yes. 
Mr:     = [Yes. 
Mrs:        [Respect ( ). 
Mr: During the day they are occupied with work, but evenings and weekends 
we use most or our time with our children.  It is important. (Nguyen 
2001:00:57) 
Mr. Nguyen does not bargain with his children, nor buy their support. In the 
discussion we had just before this excerpt, the Nguyens were explaining how the 
children get money for their needs, but not for everything they want, and if the 
parents say no, it is respected because the parents are respected. He seems to be 
opposed to the practice of parents buying the offspring’s support (hence taking a 
stand against an individualistic way of raising children). Mrs. Nguyen, realizing how 
this might sound strange to me, modifies the statement by claiming that they are 
not that strict with them—the children are just like that. I interpret this as an 
indication of their awareness that they have more rules than the average majority 
household does. On the one hand, they are very proud of having these rules and, 
most of all, that the children respect their parents; however, they do not want to 
look too different from the majority either. 
Husband and Wife have Clear Roles 
Mr. and Mrs. Nguyen have roles that influence their social relations with the 
outside world. Mrs. Nguyen has two female friends, both of whom belong to the 
majority population. Sometimes they meet at the Nguyens, and the women call 
each other sometimes. However, Mr. Nguyen does have considerable influence on 
what she does with her friends: 
Mr:  They often call my wife and ask if she can come out.   
I say 
— No.  ((Laughter)) 
She will ask me   
— Why?  Say: Yes, she can come along. 
                                                     
137 Please have a look at the notation used for transcription on page 131. 
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I say  
— No thanks.  It is more important for the whole family to be home 
together. (Nguyen 2002:01:18) 
His justification is typical of high-group: it is important for the family to be 
together. The fact that Mr. Nguyen is asked at all, again, is typical for high-grid: the 
household members have different roles with different responsibilities and duties, 
and in this case Mr. Nguyen is in a position where he can decide, not just suggest, 
that Mrs. Nguyen should stay home. In a low-grid (egalitarian or individualistic) 
household, it would be unnatural for one of the adult members of the household to 
control another in this manner. I believe that Mr. Nguyen’s little laugh is conveying 
an ambiguity created by the interview situation: on the one hand, he is proud to be 
“the man of the house”; on the other hand, he is aware that this also a breach of 
the majority society’s norms. 
The Importance of the Family 
While several households claimed that the family is important, the Nguyens also 
seem to translate this into action. Several times they mentioned how they spend a 
great deal of time together, and how that means that other things have to come 
second. Unfortunately, I do not have real time use information, which makes it 
impossible for me to evaluate whether they spend more time together than other 
households. Spending time “together” can mean quite different things to different 
households.  
Life in Society 
Social Relations 
Since the death of Mr. Nguyen’s brother, who was adopted into a majority 
household as a child, the Nguyen household does not have any blood relatives in 
Norway. This majority household, however, is now considered to be kin, and they 
visit them often and regularly. They also support financially and try to keep in 
contact with relatives (and one friend) back in Vietnam.  
The Nguyen family has as much contact with majority households as with 
households originating in Vietnam. They have contact with three majority 
households in their neighborhood, and with two of his and two of her colleagues. 
The main source of contact with the other Vietnamese households is the Catholic 
Church, through which they keep in touch with around ten families, with whom 
they share their Sunday mass, children’s Sunday school, holidays and other 
festivities (Nguyen 2002:00:43). The Nguyens also keep in touch with a group of 
five Vietnamese families: three living in other parts of Norway, one in Sweden, and 
one in Denmark. These families originally met through the church. In addition, the 
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Nguyens know, through kin in Vietnam, one Vietnamese family in Germany, with 
whom they keep in touch. 
The pattern seems to be that the majority households they keep in touch with are 
neighbors, whereas majority individuals are colleagues. None of the majority 
households they keep in touch with requires particular effort, since they are all in 
physical proximity. In contrast, practically all non-related Vietnamese they have 
contact with are households or families they know through the church. Some of 
these even live abroad.  
Helping the Deserving Poor 
The Nguyen household saves in order to be able to regularly send money back to 
Vietnam. They send significant amounts of money to their parents and to their 
siblings three times a year. In addition, they are helping five youths, who are 
studying to become priests, and two children in an orphanage. They justify the help 
they are giving in the following manner: 
Mrs: You just have to.  Right?  Have to think a little bit.  If we give, we will 
receive.  We can say it like that.  
Mr: Yes, because earlier we… 
Mrs: = Received a lot, you know, when we came here 
(…)  
Mr: We have a job, we are grown-ups, have a house to live in, and we have 
children.  Now, there are others who are in need.  And, before we came 
to Norway, we lived in a camp for a year.  They gave us food.   
Many Norwegians give money, not directly to me, but through Caritas138 
in Norway.  They get food, now we have to pay back.  Not to the 
Norwegians, but pay to others, and the poor. 
Mrs: = We cannot give to the same people who gave to us, but to the poor, 
kind of indirectly. 
Mr: = We have learned a lot—about what Jesus said—what we are supposed 
to do.  We do the right thing, because we have money.  Thus, we have to 
give.  However, when we give, we will also receive. (Nguyen 2001:01:04)  
There are two indicators of a hierarchical solidarity here. First, and most 
importantly, there is considerable asymmetry in the transactions. They received 
when they needed, now they are in a position to give, therefore they must give. It is 
not a question of equal exchange. It is rather a way to position themselves as 
morally righteous, something that would be impossible if they did not give while 
                                                     
138 Caritas Norway is the Catholic organization for humanitarian aid abroad. It is a continuation of the 
Catholic Refugee Aid (Katolsk flyktninghjelp), and a member of Caritas Internationalis. It is organized 
under the Catholic congregations in Norway. Caritas’ main task is support development, human 
rights and humanitarian aid in poor countries; to motivate Catholics in Norway to solidarity with 
the economically poor in other countries; and to increase the awareness of the causes of poverty. 
The most important domestic task is to help congregation improve their charity work among 
refugees, migrants, children and the elderly (Caritas Norge  2002). 
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being able to do so. Second, one should notice that they are giving to future priests 
and children in an orphanage—in a word, the deserving poor—which is typical for 
the hierarchical solidarity. 
The Nguyens both give and receive help through their social networks. He is 
willing to help neighbors without being too concerned whether the help is mutual 
and equals out: 
Mr: Often he [the neighbor] wants to pay me some money, but I tell him: 
— I do not want to take any money, because money means nothing for 
me.  We humans must help each other because we were refugees, we fled 
out, and then we ().  We can help.  We work, we make enough money. 
(Nguyen 2002:00:28) 
Mr. Nguyen is more concerned with his image, how others look at him, than 
whether the help he gives is reciprocated. This would not be likely in an 
individualistic household, whereas in a hierarchical household it makes perfect 
sense. It is one way of defining one’s role and position in the society. There seems 
to be in the majority society an expectation that refugees (and perhaps the 
Vietnamese) need help, but the Nguyens, by helping others, are proving this image 
wrong. Helping others is the “price to pay” for being a full and worthy member of 
the society. 
On the other hand, there are families the Nguyens receive more from than they 
give to, particularly the previously mentioned majority household that is treated as 
kin. They have repeatedly helped the Nguyens with important things, like getting a 
bank loan for the house, while they themselves do not seem to need help (Nguyen 
2002:00:28). Again, we can observe an asymmetry in the transactions, indicating a 
hierarchical solidarity.  
The group of five Vietnamese families, living in Norway, Sweden and Denmark, 
that keeps in touch with each other, also functions as a bridge back to Vietnam. 
When one family is going back, they will bring with them messages, money, and 
medicine on behalf of the others (Nguyen 2002:00:33).  
Mr. Nguyen points out that they try to make sure that, when they send money, it is 
spent on something important, not on gambling and such (Nguyen 2002:00:39). 
There is hence an element of control (and a strong sense of appropriate and 
inappropriate) involved with the gifts, indicating high accountability.  
Other families have told me that the expectation of gifts is a big burden, making it 
almost impossible to visit Vietnam. When I put this to Mr. Nguyen, he claims that 
this is caused by people exaggerating how well they are doing. He is also judgmental 
about people who work little (Nguyen 2002:00:41) and, perhaps even worse, people 
who waste their money when visiting Vietnam: 
Mr: We are staying free, but we need to eat.  We save money for family and 
relatives.  We don’t have money for restaurants and stuff.   
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We would never go out to a restaurant for a dinner or cup of coffee in 
Vietnam.  We just buy food, and then my sister will make dinner and the 
whole family will talk, eat, and enjoy themselves.  We buy the coffee and 
make it.  But the others, there are many I know; they all go out to 
restaurants and make lots of noise.  Well, there are differences from man 
to man, aren’t there.  Nevertheless, I do not like that kind of things.  
Because we have money, we have to save it and use the money well.  I 
know many like that. 
##  
Yes, there are many differences. (Nguyen 2002:00:42) 
Here Mr. Nguyen is blaming (pinning moral strategies and the responsibility on) 
individuals, not the system—deviance, in other words—which points toward a 
hierarchical cultural bias. Moreover, the behavior he is criticizing (conspicuous 
consumption, for instance) would probably be “just the ticket” for an individualist. 
Thus, the critique is a way to position himself morally.  
Loyalty and Responsibility 
Loyalty is important for the Nguyen family. Mr. Nguyen has been working for the 
same company since his arrival in Norway. The owner of this company helped him 
significantly in the beginning and a relationship of trust and loyalty has been built 
up. 
EO: There are not that many Norwegians who are in the same job after 20 
years. 
Mr: No.  That is right.  There have been many, who worked with me, but 
they quit and moved to other places.  I, too, have received offers to start 
at other companies.  But I say always no, because (…) the boss is very 
kind and has a large heart.  First time I came to work, it was hard 
because I could not speak Norwegian and not that much English, either.  
Nevertheless, they received me well: In the morning we worked, and in 
the afternoon he would drive me to [my Norwegian classes].  I would be 
there for two hours, and then he come and picked me up for more work 
at the factory.  I will never forget that, therefore I say that I cannot leave.  
He is very kind to me, pays well, and helps me when I have problems.  
EO: That is great. 
Mr: Yes.  It is not easy to find a boss who is kind.  But they know I am a 
foreigner: it is difficult to come to Norway; to find a job, and to learn the 
language.  It is difficult, because when we came to Norway, we can’t be 
bothered to sit home and take money from the social welfare office.  We 
have to find a job, make money and have a life.  It is important.  Norway 
is the right country to come to: Here is freedom; we can do what we 
want.  We must work all the time, make money and have a life.  We must 
                                                     
139 Each # signifies a pause lasting one second. Please have a look at the notation used for 
transcription on page 131. 
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build this country together.  My wife and I, we work all the time, make 
money, have a life and buy a house. 
Mrs: We can say that we have made it on our own. 
((husband laughs))  (Nguyen 2001:00:15) 
There are several interesting features in this quote. The status differences between 
Mr. Nguyen and his boss are emphasized. It is not a relationship between two 
equals, nor is it presented as a relationship of a mutual contract. The relationship 
between Mr. Nguyen and his boss resembles a traditional client-patron relationship, 
and Mr. Nguyen is happy because his patron is “kind and has a large heart.” The 
loyalty seems to derive from the very beginning of the relationship, when Mr. 
Nguyen was on the receiving end. In some sense, the boss’ act of kindness140 
created a lasting bond. Calculations of utility do not seem to apply, this relationship 
is about loyalty, and he emphasizes the loyalty by letting me know that he has 
rejected several job offers. Thus, it becomes evident that Mr. Nguyen values his 
own loyalty highly.  
The second point of interest is his responsibilities. He does not want to live on 
Social Security: It is clear that he is proud of being able to make it on his own, but 
one should notice particularly that this is connected to the responsibilities that arise 
from freedom: the need to make money, and to build the country together. He is 
not only concerned with his own welfare, but with his and his wife’s role in the 
society. They should be active members that contribute to the society; their work 
should become part of something larger. In addition, after presenting his 
responsibilities, he closes the topic by explaining how they work all the time, hence 
fulfilling the very same demands he just presented. To sum it up, the Nguyens 
presented themselves as both loyal and responsible members of society, both being 
typical hierarchical values. 
Politics and the Welfare State 
What kind of experiences do the Nguyens have of politics and the institutions of 
the welfare state? How do their attitudes and behavior fit with the predictions given 
of hierarchical households? 
Expectation of Accountability and Trust in Institutions 
Mr. Nguyen passes quickly over my questions about the municipality and the police 
with an answer of “no contact”, which I find a bit surprising, given that he is a 
home owner, and has certainly dealt with several city authorities (Nguyen 
2002:00:57). Not much later I find out that Mr. Nguyen has no problems with the 
                                                     
140 It is possible that the boss acted out of selfish motives, but somehow this does not sound right. At 
least, it does not seem to be what Mr. Nguyen believes. 
The Nguyens: Loyalty and Stability     • 
 
155 
police, but he does not think highly of them either, since he has contacted them 
three times without receiving any help. He wanted the police to check a suspicious 
truck loitering at his workplace late in the evening, and their home has been burgled 
twice while they were away on holiday (Nguyen 2002:1:06). This fits with the 
hierarchical idea of accountable authorities—because the police did not respond, 
they can be criticized.  
It is striking how much more engaged Mr. Nguyen is with UDI.141 He tells me a 
long and elaborate story of his experiences with UDI. It took him three years to get 
his Norwegian passport, which he needed in order to visit his sick father in 
Vietnam. After two years of repeated, Kafkaesque, contact with the local police and 
UDI, and despite the efforts of a friendly police officer, Mr. Nguyen ended up 
leaving Norway without a valid passport, which of course created problems on his 
return. Nevertheless, his personal contacts allowed him to negotiate solutions, and 
phone calls between police and migration officers solved the problems at the 
borders (Nguyen 2002:00:52).  
I find it fascinating the way he is trying to be a law-abiding citizen, trying to do the 
right thing, while the bureaucracy is repeatedly unable to deliver what it has 
promised. In the end, he disregards all advice and just leaves the country without 
the legal documents, and trusts that any problems can be resolved on the spot. Of 
several possible interpretations, the first one seems most credible. First, it could 
indicate a tremendous belief in hierarchy; a trust in the state and its institutions, 
even after it has failed to provide him with a passport—it will not let him down 
when he returns. In a hierarchy, the state should act accountably toward those who 
behave appropriately and responsibly. In this story there are two competing 
hierarchies: his family, requiring a visit, and the state, not permitting this. Not 
surprisingly the family wins, and Mr. Nguyen acts against the guidance of the state. 
The second interpretation is based on this being a case of a hierarchical strategy 
that breaks down when it does not fulfill its promise. Mr. Nguyen thus feels forced 
to change his strategy to a rather extreme individualistic position, trusting that he 
knows enough people who work for the authorities, and that he will be able to 
convince the border guards of his identity and of his right to enter Norway. The 
third interpretation is fatalistic resignation: Mr. Nguyen lost the control of the outer 
events (the Kafkaesque passport application procedure) and decided to let go of 
control and just follow the flow.  
This trip was clearly something out of the ordinary, perhaps even outrageous. 
Could this have been a normal act in one of the other ways of life? It does not seem 
rational based on the individualistic way of organizing, despite that supporters of 
individualism accept higher levels of risk than supporters of other ways of 
organizing (Douglas 1992). Nor does fatalism seem credible, since he was confident 
that he would get home. Even rudimentary knowledge of migration authorities 
should make one realize that such passportless travel is a hazardous venture in a 
                                                     
141 UDI stands for the Norwegian Directorate of Immigration.  
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globalized world with numerous asylum seekers. Hence, it seems like the most 
credible interpretation is based on his strong belief that authorities are accountable, 
which is typical for hierarchical way of organizing. 
School is Best Run by Professionals 
The children attend a private school, because the parents believe that there is a 
quality difference between private and public schools.  
Mr: Well, I am not saying there is anything wrong about the public schools, 
but we chose it because I am busy working all the time.  I, too, went to a 
public school in Vietnam.  A private school is always better than a public 
one.  In a public school, the parents have to pay much more attention.  
Whereas in a private school the children will succeed.  Therefore, we 
have to send them to private school.  
EO: So, you are used to that from Vietnam.  
Mr: Yes.  However, it costs money.  I pay.  It is something I just have to do.  
It is the better for my children’s future to have such an education.  
#################### (Nguyen 2001:1:10) 
The Nguyens assume that in a public school parents need to be more involved than 
in private schools, and this seems to be the starting point of their reasoning. It 
could be tempting to interpret their preference for a private school as an 
individualistic tendency, but that would be erroneous in this case. The children go 
to a Catholic school, which represents more hierarchical values than does the public 
school. In addition, this quote reveals a second hierarchical trait: In a perfect 
hierarchy, the world is divided into distinctively separate spheres of life, which do 
not often touch upon each other: there is the men’s vs. women’s sphere, public vs. 
private sphere, religious vs. secular sphere, children’s vs. the adults’ sphere, and so 
forth (Douglas 2001). I see this as explaining why the Nguyens are deferential and 
believe it is positive for the parents not to engage in the children’s schooling: it is a 
different sphere, and best run by the professionals, the teachers. In contrast, the 
egalitarian way of organizing rejects this kind of separation of the world into 
different spheres and demands that the same rules apply everywhere. 
Somewhat more hidden is the belief in the school as a means to a better life for the 
children, as education will help them to achieve positions and behave honorably in 
their positions, which fits to the hierarchical constitution of human nature—born 
in sin but redeemable through firm, nurturing and long-lasting institutions.  
Accountability in Politics 
Mr. Nguyen pays attention to politics and thinks that parties do not deliver what 
they promise, which makes politics much less important and interesting than it 
should be. In a hierarchy, it is important to be trustworthy, as authority relations are 
two-way relations: If a politician does not “deliver” (i.e., he is not what he appears 
to be), he loses respect.  
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When I inquire about what is important about politics, Mr. Nguyen replies: 
Mr: What is important, for example, is to help the elderly, help children in 
schools and kindergartens, and almost anything.  What is not important, 
is to read about refugees.  It means nothing to us—refugees, refugees—
We do not care at all.  We live in Norway now.  Some people say we can 
have it easy with taxes and (housing).  The Progress Party is OK.  It is, 
even if many say it is not. (Nguyen 2002:0:55) 
The Nguyens are now citizens but, to my surprise, they show little sympathy for 
new refugees. In addition, they support the Progress Party, which is known for its 
disregard of politicians, its populist policies and dislike of migrants. The issues 
mentioned by Mr. Nguyen as important (the elderly and schools) are, however, 
issues promoted by the Progress Party. Therefore, based on his issue preferences, 
voting for the Progress Party is an informed choice.  
There seems to be a moral paradox in having received asylum and material help, 
while not wanting to grant this to others.142 However, this paradox can be partly 
solved if this view is presented in a hierarchical setting, for in a hierarchy 
asymmetrical social relations are preferable and the world is divided into separate 
spheres.  
Citizenship 
The Nguyens have a pragmatic view of citizenship. They are Norwegian citizens 
because it makes traveling easier (Nguyen 2002:0:52). There are no signs of a deep-
felt belonging to the Norwegian state, even if they want to be seen as contributing 
to the society in the form of working and paying taxes. This kind of pragmatism 
does not fit my expectations of a hierarchical way of organizing; rather, it seems to 
belong to an individualistic way of organizing. Is it possible that in being a 
hierarchical household their traditional identities (including a transnational Catholic 
identity) are so strong that they prefer, or even need to downplay, the symbolic 
meaning of Norwegian citizenship?  
Resentment against Accusations of Not Paying Taxes 
Mr. Nguyen does not mind paying taxes, and is troubled by people who think that 
he does not pay his taxes.  
Mr: Well, I am very happy to live in Norway.  Now I have to pay taxes.  
Because, I am certain to get in a hospital.  I know many people who say 
that I come to Norway and pay nothing.   
[I tell them]   
—Don’t fool with me.  Stop that.  Make contact with the Revenue 
Authorities and check. (Nguyen 2002:00:56) 
                                                     
142 It would only be non-paradoxical if all migrants behaved irresponsibly.  
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In this quote, there is a tension between his claim that the majority population 
often assumes migrants to be free riders in the Norwegian welfare state and his 
own pride.143 In the hierarchical way of organizing roles are important, and this 
quote can be seen as a rebuttal of the majority population’s claim that he does not 
fulfill his role as a citizen, which of course comes into conflict with Mr. Nguyen’s 
pride in doing things right. To resolve this dispute he directs the majority critics to 
the authorities to find out about the “truth.” Both pride and a combination of trust 
in and duty toward the authorities are typical of the hierarchical way of life. In 
general, both egalitarian and individualistic ways of organizing are predicted to be 
less concerned with these sorts of outside criticisms.  
Summary of the Household’s Way of Organizing and the Predictions  
In the summary of each household I select those traits that either have clear 
interpretation in cultural theory, or clearly are relevant for the discussion. I will for 
the sake of simplicity indicate support for a particular way of organizing are marked 
with capitals (H, I, E, or F), while aspects that indicate rejection are marked with 
lower case letters (h, i, e or f). These marked traits are counted and used for the 
analyses in the next chapter. By indicating these traits here, and not during the 
presentation of the stories, I avoid counting two similar stories of lojalty as two 
separate traits. 
Most of the signs in the case of the Nguyens point toward a hierarchical household: 
The orderly housekeeping; their behavior during the interview (H); their careful and 
long-term plan for household economy (H); the postponement of consumption 
(H); their strong social bonds to Vietnam (even after 20 years in Norway they still 
have numerous obligations)144; the importance of loyalty (H); spending lots of time 
with family members and participating in social activities as a family (H); and the 
importance of children respecting their parents (H). 
How do the Nguyen household's political attitudes and behavior fit with the 
predictions made about hierarchical households (on pages 78-91)? There are several 
predictions that cannot be checked, but the ones covered by the Nguyens in the 
interviews do fit the hierarchical predictions. Their view of human nature and the 
role of institutions, as presented in their discussion about schools, fits the 
hierarchical predictions (H). Even if there are some traits that are difficult to 
interpret, like Mr. Nguyen’s story of his passportless trip to Vietnam, there is a 
strong trust in institutions. Their preferred form of support is for the deserving 
poor (H), and they want to make sure that I do not think of them as beneficiaries 
                                                     
143 The same resentment against accusations of not paying taxes and living off social support also 
came up in the first interview (Nguyen 2002:01:13).  
144 Even if I have included it here, I have not calculated this as a trait, as it is a rather ad hoc 
interpretation, and not discussed in the theory chapter. 
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of social support (H)—both of which fit the predictions. One of the themes 
running through the whole interview is the importance of and expectation for 
accountability, as one would expect from a hierarchical household (but not from an 
individualistic or fatalistic household). The police and UDI were not accountable 
enough (H), but Mr. Nguyen still trusted the institutions to deliver in the end (H). 
Politicians are criticized for their lack of accountability (H). Finally, Mr. Nguyen 
does not want others to view him as someone who lacks accountability (i.e, does 
not pay his taxes).145 The general conclusion is that the attitudes and behaviors 
revealed by the interviews fit the predictions given regarding hierarchy.  
                                                     
145 This is so closely connected to the not receiving social support that I have regarded them here as a 
joint indicator. 
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The Natans: the Community Helpers 
The Natan household comes next, because its salient feature—helping others—
suggests that it too is a household in which the hierarchical way of organizing is 
predominant. To start with, I thought it to be a predominately egalitarian 
household, however, much did not fit. Mary Douglas’s new improved presentation 
of hierarchy,146 made me realize that I got it wrong. I had to redo my previous 
analysis, which allowed many of the tensions to be resolved.  
A Quick Summary 
The Natan Household consists of Mr. Natan, Mrs. Natan and their two children. 
Mr. Natan migrated to Norway in the early 1970s, for work. Toward the end of the 
decade he met his future wife, in Sri Lanka, they got married and she moved with 
him to Norway. He had a business in Sri Lanka; she has professional training and 
was a state employee before moving to Norway. Now they are both working in the 
service sector. In the mid eighties, the Natan family bought a four-bedroom house 
in a suburb and has lived there since. The exceptional stability of employment is 
striking: They have both been in their present jobs for two decades.  
Reasons for Moving: 
Mr. Natan was a labor migrant and came to Norway for work and, I suspect, a bit 
of adventure. He did not have to leave, as he had a successful business based on his 
craft in Sri Lanka. He moved because his good friends moved to Norway 
somewhat earlier, and he wanted to be closer to them. They had knowledge of the 
Norwegian labor market that made it possible to plan for a year or two’s stay in 
Norway. For me there was something adventurous and romantic about this 
particular migration, and it seems like his friends are very important to him, almost 
like family. All of which suggests that, to begin with, it is individualism we are 
dealing with. 
Mr. Natan arrives. Not surprisingly, Mr. Natan was able to get work based on his 
craft; he was a labor migrant. He worked for the same company for several years, in 
a small coastal town, but he got “a bit bored of just one type of work” and wanted 
to do something else.  
Later he moved to the city and worked in a related job, in a new field, in a small 
company, and rented an apartment through a friend. Two years later he managed to 
get a job in one of the big production companies based on his trade. However, only 
a short while later he switched to a very different job, where he is still able to use 
                                                     
146 These ideas were first presented in her Marianist Award Lecture titled A Feeling for Hierarchy (draft 
dated 2001) and have been further developed in In My Grandmother’s House (draft dated 2002a). 
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his technical skills, but where he can now meet and work with people. He never 
applied for this job but was asked to take it. He has been working in the same job 
ever since (Natan 2001:00:19). He has remained for almost twenty years in the same 
firm, just like Mr. Nguyen; however, there is one important difference. Where Mr. 
Nguyen emphasizes loyalty, Mr. Natan talks about how he really enjoys his work 
and the people he meets.  
Mrs. Natan spent the first years in Norway tending their first children, and learning 
Norwegian in school. Having worked as a bureaucrat in Sri Lanka, she managed to 
get a job in a public office in Norway. Unfortunately, the line of work was not quite 
what she was trained for (Natan 2001:00:20). However, with the exception of a 
maternity leave, she has stayed within the same office, though her job description 
has changed over the years.  
The Household’s Internal Life 
The Interview 
Both interviews were done with Mr. Natan—the first at his workplace and the 
second at his home. Mrs. Natan was home during the second interview but did not 
participate; however, she was the perfect host and served us tea and cookies. This 
indicates a relatively strict division of labor.  
Resource Management 
The most obvious feature of their resource management is the surplus of resources. 
Mr. Natan spends a lot of time helping other people and is proud of this. The most 
important resources they have available are their knowledge of Norwegian society, 
their many contacts, and, in some cases, their time and labor. Time, however, is a 
scarce resourse, which sometimes creates tension at home: 
Mr: And sometimes, these meetings come in between us. Family problem, 
you know.  They are angry because I am gone too much. Kids react, too. 
So, therefore we have to think of both parties.  (…) 
But I am not thinking of myself, so that everybody can say  
— he is the best. 
Not like that. I think,  
— I am a regular man, I do my part and help some other people. (Natan 
2002:00:17) 
There is a delicate balance between helping people outside the household and 
spending time with the family. Mr. Natan is justifying this domestic conflict by 
rejecting the idea that he is helping others in order to secure a position among 
Tamils. He is a “regular man” doing his part.  
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They also have had periods with a tight household economy. For example, soon 
after they got married, they borrowed money from a bank. Mr. Natan mentions 
postponing expenses as a strategy for making ends meet during those tight periods: 
Mr:  Let’s say I want to buy new shoes—I do not really need to— because I 
can use these shoes one more year. This way it is possible to save some. 
(Natan 2001:00:37)  
There is a similarity in strategy with the Nguyen household, who also postpone 
expenses. Cultural theory suggests that hierarchical households’ needs are fixed, and 
that managing is done by ensuring that one’s income is sufficient to cover the more 
or less fixed needs. However, all households exert some control over their 
expenses. The hierarchical consumption style involves brand consciousness, brand 
loyalty, preference for quality and long term investment,147 rather than fashionable 
items (Dake, Thompson, and Neff 1994; Douglas 1996c). Similarly, in order to 
save, Mr. Natan postpones the quality purchase, rather than buying cheap shoes 
now. This is what a household based on hierarchical solidarity would be expected 
to do in order to control their expenses.  
Both Mr. and Mrs. Natan have a fixed income, with no or few possibilities for extra 
income. Even though they have good salaries, they are not able to save any money, 
because they have large food and car repair expenses (Natan 2002:00:28). Spending 
extra on food is one way of emphasizing the importance of the family, as it is here a 
joint activity. In addition, preparing both Indian148 and Norwegian food is a way of 
affirming that they belong to both cultures. This was something that was 
emphasized in the interview, and used to justify their large expenditure on food. 
Their needs, cultural theory would say, are fixed for them by their “station in life” 
and both Mr. and Mrs. Natan currently present and justify their way of life in 
hierarchical terms. 
Perhaps seeing the other explanations that could have been used, and what kind of 
solidarity they would help to build up, makes it easier to see what is going on in the 
Natan household. Had the explanation for their large food bill been that they dine 
out a lot with friends and colleagues, it would have been the sort of conspicuous 
consumption that helps to sustain the individualistic way of organizing. Had the 
explanation been a willingness to take on the extra cost of organic produce, it 
would have suggested a form of moral consumption that fits well with the egali-
tarian way of organizing. Had the explanation been a lack of planning, or caring, 
leading to lots of takeaway meals and a fair amount of waste, it could have indicated 
the consumption style that helps to sustain the fatalistic way of organizing. Thus, 
when using cultural theory to interpret a social situation, one always has to keep in 
                                                     
147 One of the classic examples of an ad relying on the hierarchical style of consumption is an ad 
explaining how you do not own one of these watches—you merely keep it for the next generation.  
148 I am uncertain why Mr. Natan talks of Indian food and not Tamil food. Is it because he thinks 
they are both the same, or because he is trying to help me to understand what kind of food they are 
eating? 
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mind the other alternatives in order to “rule out” as well “rule in” the various kinds 
of social order that the agents are trying to build, and, in a sense, defend.  
Household Work—Division of Labor 
Mrs. Natan takes care of the household economy. She keeps the overview and does 
the accounting. Mr. Natan knows and accepts that she makes the decisions. Mr. 
Natan pays the regular, monthly bills, whereas Mrs. Natan takes care of the issues 
that run on a yearly basis, like income tax forms. This division into different areas 
of competence is typical in a hierarchical household; however, Mr. Natan justifies 
this particular division by referring to her better skills (Natan 2002:00:26). Other 
parts of their division of labor, such as Mrs. Natan preparing the tea and cookies, 
are taken for granted, to such a degree that they did not need explaining. Even if 
skills-based arguments are typical of the individualistic way of organizing, the 
overall division in the Natan household seems to be gender-based, and divided into 
different areas that restrict the spouses responsibilities and are seen as 
“appropriate” and “correct,” all of which is typical of the hierarchical way of life. 
Social Relations in the Society 
The Natan family is central in the Tamil community, being one of the first ones to 
arrive in Norway (priority and precedence loom large in the hierarchical solidarity), 
and because of their involvement in local Tamil organizational life. Mr. Natan is 
also highly respected in the community because he helps so many people. 
The household has a large and rich social network. The Natan’s relatives have 
spread into several western countries, and they both have close family in the city, as 
well as back in Sri Lanka. They have also “adopted” a young relative who lives in 
the city. The family bonds seem strong, even if they do not help their own family 
much, because they do not need help. However, they occasionally help, financially, 
one sister in Sri Lanka, because they know she needs it, even though she refuses to 
ask for help. 
In addition to their family they have lots of contact with people both near by and 
far away. They keep in touch with more than forty non-kin people in town, and 
these people are from at least seven different sources: They keep in contact with 
two neighbor families, and one older man who lives close by. They both have 
contact with several co-workers outside working hours. Many of these people they 
keep in touch with through Tamil organizations, the Catholic Church, or the Hindu 
congregation. In addition, there are twelve people in other parts of Norway; most 
of them also Tamils. Friendships, unsurprisingly, are considered very important, 
and Mr. Natan has old friends from school, now living in England, whom he tries 
to meet five or six times a year. In addition, there are friends living in Sweden, 
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India, and of course back in Sri Lanka. Mr. Natan is careful to point out that some 
of these friends are Singhalese, and not Tamils.  
The strength of the group dimension is related to the amount of time spent in 
different social settings. Mr. Natan is immersed in social life through institutions: 
Mr:  I meet lots of people—at [names several organizations], and at work.  I 
spend my whole life with other people.  Always.  I am seldom alone.  I 
am alone when I sleep, otherwise I spend my life with people. (Natan 
2004:00:05) 
However, because he spends so much time in these other institutions, it brings the 
household downward on the group dimension. It is the sum of the roles and 
institutional identities that makes Mr. Natan Mr. Natan.  
Children Are Free to Be Norwegian 
Mr. Natan has been in Norway long enough to have had extensive contact with the 
majority population, and he is aware that he himself is both Tamil and Norwegian, 
while his children are probably more Norwegian than Tamil. He would prefer their 
children to participate more in the Tamil community, but accepts that they make 
their own choices: 
Mr: Yes, the whole bunch live with their Norwegian friends. Whereas, I live 
in both camps.  But they do not join me.  If I ask them,  
— Would you like to come with me, there is a wedding today?   
They answer, 
— You go! It fits for you. I get bored there. You sit there many hours 
with them, I cannot do that.   
— Would you like to join me in the temple? 
— Sorry, I do not have time. 
(…) 
I say, 
— to accept, to accept, if I do not accept, it is your life.  You are the 
ones to decide. ####### (Natan 2002:00:48) 
This appears at first sight to be a low-grid position, as he is not trying to enforce a 
tradition upon the children. The emphasis on the children making a choice is 
important, a choice that would be meaningless if one’s social identity were a result 
of just birth or outside forces. Nevertheless, if they choose to be Norwegian in the 
same sort of way that he chooses to be both Tamil and Norwegian, this can be seen 
as an orderly and consistent way of coping with inevitable change. How else could a 
hierarchical household deal with the inevitable except by keeping the children from 
having contact with the majority population? 
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Festivities and Parties 
Mr. Natan seems to prefer a dinner with his friends over large parties. He explains 
how their Norwegian friends call and invite themselves over for dinner in a rather 
informal manner.  
Mr: But our other countrymen, most of them, when they have a celebration, 
a birthday or a christening they invite. Then we go and eat there, and 
give presents, and then they come to my birthday. Right? However, 
especially I do not want these birthday parties at home. I tell all our 
children when they are ten, twelve years old, they can celebrate ten times. 
After that they should just forget about it.  On such a day one should 
rather give money to the poor, SOS-childrens’ village, Caritas or the Red 
Cross.  
— Give money to them, pay 200.- 
— Ok. 
But then sometimes they do not accept that: 
— No, must have the money.  We want to have a party.  
Then must give money. They need the money.  
A period from twelve to fifteen years, they accept this. After fifteen years 
they want to have a party. (Natan 2002:00:33) 
There is something egalitarian about this reluctance to celebrate birthdays and give 
the gift money to good causes instead. Hierarchical households are expected to 
emphasize birthdays and other rituals that help to structure the world. On the other 
hand, it is clear that he sees the money as going to the “deserving” poor, which is 
indicative of the hierarchical solidarity. In addition, there now emerges a picture 
where the children’s lives are divided into phases—young children who have 
parties, older children who do not, and teenagers who again have birthday parties. 
The need to classify, so that one can find the appropriate set of rules to apply, is 
also typical in hierarchy.  
Helpers are Beyond (and Above) the Capitalist Economy 
For Mr. Natan helping others is not just a nice thing to do, it is an important part 
of his identity and of the meaning of life: 
Mr: To help other is my hobby, or my interest, and what all my life is about. 
(Natan 2002:00:20) 
Mr. Natan told me relatively early in the second interview a story about him 
changing a ruptured car tire for an old man in heavy rain. The point of the story 
was actually how this situation was resolved:  
Mr: I know that he would give me a 500 or a 200 crown note.  I could see 
him getting ready to do it.  
— I’m done. You can drive now, I said.  
Then I took my bags and run away.  He looks at me,  
— Arrgh.   
Because his is angry, he wants to pay.  
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I do not want to take any money, right.  Sometimes I just can’t  tolerate 
that kind of stuff. (Natan 2002:00:22) 
Mr. Natan is thus putting himself in the position of the helper, who does not want 
any reward. By running away he maintained transactional asymmetry, removing the 
car driver’s opportunity to get even. Therefore, in some people’s eyes, the car driver 
now “owes” him.  
My interpretation here relies on my understanding of the interview situation: Mr. 
Natan is explaining to me who he is and why he does what he does. Just one act 
does not define a person, but because Mr. Natan chooses to tell me about this 
particular act, it signifies that this act is of importance. It is something I need to 
know about, in order to understand who he is. 
Let us interpret this situation in terms of cultural theory. Individualistic solidarity is 
based on symmetric exchange, and because the driver did not know Mr. Natan, 
there were few possibilities for returning the favor later. Therefore, for the driver, 
paying cash would have closed the situation in a good way, according to the 
individualistic solidarity. However, Mr. Natan does not help because he wants to be 
paid; he helps because it feels right, because he wants to help. If he had accepted 
the money, the meaning of the situation would have changed for him. The point is 
not to create a debt for the driver, which Mr. Natan could then in some convenient 
situation collect. The driver is unknown, and there will probably be no more 
contact between them. Mr. Natan rejects the individualistic way of closing a 
transaction, and hence declares and defines who he is. However, he simultaneously 
rejects the driver’s understanding of the situation. Instead of trying to sort out a 
common understanding, Mr. Natan chose to just run away. Only by running away 
could he maintain the asymmetry that is so important to him.  
In hierarchical solidarity these unbalanced situations are preferable, because they 
help to define and keep up the social stratification. This man deserves help because 
he is old. Moreover, by helping him, Mr. Natan can define himself as the helper. 
However, in this case, the situation is characterized by ambiguity and the actors’ 
inadequate knowledge of each other. Hence Mr. Natan’s rather undignified running 
away—what else could he do? 
Can this transaction be interpreted in terms of the other two forms of solidarity? If 
it is a situation characterized by egalitarian solidarity, one could see this as a case of 
in-group altruism extended to a stranger. It becomes a way for Mr. Natan to 
establish himself as part of the whole society, and abolish whatever ethnic or racial 
boundaries exist. Following the same logic, perhaps the old man was angry, because 
he did not want to be included in the same group with Mr. Natan. Paying would 
have allowed the old man to maintain a distance. 
The situation could also be interpreted in terms of fatalistic solidarity. Mr. Natan 
helped because he had the opportunity; without any attempts to use this situation 
to build social obligations. However, it does not seem likely that the old man would 
have protested if he was relying on the fatalistic solidarity.  
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These four interpretations show how one situation, by itself, can be given several 
possible interpretations. There is no one definite answer. One act can have different 
meanings to different participants and different observers. Nor is there any a priori 
reason to assume that Mr. Natan and the driver agree on the interpretation of the 
situation. Actually, it is rather likely that the tension between them (especially the 
closure-by-running-away) is caused by their lack of agreement upon what this 
situation is about.  
The above example, of Mr. Natan running away, which clearly does not constitute 
an institution, shows how the interpretation of a single act is often left open. We 
need more information about the participants before we can choose one 
interpretation.149 
Mr. Natan believes that Tamils are not that good at running businesses—at least 
not compared with Muslims—based on examples from Sri Lanka, London, and 
Norway (Natan 2002:00:36). That does not bother him, however, because he sees 
running a business as something that would not really fit with his identity and the 
social relations he wants to uphold: 
Mr: In the same time, you are thinking, I am not this person.  I told 
previously, I want to help.  But, for example, if I am running a shop, and 
you come shopping, but you have no money: 
— I can come and pay tomorrow.  
— Sure, just serve yourself. No problem, you are back tomorrow.   
But, if I say 
— No, put it back. Get out of here ((in a harsh voice)). 
That kind of person can survive. They become rich. But I, for my part, 
say  
— Go ahead, just come back tomorrow. If you will not pay, I will not 
ask you. That kind of person I am. I do not want to put pressure on you. 
(Natan 2002:00:40) 
In this case, the preferred form of social relations outweighs market economics. Mr. 
Natan is not a businessperson; he is a helper. Moreover, he would sacrifice the 
success of his business in order to uphold his preferred type of social relations. 
Mr. Natan has an extensive social network that can be utilized to help others. He is 
the trusted man who helps others to overcome their lack of cash by providing 
security for transactions. 
EO: What about people in the city? You probably know lots of people 
through the congregation?  
Mr: = Oh Yes, Oh Yes. I can go out without any money and shop in town.  
Nobody would ask me for money.  #### I know bookshop, pharmacy, 
record- and instrument shops and others.  If you say my name, you will 
understand.  I tell you—just say my name, and you can get it without 
money.   
                                                     
149 Cultural theory is better in explaining behavioral patterns than single acts. It is a theory of 
institutions, not people’s intentions. 
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I  have helped many Tamils, too, because they did not have money right 
away.  So, they get credit.  I help them, because they need a trusted 
person to provide security.  So, that if they do not pay, the shop will 
come to me.  I guess I have helped around fifteen to twenty. (Natan 
2002:0057) 
Even if the helping seems to be a gift without any expectation of return, there is an 
element of “pay-off” in the sense that the acquired goodwill among friends helps to 
build up the community and the Tamil organizations (Natan 2002:01:52). The 
asymmetry, you could say, generates enforceable trust.150 
Therefore, even if the first example by itself is difficult to interpret, the additional 
examples steadily increase the likelihood that his definition of himself as a helper is 
based on the hierarchical solidarity. In addition, he is distancing himself from the 
individualistic solidarity.  
Respect is Eroding 
Respect is an important issue for Mr. Natan: during the second interview he 
invoked the concept twelve times, whereas equality was not mentioned at all.151  
Respect (like dignity) is present in all ways of organizing; it just has different flavors. 
In individualism, respect is connected to abilities and achievements, and people are 
likely to get a second chance, since failing is part of the game: one who never fails, 
is not trying hard enough.152 In hierarchy, respect is connected to the social roles 
and positions, that is one loses respect for not living up to one’s role. In an enclave 
respect is earned and is more like a personal trait. Where in hierarchy the leaders 
demand respect for their positions, in enclaves people are leaders because they are 
respected.153 In enclaves respect is connected to being a righteous and consistent 
person154 as the “unity of the world” makes it difficult to sustain a lifestyle where 
the person does not appear as consistent across all areas of life. 
Mr. Natan tells how, when he came to Norway, people still respected the elderly 
and gave them a place in a queue or a seat on the bus. He thinks that today there is 
not enough respect for the elderly. Today’s youngsters will not even give a bus seat 
to an old lady with a cane in her shaking hands (Natan 2004:00:30). This is 
offensive in a hierarchy in several ways. First, it is disrespectful toward this 
                                                     
150 Enforcable trust is one of several types of social capital (Portes 1995:Figure 1.3.). 
151 Tamil organization coordinator (Natan 2002:00:12), In Hindu congregation and elections (Natan 
2002:01:11), Children at school (Natan 2002:01:13) , Possible asylum institution (Natan 
2002:00:52), Majority population respects Tamils (Natan 2002:01:27), Mr. Natan takes care of how 
he behaves at parties so that people cannot come the next day and say that he was a foolish drunk 
the night before (Natan 2002:01:32). 
152 Extreme individualists in California like the following proverb: "If you're not living on the edge, 
then you're taking up too much space." 
153 The hierarchical leadership resembles Weber’s traditional and legal leadership, while the egalitarian 
leadership resembles Weber’s charismatic leadership (Weber 1990). 
154 Chong has analyzed leaders in civil rights movements, and shown how the pressure to be the 
person one claims to be is stronger than threats of violence or imprisonment (Chong 1991).  
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particular old woman, because she is old and should be respected for this. Second, 
because this person deserves help (as old age is not caused by deviant behavior); it 
is a breach of the hierarchical helping codex. Third, the behavior is signaling that “I 
am just as worthy of this seat as this old lady,” which is a rejection of the 
hierarchical ideas of stratification and rank. 
Politics and the Welfare State 
Mr. Natan is politically highly aware and has enough knowledge of Norwegian 
politics to be involved in many different issues. Because of his position in the 
community and his contacts, he gets involved in issues concerning applications for 
asylum, student loans and the like.  
Citizenship Makes Traveling Easy 
Mr. Natan got his Norwegian citizenship fifteen years after he moved to Norway 
for the following reasons: 
Mr: #### it is easier to get into the society. Easy to travel in and out of the 
country, because of visa and stuff. ### and ### For example, if we get 
in trouble abroad: If we have a Norwegian passport we will get help 
from the embassy right away. (Natan 2004:00:02) 
Mr. Natan’s reasons are mainly connected to the ease it facilitates when traveling. 
One should also note that he trusts that the Norwegian state will help him “right 
away,” which fits well to the hierarchical predictions about trusting institutions.  
Participation in Majority vs. Minority Organizations 
Mr. Natan is active in several Tamil organizations, whereas he did not mention 
participation in any majority organizations. The Tamil organizations are community 
organizations, which provide children with linguistic and cultural tutoring and 
adults with cultural and religious practices. In terms of state- and nation-building, 
all of these organizations can be used to create an ethnic identity for the Tamil 
minority in Norway. 
Voting is a Duty 
Mr. Natan votes because it is his duty, and voting is very important for him (Natan 
2004:00:06), just as one would expect of a hierarchical household. Voting is part of 
being citizen, and being a citizen you have to do what is required of a citizen.  
However, there is one story that does not fit the hierarchical predictions. Mr. Natan 
thinks that people should be more involved in politics and not let politicians decide 
so much. 
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Mr: Today politicians decide everything. People no not make decicions.  
Politicians decide, and people just pay.  That’s right, we do not react. In 
many cases, I have noticed, people do not react. When politicians make 
decisions, they just accept, accept, without asking why.  There is very 
little resistance.  Politicians do lots of good things, but sometimes bad 
things, too, but regular people they do not ask. (Natan 2004:00:12) 
This story displays a preference for more participation, which could be interpreted 
as support for the egalitarian type of participatory democracy. It does not fit the 
hierarchical idea of they should decide what we should do.  
Mr. Natan used to be a Labor Party voter, which fits well with his hierarchical 
preferences. However, when the Labor Party changed their economic policies 
during the 1990s Mr. Natan changed to the Socialist Left Party. I was surprised 
because my previous research showed that support for hierarchy is one of the best 
indicators for not choosing the Socialist Left Party, while support for hierarchy is 
common among voters of the Labor Party, Conservative Party and the Christian 
Democratic Party (Olli 1999). The Socialist Left Party displays an anti-business 
sentiment and explicit caring for the weak groups, which can at least partially 
explain Mr. Natan’s party preference. However, there are many reasons for 
choosing a party that we did not discuss. Voting for the same party in every election 
shows loyalty. 
UDI is not Accountable Enough 
The only state institution Mr. Natan has a negative relation to is UDI: 
EO: What about UDI? 
Mr: UDI? 
EO: Yes. 
Mr: = Well. ##### I do not know. UDI, I hate UDI. ((laughs)) It is that 
simple.  They do not work swiftly. And they only make trouble. 
However, I do agree that many people decive UDI, too, don’t they? I 
think so. Nevertheless many cases are very clear, but they take lots of 
time. (Natan 2002:01:53) 
Mr. Natan seems to be a bit uncertain about what to say, and takes a small pause 
before he expresses his negative feelings. He modifies his critique of “Norway,” by 
showing how migrants themselves share some of the blame. However, he thinks 
that UDI should be better in discerning between the easy and complicated cases.  
Mr. Natan gives an example: It took two years to get a new work permit for a 
priest, who already was working in Norway. Mr. Natan understands that asylum 
cases take a long time to process, but he thinks that for a simple work permit, two 
years is too long. 
On the surface this sounds a bit like a critique of systems, which is expected of 
egalitarian, but not of hierarchical, households. However, Mr. Natan directs the 
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blame on people who do not fulfill their roles within the system in a satisfactory 
manner:  
Mr: There are many [state officials] who do not know the system. What one 
permits, another one does not, right? There is difference between 
people, in treatment. (Natan 2002:01:56) 
Mr. Natan’s choice of “problem” is as expected of a hierarchical household, as 
justice in the hierarchical way of organizing is primarily procedural justice, which 
becomes visible in how the state officals treat people in a consistent manner 
according to the rules. Both individualistic and egalitarian cultural bias would look 
at this inconsistency in treatment as positive, however, for different reasons. 
Individualism would emphasize the efficiency and flexibility, whereas egalitarianism 
would emphasize the importance of taking humane considerations.  
School Uniforms 
Mr. Natan thinks that the Norwegian schools are good, because they do not push 
the pupils too hard; pupils are supported, instead of made to compete too much. 
However, he thinks pupils and university students should wear school uniforms, in 
order for them to be distinguishable, so that one then knows how to treat them 
(Natan 2002:01:42). 
Emphasizing less competition is to reject the individualistic bias, but could go with 
both the egalitarian and hierarchical way of life. His support for the school uniform 
seems to be a hierarchical trait, especially because it is connected to displaying 
social roles and positions. Had he argued that uniforms create equality among 
pupils, who presently are under difficult pressure to purchase expensive clothing, it 
would have been an egalitarian argument.  
Human Nature is Weak 
Cultural theory predicts that hierarchical households view human nature as weak, 
which is a reason for having strong institutions. Mr. Natan tells a story of 
Norwegian households and children, which confirms his hierarchical position. 
Mr: Children go to school in Norway. This child wants to go home after 
school, when it is two or three o’clock.  But he is standing there outside 
the school and thinking:  
— if I go home father or mother will not be there. They are not at 
home.  The first one will come home at seven, and the last one at ten 
o’clock.   
So the child is hanging out on the streets, meeting friends.  That 
becomes his life: if he meets good friends, he will become good. If he 
meets other kind of friends his life will be ruined.  This policy is much 
better in Asian countries. When the school is over children start running 
home, because mother is waiting for them at home with food.  Here, the 
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mother is working, because both mother and father have to work, to 
make ends meet. (Natan 2004:00:26) 
There are several hierarchical traits present. The future of the child is ruined if there 
is not enough institutional support, so that bad friends can have influence instead. 
It is good for the children and the society to have mothers at home tending the 
family. In addition, it is possible to see this as a critique of an individualistic 
household, where the parents have their own lives and arrive home whenever it 
suits them. Similarly, he is identifying economic pressure as the cause of the eroding 
family.  
You Can Trust Institutions 
When I inquired about what Mr. Natan thinks of a society where everybody 
competes with everybody, where they do not help one another, he replied with the 
following story:  
Mr: Yes, helping each other, that is something else.  For example, I 
experienced three days ago, in front of the bus station (…) 
My car stopped in the the middle of the road, and I am standing there 
with the lights blinking.  People  just drive by, without stopping to check 
what it is, if I need help or not.  They just do nothing.  They are thinking:  
— It is not my job.   
They do not have this kind of caring, to come out and help. Or they do 
not understand how much a person standing there is stressing, because 
they have not experienced it themselves.   
Luckily a policecar came and stopped. 
— Do you need some help, he asked.  
— Please, I could use a push. 
Then he pushed the car. It started right a way. I said, 
— Thanks a lot  
He said, 
— my pleasure [in English] 
 because he thought I could not speak Norwegian.  
That is great. It is one way to do it. But regular people, they do not think. 
(Natan 2004:00:23) 
In this story there are several interesting features. Mr. Natan is critical of the low 
level of accountability among most people, as they neither respond to the situation 
based on a role (it is not my job) nor with caring. Mr. Natan is thus listing here the 
typical justifications used in hierarchy and in egalitarianism. Moreover, he 
recognizes that, regrettably, most people do not live by these justifications. Luckily, 
and as expected in a hierarchical story, the rescue comes from a police officer, a 
representative of an institution. Institutions are what you can still trust! 
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A Global look at the World 
When I inquired as to whether Mr. Natan has problematic or conflictual relations 
to other people, my mind was on the people close to their household, while his 
response was linked to Sri Lanka. It is sometimes difficult to remember that many 
migrants come from countries that have seen war, and where “conflict” has more 
bloody and serious connotations than in peaceful Norway: 
Mr: Do you mean in Sri Lanka: we have a conflict, a war, you know. But 
otherwise, for example here in town, sometimes there are conflicts, 
battles for power. Right? ### In an association, or such, they say 
nothing, but talk behind your back.  At the same time, if they come and 
want power, or positions,  they won’t work, they just complain.  It is 
propably like that everywhere, and...  (Natan 2002:01:07).  
One should notice that Mr. Natan is not making these conflicts in organizations 
personal, as they are connected to power plays within the organizations. He 
continues with a detailed description of one example, where he emphasizes his 
willingness to step down and leave his position despite the negative consequences it 
would have. He was trying to give the opposing fraction an opportunity to save 
face, through testing the mood in the crowd. Nevertheless, the opposition insisted 
the matter be vited on, which lead to a strong show of support for Mr. Natan. 
Again, we can see hierarchical traits emphasized: avoiding competition and saving 
face. 
Social Welfare Office is Not for Me 
Mr. Natan thinks that the Tamils do not prefer to be dependent on the state, but 
when they have problems with residency permits or asylum rights, they sometimes 
have no choice (Natan 2001:00:48). When I inquired specifically about the social 
welfare office, Mr. Natan’s response was loaded with values: 
Mr: Social welfare office I have no experience of, not at all. I am sorry, but I 
have no knowledge.  I just know how it functions, and all that.  
Personally, I do not need any social support.   
— If I do not work I get welfare money. 
No, none of that. (Natan 2002:01:56) 
His response is defensive: he is making sure that I do not mix him with the people 
who do receive social support, which is very similar to Mr. Nguyen’s response. For 
both of these hierarchical households the most important thing about the social 
welfare office is that they do not want to be seen as welfare recipients, who are seen 
as low on accountability and rank. In a hierarchy roles are important: being a 
welfare recipient does not fit with their own ideas of who they are and how they 
should be treated by others.  
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Welfare State and Abiding the Law  
Mr. Natan is critical of the welfare state, or more precisely, the lack of it. The first 
part of his critique is connected to how people relate to the state: people complain 
because things like cars are so expensive, because of taxes; simulaneously, people 
are good at giving money, but they do not know why they give. Thus, there is 
something lacking in people’s attitude, which is a typical hierarchical critique. The 
second part of his critique is connected to the lack of performance by the state: 
there are people who are struggling economically; and there are people dying while 
waiting in a queue for an operation (Natan 2002:01:59). This can be interpreted as 
based either on the egalitarian or the hierarchical view of the state, which has a 
responsibility for citizens’ well being. Even if hierarchy is usually supportive of 
systems, it cannot be blind to all shortcomings. 
However, there is one area where Mr. Natan thinks that the state is doing too 
much: 
Mr: Yes, at the asylums.  The state does not need to take care of the asylum-
seekers in asylums, and give them food and money.  Send them straight 
to work, let them earn money and make their own living, just like they 
do in England.  When people sit many years in asylums, they become 
angry and tired of each other. (Natan 2004:00:19) 
Not all institutions are good. Asylums make people into something less than what 
they really are, and living many years in an asylum does affect one. This is where 
Mr. Natan draws the line for the public influence. Giving asylum seekers the 
freedom and responsibility for their own well-being does seem like an 
individualistic solution to too much hierarchy. However, it is possible to see this in 
hierarchical terms as the state casting the asylum-seekers into a role that does not fit 
them. 
Because of his role in the community Mr. Natan has had significant contact with 
the migration branch of the police, however, never with the criminal police (Natan 
2002:01:48).  
Even if Mr. Natan helps migrants with their applications, he makes it clear to me 
that he has refused to help people get into Norway: 
Mr: But I could not help, because it is very difficult nowadays.  I cannot take 
alternative routes. I want it right, because I do not want to destroy the 
respect. It is very important. (Natan 2002:00:53) 
Mr. Natan is concerned about abiding the law and maintaining respect. However, 
his statement is ambiguous, and I am not certain whether the respect refers to the 
respect for the law or to the respect the majority population has for the Tamil 
minority.  
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Integration Requires Equality on Several Fields 
The following statement by Mr. Natan is loaded with typical hierarchical concerns: 
balance, rank, and place in society: 
Mr: [Tamils are working at] Gilde, a meat factory, and cleaning for cleaning 
companies.  So, they always go for it and work hard. They want to work 
more. Right? So that they will be equal.  When you are talking about 
integration, one needs a balance with people you are living with.  If you 
are rich, there is no balance between you and me, but then there is no 
integration.  So, you need a balance with the neighbors.  He must 
consider me to be on the level he expects, right.  Thus, those who are 
going for it, they get a place in the society they live in. (Natan 
2001:00:49) 
Mr. Natan has a clear view of what is needed for a successful integration into 
Norwegian society: First, integration requires a balance with the people you live 
with. Second, integration is measured through contact with neighbors. Third, the 
majority population is the judge of the Tamil’s success. Fourth, the Tamils have 
succeeded as well as they have because they work hard.  
Compulsory Norwegian Education for Migrants 
Mr. Natan realizes that in the dominant political discourse the Progress Party (Frp) 
is understood to use negative attitudes against migrants as a strategy for gaining 
popularity.  
Mr: (…) I have a bit mixed feelings about Frp. Sometimes they have issues 
that I totally agree with them. Oh, yes—totally agree with them.  I 
cannot just say that they are againts migrants and such, because they 
have some good issues. For example, they say that all migrants should be 
forced to participate in Norwegian education.  That is very positive, isn’t 
it? Many who come, just sit and make money, and they watch movies 
and TV, and that is the way they live.  They have no contact with 
Norwegians or like. That is bad, isn’t it?  They just sit there, and think 
about money. That is not OK (Natan 2002:01:34) .   
One should notice how he is criticizing Frp very indirectly (mixed feelings), and 
how this is even modified by his showing how on one migrant related issue he 
actually “totally agrees” with Frp.  
Being judgmental about migrants who isolate themselves and live off social welfare 
signals that Mr. Natan is very well integrated.155 Mr. Natan’s opinion about forcing 
migrants to participate in Norwegian education is as expected, for the hierarchical 
way of organizing typically blames deviant individuals, and finds it reasonable to use 
institutions to transform people. Individualistic cultural bias would reject this as 
nonsense, as people are robust to change, and will just follow their own self-
                                                     
155 It can also be seen as a response to the anti-migrant sentiments. By displaying this critical attitude, 
he is taking the majority populations side on this issue. 
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interest. The expected individualistic response would be to remove the benefits that 
make it possible for people to sit home and watch TV, as it is in people’s own best 
interest to be forced out into real life, where they need to take responsibility for 
themselves.  
Trust in Politicians 
Mr. Natan trusts Norwegian politicians in general, much more than politicians back 
in Sri Lanka, where politicians just take care of their own families, and “if one gets 
elected to an office, one becomes rich, multimillionaire, right? All of them!” (Natan 
2002:01:38). 
This kind of anti-establishment attitude is common to the egalitarian solidarity. It 
defines the group as different from the establishment, which helps to sustain 
internal cohesion in the group. However, hierarchical households can also show 
anti-establishment values, especially if the elites are misbehaving, according to the 
hierarchical standards, and hence unworthy of their positions and undeserving of 
respect by the people, which seems to be the point in Mr. Natan’s critique. 
Individualistic households can also be anti-establishment, but not on the grounds 
of elites becoming rich, as it is rather expected of the elites.  
A Summary Compared with the Predictions  
Both the household’s internal organization and their social relations support an 
interpretation of the household as one that relies on the hierarchical way of 
organizing in many situations. The Natan household has many hierarchical 
characteristics. One of the central aspects in a hierarchy is the lack of competition, 
which is replaced by a different type of social order. Mr. Natan is very concerned 
with how he is portrayed (H). He emphasizes the stories that portray him as the 
helper (H), and prefers social bonds over market relations (i). He dislikes the idea of 
being presented as somebody important or central, as he wants to be portrayed as a 
regular person. Nor is he interested in me elaborating the positions he has hold (H). 
He does not accept being portrayed as a receiver of social welfare (H). All of these 
fit well with rejecting competition as a means for success, and with knowing one’s 
place within the social order. Modesty is a tasteful way to downplay achievements 
in a hierarchical way of life. Even if the general division of labor is gender-based 
(H), they use skill-based justifications for it (I). There is also something egalitarian 
about trying to avoid celebrating birthdays (E). In sum, in the Natan household, 
there is a clear hierarchical way of organizing, with a small egalitarian component, 
while the pro- and anti-individualistic traits balance each other out. 
How well do the Natan household’s political views and preferences fit with the 
predictions made about hierarchical households (on pages 78-91)? Mr. Natan fits 
relatively well the predictions given about hierarchical views concerning politics and 
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society: human nature is weak but can be saved by institutions (H); preference for 
school uniforms and supporting compulsory language education (H); rejecting 
competition (i); trusting institutions more than people (H); accusing institutions of a 
lack of accountability (H); integration being finding the right balance with your 
neighbors (H); fear of being seen as a welfare recipient, and concern about the 
erosion of respect (H). However, there were two topics that do not fit with the 
hierarchical predictions: Mr. Natan’s emphasis on people’s lack of participation in 
politics is closer to the egalitarian predictions about the nature of the democratic 
game (E); also, his anti-establishment attitude seems more egalitarian than 
hierarchical (E); while letting asylum seekers work and earn their own living fits 
better with the individualistic predictions (I). Despite these three non-hierarchical 
preferences, the overall image fits the hierarchical predictions.  
After these two households with many hierarchical traits—the Nguyens from 
Vietnam and the Natan household from Sri Lanka—it is time to look at households 
that are lower on the grid and use egalitarian solidarity in many situations. I have 
chosen to include two households with egalitarian backgrounds, both from Chile. 
The Gracias are social organizers with regular jobs, whereas the Herreras are 
entrepreneurs. 
  178 
The Garcias: Equality as a Solution 
The Garcia household is an example of a household that uses egalitarian solidarity 
in many situations. However, each family member is allowed a large degree of 
freedom, so it is a rather moderate case.  
Short Summary—Community Organizers in a Creative Chaos 
Mr. and Mrs. Garcia are from Chile. He had a good high-tech job, she worked as an 
organizer and educator, traveling around. At the end of 1980s they moved closer to 
his father, who was then sick, but it became clear very soon, given the political and 
economic situation in Chile, that they would be forced to leave. Mrs. Garcia and 
their two children received refugee status in Norway, and a few months later, Mr. 
Garcia was able to follow. As a part of their Norwegian studies they both got 
themselves a trade, she in healthcare, and he in construction. She currently has a 
steady job, and is happy in it. He spent several years working in the food industry in 
a poorly paid job. Later he moved into construction, but after an accident, he is 
partially disabled. They have been living in their own four-room apartment in a 
green suburb since the beginning of the 1990s. 
Household’s Internal Life 
During my first visit to the Garcias I was thrown into the middle of a Latino 
household that buzzed with life and with a “creative chaos.” Where the Nguyen 
household’s home was orderly and everything in its place, here activities, and not 
appearances, seemed to be the focus point.  
The layout of the apartment was relatively open, with no doors between the kitchen 
and the living room. I was shown every corner of the apartment,156 thus they were 
not using the apartment to create boundaries between themselves and their 
guests.157 The apartment was filled with small memorabilia: one could follow the 
household’s life over years by looking at items on the walls and shelves. Each one 
had a little story of the family life connected to it. However, the items provided 
meaning only after the stories were told. As such the display was mainly for the 
family, not for outsiders. This points toward a form of nostalgic attitude considered 
an indicator of egalitarian bias (Caulkins and Weiner 1998:28).  
                                                     
156 The parent’s bedroom was next to the living room, and they even left the parent’s bedroom door 
open the whole time I was there.  
157 Their teenage children, however, were more private, and made sure to keep the doors to their 
bedrooms closed. 
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Everybody Does Household Chores 
Household work is divided amongst all of them, and the children are responsible 
for their own rooms. Mrs. Garcia says that her husband is capable of taking care of 
all types of housework, which emphasizes equality in egalitarian terms; everyone 
shares every task. In the Garcia household, who does what varies on a daily basis. It 
seems that the main principle in practice is the availability of time: whoever has the 
chance to cook dinner does it (Garcia 2002:01:45). For the egalitarian way of 
organizing, the ultimate equality in the division of labor is that everyone does every 
task according to their capacity. The Garcias have designed their everyday life close 
to this, if one would only listen to their justifications.  
Closer scrutiny shows that they do divide tasks between them. When it comes to 
household economy, Mrs. Garcia is responsibile for overall planning and for the 
apartment, whereas Mr. Garcia is responsibile for the car. He saves money by 
reading the advertisements carefully and having an overview of the prices in many 
stores. Because he now has extra time, he can drive from store to store and shop 
for the best prices. She says that they have been poor, especially after they moved 
out of Chile. Because they had to leave everything behind them, and start empty-
handed, they were “thinking like the poor” (Garcia 2002:01:57). 
Mrs. Garcia tells a story of how her husband sometimes behaves as if the money 
was burning a hole in his pocket, in other words his control slips sometimes: 
Mrs:  (…) There are no big problems with money.  We have a little bit of 
problem with him getting back with five or six types of fruit, when he 
was only supposed to get four  (…)  (Garcia 2002:01:55). 
This quote reinforces my impression of the needs being actively managed, because 
she is blaming him for not being able to limit his shopping to their defined “needs.” 
Having four different types of fruits is good for the household, but more than that 
is extravagant and something that they cannot afford to do. The point is that there 
are boundaries, which he sometimes oversteps. 
The Garcia’s economic management strategy focuses on keeping the expenses 
down and on setting limits on their needs. This behavior is supportive of the egali-
tarian way of organizing.  
Equality as a Solution 
Equality is a central issue for the Garcias. They pass numerous judgments and 
provide multiple justifications that establish equality as the most important 
guideline for creating a good life. They emphasize several times that their concern 
with equality is not anything they have learned in Norway, but something they have 
brought with them from Chile. This makes me suspect that they have met 
Norwegians who assume that migrants are not concerned with equality. They take 
pride in this issue, and want to be sure that I understand that it is their issue: their 
contribution to Norwegian society. 
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Equality is presented in several ways in relation to the life of this household. Mrs. 
Garcia explains how her mother was always “under” her father, whereas she and 
her sister both have jobs and are much more independent (Garcia 2001). There is a 
clear shift in the gender roles from generation to generation, and Mrs. Garcia and 
her sister have managed to fulfill her norm of equal standing between the genders.  
This brand of equality is not just equality of inherent worth, but also equality of 
contribution to the household’s resources. The women should be strong and 
independent: able to take care of herself and the children, in case the man cannot 
(Garcia 2001:00:45 and 00:40).  
She emphasizes that she wants to make her own decisions, which could as well 
have been an individualistic preference. However, her stories about men, women, 
and work, viewed together, are arguments against a hierarchical division of labor 
drawn from an egalitarian point of view. 
Mr. Garcia never showed any resentment that he was in Norway working below his 
previous experience: Before moving to Norway, he worked in a high-tech company, 
whereas in Norway he has worked in a factory and as a construction worker. 
Nevertheless, he seemed happy to work in construction. The social status 
connected to work does not seem to be an issue, which could be a sign of egali-
tarian bias, as the group’s internal well-being is considered more important than 
external status.  
To summarize, the Garcias are proud of their consistent emphasis on equality and 
the ways they have been able to create a household where this equality is 
manifested in the daily practices.  
A Loose Interview Setting: 
The interview itself can also be analyzed as in indicator for their preferred way of 
organizing. The previous observations are confirmed as the whole interview was 
structured loosely. In the first interview, which was mainly conducted with Mrs. 
Garcia, Mr. Garcia was several times in and out of the interview, without any 
explanations—it just happened. In the second interview, their teenaged children 
were present and participated actively. They were not just children; they were 
members of the family life, who were treated more as equals by their parents than 
by me, who was trying to keep the parents talking.  
There was often no immediate message on the surface, as she talks in circles and 
presents examples rather than clear answers to my questions. Sometimes it was 
difficult to understand where she was heading. However, looking at the transcript 
of the interview, I can see each story as an example with a point. It appears that she 
is trying to give me a more direct access to her experiences. It is impossible to say if 
this is the result of a communicative preference or a technique to compensate for 
using a foreign language, or else a reflection of the egalitarian bias, which 
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commonly trusts personal experience more than abstract knowledge. Nevertheless, 
this style fits well with their egalitarian way of organizing. 
The Garcias share the telling of the story—observe what the quotes on pages 181 
and 158 look like. They both know where they are heading, but do not allow the 
other one to tell alone, or perhaps they are helping each other with the language. 
Nevertheless, it results in a moderately chaotic discussion, which indicates a low 
grid. A hierarchical household would not like to present itself in this way to the 
outside world. 
Social Relations in the Society 
The Garcias have a high number of friends and acquaintances. They have extensive 
social contact with neighbors and friends, and a Chilean group in the Catholic 
Church acts as an especially important arena for social contact. They list eighteen 
people with Chilean background (some of which actually represent a whole family), 
one from Sri Lanka, and five from the majority population. They have little contact 
with people living outside the town, with the exception of Mrs. Garcia’s sister and 
their four friends back in Latin America. Their connection back to Chile is alive, 
and one of the positive sides of living in Norway is that now she can help her 
mother financially. Mr. Garcia does have kin, a sister, in town, while Mrs. Garcia 
has no relatives in Norway. 
Friendship is important to them: they have very close friends to whom they are 
devoted: 
Mr: (…) For example, I have few friends in town.  I do not have many, but I 
have the best ones!  
Mrs: Best friends. 
Mr: The best ones.  I have the four best ones (…) I would do whatever they 
need from me.  I know for sure that they would do the same for me.  
EO: You said that you have four very good friends, but are they also friends 
with each other?  
Mrs: Yes. 
Mr: = Yes.  I can see that I do various things for them, but I know they do 
the same, too.  
Mrs: It all comes back.   
Mr: = No, it does not come back, but lets say that we have a problem, 
immediately they would help me.  And when a friend has a problem I 
would call at once and ask, ”No problem, what do you need, where do 
you want me to pick you up?  No problem.”  
Mrs: No that is great.  Sometimes it is it just like a family. (Garcia 2002:01:35) 
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This, together with other examples they provide, makes it clear that they go quite 
far in helping each other, and the logic seems to follow the egalitarian solidarity, as 
they do not make “contracts,” but trust that everyone will do their share. As Mr. 
Garcia points out above, it is not about “everything coming back,” but about being 
able to count upon the other’s help when needed.  
This group of friends shares many kinds of activities and help, everything from 
cooking food to spending the night at the emergency room with a friend’s sick 
child (Garcia 2002:01:37). In addition, they get involved with more intimate family 
issues, like giving advice concerning one of the daughter’s boyfriend’s character 
(Garcia 2002:01:31). I wish I had asked them what the friends do not get involved 
in, as they seem to be present in most areas of their lives. 
Neighbors are also important, and two of them function practically as extended 
family for the children, who can go over to the neighbor’s when the parents are not 
home. The setup is loose, and the children eat wherever they happen to be. One of 
these close neighbors belongs to the group of Mr. Garcia’s four best friends, while 
the second neighbor is a woman from Chile.  
Their social relations are mainly with Chileans: all of their best friends are Chilean; 
the people they have close and multiple relations with all seem to be Chileans. 
However, they do have contact with the majority population and migrants from 
other parts of the world, as neighbors. Actually, the majority of the listed neighbors 
they have regular contact with are non-Chileans, but there seems to be a qualitative 
difference between these “normal” neighbors and the Chilean neighbors, many of 
whom they also know through church activities.  
They are concerned with the boundary between important and unimportant people. 
There is pressure for more social contact than they feel they are able to keep up 
with, so they are by no means isolated as migrants. Mrs. Garcia claims that she 
cannot remember the names of all these people, which could indicate an ego-
focused network, where I would expect to find so many people that it could 
become difficult to keep track of them. However, it seems better understood as an 
egalitarian household trying to set up some boundaries in a rich social space: 
EO: If you do not remember their names, they are probably not that 
important.  
Mrs: No, but you know what, we know many people.  And people come and 
talk about so private things that it does not interest me, but they still 
come and talk.  [Talks about the church group, which is very important 
for them]  Other people who know us come, too.  They might invite us 
home, but that becomes like a compromise.  We cannot cover their need 
for friends, because of lack of time:  Perhaps we talk on phone; we have 
our jobs; and the Catholic Church; and we are parents.  Otherwise, we 
would just go around and around.   
EO: You cannot be friends with everybody.  
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Mrs: Oh no, I cannot visit everybody.  On Monday, my colleague,—a 
friend—will be operated.  I must go, because I am her best friend.  (…)  
She is at a hospital.  I have to go. (Garcia 2002:00:41)   
They are very close to the people they consider friends. He worked for the same 
company for fourteen years in Latin America and still keeps in touch with three of 
his colleagues, notwithstanding his having lived this long in Norway.  
Despite that they know different people through their work and children’s activities 
(it is he who takes their son to the sports activities), all of their friends are common 
friends. When I inquire about this, Mrs. Garcia suggests a physical therapist who is 
only his friend, but he immediately refutes this and says it is a professional 
relationship and hence not a friend (Garcia 2002:00:45). Having only common 
friends shows that the household acts mainly as one unit (high-group), instead of a 
collection of individuals, each of whom have their own set of social relations.  
Despite this contact with old friends, their social map is dominated by members of 
the congregation and neighbors: people with whom they can have weekly or even 
daily face-to-face contact. In fact, there is really no room for other people, and the 
rest of the chart depicting their social relations is glaringly empty. 
Tight Organizational Bonds 
They take part in several non-governmental organizations, which help people in 
Latin America. After explaining how an organization they are members of helped 
to build a chapel, they continue:158 
Mr: = But it helps lots of different things, not just this… 
Mrs: = Right, there are different zones, different... 
Mr: = In Argentina.  In southern Chile.  In (Barbareiso), Santiago. 
Mrs: = Also in North.  Like that time with the chapel… 
Mr: = They make parties… 
Mrs: = in the city. [here in Norway] 
Mr: = in the city.  And we work for free through the whole night on that 
party.  First, during the day with preparations and organizing, and then at 
the party we charge money, and make, for example 20-30 000 crowns, 
which we would send to different organizations. (Garcia 2002:01:15) 
This organization now has their own Internet pages and gets many requests for 
help. They prefer to give help for self-help: to send help just once and then let the 
local people run and develop it further (Garcia 2002:01:22). This fits well with an 
egalitarian way of organizing, where distrust of institutions and experts leads to the 
preference for direct contact between people. In addition, if you are trying to 
emphasize the equality between the receiver and the helper, you cannot really take 
                                                     
158 Notise how  they share the telling the story. 
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charge of the projects and tell the receivers what they should do. Instead, an egali-
tarian way of giving aid often relies on empowerment as a strategy. 
When I inquired whether this was a formal organization, with a leader and 
everything that entails, they answered: 
Mrs:  We have a leader, something like 
Mr: = a coordinator. 
Mrs: = a coordinator.  He does not like that we call him for a leader.  
Everybody have to take responsibility for something.  So he says:  
— What shall we do?  There is a party coming up.  Who will arrange 
this? 
And everybody contributes.  (…)  So, it is very democratic in our group  
((laughter)) (Garcia 2002:01:23). 
As cultural theory expects from an egalitarian household, they view this flat 
structure as a democratic ideal. They prefer participation in this kind of 
organization, with a coordinator rather than a leader. However, this form of 
organization requires that everybody accept the obligations that participation puts 
upon them. Contrary to the other cultural biases, the egalitarian bias has difficulties 
in seeing the costs of participation as costs.  
They meet these people from the Catholic Church often and in several types of 
activities: there is a study group, which discusses religion and relatively private 
issues connected to family life; there is the weekly Sunday mass; and there are the 
activities to help the needy in Latin America. One might easily be lead to think of 
this as a typical hierarchical setting, nevertheless, it seems egalitarian in the sense 
that there is no clear separation of functions: religious practice, mutual aid between 
families, social meetings, and aid to Latin America all seem to mix together in the 
Chilean church group, which thus becomes a solution to many kinds of needs and 
practices. The social relations within this group are multiplex, and not confined to a 
predefined set of relations. 
There seems to be a high willingness to take part in group activities for morally 
worthy goals, like helping others. The receivers are not specifically selected for their 
past behavior or roles, which would have indicated a more hierarchical solidarity. 
Commonly, the receivers are collectives and regular people, which would be more 
typical for egalitarian solidarity.  
Politics and the Welfare State 
Personal Experiences  
Like many other migrants the Garcias come from a state that has abused its powers 
and terrorized its population. Violence leaves marks that do not go away easily. For 
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Chileans September 11th is the date of the 1973 military coup, which put General 
Pinochet in charge of the state, and began an era of terror (Martínez and Díaz 
1996).  
Despite (or because of) their negative experiences with the Chilean state, the 
Garcias are positively inclined to the state in Norway. After they arrived in Norway, 
the refugee office (Flyktningekontoret) helped them a lot: with housing, Norwegian 
courses and so forth. In addition, for two years they lived in a municipally owned 
flat. 
Surprised by the Caring Police  
The Garcias have positive experiences with the local police. They told me three 
different stories. First, how one of their children is involved in Red Cross (Røde 
kors hjelpekorps) and has helped police search for missing persons (Garcia 
2002:2:45). The second story also revolves around one of their children: the police 
gave a lecture at school, for the first grade about traffic safety and the dangers of 
IV-needles left in the local park by drug addicts (Garcia 2002:2:47). The third story 
involves the parents: They had locked their house keys in the car and needed help 
to get into their home and into their car. After the police solved the situation, they 
wanted to pay the police, and were surprised that it was neither expected nor 
possible. She emphasized that they were not expecting the police to take bribes, 
(which is common in Chile); nevertheless, they expected that the police as an 
institution would charge for helping people (Garcia 2002:2:56).  
These types of stories about the police were typical for the Chilean households. 
Several households gave, enthusiastically, examples of their surprise when they 
experienced for first time that the police cared about people in Norway. They 
present the Norwegian police force as caring, non-corrupt, and trustworthy, in 
contrast to the Chilean police force.  
Social Welfare Office is for Those Who Are Alone 
When I query Mrs. Garcia about her relationship with the social welfare office, she 
begins by personally distancing herself from it: “I do not want to get involved with 
it” (Garcia 2002:02:19). She has a social network that she can rely upon if she needs 
support.  
EO: You have managed without.  That is good, but 
Mrs: = Of course there are elderly people.  I think about our culture.  There 
are people who have to go there, because they came alone to Norway, 
and they did not manage to talk good Norwegian, and have no family.  
That is OK, of course.  It is the last chance, when one has nothing else.  
It is good to have an office that can worry about people like that.  And it 
is the same office that helps unmarried women, isn’t it. (Garcia 
2002:02:19) 
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Thus, Mrs. Garcia speaks positively regarding the social welfare office’s existence, 
but does not want to be associated with it herself. In addition, she emphasizes the 
importance of the social welfare office, as a security net, when one has “nothing 
else.” She is saying, implicitly, that social relations and families should carry the 
responsibility when possible. What is the point of being a member of a group if the 
group cannot take care of its own? The egalitarian bias takes pride in taking care of 
a group’s members, just as the hierarchical bias does.  
Blame the System 
Blame is a good indicator of how people relate to institutions. The Garcias blame 
the system in general, that is, both private and public support systems. At one point 
Mr. Garcia had an accident, and in the aftermath everything seemed to go wrong: 
the hospital made mistakes; the insurance company did not want to pay enough 
during the early stages, when all the bills were coming; and now that he has started 
with work-training his income has been reduced by 40 percent compared to what 
he made while he was home sick (Garcia 2002:00:10). Mr. Garcia is unhappy about 
his present situation, because of the drop in income. He recognizes the lack of 
incentive to work: he made more money being “sick” than he is making in the 
work-training program; therefore, he thinks there is something wrong with the 
system. 
I find this interesting, for they could just as well have chosen to emphasize the fact 
that he has had a long sick leave, during which time the public healthcare and social 
insurance systems have been important in sustaining the family. After many years in 
Norway their expectations have risen to a Norwegian level. Moreover, this egali-
tarian household, as predicted by cultural theory, is eager to blame the system.  
Violence and the Non-Accountable Headmaster 
The Garcias had their children in a public school, where one of their children was 
subjected to violence that was not properly dealt with by the school. Mrs. Garcia 
made personal contact with the headmaster, which did not induce the results the 
Garcias had expected. We can see how they, being resourceful, are addressing this 
problem at the level of systems. The problem was the school’s poor response, not 
the individuals who used violence. Finally, they solved the problem by exiting the 
public school system and entering their children into a private catholic school 
(Garcia 2002:02:56-03:01).  
Their response could have been quite different. With cultural theory it is possible to 
describe many alternatives, especially if one takes into account both the school’s 
way of organizing and the Garcia household’s way of organizing. First, the Garcias 
could have chosen a more hierarchical approach and blamed the deviant individuals 
(the violent kids), if the headmaster had been responsive. By being the person in 
charge, while not taking responsibility, the headmaster more or less made it 
impossible for the Garcias to use a hierarchical strategy. Basically the headmaster 
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confirmed the egalitarians negative expectations of a hierarchical system. Second, 
the Garcias could have just accepted, fatalistically, that the world is an unjust place, 
where this kind of thing happens (as you do not expect the authorities to be 
responsible or just), and all you can do is absorb the blows when they come. Third, 
the Garcias could have chosen an individualistic approach, which bypasses the 
institutions (like teaching their children street survival skills).  
Dreams that Reduce Fears 
Mrs. Garcia tells me that her future is here, however, she will never forget the 
Spanish language. Old people turning senile tend to forget languages other than 
their native language. She gives an example of a Finnish woman who lost her 
second language (Norwegian) with senility, thus, today, the only way to 
communicate with this woman is in Finnish. Therefore, she would like to start a 
clinic or a retirement home, where both Spanish and Norwegian are used (Garcia 
2001:01:55). This dream offers resolution to a fear: being a native Spanish speaker, 
Mrs. Garcia fears one day losing her ability to speak Norwegian and ending up in 
the care of a welfare state that does not speak Spanish. It also represents a change 
in the welfare state. The population changes and the welfare state should change 
too, in order to take care of its own.  
Being risk averse is part of the egalitarian cultural bias, whereas seeing possibilities 
and underestimating the risks is part of the individualistic cultural bias. Had Mrs. 
Garcia used the individualistic cultural bias, she might have presented her dream in 
different words, as a business opportunity rather than a solution to a fear. 
The Nationality Issue 
Mrs. Garcia is concerned about the way the majority population treats her family as 
foreigners, especially her children. 
Mrs: Yes, do you know why?  We are the foreign Norwegian people.  We—
me and him ((points to husband)).  He is born here ((points to son)).  
Nevertheless, we are all foreigners. (Garcia 2002:02:07) 
It sounds like she does not think that it is possible for them to become 
“Norwegian.” On the other hand, she does not view this as preferable either, as she 
thinks that we all should be in solidarity with each other and help each other, but 
keep our own respective languages and cultures (Garcia 2002:02:18). It seems 
natural to her that since the population is now multilingual, the services for older 
people should become multilingual too. 
They consider it important to keep Spanish as their language at home . One of the 
family members has been involved in a Spanish-speaking radio program (Garcia 
2001:00:51). Mrs. Garcia has been involved in the Chilean community, organizing 
many events. The Garcias are involved in activities that help to sustain their identity 
as Chileans in exile, and hence reduce their need to become “Norwegian.” They are 
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part of a vivid Chilean community that provides them with all the social support 
and belonging they need. 
Mrs. Garcia does not think that several cultures in one society creates problems, 
whereas there is a potential problem with letting previous terrorists into Norway 
(Garcia 2002:02:16).159 Thus, the problem is not on the level of collectives, but 
instead with a system that is unable to exclude the individuals willing to use means 
that do not fit into an equality based society. 
Leftist Party Politics and Same Rights for Everybody 
Mrs. Garcia says straight out that they do not follow politics, however, in my view, 
she has clear opinions of political issues (Garcia 2002:02:01). They are not members 
of a party, and they alter their vote between several parties on the left of the 
political landscape (Garcia 2002:02:04). She shows a good knowledge of the 
different institutions and their functions. She follows politics on the news and is 
able to comment upon the cuts in the city budget: 
Mrs: = For example, I heard the seven o’clock news this morning.  There is 
an economic problem, the city has to reduce its budget on care, 
kindergartens, everything, kindergartens, schools, everything.  
((Whispers)).  For the fosterkids it is the future.  Moreover, the care of 
the elderly that is what we do: always at work, heavy work, but it is 
thanks to the elderly that the country is what it is.  Now they want to cut 
it down again.  I think that when they cut the budget: perhaps a patient 
will not get his wheelchair; perhaps one has to wait longer to get to the 
physical therapist; and perhaps the retired people, who can’t cook 
themselves, will not get food delivered at the door; perhaps people in 
diapers will get only one daily visit by the auxilliary nurse.  Of course, if I 
think about our country, it is not the same.  But here we pay high taxes, 
which we do not do down there. (Garcia 2002:02:29) 
She has very detailed ideas about the consequences of the budget cuts, because she 
works in health care and will meet some of these cuts firsthand in her work. She is 
presenting the consequences for people, rather than relying on what the experts are 
saying. This story also has a moral built in it: because the tax level is high, it is 
wrong to reduce the level of care; it is immoral for the community not to take care 
of its weakest. She also uses this story to explain to me differences between Chile 
and Norway.  
Her knowledge and interest seems to be beyond what I would expect from an 
average Norwegian person who claims to be uninterested in politics. She also 
shows some political refinement in discussing principles rather than simply issues: 
for example, she dislikes Carl I. Hagen for lumping all migrants together.  
                                                     
159 This interview was conducted three months after the World Trade Center bombing in New York, 
while terrorism was a major issue in Norwegian media. 
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Mrs. Garcia thinks that the most important political issue in Norway is getting the 
same rights for everybody living here (Garcia 2002:02:05). Given their successful 
egalitarian experiences and preferences, it should not come as a surprise that they 
believe that the rest of society could be organized according to the same egalitarian 
principles. 
Summary of the Household’s Way of Organizing and the Predictions  
There is a general pattern that fits the egalitarian way of organizing internally in the 
household and in their social relations: they emphasize that everyone shares the 
household tasks (E); they control their economy by keeping the expenses (and 
needs) down (E); they justify their household organization through equality, see 
economical gender equality as important (E), and critique the gender based division 
of power at their parents’ homes (h); the interview setting was loose, the children 
were automatically included and both parents share the telling of the stories (E); the 
help given is shared among a tight group of friends or given to regular people (E); 
they emphasize how help is not about “all coming back” (i); and they are concerned 
with the boundaries for involvement and all their friends are family friends (E). The 
household’s internal equality and flat structure is mirrored in their preference for 
organizing their social life. A large part of these tight multiple social bonds are built 
around ethnic organizations, which provide them with the resources they need.  
There are many topics they did not touch upon in the interviews, but their political 
views and behavior fit consistently with the egalitarian predictions. Even if they do 
not say that they consider participation important in a democracy, their own 
behavior makes this very clear: The Garcias are “ethnic” community organizers; 
their public participation is oriented toward their own ethnic community through a 
number of organizations, where they have time-consuming positions (E). They 
view the flat structure as an ideal. They see equal rights for everyone as the most 
important political issue (E). They have a positive view of the state, and are willing 
to increase the scope of public involvement (E). She prefers a social network for 
social security but does find the social welfare office important for others (E). They 
are eager to blame the system (E). Even their being surprised by the caring police 
confirms their general distrust of institutions (E). The story of the headmaster not 
responding shows a critique of hierarchy (h).  
The Garcias display some criticism of hierarchy and individualism combined with a 
strong support for egalitarianism in the household’s internal organization and 
helping relations, while their political views show strong support for egalitarianism 
and some criticism of hierarchy. Thus, the Garcias as a case confirm the predictions 
made by cultural theory. 
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The Herreras: Entrepreneurship for the Whole Family 
The Herrera household is an interesting case. They are a tight family that spends a 
lot of time together and relies on the egalitarian way of organizing in many 
situations. They have chosen to run their own business, which makes their resource 
management style very prominent in the interviews. I have chosen to include both 
the Garcias and the Herreras, despite that they both come from Chile and rely 
mainly on the egalitarian way of life, because it allows me to show how they differ, 
yet in many ways still resemble each other.  
The first part of my presentation of the Herrera household is structured after 
concepts from cultural theory: the subchapters focus on social relations, behavioral 
patterns and cultural biases. This slightly different view follows cultural theory 
closer than the presentations of the other households. Nevertheless, the themes 
covered are the same—the difference lies in the order of discussion. The second 
part of the presentation, similar to the other presentations, deals with their views of 
the welfare state and politics. 
A Quick Summary—a Tight Family that Works Together 
The Herrera family owns and runs a family business, where four of the family 
members and some of their spouses work. They operated a similar firm back in 
Chile. They came to Norway at the end of 1980s as political refugees, because Mr. 
Herrera’s participation in leftist politics forced them to flee. After arriving in 
Norway Mr. Herrera worked in a factory for many years before he started his own 
firm on the side. After some years his company was solid enough to provide a 
living and he could leave his factory job. Mrs. Herrera stayed at home and took care 
of their, and a few other families’, children. A few years ago the firm diversified 
their production and expanded, allowing them to hire several family members.  
The first interview was conducted with Mr. Herrera only, because the rest of the 
family was traveling. The second interview was conducted with the whole family, 
and gives a lively picture of the household’s internal life. 
Social Relations 
In the beginning of every interview I ask: Can you just tell me a little bit about who 
you are? This prompts very different types of answers. Here is a slightly longer 
quote, which will give us a glimpse of one way to create an identity through social 
relations. 
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Mr: Yes ((laughs a little)).  It is not easy, but I will try.  I am man.  I come 
from Chile.160  I had a difficult situation in the 80s, and some friends, 
they helped us to come here.  When I came here, I started to feel like a 
person.  I started to feel I had my rights.  People listened to me.  
Moreover, I met very kind people, Norwegian people.  I am Catholic (), 
so I started there immediately I came to town.  I helped to organize a 
group at the church.  There my faith became very strong.  I worked very 
hard with the church, and I met some families from downtown.  My 
family came some months after me.  I lived in a suburb, but when my 
family arrived, we moved to downtown.  I thank my God for arriving to 
this particular place, and meeting this Norwegian family with Colombian 
children.  They could talk a little Spanish with us.  I went to school, but I 
did not learn anything until my family came, because I was very nervous 
and in a bad situation. (Herrera 2002a:00:03) 
We can see how his self-presentation is actually a story about friends, family, and 
the church. He establishes himself as a person through a description of his social 
relations. The first thing he does in Norway is join the church; however, he is not 
complete, not able to perform well, until his family arrives.  
The Herrera family’s social relations are built around their company, the Catholic 
Church, and their home. Like many Chileans they go regularly to the Catholic 
Church, and this provides them with a network of friends and acquaintances. Like 
most family firms, this one also consumes all available time, and while I suggested 
that we could conduct the interviews at their home, they insisted that we do them 
at their firm, which is a place where the family members are together, and a location 
they use, not only for work, but also for socializing.  
The second interview situation was informal and people, some unknown to me (but 
obviously very familiar with the Herreras), moved in and out during the interview. I 
had made my appointment with Mr. and Mrs. Herrera, but during the interview 
their daughter (indicated later by “D”) and her husband and a friend of the family 
joined in. They all knew who I was and the purpose of my visit. In many ways this 
resembled the setting of the interview with the Garcia household (on page 180). 
The children are a part of the family and therefore have a “natural” right to be 
present and participate just like their parents. 
The Herreras have multiple social relations with each other, as they are both family 
members and colleagues at the same time. When I asked them how they separate 
between family life and the company, the daughter in the family answered: 
D: There is no difference ((everybody laughs)).   
(…) 
When we are here [at the company] all we siblings talk, and work, and 
then we have cigarette breaks; when we get home, we call each other to 
find out what to do today.  It is actually the same. (Herrera 2002b:00:14) 
                                                     
160 He is first a man, and only after that is he from Chile. 
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The family is a tight family, united both in their work and in leisure. The fact that 
they need to consult each other in order to find out what to do indicates Low-Grid-
High-Group. In a high grid, many of the events they would participate in would not 
be “voluntary” in the same sense. 
Even when there are events that could disrupt their tight social life, they manage to 
find a way to keep it going. When Mrs. Herrera and the Herreras married daughter 
went to Chile for a long holiday, to visit family, the daughter’s husband moved into 
the Herrera’s house, so that neither he nor Mr. Herrera needed to be “alone” while 
the women were traveling (Herrera 2002a:01:07). 
Their first apartment in town was provided by the refugee office. These apartments 
are intended only as a temporary solution for refugees, and they are available only 
for a few years. The Herreras characterize these first years as a happy time, and they 
had a very good social network of neighbors, who later wrote a letter to the refugee 
office requesting an extension in the Herreras lease (Herrera 2002a:00:31). The 
Herreras were eventually able to buy their own apartment downtown, but did not 
manage to keep these old neighbors as friends, because they spent their time 
working or in church related activities.  
Another indicator of the Herreras willingness to integrate into the community is 
how they, following advice from a friend, opted against putting their children in 
catholic school, because they believe that it is better, for the children’s integration 
into the local community, to go to a school located in their own neighborhood 
(Herrera 2002a:01:10). 
In the mid-90s they sold their apartment and bought a house in a suburb, where 
they now live, and have only limited contact with their present neighbors, which, 
according to them, is typical for this neighborhood (Herrera 2002a:00:35). It shines 
through that Mr. Herrera feels that becoming increasingly similar to Norwegians is 
not merely positive. 
Even if nowadays they do not have lively contact with their neighbors, the new 
house has a very large living room, “in order to have parties” (Herrera 2002a:00:39). 
They have many friends who try to help each other as much as they can. An 
indicator of their number of friends is the moving-in party they had in which more 
than fifty guests crowded into their new living room (Herrera 2002b:00:41).  
Behavior 
Households Tasks 
The Herreras divide the household work between all members of the household, 
without having fixed tasks or fixed times when the work should be done. They 
claim that it is difficult to explain how, but everything does get done in the end 
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(Herrera 2002b:00:25). This indicates a low grid within the household. On the other 
hand one of the daughters emphasizes that Mrs. Herrera likes to have control, and 
tells how things used to be:  
D: For us the difference is that there used to be kids in the house.  There 
was lots of hubbub.  Previously we had to clean the house every 
Saturday.  In addition, I had to wash or vacuum during the week, too. 
Right?  This way the house was not a mess.  You could say that with 
children in the house you cannot have it the way you would like to have 
it.  Where as now it is a pleasure to be at home, everything is on its place, 
and is clean and nice, and there is no washing of floors in the middle of 
the week.  
Mrs: No, that is not necessary. (Herrera 2002b:00:27) 
So, there are some standards that need to be met, which were, previously, difficult 
to meet without having fixed days and fixed tasks, where as now, they can allow the 
housecleaning to “happen.” The women in the household tell me that Mr. Herrera 
is, little by little, doing much better with the household work, and the only thing 
that he does not really do is the cooking (Herrera 2002b:00:24). The household 
seems to prefer an egalitarian way of organizing, and Mr. Herrera’s increased 
participation in the household work is now changing their behavior towards that 
direction, too. 
Management of Resources and Consumption 
Three people own the family company jointly. The main motivation for starting the 
company was to take care of the family: to create good jobs for the family members 
and to create a chance for a good life. “If we work, we work for ourselves” 
(Herrera 2002a:00:49). The company does not make much money, so they would 
probably still be economically better off by working for others, but they hope that 
little by little it will get better. 
The company’s internal life is informal and based on meetings where things are 
settled, and people have their fixed work tasks. Mrs. Herrera is the “boss,” but on 
paper, it is Mr., and not Mrs. Herrera, who is the owner. The reason given was 
practical—the bank was willing to give Mr. Herrera a loan because he had a job. 
Mrs. Herrera comments upon this: 
Mrs: It is my idea.  It is much better that he can do it.  It is the same for me.  
It does not mean anything. (Herrera 2002b:00:19) 
The formalities are not important to her: The family or household is one unit, no 
matter who is listed as the owner on paper. Had this been a hierarchical household, 
the justification would probably have been more in terms of the right thing to do, 
instead of it not making any difference. Thus, the impression of a predominately 
egalitarian household is strengthened. 
The company is still young, and they are not able to take full salary out, yet.  
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Mrs:  Nobody has a fixed salary yet. 
(…) 
D:  So, for example, if mother needs 2000, she will get 2000.  If father needs 
5000, he will get 5000.  But everybody is trying to avoid taking the 
money, right?  ((Laughter))  To be able to pay the bills, right? (Herrera 
2002a:00:20) 
There is a strong loyalty toward the family and the family company. People are 
investing their time and effort—large parts of their lives—into a collective 
endeavor that they hope one day will be a profitable and solid company, but it still 
requires them to keep their demands low and sacrifice consumption for awhile. 
One should also notice that justification for the amount of salary paid is based on 
need, not contribution, which points toward an egalitarian way of organizing.  
Their behavior is justified by their belief that happiness is not dependent on 
material well-being. The daughter in the family describes poor people in Chile: 
D:  They manage because they laugh of their own tragedies.  ## 
They are actually very happy people, even if they are poor.  I saw that 
when I was in Chile.  Poor people are the happiest people I have ever 
seen.  More than anyone I have seen here in Norway.  True, they have 
neither this nor that.  So, down there a little means a lot, but here. (…) 
So, they are happy with what they have. (Herrera 2002b:01:13) 
Small Is Good 
There is only a thin boundary between the family economy and the company 
economy. Mr. Herrera prefers to earn only enough to pay for the house and a 
simple living, because if it looks to relatives like they have a lot of money, it will 
become a problem, and Mr. Herrera is tired of sending money to relatives back in 
Chile. Mr. Herrera’s style of economic management is now focused on the 
expenses instead of income. 
Mr: I am getting tired of trying to make lots of money.  I do not believe in it.  
It is much better to manage well the money you have.  Because you end 
up thinking too much: how to watch for [the people working for him.  
In the family company] there are no problems.  We do not need to watch 
after the people here.  That is why. (Herrera 2002a:00:51) 
For the Herreras a small family company is preferable to a big company, which 
needs a lot of supervision, since the additional surplus does not motivate them (as 
the relatives would make claims for it). This is an example of how tight social 
bonds carry claims for resources, which can become a burden (see page 76). In 
contrast, the individualistic way of organizing limits the claims others can make 
without reciprocation, which makes it easier to run a business.  
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Social Support Created Money Problems  
Now that Mr. Herrera is looking back he recognizes that they had problems with 
their household economy, because of the way they managed their money, and not 
due to any lack of money. 
Mr:  Even if I had an old car, I had a small flat, and I still had never enough 
money.  Later I bought a new house, a new car, and still had more 
money.  And at that time, my mother was also alive, and I had to help 
her with everything, but still.  ######## (Herrera 2002a:00:55) 
Mr. Herrera claims that the “free money” they received after their arrival in Norway 
led them into a spiral of purchases on credit cards. They spent too much money 
and never had enough:  
EO: You said previously that it does not matter how much money you have, 
it is how you manage it.  Do you think that you manage your money 
different now than you did 10 years ago?  
Mr: I take much more care now.   
Previously, yes, we just spend, spend, spend on credit, credit, and credit.  
It was a time when we had lots of things.  We used on garden; money for 
spending; we had a video camera— Nothing luxurious.  We used lots of 
money: my girls were small; we traveled a lot to Denmark and to 
Sweden.  ((Talks Spanish to someone)). 
Luckily, when we sold our apartment, I paid around 70.000 [for our 
debts] at that time.   
EO: Did I understand you correctly: you sold the apartment and paid off the 
credit you had?  
Mr: Yes, fortunately, during a few months.  But I had to choose; therefore, I 
learned to say no. 
And my Norwegian friend said:  
— No, Carlos, you have to...  
Because, I remember the first period, when I got money from the 
refugee office, it was 8000 and something, and I did nothing.  Then I 
went to my friend (at that time) and complained to him:  
— Huff, I do not have enough money.   
— How much do you get?   
— 8000.   
He said:  
— You, know what.  I work the whole month and make 8000. 
# 
There was something wrong, wrong.  But he understood, too.  You 
know, I could not work then, because I had to go to school.   
# 
I said,  
— No, I have to work. 
— No, he says, I am sorry but you have to wait...  
— No, but I do not have enough money, only 8000.   
We were sending money to my father and to her mother, but still.   
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But he said:  
— I earn, I work the whole month.  ((Moans)) 
While I got 8000 for free and slept well, too.  That is how it was.  Yes.  
########## (Herrera 2002a:00:56-01:00) 
It is unclear why this support from the refugee office should lead to extensive 
spending, but it is possible that it distorts realism in household management. 
Perhaps the phrase “easy come, easy go,” describes the process that lead to their 
phase of mostly unsuccessful spending. Especially during an establishment phase, 
in a comparatively rich country, one can be lead into false expectations regarding 
one’s future income and standard of living: that is, if we are making this much 
money already, we should be making much more when we start working…  
Their past spending could be interpreted as fatalistic behavior in a situation in 
which they have little control over their lives. However, I have too little 
information concerning this phase of their lives to reliably choose between the 
different interpretations (false expectations vs. fatalistic spending). I can only 
suggest that it is possible that this household has moved from an egalitarian way of 
organizing in Chile to a fatalistic way of organizing as refugees, and then back again 
to an egalitarian way of organizing after managing to get their lives back on track. A 
study of these kinds of changes would be most interesting from a cultural theory 
perspective.161  
Nevertheless, now, Mr. Herrera blames the system for the economic problems the 
household experienced, which fits the egalitarian predictions. The same behavior 
could easily have been used to confirm the individualistic view of people as selfish 
and lazy. Individualists are expected to blame the non-productive individual, which 
does not seem to be the case here.  
Making Big Decisions 
I always try to inquire into how the household makes big decisions, but Mr. Herrera 
managed to tell about tell about how they bought their house before I even asked. 
Obviously, the way it happened was important for him. 
Mr: I just went to talk with the lady in the bank, and  
she says,   
— of course, what would you be interested in?  You can see here.  Here 
are some prospects.  (…)  You earn so much money. Of course  you can 
buy.  When do you want to buy?  (…)  I have a prospect here, look at 
the picture. 
I liked it.   
And my wife said, 
— oh yes, this is my house.   
I said,  
                                                     
161 There are also other interesting questions: Why is this the only household that shows this kind of 
behavior? Had there been more information from this period, one could compare them with 
another credit card spending household relying on fatalistic solidarity (on page 243). 
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— Wait until we see some other locations too.   
— NO, I like it!   
— No. 
— Yes. 
— What does it cost? 
She said,  
— just buy it, just buy it.  Sell the apartment, and we can buy it. (Herrera 
2002a:00:35-38) 
Mrs. Herrera is the person in charge both at home and at the family firm. This story 
presents her as a charismatic leader. There is no rational weighing of different 
alternatives against each other. The decision is based upon a gut feeling: the wife’s 
immediate response to the sales prospect. 
Later on I get back to the decision-making as a general topic and Mr. Herrera 
explains:  
Mr: When we need to make decisions, we talk very much.  That is good.  
And all of us, the whole family.  [And sometimes] we invite [my friend] 
to join us and ask:  
— what do you think?  (Herrera 2002a:01:03)  
This emphasis on discussion with the whole family is close to the ideals of egali-
tarianism. Decisions are based on consensual agreement, and because there are no 
clear authorities, the decision-making process is based either on argumentation or 
charismatic leadership, as in the first example. Seen together these two examples 
come close to an ideal typical household, relying on an egalitarian way of 
organizing. 
Helping Others and Being Helped: 
Acts of help define a household’s social relations, and the Herreras, like many other 
cases, use their social relations to define who they themselves are. Most of the 
people who have a relationship with the Herreras that includes helping each other 
are “Chileans” and a few “Norwegians” from the Catholic Church (Herrera 
2002b:0047).  
The Herreras used to be receivers of help when it came to language and 
information.  
Mr: For example, when I had to go to an office, to the bank for a loan, I 
needed help.  Now I can do everything myself.  But earlier, hhhhh, they 
had to do everything for me.  (…)  Especially, when you cannot talk, you 
stand there, and do not know anything.  Now we do need help very 
seldom. (Herrera 2002b:00:48) 
Helping others seems to be common, especially when it involves the people who 
belong to the same church group (Herrera 2002b:00:46), but the Herreras prefer to 
tell me about more random and surprising acts of help. These stories involved 
unknown people receiving or giving significant help without any demands of 
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mutuality. There is also an important social dimension: these people are pulled 
temporarily into the family or corporate life, or at least entertained thoroughly. 
Some of the stories also have a return gift, which involves taking part in social 
events, art performances, or something else out of the ordinary. The common 
element seems to be a shared social experience—a feeling of connecting with 
strangers. Could it be that the moderate egalitarian’s form of payback is some form 
of social inclusion?  
When I try to ask them about the mutuality of helping, they deny the expectation of 
mutuality, and refer to God: 
Mr: No, we get from the boss upstairs.  We are content.  We are content.  
(…)  We have to help, the people who need help, because God has given 
us so much.  (…) 
Mrs:  We have received a good gift from God: to live in Norway. (Herrera 
2002b:00:51) 
It seems to me that they separate between helping their friends in the church group, 
who they help regularly in such ordinary ways that it is not so interesting for them 
to talk about it, versus helping strangers, which seems to have a potentially different 
moral dimension. The moral underlying these stories seems to be that one should 
not expect or demand a reward for helping others, as it is one’s duty (in order to 
balance out their own good fortune). This connection between acts of mercy and 
their own good fortune indicates that there is a moral unity: acts in one domain 
help to balance out acts in another domain, which is typical for egalitarian 
solidarity.162 They are also clearly rejecting the individualistic solidarity based on 
balanced exchange. 
Cultural theory emphasizes justifications because the same behavior can carry 
different social connotations, and as we have seen, the Herreras’ egalitarian 
justification for providing help is quite different from the hierarchical justification 
given by the Nguyens, who would rather give to the deserving poor (on page 151). 
As we saw earlier Mr. Natan helped a stranger to change a tire. There is a superficial 
resemblance, as both Herreras and Mr. Natan helped strangers, but Mr. Natan 
emphasized that the man was deserving (old) and that he himself ran away. There is 
no way members of the Herrera household would have run away, since for them 
the point is to build bridges to these people. Where Mr. Natan defined himself as 
the helper (and thus in some sense above the receiver), the Herreras avoid ranking 
themselves in relation to the strangers they help.163 A temporary intimacy is a way 
to define the receiver and the provider of the help as equals. 
                                                     
162 In a hierarchical system, the different domains can remain separate and acts within one domain do 
not necessarily transfer to another.  
163 Sometimes it can be difficult to see the differences in underlying structures as they both use 
“Catholic” vocabulary. 
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Cultural Bias 
Dreams 
Mr. Herrera has a dream of working less. The money is not the most important 
thing, neither is the company. Mr. Herrera wants more spare time. He does not 
specify here what he would use the free time for, but other parts of the interview 
indicate that social life (family and church) is a high priority.  
Mr:  (…) I do not have time for everything.  ((Laughs)).  No, I should not 
complain.  That is how life is, and I believe that I do not have that much 
more time left.  And my philosophy —I have my own philosophy—
which I have told to everyone in my family: When you get old, you 
should work less.  I should work less and make more money.  But first, I 
need to work some more.  Therefore, perhaps one day I will do nothing, 
and still make money.  This is the dream.  We will see.   
#########  ((Loud laughter in the background)) (Herrera 
2002a:00:45) 
The loud laughter in the end is revealing. The family members seem very safe with 
each other, and free to laugh at each other. This is something I would not expect to 
see in a hierarchical household, where this kind of behavior would be most 
improper. Again the impression of an egalitarian household is strengthened. 
The Herreras tell me about another dream: they hope to retire to Spain, because 
they believe that when they become senile they will only speak Spanish (Herrera 
2002b:01:44). Thus, they seem to share the Garcia’s fear of not being able to 
communicate with their caretakers (on page 522). It does not really matter how well 
integrated one currently is if one loses the ability to talk Norwegian later. 
More Rules 
When I inquire about differences between Norway and Chile, the Herreras say they 
have learned more rules in Norway. For example, Chileans often arrive too late, 
instead of arriving on time like the Norwegians (Herrera 2002b:01:22). Another rule 
they mention is that one is supposed to make an appointment before visiting 
someone: 
Mrs:  We do not have so much time.  Now, I like these Norwegian rules, I do.  
If you want to visit a family, you call them ((laughter)), then we can plan. 
(Herrera 2002b:01:20) 
The Herreras offer these new rules as examples of changes in their lives in Norway. 
They are, thus, depicting their household moving upwards on the grid dimension. 
The opposite movement can be seen in the Lorca household, where they have 
moved from an underground activist household (high-grid-high-group) in Chile 
toward a more individualistic household in Norway (more about the Lorcas on 
page 218). Arriving in Norway can trigger changes in opposite directions. 
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An Egalitarian Household  
The Herrera family can be seen as an enclave that runs its own business. This may 
sound paradoxical, as individualism and markets are in many ways connected to 
each other. There are, however, several examples showing how companies can be 
dominated by any of the ways of life (Mars 1994).  
Since the Herreras run a business—which is one of the preferred ways of making a 
living for individualists—is it possible that this is an individualistic, low-grid-low-
group household? It does not seem likely, considering how much time they spend 
together and how many different types of activities they share together, both of 
which point toward high-group. 
Given that it is a high-group household, could it be a high-grid household, pointing 
toward hierarchy? Especially since they themselves explain how they have learned 
new rules in Norway. Despite some movement upwards on the grid dimension, 
they are still relatively low on the grid, given the flat structure in the firm and 
household, the non-planned time use, the critical tone used, and the looseness of 
the interview situation (people joined and left the interview without any warning).  
The Herrera household belongs to the low-grid-high-group corner of the diagram. 
Enclaves are typically thought of as having a strict boundary separating the inside 
from the outside. In this case the boundary seems to consist of two concentric 
boundaries. The innermost is the family/non-family boundary. The second 
boundary separates the Chilean church group and their friends from everybody 
else. However, because this household runs a business, they need a large social 
network, and in some aspects the size of their social network matches an ego-
focused network. Nevertheless, the activities that sustain their social network seem 
to be group activities, which do not fit well with the individualistic way of 
organizing. In addition, the justifications they gave for helping others do not fit 
with the individualistic solidarity. 
The Herrera household utilizes a way of organizing that allows them to turn the 
family’s strong sense of togetherness into a family company. They have been able 
to find a livelihood that allows them to reinforce their identity as separate from the 
majority population.  
Caulkins and Weiner have described three egalitarian manufacturing firms in Mid-
Wales that resemble the Herrera’s company (1998).  
… all these firms have found ways to create a sense of commitment 
and ownership, rather than alienation, in the work organization. …  
As the pace of privatization increases throughout Europe, these 
egalitarian firms may become increasingly important models for 
avoiding some of the excess of both the bureaucratic and 
traditionally entrepreneurial types of firms. (Caulkins and Weiner 
1998:31)  
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Caulkins and Weiner believe that by studying the everyday practices of unusual 
businesses, one can avoid the homogenizing assumptions of the business schools 
and management models. The majority population seldom accepts that they have 
something to learn from migrants, but I believe that in the case of the Herreras the 
lesson is obvious: there is more than one way to run a business.  
Welfare State and Politics 
So far I have shown how the Herreras, both internally and in their external social 
relations, depend on the egalitarian way of organizing. Does this influence their 
relations to the welfare state and its institutions?  
The Herreras trust the police in Norway, even if they are not very effective, while in 
Chile the police are both violent and corrupt. Nevertheless, if you paid them, the 
Chilean police could often retrieve the stolen property (Herrera 2002a:01:14). 
Sometimes, using cultural theory does not add much to the interpretation: even if 
one interprets the corrupt Chilean police force as lacking in obedience to rules 
(hierarchical deviance) and excelling in privately enforced bilateral agreements 
(individualistic corruption), the main message is that the Herreras trust the 
Norwegian police, and not the Chilean police. Obviously, cultural theory does not 
determine people’s attitudes; however, it can give people a framework for 
interpreting their various experiences. 
Welfare and Blaming the System  
When I inquire about their relation to the welfare state, Mr Herrera tells me the 
following story that makes it apparent how he appreciates the welfare state’s 
inclusiveness and the substantial coverage it provides.  
Mr: [My wife] was operated, and she had to pay for it.  I will never forget 
this.  I paid more for parking the car at the hospital.  I paid 200 for 
parking.  She paid 190 crowns for a big operation.  It is totally amazing, 
and it happened here in Norway.  Not in my country.  In my country, 
you do not have any chance if you do not have money.  I am very 
satisfied with these things.  I was at hospital once too, and paid nothing. 
(Herrera 2002a:01:34)  
There is thus a big difference between Norway and Chile in the options and 
possibilities available to people with a low income.  
Mr. Herrera is happy to pay taxes, because the welfare state takes care of important 
functions like healthcare. However, he is not happy about all other payments, like 
paying for the yearly vehicle tax, or the road taxes. Nor does he like to pay for a TV 
license, especially because he does not watch the Norwegian public channels 
(Herrera 2002a:01:38). Here is a tension between preferring a universal welfare state 
funded by general taxes, which gives universal and substantial coverage for people 
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in need, and preferring a consumer state, where citizens are consumers of public 
goods and only pay for those goods they utilize. The first one requires solidarity 
with the rest of the population, while the second lacks it, as the justification is based 
on one’s own private usage of the goods. I find it interesting that the two areas 
presented by Mr. Herrera—driving a car and watching TV—are both characterized 
by their solitary nature, their lack of social involvement.164 In addition, by stating 
that he does not watch the Norwegian channels, perhaps he is implicitly saying that 
is not interested in paying for programming targeted at a community he does not 
feel himself a part of. 
Mr. Herrera thinks that the welfare state is sometimes too kind, especially with 
people who cheat (Herrera 2002a:01:30). Mr. Herrera is again criticizing the system 
and not the people, a typical egalitarian trait. We should also remember the 
previous discussion of how the Herreras received income support from the refugee 
office, which distorted their economic management strategy (See Small Is Good on 
page 194). Together these points could seem contradictory. However, they do 
partially fit with the egalitarian predictions: positive toward distribution of resources 
and the welfare state, while still finding many problems in the institutions. 
However, Mr. Herrera’s critique is voiced in both egalitarian and individualistic 
terms (road taxes and TV license).  
No More Political Participation 
Mr. Herrera was active in the socialist party when Allende became president, more 
than thirty years ago. Mr. Herrera is not yet able or willing to face the memories of 
the ensuing conservative military coup (Herrera 2002a:01:22). Consequently, I 
refrained from touching on this topic any further. However, it is clear that certain 
experiences forced them to leave Chile and still define their relationship to politics. 
EO: What about Norway, have you been interested in politics here?  
Mr: Nope.  Nothing. I do not want anymore.  I have done so much.  I did so 
much over there.  If my father had not picked me up, they would have 
killed me.  He sent me away.   
Here I am not interested.  There is no need. (Herrera 2002a:01:24) 
Mr. Herrera harbors a great deal of resentment toward politics, and now he does 
not want to have anything to do with politics. There have been many Chilean 
political groups in Norway, but he has kept his distance from all of them.  
Mr: (…) But I do not make contact.  I do not make contact with them.  I just 
talk a little bit, but not with them.  It was enough.  I have had enough. 
(Herrera 2002a) 
                                                     
164 One of the explanations presented for road rage is that drivers are isolated from each other’s social 
signals while in their cars. Thus it becomes difficult to solve small conflicts through social means, 
like apologetic gestures, and so many people react with rage instead.  Similarly, I believe that 
watching the TV is in most cases not a form of social activity, even if it might feel as such for the 
viewer. This is in contrast to talking about watching TV, which obviously is a social activity.  
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His involvement in Chile forced him to leave the country. He lost friends and 
relatives, and almost his own life. Now he just wants to have a normal life, without 
any politics.  
In addition to just being fed up there is a second key point in the first quote: “Here 
I am not interested. There is no need.” Mr. Herrera does not elaborate on why he 
feels there is no need, but it seems reasonable to interpret this to mean that the 
state of affairs in Norway are such that there is no pressing need to change them. 
One can trust the police, and the universal welfare state takes care of those who 
need help. Injustice is a strong motivator, and in Norway Mr. Herrera does not find 
a cause that would bring him back to politics. 
Political refugees are among the people in Norway who have sacrificed most for 
their beliefs. Considering this, it is surprising how little visible migrants are in 
Norwegian politics. Is this because the lack of available political space and 
discourses, or are many of them, like Mr. Herrera, tired and content to finally be in 
a safe harbor?165  
How does this fit the predictions about the views of the nature and scope of 
democracy in egalitarian households? Mr. Herrera is vehement in his justification of 
his own lack of participation. Only the egalitarian households put extensive 
demands on participation in collective decision-making. The other ways of 
organizing are expected to have a lower degree of participation in politics, so their 
supporters do not need to justify their lack of participation in the same manner. 
Thus, Mr. Herrera is indirectly confirming the predictions. He seems to believe that 
he really should participate, but he has his personal reasons for not doing so.  
Citizenship, Race and Roots 
Mr. Herrera gives an example that shows how being Norwegian is a racialized topic, 
and how it is possible for a migrant to use that to his own advantage: 
Mr: One day, they were sitting at work.  (…)  They asked me 
— When will you become Norwegian? 
— Not now, but there is improvement.   
— What kind of? 
— See, I have ordered blue eyes; they just have not arrived yet. 
((Everybody laughs))  
They never asked again. (Herrera 2002b:01:41) 
Mr. Herrera seems to believe that turning the tables is effective: instead of 
defending his choice to postpone accepting Norwegian citizenship, he makes of it a 
joke that mirrors his view of the majority society’s treatment of him. Thus, he 
effectively confronts his workmates with some uncomfortable sides of the racial 
                                                     
165 This could be a very interesting study. How do political refugees, who have been political activists 
in their home countries, view and participate in politics in Norway? They have experiences and a 
vocabulary that make it possible to discuss fairly ideological and specific topics. 
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aspects of being Norwegian. This is a pun that hits the target; at least he seems to 
believe so, as “they never asked again.”  
EO: By the way, about becoming Norwegian. I almost forgot to ask you 
about citizenship.  
Mr: = No, we will, we will become.  
Mrs: = I. I [will become Norwegian.  
Mr:          [will become 
Mrs: Then I will change my name too.  ((Everybody laughs))  No, I will not 
use Norwegian names, no.  
Mr: = But for example I will.  
Mrs: = I want to have a long name. (Herrera 2002b:01:42) 
Many Chileans use multipart names that refer to several close relatives. Thus, 
having a long name is a sign of whom one is related to, but also a marker that is a 
source of identity and separates her from the majority population. Mr. Herrera, 
however, prefers to use just one name.  
The Herreras are not Norwegian citizens; however, they do have plans to apply for 
a Norwegian citizenship, because they are worried about losing rights in the future 
if they are not citizens. They do not quite trust that the universal coverage of the 
welfare state will continue to include non-citizens in the long run. However, being 
Chilean is important for them, and they have not yet applied for a Norwegian 
citizenship.  
Mrs: Every year we say, we shall, we shall. (Herrera 2002b:01:42) 
If they did not have mixed feelings about giving up their Chilean citizenship and 
taking Norwegian citizenship, they would manage to find the time to send in the 
applications. While many of the other households gave reasons connected to 
different forms of belonging to a society or else practical issues, the Herreras did 
not mention a single practical issue. Issues of belonging are touched upon only 
through exclusion: the stories of racialized difference and how they deal with it. 
One should also remember how the social life of the Herreras is not oriented 
toward the majority population, but toward their Chilean friends and the Catholic 
Church.  
Summary of the Household’s Way of Organizing and the Predictions  
Overall, the Herreras are an egalitarian household. They prefer to share the 
household work and Mr. Herrera’s increased participation shows that justifications 
are followed up by behavior (E). Their decision-making is either collective or based 
on charismatic leadership (E). Their life is organized around the firm; they share 
both work and leisure (E). The children took part in the interview as family 
members and the whole interview situation was a bit chaotic (E). They had, early 
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on, a period in which their economic management strategies broke down, as they 
spent more than they could afford, while they were receiving public support (F). 
Now their economic management strategies are clearly egalitarian: they manage 
their needs down, pay salaries only according to need, and avoid demands for 
support by keeping their company small (E). This is further justified by stories 
which show how poor people can be the happiest ones, making consumption 
morally conspicuous. They also reject an expectation of symmetrical exchange in 
their helping relations, hence rejecting individualistic solidarity (i). 
How do the Herrera household's political attitudes and behavior fit with the 
predictions made about egalitarian households (on pages 78-91)? The picture is 
complicated by the Herrera’s personal experiences, which clearly influence their 
views concerning the welfare state and its institutions. However, they rely in many 
aspects of their lives on egalitarian solidarity and they prefer the egalitarian way of 
organizing, which reflects their relation to the welfare state through an eagerness to 
blame institutions (E). They are positive to the welfare state in general and to the 
redistribution of resources and the availability of healthcare to all social groups (E). 
They are critical of a system that is too kind to those who cheat (E). In addition, 
Mr. Herrera needed to explain why he does not participate in politics, indirectly 
showing his support for a participatory form of democracy (E).  
Some of the criticisms the Herreras presented, like the TV license and road taxes 
(I), resemble what one would expect from a dominantly individualistic household. 
However, the solutions to the problems facing the society seem to be more rooted 
in their egalitarian way of organizing.  
Overall the Herrera household is based largely on the egalitarian way of organizing, 
both internally and in their social relations. This relates to their view of society and 
politics largely as predicted by cultural theory. Despite some individualistic voice, 
their overall view of society and the solutions to future problems are more egali-
tarian than individualistic.  
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The Ngas: Entrepreneurs See Opportunities 
The fifth household, the Nga household, from Vietnam, differs from the previously 
presented households, which rely predominately on either hierarchical or egalitarian 
ways of organizing. The Ngas rely mainly on the individualistic way of organizing. 
It is particularly interesting to contrast this household with the more hierarchical 
Nguyen household, since they both have their roots in Vietnam.  
Quick Summary 
Prior to leaving Vietnam Mr. Nga had a job matching his technical education, Mrs. 
Nga worked as a teacher, and together they had two children. In the early 1980s 
they had to flee; and then one year and several refugee camps later they arrived in 
Norway. Soon after their arrival, the refugee office helped them to buy an 
apartment with a loan from the state housing bank. Not that much later they had 
their third child. Mr. Nga worked in a food factory for two years before he 
managed to get a job in construction. A few years later family reunification brought 
Mr. Nga's mother, along with their oldest child, to town. Mrs. Nga began work in a 
service profession. In 1989 they bought a house in a suburb to accommodate the 
growing family, but unfortunately, in a rapidly falling market, they failed to sell their 
apartment, and were forced to sell the house and move back to their apartment. In 
the 1990s Mrs. Nga developed a health problem that partially disabled her, and Mr. 
Nga, after ten years, got formal qualifications for his job. A few years ago Mrs. Nga 
started a small food related company. Presently, their daughter is married and the 
Ngas have become grandparents. 
The Organization of the Household 
Household Work 
The Nga household’s way of organizing household work has changed, because of 
Mrs. Nguyen’s disability.  
Mrs: = Previously, while I was working: after I was done at work, I cleaned 
and cooked at home.  My husband worked, and did not do anything at 
home.  [After I got sick]  my doctor told him, I need help.  Now he is 
very good.  He washes the floors, vacuums, and often he cooks.  I do 
only very easy things, nothing heavy. (Nga 2002a:00:56) 
Strict division of labor at home is not necessarily an indicator of preference for a 
hierarchical way of organizing, because sometimes it is not a result of choice. Their 
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pattern of division of work is dictated by her disability. In an individualistic way of 
life one of the legitimate justifications for the division of labor is skill, which could 
be the case here. However, it is difficult to interpret this with sufficient certainty. 
Another trait pointing away from hierarchy and toward individualism is the lack of 
a regular dinnertime, as Mr. Nga’s working hours vary a lot. 
The Layout of the Home 
The Ngas have an apartment in which you can see that people live there. There 
seemed not to be a division of the apartment into clear zones with different 
activities. The hallway was filled with things (children’s sports equipment, spare 
parts to the car, and so forth) that gave away what kind of activities they are 
engaged in. The living room was the heart of the home, and there you could see the 
importance of their hobbies. On my second visit it seemed like a guest had been 
sleeping in the living room, for there was a partly hidden mattress on the floor. In 
addition, it looked like some things were just stored in the corners. The style 
seemed to be quite an eclectic mix of items looking either expensive or practical. 
There were no family pictures, or any references to their past, as far as I could see. 
This family is living in the present, and does not care much for what other people 
think. At least they did not bother to change things much in order to make an 
impression on me.  
The Interview Situation 
The interview situation was relatively loose. Both Mr. and Mrs. Nga did other 
things during the interview: They had things to do, and had to divide their attention 
and presence. In addition, there were several phone calls, which they decided to 
take. All of these elements indicate a low-grid position.  
Mr. and Mrs. Nga could each represent their household individually, and they did 
not check up on each other as to whether the other’s representations were correct. 
They did not rely on support from one another, or from some external authority, 
for their opinions. These indicators point toward low-group. 
Making and Spending Money 
The Ngas are interested in making money. They have multiple sources of income: 
in addition to his job, the family runs a small food business, and they do some 
business related to festivities.  
Mr. Nga works in construction, which is a seasonal business. Therefore, during 
parts of the year he has time available to help in the family company. Mrs. Nga is 
partially disabled and receives some benefits to compensate for this. The family 
company was a way to create a job for her, in which her disability is not a problem.  
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I tried to find out if this family company represented a dream, something they have 
wanted for a long time. However, they rejected this. Their attitude to it is quite 
pragmatic.  
Mr: No, it was not that important.  We can work and make some money. 
That is it.  You know, we can manage fine without the company. (Nga 
2002b:00:13) 
Another reason for starting the shop, and having their son work there, is to teach 
him about work and the realities of life. This matches individualistic cultural bias, 
which blames people for not trying hard enough. They are seriously trying to teach 
their son to become self-sufficient: 
Mrs: He knows how to use money.  It is important that he works, right, a bit 
heavy or a bit hard work.  He said, a few times, that he wanted buy this 
or that, which would cost loads of money.  But he was not working, 
right?  He did not know how to make money.  That is what we need to 
show him: how to save money, and how to make money. (Nga 
2002a:00:56) 
The Ngas are quite concerned with saving, as it provides security: if anything would 
go wrong, they have the means to deal with it (Nga 2002a:00:50). They prefer to 
make the money first, before they spend it, and if they need something more 
expensive, they will save for it (Nga 2002a:00:42). They keep the saved money in a 
separate account, because otherwise they would just use it up.  
Allegedly, many of the Vietnamese-Norwegians think that the first-generation-in-
Norway is almost obsessed with saving, because of the boat refugees’ experiences 
of extreme poverty and lack of safety. They are making sure that if anything goes 
wrong they still have their basic needs covered (Tranh 2002).  
The Nga household, too, is saving, but they distance themselves from the other 
Vietnamese’s practice of saving. They point out that even if saving is important, 
one should use the money: 
Mrs: Money.  Future.  Right?  If I die when I sleep (could happen any time), 
money does not mean anything.  I don’t think that we should use lots of 
money or waste it, but we should use it for things that are important in 
life.  That is OK.  My daughter, she exercises, and we have to pay 
money, but that is quite OK. (Nga 2002a:00:34) 
Saving is justified by future safety, whereas the justification for the use of money, 
she offers is in the present, not in the future.  
In the following quote, Mr. Nga emphasizes that being able to prioritize what to 
spend the money on determines one’s well-being.  
Mr: I have a friend who makes good money—the same as me.  We work in a 
same group, same company, same salary, same team.  But he has almost 
no money.  When he gets his salary he goes right out to town (…) or 
then he uses it on slot machines.  Right?  And the he has no money.  He 
has no children, no family, no house, but he has no money.  He earns the 
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same as I do.  I earn the same as he does.  But I save the money—I buy 
good music, good TV. (Nga 2002a:00:47) 
The blame is not put on deviant individuals or the system, but on an individual who 
is not trying hard enough to make the right choices.  
These traits combined, point toward individualism, as individualistic households are 
characterized by their freedom in consumption: they can decide themselves what 
they spend their money on, which allowes both for conspicuous consumption and 
for the ability to reduce consumption in areas that are not considered important. 
Both traits can be seen in the Nga household’s consumption. They spend lots of 
money on their hobbies, and have, consequently, filled their house with extravagant 
equipment. This spending is visible, as the equipment is used at social events. Thus, 
following the logic of the individualistic way of organizing, they are spending 
money in the area of their lives that is most visible. However, their own justification 
is that it is easy to spend money on these hobbies, because they can make money 
with them (Nga 2002a:00:37). They have also chosen to have an old car, because it 
is not as important as their hobbies. 
Making Money from a Hobby  
Mr. Nga is involved in a hobby project that could become a business, but he says 
that there is no money in it—the income covers the expenses, but no more (Nga 
2002a:00:31-00:35). This hobby grants him invitations to many social events in 
town and sometimes even further away. Because he is not working full time all year 
round, he is able to spend considerable time on this hobby during slow seasons at 
work. This hobby reveals that he, along with the rest of the family, are actually quite 
well connected, as they know practically everyone (or 80 percent according to their 
own words) in the Vietnamese community. 
Following an entrepreneurial strategy, they seem to be quite pragmatic about 
making their ends meet, and obviously enjoy the wheeling and dealing that attends 
both this hobby project and their food business. This became clear during the 
interview, when there were several small interruptions that were necessary to keep 
the wheels running smoothly. In the individualistic way of organizing status is 
displayed through the size and centrality of social networks. Thus, these small 
interruptions are accepted more easily, because they are the marks of a busy, high 
status person. 
Their External Social Relations 
The social relations available to the Nga household are predominately Vietnamese, 
which is probably connected to their limited Norwegian language skills. They are 
not able to create the kind of social relations they would like to have with members 
of the majority population. Their social activities make it apparent that they have a 
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large social network in the Vietnamese community. Mr. Nga mentions parties 
where attendance is anywhere from 50 to 200 people, but when I try to find out 
who these people really are and what kind of contact the Ngas have with them 
beyond festivities, these people become suddenly unimportant.  
The only relatives the Ngas have in Norway are Mrs. Nga’s niece and brother, who 
also live in town, and whom they meet perhaps once a month for dinner.  
Another important source of social contact is the Protestant congregation, where 
almost every Sunday they would meet with people. However, through the church 
they have closer contact with only four households: two majority households and 
two Vietnamese households. 
Symmetrical Assistance 
The Nga household is not deeply connected to anyone through mutual assistance. 
They, of course, have contact with their relatives in town, but it does not entail 
important transfers of resources. The Ngas claim that helping each other is 
important for the Vietnamese (Nga 2002b:00:22), but when I try to find out what 
kind of help they give and receive, the importance of this is reduced. They give a 
hand when somebody is moving or something extraordinary is happening (Nga 
2002b:00:25). Their friends and relatives would not hesitate to ask if there was 
something important, but they would not ask for help in the regular day-to-day 
problems of life (Nga 2002b:00:20). Thus, one reason for not helping each other is 
the lack of need.  
Justification of assistance allows us to see what kind of solidarity they are relying 
upon. Mr. Nga states that assistance should be symmetrical: 
Mr: =Yes, that is very…  If someone gets help three times, and gives nothing 
back, right.  Then, you know, this is not a good man.  And in the future, 
we would not have any contact.  That is common. (Nga 2002b:00:29) 
Lack of reciprocation would actually lead to termination of the social contact. The 
combination of a large peripheral network of contacts, and a solidarity based on 
symmetrical exchange, makes it understandable that their hobby is treated as a small 
business, instead of something that is used to build a complicated set of social 
interdependencies. If we compare this with a hierarchical way of organizing, we can 
see how his insistence on symmetrical exchange does not allow the Ngas to rise in a 
social hierarchy (compare with the Natans on page 165). Nor are the Ngas 
burdened by their social responsibilities, like Mr. Herrera, who refrains from 
earning more money because of the claims made by family and friends (on page 
194). 
None of the households I investigated that were closely involved with the Catholic 
Church showed tendencies toward individualistic management of economy. 
However, I cannot see any traces of Weber’s protestant asceticism in the Nga 
household (Weber 1964:214, 1989). Perhaps, it is more important for the 
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accumulation of resources that they have the freedom to choose what they want to 
spend their money on, as their resources are not bound by social obligations or 
rules. 
Politics and the Welfare State 
How does the Nga household’s individualistic way of organizing influence their 
relation to the institutions of the welfare state?  
Social Welfare 
The first year, upon arriving in Norway, the Ngas were dependent on help from 
both the social welfare office and refugee office. They are proud of finding work so 
soon after their arrival and being able to make it on their own, which allows them 
to be quite judgmental about those people who receive benefits without working. 
Mr: The social welfare office is quite fine.  I think, you know that we do not 
go through them any more.  We came to Norway in mid-80s and the 
next year we were working.  Just one year we lived through the social 
welfare office.  We were happy with the assistence.  They helped a little 
when we came and did not have a job.  So, the first year, we felt quite 
happy. 
Mrs: But, I am not happy, because... 
Mr: =Now.  Previously it was fine. 
Mrs: It is a long time since I came to Norway—it was fine—but not anymore, 
right?  Because, the system in this society makes people lazy.  
Mr: A little bit lazy.  
Mrs: A little bit lazy: do not want to work.  Because, they pay very well: 
electricity, rent and such, LOTS of money.  I know.  But when you work, 
right, or, my husband works and pays lots of taxes.  These taxes cover 
THAT.  But they pay to many who do not want to work. 
Mr: ((says something short in Vietnamese)) 
Mrs: You know, I know many families that—They do not want to work—the 
whole family, right, gets lots of money (social benefits).  Yes, they have a 
nice car, have a house, and stuff.  The social welfare office pays the rent, 
right.  And they use electricity and pay for the food and everything.  But 
if we are working, right, we pay of everything.  And we have to pay more 
taxes.  Right.  Not happy.   
##  I do not agree how we pay to them.  It is OK, right, but people get 
lots of money.  They do not want to work, because it is enough for 
them.  
EO: So, what you mean is that they pay too much? 
Mrs: = Yes, too much. (Nga 2002a:00:58) 
•    Eight Households 
 
212 
There are a several interesting points in this lengthy quote. First, they did get help 
and they are happy that people can get help (also Nga 2002a:01:06). Second, they 
think that excessively generous help will corrupt people, and make them lazy. 
Third, they as a family managed to resist laziness. They survived the system and can 
now afford to be judgmental. Fourth, they resent the level of payments, because it 
comes from their tax money.  
Even if Mrs. Nga says that the system makes people lazy, echoing Mr. Herrera, she 
puts more emphasis on the people “who do not want to work.”166 Implicitly, she is 
saying that because the Nga household could make it, these other households 
should also be able to make it, if they just tried harder.  
In the individualistic way of organizing, it is typical to blame peoples’ lack of effort. 
The Nga household’s way of blaming seems to fit this pattern quite well, as they are 
also judgmental about people who get social support and use it “right away on 
beer” (Nga 2002a:01:07). The individualistic way of organizing is built upon the 
individualistic solidarity, which is characterized by symmetrical exchange (see 
presentation on page 74). They are reciprocating for the help they received by being 
good citizens who pay their taxes. However, the people whom the Ngas consider 
lazy and those who “buy beer” are violating the assumption of symmetry, as they 
are not likely to become “good citizens” and pay back the society.  
Mr. Nga thinks that Norway helps migrants much more than the United States, 
where you can get help only for a few months. In addition, in the U.S. you get food 
stamps, which can only be used for food (Nga 2002a:01:08). I believe that this story 
was told as an example of how the state can make sure that people are kept more 
responsible for their own well-being, by keeping the duration of the help limited. 
Could the judgmental attitude demonstrated by Mr. Nga be based on a hierarchical 
bias? The food stamp program seems to be a typical hierarchical mechanism of 
control: deviant people are forced to comply and use their resources in a proper 
way, in this case, on food. However, limiting the time support is available also fits 
with the individualistic logic, as it forces people to try to support themselves.167  
Several of the predictions about the individualistic household’s relation to politics 
and the society can be recognized in the Nga household: Social support makes 
people lazy; symmetrical exchange is the basis of all solidarity; the blame is put 
upon the non-productive individual; and human nature is seen as primarily selfish. 
School and Language 
Parliament has ruled that the motivation for providing education in peoples’ native 
languages is based upon the necessity for one good language as a prerequisite for all 
                                                     
166 She uses this frase four times in this quote. 
167 In a later interview, Mr. Nga claims that the reason why so few Vietnamese are unemployed, lies in 
their social obligations: they have family back in Vietnam that depends on their help (Nga 
2002b:01:02). In such a situation, one must prioritize a steady income rather than any future hopes 
concerning education, self-fulfillment, or status in the Norwegian society. 
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learning. Thus, native language teaching is not aimed at sustaining minority 
languages, but instead toward ensuring that they will learn sufficient Norwegian. 
When a child’s level of Norwegian is considered sufficient, the school will not get 
state support (through the municipality) for language education. There has been 
resistance toward these new rules among teachers, and it has taken two years to 
implement these new rules started in the municipalities.168  
The Ngas have two children in the public school system. The youngest one just lost 
his right to extra Vietnamese education, because he is too good in Norwegian.  
EO: Did the children get education in their mother tongue?  
Mr: Yes, we did get, but not anymore.  But in our family, we talk Vietnamese 
at home.  That helps a little.  
Mrs: He is 13 years, right.  Because he is good in Norwegian, he does not get 
any more.  
EO: Yes, I know they changed the rules.  
Mrs: We wanted him to learn more Vietnamese.  Right?  We have applied, but 
they have not promised.  They say he is good in Norwegian.  
EO: Do you think it is too bad that the children become a little Norwegian?  
Mr: No. 
Mrs: No. 
Mr: But it is difficult.  We understand: the young ones who are born here in 
Norway; they must have Norwegian culture.  And we wish for a mixed 
culture: Vietnamese-in-Norway.  But it is a bit difficult.  But, since he 
[lives in Norway ( ). 
Mrs: [The boy is 13 years.  He does not have a problem with native tongue.  
But, the boy who is 18 does—Yes. ((Laughs apologizing))  Because, he 
only played with Norwegian children, not with Vietnamese. (Nga 
2002a:01:04) 
The parents are quite well informed about the rules, and are trying to apply for 
what they want. They hope for a mixed culture, where the children have traits from 
both Vietnamese and Norwegian culture.  
I find it interesting that there are clear differences between their children’s ability to 
speak Vietnamese: Obviously, their daughter, who was almost ten years old before 
she came to Norway, speaks good Vietnamese. However, they feel like they have 
not quite succeeded with their son, who was born in Vietnam, but does not speak 
Vietnamese well. Whereas their youngest son, who was born in Norway, does not 
have any problems with Vietnamese.  
In this area, too, they fit with the predictions about individualistic households’ 
relations to politics and society, as they look at themselves as responsible for their 
children’s language skills. There is no need for collective action, institutional 
solutions, nor blaming anyone else. 
                                                     
168 Personal communication with several native language teachers. 
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Naturalization  
The Nga household applied for and received their Norwegian citizenship soon after 
the required seven years of residency. They gave three reasons for naturalization: 
first, it is beneficial for Mr. Nga’s work; second, it makes traveling easier; and third, 
provides a sense of belonging.  
Mrs: We think, true, we live in Norway.  We must apply for [citizenship]  
Mr: We live so long in this country. We work, make money, and pay taxes. 
Therefore, we should be with them. (Nga 2002a:01:20) 
This shows a very pragmatic attitude, which Mr. Nguyen comments upon 
citizenship confirm:  
EO: Does it mean something for you? 
Mr: No, not for me, but for the children. The children. For them it is better 
to have Norwegian citizenship. They are born here, grew up here, and 
know the culture.  It does not mean much for me, but for the children. 
(Nga 2002b:00:50) 
Not surprisingly, when I inquired about the importance and meaning of traditions, 
Mr. Nga explained that traditions are important, and children have to know their 
background, so that they can themselves choose which parts of the tradition they 
want (Nga 2002b:01:07). This kind of emphasis on mixing and choosing traditions 
fits well with an individualistic cultural bias.  
Politics  
The Ngas discuss politics only with other Vietnamese, because they feel they lack 
the language skills (Nga 2002b:00:30). They do not discuss politics regularly, 
however, before important events, like elections, they can discuss politics for 
several hours (Nga 2002b:00:48). 
The Ngas think that there are only small differences between the parties, and it 
does not matter much what they promise before elections, because there are many 
parties at the parliament who need to work together (Nga 2002a  01:12).  
They are also concerned with migrants who demand too much from the society—
things like their own churches, schools, and so forth (Nga 2002a 01:15). It looks 
like they would like to limit the state’s involvement, particularly if they should be 
paying for other’s collective action.  
Overall, it is difficult to find traits in the Nga household that go against the 
predictions concerning an individualistic household’s relation to politics and 
society. 
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Summary of the Household’s Way of Organizing and the Predictions  
The Nga household shows several individualistic traits in their way of organizing 
the household internally and in their helping relations: The layout of their 
apartment was hobby oriented, with an eclectic mix of styles and items (I); during 
the interview both parents had independent opinions and presence (I); their 
economic management style is pragmatic and focused on making money rather 
than saving it, and they have some traits of conspicuous consumption (I); they have 
a large social network that is connected to one of their hobby projects (I); and they 
emphasize the symmetrical exchanges in helping relations as a requirement for 
having contact at all (I).  
How do the Nga household's political attitudes and behavior fit with the 
predictions made about individualistic households (on pages 78-91)? In their views 
about politics and society several individualistic traits are present: social support 
makes people lazy (I); the blame is put on non-productive individuals (I); humans 
are selfish by nature (I); people should take responsibility for themselves, like they 
did (I); limited food stamp programs force people to take responsibility;169 and 
children’s language skills are the parent’s responsibility (I).170 There were no traits 
that could be interpreted as rejection of the individualistic way of organizing. 
We can thus see how their individualistic way of organizing fits quite well with their 
individualist views of politics and society. 
In Contrast to Nguyen 
So far I have presented two refugee families from Vietnam: the Nguyens and the 
Ngas. The Nguyen household had many hierarchical traits: the importance of 
proper presentation; the emphasis on loyalty, tradition, and authority; and a long-
term view of life. The Nga household is quite different. They seem to rely much 
more on the individualistic way of organizing: personal preferences and hobbies are 
important; they take responsibility for their own actions; they blame people for lack 
of effort; they see opportunities and go for them; they like wheeling and dealing; 
and they embrace change. They seem like two totally different households even 
though their backgrounds are very similar and they currently share somewhat 
similar work situations; the main difference is Mrs. Nga’s disability, whereas the 
Nguyens have two full incomes. The Nguyen’s housing situation is better, as they 
managed to buy a house of their own, where Nga had to back off and sell the house 
they already bought.  
                                                     
169 I am not giving them points for this story because it duplicates the prediction concerning social 
support and the one concerning responsibility, which both are already counted as indicators.  
170 I am giving them one E for this because it fits with the individualistic view of the scope of 
democratic game and actor role. 
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How can two households be so similar and still be so different? One of the keys to 
understanding their present situation is the difference in their social relations: The 
Nguyens are involved in a group of households, which support each other in 
several ways, and they also have more private contact with the majority population. 
The Nguyens are involved in supporting others in a setting where it can be seen 
and appreciated. The Nga’s pattern of assistance is more particularistic, and in some 
ways their “business” relations seem to be more important in their lives than their 
friends and family, at least when it comes to the flow of resources.  
There are many signs indicating that the Nguyens are more hierarchal and the Ngas 
more individualistic; however, they display somewhat similar attitudes toward social 
welfare. They both emphasize responsibility and differentiate between the deserving 
(like themselves) and the not so deserving receivers of social welfare. However, 
their manner for distancing themselves from the welfare recipients was different: 
the Nguyens relied on we-are-not-one-them arguments, while the Ngas used a they-
are-bad-and-lazy argument.  
They share some of the same experiences from Vietnam, the flight from their 
country of birth, the dependency on social welfare after their arrival in Norway, as 
well as the quick entry into wage labor and self-reliance. Nevertheless, the way they 
have made ends meet, after the first years, is quite different.  
They both live in a society where, lately, there has been much focus upon the 
misuse of social welfare, and the costs and problems related to immigrants. 
Therefore, they both have a “need” to establish themselves as different from those 
people, who, in their view, are misusing the system. However, there is a difference 
in the way they build their own character through their stories. The Nguyens 
emphasize the way they are now helping others by participating in different forms 
of voluntary work and private aid. They do not want to be seen as free-riders. The 
Ngas emphasized their reluctance to pay taxes, hence focusing on the flow of 
resources and the lack of symmetrical exchanges, more than on the public 
perception of them. Thus, it is possible to see how the organization of their 
household and their social relations are related to their view of social support in a 
manner consistent with cultural theory. 
Compared with Herrera 
The Herrera household is also engaged in business; however, their style of 
organizing is predominantly egalitarian. What do the Ngas and the Herreras have in 
common? They both are low on the grid dimension. Most of the Vietnamese 
households I have had contact with, however, seem to be high on the grid. The 
Nga household’s focus on getting things done, rather than how they look, and their 
easy going, informal approach to other people, resembled in many ways the 
lifestyles I have seen among the Chilean low grid households. 
How does the Nga household differ from the Herrera household? From the 
viewpoint of cultural theory, the biggest difference lies in the way they have 
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organized their daily lives. Where the Herreras have extensive involvement with 
each other, virtually around the clock, and work together as a group, all helping as 
much as they can, the Nga’s activities are more diverse. Mrs. and Mr. Nga each 
have their own projects. In addition, their son works a little for them, but none of 
these seem to be joint projects. Each project belongs to one of them, and the 
others are called on to help when needed. The Nga household’s businesses are 
more like extended hobby projects, if one goes wrong they can always rely on other 
sources of income. Whereas the Herrera’s business is their only source of income, 
which will create a real-life difference both in the nature of the business and in the 
importance the business for these two households. They also differ in their external 
social relations: the Herreras are deeply involved with their church group and have 
many tight bonds with people, while the Ngas seem to have looser contact with 
their church group and friends.  
We have now seen how the Nga household’s individualistic way of organizing 
differs from the Nguyen’s hierarchical way of organizing and from the Herrera’s 
egalitarian way of organizing. How would the Nga household compare to another 
household that relies predominately on the individualistic way of organizing? 
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The Lorcas: With the Right to Make it  
Similar to the Ngas, the Lorca household relies in many situations on the 
individualistic way of organizing. The family members each have their own lives, 
which are then coordinated. It is informative to compare them with the egalitarian 
way of life that emerges in two other households originating from Chile, the 
Herreras and the Garcias. 
A Quick Summary 
The Lorca household came to Norway at the end of the 1980s, as political refugees 
from Chile. Mr. Lorca was working in his profession, which required higher 
education, before their escape. In Norway they have lived in several cities before 
moving to their present hometown. Both Mr. and Mrs. Lorca have now completed 
higher education in Norway. He has not been able to find a job that matches his 
qualifications, and is now working below his level of merit, even if it is in the right 
branch. She started a company, but after a few years she sold it. They are renting a 
section of a house in a suburb, where they live with their daughter and son.  
The Interview Situation 
My main contact within the household was Mrs. Lorca. I did meet briefly with Mr. 
Lorca but he showed no interest in being interviewed. Participation in my research 
project was her decision and her responsibility, not a joint project. Therefore, all my 
interviews are with Mrs. Lorca only. During the first interview, Mr. Lorca was 
home, but chose to stay in the living room, while Mrs. Lorca and I conversed in the 
kitchen.  
Household’s Internal Life 
Time Use 
The Lorca household consists of individuals who have their own lives and their 
own plans, in addition to the things that the whole family does. When I inquired as 
to whether they always know what the other person is doing, she answered 
Mrs: Yes, we usually inform each other. (Lorca 2002b:01:10) 
They make time use decisions independent of each other, and the household is not 
the social actor. This is different from the egalitarian togetherness that we saw in 
the Herrera household.  
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Household Work 
The division of housework is quite flexible. The spouses do not have set tasks, but 
rather agree during the day who will shop, cook, and so forth, based on who has 
the time to do it (Lorca 2002b:01:12). Their division of household work is 
characterized by flexibility and short-term agreements, which are typical 
individualistic traits. However, for Mrs. Lorca, the most important aspect was the 
justification: division of work was based on “100 percent equality,” which they 
practiced already in Chile—it is not something they have taken up in Norway 
(Lorca 2002b:01:10). When I pushed a bit on what equality is, she answered: 
Mrs:  I do not look at gender differences as a reason for someone to be 
considered more important than the other.  Both a man and a woman 
are humans; both should have duties and rights.  #######  
(…)  
I think it is foolish, or confusing, to try to consider both as similar, based 
either on gender or anything else.  In addition to the gender differences, 
the individuals are different.  We have different skills, if we only look at 
it practically.  So, the reason for the husband to go to the mall shopping, 
is that he drives a car, right?  So, it is faster.  I stay at home and wash the 
floor.  But, if I had a driver’s license, perhaps I would have driven to the 
mall.  We are thus trying to utilize the possibilities that we have, as 
people.  Depending on the issue, one is always more skillful than the 
other one, no matter what. (Lorca 2002b:01:14) 
We can se how equality is justified in relation to differences and skills. Equality is 
not created by spending an equal number of hours on household tasks, instead, 
their respective skills are taken into consideration, and tasks are allocated to the 
person who has the better skills and more time to do them. What at first sight 
could look like an egalitarian justification based on equality is actually an 
individualistic skill based justification.  
Economic Strategies 
The Lorcas have shown a remarkable willingness to go after opportunities. They 
have moved from one city to another when they viewed it as advantageous for 
study or work. In large parts of their lives, future possibilities have counted more 
than their present social relations. 
The Lorcas think that they have the right to make it. They are talented people with 
higher education and a drive to move forward. Even if they have not succeeded in 
Norway careerwise, they have not given up. Mr. Lorca’s present job is an attempt to 
gain a foothold within the company, which they hope will lead to an advancement 
into a position more fitting of his skills and experience. In a similar manner the 
Lorcas envision a bright future for their children. While most of the households I 
have interviewed have been quite settled in (and happy with) their housing and 
work situation, the Lorcas are determined to improve their situation to a level that 
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is more congruent with their aspirations. There is something very individualistic 
about their willingness to move and grab the chances that open for them.  
When I inquire into whether they have control over their household economy, she 
answers: 
Mrs: Yes, over whatever is possible for me.  I have never had any problems.  I 
can pay all my bills. What is difficult, of course, is to have a decent 
standard of living.  And to have a better life. But then you need more 
income, and that is out of my control. (Lorca 2002b:00:45) 
Cultural theory claims that the economic strategy fitting the individualistic way of 
life involves managing income upwards, whereas Mrs. Lorca is managing her 
expenses. However, she would like to manage her income and expenses upwards, 
which is a statement that would fit to almost everyone with low income. More is 
needed to identify the individualistic strategy of management.  
Mrs. Lorca claims that both she and Mr. Lorca bring money into the household, 
and that they do have a budget:  
Mrs: Yes. We have not been that disiplined, and I put the blame on him, not 
on me. ((Author harks)) I even make it in writing.  So, I write a budget, 
and he forgets about it. (Lorca 2002b:00:44) 
The husband does not keep the budget, which indicates that the group pressure is 
not strong enough to create accountability. It is possible to interpret her business 
activities as a way to gain control over their income and manage their own lives. It 
requires entrepreneurship and risk taking, which are typical of the individualistic 
way of organizing. My interpretation is that they are running their household using 
the individualistic strategy; however, they have not been successful in creating the 
income they had hoped for.  
They have also shown the ability to cut down on their needs when it is necessary to 
reach a goal. There was a period, some years ago, when the whole family, including 
their children, was living in one room at a dormitory, in order to send money for 
the medical care of one of the grandparents in Chile. In some ways this shows the 
individualistic ability to cut down on one’s needs. On the other hand, it shows how 
strong the family loyalties are. However, this is not a counter indicator of the 
individualistic way of organizing.171  
What distinguishes the Lorcas from the more egalitarian Herrera household, who 
also run a business? First, the Herreras run their business as a collective project, 
whereas Mrs. Lorca’s business is her own, and her husband has nothing to do with 
it. Second, Mrs. Lorca says that they are not able to save any money, but they would 
                                                     
171 Cultural theory actually does not say that the loyalties are weak. It says that the group pressure is 
weak, and that the obligations constructed by roles are weak. There is nothing that says that family 
is not taken care of. However, while egalitarian and hierarchical households would probably unite 
in their dislike of sending elderly people to retirement homes, instead of taking care of them within 
the family, the individualistic households would probably insist upon the choice: No one should be 
forced to sacrifice their lives, just because one is family… 
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like to earn and spend more money. Mr. Herrera, in contrast, says that he is not 
interested in having any more money, because other people would make claims on 
it.  
Social Relations 
Mr. and Mrs. Lorca have few relatives back in Chile and keep in touch only with 
their parents and siblings. They have no relatives in Norway, so relatives make up 
only a small part of their social relations. Most of their social contacts are by their 
own choice. Mrs. Lorca has daily contact with a cousin who lives in Europe; 
however, this is a self-selected relationship, as there are other kin who are closer. 
This cousin is more like a good friend to her.  
The Lorcas have a large social network: They keep in touch with ten to twelve 
families among their neighbors; in the city, they have five common friends, and Mr. 
and Mrs. Lorca each have their own respective circles of friends; from every 
location in Norway where they have once lived, they keep in touch with either 
families or individuals. In addition, back in Chile, there are three friends with whom 
they keep in touch. It totals up to forty-five people that they consider friends. One 
should note how these people have arrived in the Lorca’s lives, little by little, 
through daily social contact, and from numerous different sources. The majority of 
these people are Norwegian, especially the ones living in town, whereas the bulk of 
people living further away have Chilean origins.  
The friendships play a very different part in their lives: 
Mrs: I think, I have more friends than he does.  It has to do with his 
personality.  Sometimes, he says that it is not that he is not their friend, 
but it is they who seek him as a friend.  He simply does not preoccupy 
himself with it.  My husband is a man who would survive alone, whereas 
I would not make it alone.  However, the others like him, because he is 
so stable.  And it is true, he almost never calls out, whereas they call and 
invite him out and stuff. (Lorca 2002b:01:40) 
She is a very social person and spends a lot of time and effort in maintaining social 
relations, which have certain qualities she demands: 
Mrs: I am very concerned with justice and respect.  If something collides with 
my understanding of what is respectful and just, I let them know.  [She 
makes a parallel between the social map172 with concentric rings I am 
drawing, and circles of intimacy]  If they have been [close] and behaved 
in a way that I cannot accept, then I place them further out, until there is 
little or no contact.  
(…)  
Most people are not used to be criticized.  I have had some conflicts, 
                                                     
172 See page 519 for an example of these schemas. 
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because I let them know, and people don’t like that, even if I am not 
angry or say it in a mean way.  In those cases, I just prefer to place them 
outside. (Lorca 2002b:01:41) 
Social relations are intentionally maintained or cut off; they are not a permanent 
feature of life, but rather something that must be sustained. The Lorcas do of 
course have some long-term friendships, some of which go back twenty years. To 
summarize, they uphold those social relations they want to keep.  
They are not deeply involved in ethnic organizing: While both the Garcia and 
Herrera households spend lots of time in activities with other people from Chile, by 
way of the Catholic Church and a few other organizations, the Lorcas have a much 
more varied social network, with less multiplex relations. Even if they do have quite 
a few Latin American friends, their friends do not belong to one particular group 
and know each other mainly through the Lorcas.  
Politics and the Welfare State 
Despite all the egalitarian voice used, the Lorca family has shown enough 
individualistic traits in the way they organize their home and their social relations 
that it seems justifiable to treat them as a predominately individualistic household 
during the evaluation of the predictions about views about society and politics.  
A Life that Disappeared 
The Lorcas are political refugees, whose previous lives have disappeared. Theirs 
and other political refugees’ stories point toward experiences and qualifications that 
they keep hidden in Norway, either by choice or by necessity. The following quote 
is long, but it gives a glimpse into a world that is usually hidden from us. 
EO:  Can you tell a bit more about what you did before you left Chile?  
Mrs: Before I came to Norway the first time?  
EO: = Yes. 
Mrs: Well, I was done with high school very early, and I come from a family 
where everybody is a party member.  So, I became politically active very 
young.  And that is the way it went.  In the beginning, like other young 
people, I was thinking that I have to work hard now, and then later life 
will be easier, right.  So, I postponed all those things that young women 
usually do, until we had beaten the dictatorship: studies, work, even 
boyfriends, parties and such.  I was very active and involved in the 
organization, had several promotions, and had a lot of responsibility in 
the end.  You could say that I had a career at home.  I have many years 
of political experience. 
EO: See, I had the feeling that there should have been something [on those 
empty years on the timeline]...  
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Mrs: Oh yes, something.  
EO: = I felt that there was something... 
Mrs: = Formally, I don’t have anything I can show, right.  So, usually I just tell 
people that I got married, had children, and stayed at home, which 
reflects very negative on my husband.  For it was not like that at all, but 
that is what I must say.  
EO: = So, you were a full-time activist? 
Mrs: Yes. 
EO: For how many years? 
Mrs: If I count in all years: fifteen years.  (…)  The last six years of those 
years, I was even on the payroll.  That was the level [I was] in those poor 
structures.   
So, that is it.  That was my life. (Lorca 2002b:00:10) 
She is a very talented and highly skilled woman, who has many years experience 
working with people under extremely difficult conditions. This is clearly something 
many employers would appreciate, but she does not feel comfortable letting people 
know what she has done. Secrecy was such an integral part of their safety during 
this period that it is still difficult to trust people with this kind of information.  
Meeting the Norwegian Police  
The Lorca household came as political refugees. The following story will give an 
example of how the state does not always act in a unified manner, and how the 
migrants’ responses are heavily influenced by their previous experiences. The 
Lorcas did not behave as the Norwegian bureaucracy expected when something 
went wrong at their arrival in Norway:  
Mrs: It is hard to leave your native country, and to leave everybody, and travel 
to the unknown.  It is not easy.  Even if there are so few other 
possibilities, you think about them, so it is not easy.   
So, we had stopped crying only a few hours earlier over the image of our 
families, mothers, and everybody else in our hearts.  Then we were taken 
by the police at the airport and arrested with the kid, who was only two 
and half years.  I was so, We were so, provoked that we told to the 
police,  
— We want to go back.  We did not come here to be treated like this.  
And, they did not understand anything.   
You see, we were expecting something else. I can understand it now, but 
back then both parties were quite confused.  When we got a translator, I 
told him:  
— You know what, we are going back.  (…)  We were previously told 
this, this and this, which has not happened.  It looks like that this is not 
valid any more.  Therefore, we will go back.  We have all our lives fought 
against being humiliated.  We do not need to travel abroad to be 
humiliated.  Not like this.   
Then the policeman understood nothing.  They expected just the 
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opposite; you are supposed to be down on your knees begging for a 
chance to stay as an asylum seeker.   
And it was a misunderstanding, but we were verbally treated very 
harshly.  And we had a small child, too, that cried all the time.  We spent 
four and half hours in a room, and the police went in and out, while we 
were in reality imprisoned.   
Then a new message arrived; there had been a mistake.  Lots of talking: 
we had to clarify. And they changed their attitude: they wanted to help us 
with our luggage and the baby, and give all kinds of help.  However, it 
was a shocking first impression of the police: They were watching out 
for the colored.  
After that, we have never had any problems with the police.  Not, that 
we have done anything illegal, either.  It is a question of principles.  I 
believe that the police force is an organ that is supposed to control the 
society.  It functions by displaying force, and it is supposed to defend the 
established.  Therefore, I always assume that the police is not on my side, 
as an individual, to start with.  However, if I am a victim to someone 
who breaks the rules, then they are on my side.  Nevertheless, if the 
confrontation is between the system and me then the loyalty of the 
police will be to the system, I think. (Lorca 2002b:00:34-00:39) 
The decision to leave their native country and family behind and move to Norway 
required a leap of trust. They had been promised a safe place, however, upon their 
arrival the conditions were far from their expectations. The trust that they had 
based their decision upon was violated. Norway was supposed to be different from 
Chile, while the behavior of the police showed that it is not that different.  
Despite their experiences Mrs. Lorca does trust the police to do its job: to catch 
criminals and enforce control in the society. However, she still sees herself in 
opposition to the system. She can go to the police if she has a problem, but it is not 
“her” police.  
The problems they had during their arrival were actually caused by an error on the 
part of UDI. Mrs. Lorca recognizes the necessity of having UDI. However, she 
thinks they could do a better job, for example, in their own case (Lorca 
2002b:00:40). 
Social Welfare Office  
During their first year in Norway, they were dependent on the social welfare office, 
like other refugees. However, they were not happy with the way the system worked.  
Mrs: It looked very dark for us back then, because we were dependent on 
social welfare. There were no, or very few, possibilities to build a social 
network. It was ridden with conflicts. (Lorca 2002a:1)173 
                                                     
173  Due to a technical failure, the first interview with Mrs. Lorca is not recorded. The references are to 
page numbers in my notes, which she approved next time we saw each other.  
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They were pushed toward the isolate corner of the grid-group diagram by the social 
welfare office, because the control systems removed their freedom of choice 
needed to sustain their own social networks. 
Mrs: The social welfare office decided everything, even what was in the 
refrigerator.  I am sorry to have to say it, but it was shitty. (Lorca 
2002a:1) 
Having only limited freedom was difficult for the Lorcas, and they resented this on 
a personal level. The fatalistic way of life is the only one that fits easily with the kind 
of treatment they received from the social welfare office. The Lorcas refused to 
adopt the fatalistic way of organizing, and managed to gain control of their own 
life. 
Mrs: It was important to us to make some money, and not just receive.  We 
have never liked the social welfare office, and just receiving money. 
(Lorca 2002a:1) 
Making money is a way to establish self-respect and gain the freedom to consume 
in ways that help to create social relations. 
The Lorca’s attitude toward social welfare and behavior is very similar to the one 
displayed by the Ngas, who also rely heavily on the individualistic way of life. They 
both were critical about the effects receiving social welfare has on people. 
However, the Ngas were happy about it when they got it, while the Lorcas 
experienced it as something negative.  
A very different case is the Herrera household, who lost control of their own 
spending during the period in which they received social welfare (See Social 
Support Created Money Problems  on page 195). While the Lorcas “hated” the 
control the social welfare office exercised, the Herreras did not even mention this. 
Considering the way the Herreras spent the money, it is possible that the social 
welfare office subjected them to less control.174  
Political Parties Just Administer Social Democracy 
Mrs. Lorca has chosen not to get involved with politics in Norway: 
EO: Do you feel engaged in Norwegian politics?  
Mrs:  I have chosen not to, because, on the one hand, I have changed my 
views.  I am not longer a member of the party I was active in.  On the 
other hand, I do not identify with any particular party, because of 
ideological reasons, political issues, and the ways they conduct politics.  I 
am not happy with any one of the parties.  So, I have my political views, 
and prefer voluntary organizations to political parties. (Lorca 
2002b:00:16) 
                                                     
174 The Lorca and Herrera households are refugees from Chile, however, they came to different cities, 
which could explain the two apparently different practices by the local social welfare office. 
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It does not seem likely that she will find a party to identify with, as she sees 
problems on several levels: ideology, choice of issues, and behavior. Notice, also, 
how Mrs. Lorca thinks that all Norwegian parties are social democratic, and that the 
ideological range in Norway is much smaller than in Chile. 
Mrs: (…) even Carl I. Hagen would be considered a leftist by the extreme 
right in Chile.  And those who belong to the left in Norway, would be 
considered gravitating towards the right by socialists in Chile  
(…)  
The bottom line is that there is not much difference between them.  
Which could be connected to that political parties around the world 
today are basically just administrators. (Lorca 2002b:00:19) 
Mrs. Lorca views the parties as merely competing over how to administer the social 
democratic order. They do not provide people with real alternatives. In this way, 
political ideologies and programs are obsolete. At the same time, election 
campaigns are becoming more Americanized, and we are asked to trust persons 
more than parties. In addition, when the party programs do not differ, differences 
in trust are the only basis left for choosing between politicians. This is a dilemma 
for Mrs. Lorca, because she does not trust politicians.  
Even if Mrs. Lorca is critical of the political system, she thinks that the 
Scandinavian welfare model works: at least there is a functioning democracy in 
Norway.  
Schools Do Not Differentiate Enough 
The line between private and public can be seen in the household’s relation to 
school. Cultural theory predicts that individualistic households will prefer to 
maximize the private space and limit the public areas of influence. Mrs. Lorca’s 
ideals of upbringing seem to fit this: 
K: Children should be raised up at home, not at school! (Lorca 2002a:4) 
This is quite different from the hierarchical Nguyen family, who prefers to let 
teachers, the trained professionals decide (on page 156).  
Mrs. Lorca tells me the following story to show how the public school does not 
provide her daughter with enough challenges and possibilities:  
K: On a meeting for parents, the teacher complained that my daughter 
wants to answer every time, while there are twenty-five other students, 
too.  My daughter answered that he could wait a few seconds, but if the 
others do not want or do not KNOW she cannot take responsibility for 
that. (Lorca 2002a:5)   
Cultural theory predicts that individualistic households dislike (and view) 
institutions limiting individual freedom, which seems to be the case here. Two of 
the most central individualistic traits are low accountability and high 
competitiveness, while in hierarchy competition is curtailed by elaborate rules, and 
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in egalitarianism by norms of similarity. Thus, in a hierarchical or egalitarian 
household this story would have been told as an example of improper behavior, 
whereas in an individualistic household it is an example of the right kind of 
competitive spirit and good skills, which will justly allow a person to improve his or 
her condition.  
Mrs. Lorca has clear opinions about the strong and weak sides of the public school 
system. She thinks that her children are lucky because they have attended school in 
Norway. The Norwegian schools have a higher standard than schools in Chile, 
particularly when it comes to taking care of the weak pupils, the schools’ social 
profile, and the variety of experiences the schools provide the children. However, 
she is worried about budget cuts reducing the possibilities schools have to offer the 
children. 
Mrs:  (…)  I have never believed that my children should be brought up only 
by the school.  In addition, when it comes to education —not only 
upbringing—also education is someting me and my husband share with 
the school.  It is not only the school that will educate my children.   That 
is my principle. Therefore, my opinions differ from those who grew up 
in Norway, and can compare themselves with their parent-generation, 
and the possibilities they had and so on. # 
That is what I think.  However, the school has a rule about treating 
children equally, which is a problem for me.  Even considering all the 
possibilities the schools are giving [for the children].  What are we 
supposed to do with the children that have more potential?  That is a 
great weakness. (Lorca 2002b:00:28) 
Mrs. Lorca is making a point of her involvement in educating their children in 
order to release their potential. These kinds of arguments are rooted in an 
individualistic bias. She even argues against the principle of treating children 
equally, which is one of the core egalitarian principles. 
Her ambivalence is clarified when she argues for talented children to be helped in 
furthering their development.  
Mrs: It is not only about helping the individual to develop and enjoy, it is also 
about society.  The children with special talents should be considered 
individually, because they will later contribute to the society through 
whatever they are good at.  This kind of weaknesses in the system, make 
me sympathize for the private, or at least private options for this should 
grow larger and larger. #### (Lorca 2002b:00:30) 
Mrs. Lorca believes that giving the talented better follow-up would be best for the 
whole society. This argument is based on the idea that people’s contribution to 
society is dependent on their talent or their skill. The results for the society count, 
and not the principles involved; hence, a cost-benefit analysis would show that the 
present investments are smaller than the future rewards. She is here confirming two 
of the predictions made about individualistic households. First, she trusts successful 
individuals more than institutions. Second, the well-being of our society depends on 
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the contributions of individuals. Institutions limit freedom, and hence reduce the 
potential individuals have to create resources.  
Again, the structure of the argument fits the individualistic way of organizing. 
However, there is an internal tension in her arguments, as she still believes that the 
best would be to improve the public school system in order to make it more 
resistant toward pressures against privatization. She is trying to reconcile the best 
from both the individualistic and egalitarian arguments (Lorca 2002b:00:31).  
Does this represent a problem for cultural theory? The answer is a double no. First, 
several signs point toward a household that has changed their style of organizing 
from strict egalitarian to more individualistic. We are observing change, not a 
problem. Second, one must separate institutions from arguments. Cultural theory 
claims that it is difficult to create lasting institutions based on two competing ways 
of organizing. However, there is nothing that inhibits making arguments that 
support two ways of organizing simultaneously. Actually, arguments in any kind of 
regime (a temporary cooperation or combination of two ways of organizing) need 
to satisfy supporters and institutions from both ways of organizing (Thompson, 
Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:4). 
Double Standards in Competence Evaluation 
The individualistic view of justice emphasizes the importance of skills, rather than 
other, hereditary characteristics—everybody should have the possibility to advance 
in life according to their skills, independent of their social background. 
Consequently, recruitment based on hereditary principles, like ethnicity, is unjust 
and discriminatory according to individualism, as people’s skills are disregarded. 
As one would expect from an individualistic household, Mrs Lorca seems to share 
this position. She comments on how the competence migrants have is not 
recognized, no matter how high it is:  
Mrs: What goes wrong?  One is never considered good enough with the 
language. No matter how long we have lived in Norway, we are not good 
enough.  However, a Norwegian is highly skilled after one year in Chile. 
(Lorca 2002a:p.4) 
There is, then, a double standard that the Norwegians do not recognize themselves. 
A Norwegian living in Chile becomes a highly skilled specialist in the local language 
and culture after only one year, whereas migrants permanently living in Norway will 
never achieve a “good enough” competence in Norwegian culture and language. 
Moreover, even the competence migrants possess with regard to their previous 
homelands is not utilized; when information about Chile is needed, people ask a 
Norwegian “expert” on Chile, instead of a migrant. Because Mrs. Lorca is not 
treated justly by the majority, she interprets this as a message: “you are not truly 
welcome.” This kind of belief could easily become a factor impeding integration 
into the majority society.  
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The Lorca household’s view of justice seems to fit well with the prediction that 
individualistic households understand justice to mean equality of opportunity.  
Native Language Education 
The children in the Lorca household do not receive extra education in Spanish in 
school, because of their good Norwegian skills.  
Mrs: The situation is paradoxal. The reason I did not do anything about it is 
that I admit my children’s native language is Norwegian.  (…) However, 
there is no reason in the world why they should forget their Spanish.  
Quite in the contrary. (Lorca 2002b:00:33) 
Mrs. Lorca has given up her dream of going back to Chile, and she recognizes that 
her children are more Norwegian than Chilean.  
Becoming a Member of a Society and the Fear of Strangers 
When the question of membership in society must be settled, hierarchy emphasizes 
tradition and background, preferring controlled inclusion, with institutions 
providing help for adaptation. Egalitarianism emphasizes similarity, which can lead 
either to the inclusion of migrants, because we are all humans, or to the exclusion 
of migrants, because they can never become like us anyway. Individualism, though, 
is more open and resorts to an evaluation of skills. In a truly individualistic society 
there should be no reason not to treat a migrant as a member of the society, if he or 
she possess the right skills. Mrs. Lorca’s statement is close to what one would 
expect in an individualistic household: 
K: The fear of the strange was different in Chile.  We are all foreigners, a 
mix of backgrounds.  We are used to it.  There the Spanish accent 
determines it, not your looks, nor your last name.  If you speak fluent 
Spanish you are Spanish. Period.  
Here, the name means still too much.  The multicultural society is quite 
new. (Lorca 2002a: p.3) 
Mrs. Lorca feels that Norway does not allow migrants to become real members of 
the society, in contrast to Chile, where language skills are sufficient for inclusion 
into the society.  
A Change of Lifestyle Requires a Change of Views 
The Lorca household seems to have changed from being a highly disciplined family 
with a double life that allowed them to both sustain a cover and to be political 
activists. They acted upon something they believed in, even if they knew that it 
would endanger them. They were dependent on trusting each other and the people 
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around them for their lives. The need for secrecy was real and they had their cover-
up stories to keep track of.175  
After their arrival in Norway the setting has changed completely: They are safe; 
they are not dependent on other people in the same way; their lives are out in the 
open; they are not dependent on elaborate minute planning to coordinate secret 
meetings; and they can associate themselves with people of their own choosing. 
The individualistic traits have become more prominent over time; however, they 
still use some justifications from the egalitarian way of organizing. Their present 
behavior and manner of organizing their social life seems to point toward a more 
individualistic way of organizing. Their life situation has changed radically, and they 
have responded to these changes. 
Summary of the Household’s Way of Organizing and the Predictions  
To summarize, the Lorca household’s internal organization and their helping 
relations show many individualistic traits: the appointment Mrs. Lorca made for the 
interview did not include Mr. Lorca, as they merely inform each other of what they 
are doing (I); there is a critique of traditional gender roles (h) and many references 
to equality (E); however, the division of household work is ultimately justified by 
skill (I); they are willing to move and go after opportunities (I); their economic 
management is characterized by Mr. Lorca’s lack of accountability and Mrs. Lorca’s 
entrepreneurship (I); they have also shown an ability to reduce consumption when 
needed (I); they have a large social network consisting of those social relations they 
want to keep (I).  
How do the Lorca household's political attitudes and behavior fit with the 
predictions made about individualistic households (on pages 78-91)? The Lorca’s 
views of society and politics are also quite individualistic, but with some other traits, 
too: Mrs. Lorca sees herself in opposition to the police and the system (h); she 
rejects the control the social welfare office was trying to enforce (f), because of the 
limited possibilities to build social networks (I); she thinks children should be raised 
at home, not at school (I); institutions limit freedom (I); she rejects equality as a 
principle in schools (e), while she prefers to build upon the public school system 
(E); society benefits if the talented are encouraged (I); and justice is about equal 
opportunity based on skill (I). As several of these other traits criticize alternatives to 
the individualistic way of organizing, they actually strengthen her individualistic 
arguments. 
                                                     
175 Cultural theory does not have a ready interpretation of a family that lives a double life. The hidden 
part of their lives is probably the more “real one,” which dominates the overt one.  
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The Maheswarans: a Career Builder and a Homemaker 
So far we have met two predominately individualistic households, the Ngas from 
Vietnam and the Lorcas from Chile. The next household, the Maheswaran 
household, shares more similarities with these two than with the hierarchical Tamil 
household presented earlier.  
Quick Overview 
Mr. Maheswaran had to flee Sri Lanka because of his student political activities. 
Like many others he came to Norway on a student visa and worked hard to make a 
living. Here he met his future wife, who is a second generation Tamil in Norway. 
Mrs. Maheswaran is the homemaker, whereas Mr. Maheswaran is the breadwinner 
and career builder. Mr. Maheswaran is a hardworking entrepreneur, who has 
worked his way up in a corporation. They now live in a beautiful house in a suburb.  
I have chosen to include them in this presentation, because they are a good 
example of how a husband and wife team does not always agree. While their 
behavior, cultural bias, and social relations fit the individualistic way of life in many 
ways, I believe that Mr. Maheswaran is more individualistic than Mrs. Maheswaran. 
Where several households portray themselves as one cohesive unit, in this 
household the husband and wife seem to have somewhat different preferences and 
social relations, which they bring into their common household.  
The Internal Life of the Household 
Mr. Maheswaran has made a good career, which he is proud of, and he is not afraid 
to show it (as egalitarian households might be). Not only has he risen to a high 
position in the company, he can also demonstrate his success by showing that he 
earns more money than his peers, thus revealing two individualistic traits: 
competiveness and the use of money as a proxy for success.  
Mr: I am a person who always sets goals.  I have achieved to become the best 
paid person in the whole corporation in a comparable position.  So, now 
is time for the next step. I cannot just sit in the same place, same 
position, forever. I have to move on.  
E: Does it become boring? 
Mr: No, not boring,  I enjoy the work, but I have to develop myself. 
(Maheswaran 2004:02:55) 
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Where the hierarchical household’s career orientation is toward loyalty and job 
security, the individualistic household is concerned with work as a means for self-
development. 
In some ways there is a typical gender based division of labor in the Maheswaran 
household: he is the male breadwinner and she is the female caretaker, working 
part-time by choice.176 However, when Mrs. Maheswaran describes their division of 
labor, it is quite flexible, changing on a day-to-day basis, and the justifications used 
are not connected to gender. Instead, the justifications are connected to skill: the 
person who is better at a certain task, or who has time available, takes care of it 
(Maheswaran 2002b:00:37). The justifications are similar to the ones used by the 
Lorcas (on page 219), who also rely on the individualistic way of life. 
The Maheswarans own a house in a suburb. The house was not lavishly decorated; 
however, it is stylish, with many objects of art, and few signs of family life. I did not 
observe any family pictures on the walls of the one floor that was shown to me. 
The layout was open with no clear division between the kitchen and the two living 
rooms, one of which served as the TV lounge. The house seemed clean and well 
organized, especially considering that they have small children. 
Food Habits are Enforced by a Global Grandmother 
Mr. Maheswaran tells me that he has changed, and that his household meals are 
served at flexible times, depending on other activities and how hungry they are. 
Usually they serve Norwegian food (Maheswaran 2002a:01:05). Mr. Maheswaran 
compares himself to his brother’s household, which consists of Mr. Maheswaran’s 
brother, his Tamil wife, their children, and grandmother Maheswaran. Mr. 
Maheswaran makes a point about how his brother’s household has a very strict 
schedule: breakfast, lunch, and dinner are served at the same time everyday, and the 
food should be from Ceylon. Mr. Maheswaran’s changed habits create some 
tension when grandmother Maheswaran comes for a visit, as she expects to eat at 
fixed times. In terms of cultural theory this can be interpreted as a conflict between 
a high-grid and a low-grid household. Alternatively, one could describe this as a 
conflict between Tamil and Norwegian cultural practices. 
Grandmother Maheswaran travels from country to country, spending a few months 
with each of her children and numerous grandchildren, spreading love and strict 
food habits. To my surprise, grandmother Maheswaran and others in her 
generation seem to be more transnational than their grown-up children. Some of 
those with global lives are not executives, students, or tourists, but grandparents, 
who are following their family all over the globe.177  
                                                     
176 See Fraser (1994) for a presentation of the concepts. 
177 In another family I was witnes to an interesting discussion, which showed that, among these global 
grandparents, healthcare is shopped for on a global basis, as one of the grandparents was planning 
for surgery in India. I expected them to prefer the Norwegian, or at least Western European, 
hospitals, however, for this particular problem, they were confident that it was best to go to India.  
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Economy 
The Maheswaran household has several distinct features typical of the 
individualistic way of managing a household economy. Mr. Maheswaran has a good 
salary, which they can live comfortably on, even if it is fixed. Therefore, Mrs. 
Maheswaran does not really need to work, however, when they anticipate extra 
expenses, she works extra. (Maheswaran 2002a:01:12-01:18). In other words, her 
work is a way to manage their income. Other individualistic traits are their ability to 
cut down on their spending when needed (on page 234), his strong sense of 
entrepreneurship (on page 237), and the lack of an upper limit for spending (see 
below).  
They both have an overview of their economic situation, but Mrs. Maheswaran 
pays their regular bills. He seems to be the big spender, while she tries to limit his 
spending:178 
Mr: I want this and that, and then she says, 
— No, that is enough. 
Then we stop. When I need something, I cannot take all decisions, 
because I can be wrong, too. (Maheswaran 2002a:01:22) 
While we discuss how he would like to spend 200.000 crowns179 on a new high-
status hobby, Mrs. Maheswaran changes the topic back to our previous discussion: 
Mrs: When I think about it, most of the decisions we make, when you want 
something then… If I say, 
— No, we will not buy this. 
You still buy it. It is always like that. ((everybody laughs a bit.)) I actually 
have many examples.  This applies at least sometimes.  However, we 
both did agree upon buying the couch. (Maheswaran 2002a:01:23) 
Mrs. Maheswaran is pointing out how Mr. Maheswaran is not quite as accountable 
as he would like to present himself. Low accountability is typical for individualism. 
What is more revealing, she is challenging her husband in front of a stranger, a 
behavior that would be rude in a hierarchical household.  
Mr. Maheswaran’s dream of investing in this new hobby shows that he is not 
dissuaded by excessive demands (see page 76), like the Herreras, who had to hide 
their wealth from their relatives (on page 194). The demand for symmetrical 
exchange that is part of the individualistic way of organizing makes it easier to 
consume publicly. Mr. Maheswaran seems rather happy to show his wealth to the 
outside world: he is a successful company man, with his company car, new house, 
beautiful wife, and children.  
                                                     
178 This accountability issue is also present with the Lorcas (on page 220), who, however, have much 
less money to spend. 
179 This amount is comparable to one year’s low-income salary after taxes. In 1999 the average income 
after taxes for a migrant household (with children) from Asia, Africa, Central- or South America 
was 325 000 NOK (SSB 2001a). 
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According to Mr. Maheswaran, the majority population assumes that migrants are 
poor people coming to Norway for economic reasons. However, this is not always 
right. Even if he himself has had cleaning jobs in Norway, he grew up in a wealthy 
family, where the family’s private driver drove him to school everyday (Maheswaran 
2002a:00:34).  
Goal Orientation 
Mr. Maheswaran is very goal oriented, and advises people to stick to their goals. He 
has made a good career in the company, even if he had to start from the bottom 
(Maheswaran 2002a:01:01). This goal orientation also applies to the household 
economy: 
Mr: For example, if I have 100 crowns, I will live for those 100 crowns. I will 
not spend more than 100 crowns. Or if I decide, this month I will save 
50 crowns, then I will save it, and live on the other 50 crowns.  I always 
plan like this.  I have always done it like this. (Maheswaran 2002a:00:51) 
When they decided to buy a house, they moved first to a student home, because 
this allowed them to save enough money. The individualistic way of life makes it 
easier to temporarily cut down on needs and, thus, on expenses, in order to reach a 
goal. 
So, Who is a Tamil, Anyway? 
Mrs. Maheswaran is a second-generation migrant, who had to create her own place 
both in the household and in the society. At home Mr. and Mrs. Maheswaran speak 
mainly Norwegian, as this is their best common language. She is trying to learn 
more Tamil, and their children do get some extra Tamil language education 
(Maheswaran 2002a:01:31).  
Mrs. Maheswaran tells about her identity: 
Mrs: We visited Sri Lanka, and I felt myself like a stranger there.  I thought 
that I would get a better relationship to the country, but I was simply a 
stranger. ( ) the language and everything, people, too.  I feel myself more 
like a Norwegian. People treat me like a Norwegian because of the 
language.  ## When we have Tamil visitors, we speak mostly 
Norwegian.  And a Tamil couple we have very close contact with treats 
me like a Norwegian.  It is not like being a real Tamil. (Maheswaran 
2002b:00:10) 
In order to be a full member of the local Tamil community one needs to know the 
language, whereas her language skills are limited. It seems like she feels it a burden 
that other Tamils need to speak Norwegian around her.  
Mrs: But I actually feel more…, when I am with Tamils, I feel like I am one of 
them. However, at the same time I do feel a bit distanced, because of the 
language, as I do not understand everything they say. And when I am 
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with Norwegians, I feel myself completely Norwegian. And suddenly, I 
just forget that I am not. Right? (Maheswaran 2002b:00:13) 
Mrs. Maheswaran lacks an easy identity: Her limited Tamil skills separate her from 
the “real” Tamils, and at the same time, her appearance separates her from the 
majority population.180 This is a situation that many second-generation migrants 
meet (Andersson 2000).  
The Household and their Friends 
Getting Away from the Relatives 
Mr. Maheswaran had to leave Sri Lanka, because he had publicly opposed the 
government as a student. However, he had time to plan and organize his departure, 
and had a choice between several different countries and schools. He comes from a 
hierarchical family, which he found difficult during his youth, as it constricted his 
freedom (Maheswaran 2002a:00:10). 
Mr: I was accepted to schools in England and in Australia, but I chose 
Norway, because I have no relatives here. Whereas I do in the other 
countries. ((laughs))  (…)  
There are relatives, and I have always wanted to stand on my own feet..  
(…)   
So, I thought, —Oh no, if I go to England or Australia, then I will be 
with relatives again, and they will watch after me again, and stuff. 
(Maheswaran 2002a:00:08) 
This youthful quest for freedom and independence is a typical anti-hierarchical and 
individualistic behavior.  
After the death of his father, Mr. Maheswaran, being the oldest, assumed some 
responsibility for his siblings, and has even managed to get one sibling and his 
mother to Norway. 
Being a second generation migrant, Mrs. Maheswaran has most of her family in 
Norway: her parents and her siblings, of whom several are married to members of 
the majority population. Some of her uncles and aunts live in town, too. Her kin 
consists of three family units living in the neighborhood, and four in other parts of 
town. In addition, her distant family lives all over Europe and North America. Mr. 
Maheswaran’s family is considerably smaller: his mother lives with his brother in 
another city in Norway; and his two other siblings live in Western Europe. Overall, 
his closest relatives are on the other side of the country, while hers are in the same 
suburb.  
                                                     
180 The next story she tells is connected to looking different, and how people do not know how to 
address her in some situations (Maheswaran 2002b:00:14). 
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I will present their large network of friends starting from neighbors and moving 
away in physical distance. Some of their friends live in the same neighborhood: one 
majority family with small children, like the Maheswarans; one Tamil family, who 
are mainly Mr. Maheswaran’s friends; and one helpful man, who migrated to 
Norway from Southeast Asia. Mrs. Maheswaran still has good contact with her 
friends from school and the neighborhood she grew up in, as well as two 
colleagues. Mr. Maheswaran has two Tamil friends from the time he was living in a 
student dorm, and there are six people from his work, half of them Tamils, that he 
keeps contact with outside working hours. In other parts of Norway there are four 
people they keep in touch with: she has a friend from her student years, and he has 
three friends that go all the way back to Sri Lanka.  
The Maheswaran household’s current social relations show a balance between 
family and friends. There are a total of thirteen families (kin and non-kin) and 
nineteen individuals that they mention in their social network. One pattern is that 
all family units are either kin or neighbors, whereas non-kin social relations are 
mainly individuals (with the exception of the two families in the neighborhood). 
Households that relied upon egalitarian and hierarchical ways of organizing had 
many, sometimes even mainly, households on their list of friends. Another 
individualistic feature is the lack of common friends—the friends are presented to 
me as either his or hers. 
They mentioned one household, whom nowadays they have a somewhat difficult 
relationship with, because of a work related problem. Interestingly enough, the 
Lorcas also mentioned a problematic relationship, whereas none of the hierarchical 
or egalitarian households mentioned a problematic social relation. This is probably 
a question of what they present and what they keep out of my view.  
Finding Help without Social Relations 
Mr. Maheswaran arrived in Norway alone, without support from either relatives or 
friends, so the staff at the folk high school managed to find him a place to stay for 
the first few days.181 He believed that the only solution for housing was the market: 
Mr: They arranged for me to stay for the first two days with an older man. 
After that I had to walk around and knock on doors ((laughs)) and ask  
((coughs)).  How can I manage to knock on every door? ((laughs)).  But I 
did.  When I have come all the way from Sri Lanka to Norway, I must be 
able to. (Maheswaran 2002a:00:18) 
In order to stand on his own feet he must do things he has never done before. 
After a few complications, the story ends with the school staff finding an apartment 
                                                     
181 Many folk high schools do have a special course for immigrants who want to learn norwegian 
language and culture. The folk high school movement is a characteristically Nordic phenomenon 
which started in the middle of the 19th century in Denmark, followed by Norway, Sweden and 
Finland. Folk high schools provide opportunities in general education, primarily for young adults. 
These schools are different from secondary schools, high schools and higher education.  
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for him. This time his newly acquired social relations provided him with a better 
solution than he was able to find through the market.  
Entrepreneurship 
Mr. Maheswaran shows many signs of individualistic entrepreneurship.  
Mr: I am considering changes now. I am a bit tired of working.  I have 
worked for many years.  I ponder whether I should stay and build upon 
my current job, or whether I should quit, and start my own business.  I 
have been thinking, but I haven’t got that far yet. I have just bought a 
house and stuff.  So, there are many things I should, but I am always on 
alert. ((laughs.))  Yes, everybody says that.  ##  I have succeded on one 
path, and must keep it very safe because of the small children, you know.  
If I did live alone, I could try out lots of things— experiment all the way.  
Anyway, I am very happy now.  (Maheswaran 2002a:01:09).  
There are at least three individualistic traits here. First, Mr. Maheswaran is always 
“on alert,” and ready to grab the opportunities that emerge in front of him. He 
believes that most people are not on the alert, even if they claim so. This is a 
variation of the individualistic household’s inclination to blame people for not 
trying hard enough.  
Second, risk-taking is typical for individualism. We can see how Mr. Maheswaran is 
willing to take chances and experiment with projects; however, his recent entry into 
parenthood requires him to create a secure environment for the children. 
Nevertheless, two years later, he has indeed started his own company (Maheswaran 
2004).  
Third, and perhaps a little more hidden, is his willingness to move on. Even if Mr. 
Maheswaran has climbed the career ladder, starting from the bottom and finishing 
at the top of one company, he does not feel bound to them in the same way as Mr. 
Nguyen, who relies more on the hierarchical solidarity (on page 153). Mr. 
Maheswaran’s loyalty is toward his own opportunities, while Mr. Nguyen’s loyalty is 
toward his first employer. 
Different Relationships of Help 
Mrs. Maheswaran explains to me that they have different types of relationships that 
involve helping each other. Her parents have helped them a lot, and this is not 
something that is calculated and reciprocated. However, when she talks about 
babysitting for her siblings, she is a bit upset that they do not babysit as much for 
her. In other words, babysitting for each other should be based upon a reciprocal 
exchange relation (Maheswaran 2002b:00:43). 
EO: You are there for quite many different people: your siblings and his 
brother..  
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Mrs: Yes, we are very much like that. I am there for the people on my side of 
the family, and he is there for the people on his side.  But, it has always 
been like that in his family. I think they are more connected than I am to 
my family.  But it is surely because their childhood. Right? They have 
stronger bonds in some way. And then they have lived in Sri Lanka, and 
experienced much war.  In addition, his mother lived here a few years, 
and the bonds are stronger then. (Maheswaran 2002b:00:49) 
Everything is relative: Mr. Maheswaran emphasizes how he has changed, and how 
he tries to avoid social control by the kin (on page 232 and 235). Nevertheless, Mrs. 
Maheswaran emphasizes how his bonds are still stronger than her own. They both 
show individualistic bias, but his family is tighter, and shows hierarchical 
characteristics. Therefore, he prefers to keep a certain distance, to gain enough 
space to be comfortable. One should also notice how the spouses feel responsibility 
mostly for their “own” kin: she helps her relatives and he helps his relatives. 
Helping other people is not limited just to kin. Mr. Maheswaran regularly sends 
funds to an organization in Sri Lanka that helps orphans from the civil war.  
Mr: I feel like I must.  I am doing something for my country and people.  I 
am doing well, so I have to give something back. (Maheswaran 
2002a:00:54) 
Mr. Maheswaran has a clear Tamil identity and loyalty; however, he made it clear 
that he does not support the Tamil Tigers. His choice of receiver fits well with the 
hierarchical solidarity, while his justification “to give something back” is a typical 
individualistic justification. 
Politics and the Welfare State 
The Maheswaran household has shown clear individualistic traits both in their 
internal organization and in their social relations. Now it is time to see if their views 
of society and politics fit the predictions about individualistic households. 
Mrs. Maheswaran is a second-generation migrant, and in many ways more 
Norwegian than Tamil. Her experiences resemble the majority population’s 
experiences, even if her appearances do not—a condition Cathrine Sandnes, who 
was herself adopted from abroad, describes as being “white inside” (Sandnes 2004). 
In order to keep the focus on the first-generation migrants, I will, in the following, 
focus more on Mr. Maheswaran’s experiences.  
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Relaxing the Name Law  
According to Mr. Maheswaran, the Tamils have had some problems with their 
names and name traditions in Norway; however, the increase of possibilities for 
changes in the new Law of Personal Names has made things easier.182  
On the visa application forms Mr. Maheswaran had to fill out at his arrival in 
Norway, he was asked to fill in his first, middle and family name, which is a 
structure that does not fit well with the Tamil name tradition, based more on the 
father’s name. Therefore, the name in his passport is not really his name. However, 
Mr. Maheswaran and his brother are now using Maheswaran as their family name 
(Maheswaran 2002a:01:38). 
Student Years and Work Permits 
Mr. Maheswaran’s school credits from Sri Lanka were not accepted, and in order to 
gain access to college in Norway he had to go through the high school system for a 
second time. Unfortunately, because of a lack of information, he ended up in a 
program that did not allow him to continue on to medical school.  
He is very resourceful and managed to hold sometimes three jobs simultaneously, 
while studying for a Norwegian high school diploma. He used some of the money 
he made to provide for his brother, because this was a precondition for getting a 
student visa for his brother.  
Mr. Maheswaran’s experiences with the Norwegian authorities started as negative, 
while now he is more positive. During the first years there were many practical 
problems with being a migrant, as applications to school, a student visa, work 
permits, tax forms, and so forth, were all dependent on each other. In addition, 
they all took too long to process, which created problems for making a living. 
However, Mr. Maheswaran thinks that the state now has a more realistic 
understanding, as those who want to work can work, which reduces the pressure on 
the social welfare system (Maheswaran 2002a:00:32). 
In the early 1990s the Maheswaran brothers decided that they could not go back to 
Sri Lanka, and applied for asylum, which was granted in just three months. 
Obviously, their need for protection was real. However, the timing of their 
application was influenced by their problems in getting a visa to visit their relatives 
in England (Maheswaran 2002a:00:48).  
Citizenship—from Visa to Loans 
Like many other migrants, Mr. Maheswaran says that the original reason for 
applying for Norwegian citizenship was that it made it easier to travel abroad.  
                                                     
182 The name law—or The Law of Personal Names, became valid January 1st 2003 (Ot.Prp. 19 2004-
2005) . 
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Mr: In the 90s I was thinking OK:  In Norway there is no problem to 
have a Sri Lanka citizenship, as long as I have my residency permit—
not a problem. But if I travel abroad, I can do it without applying for 
a visa.  Having a Norwegian passport makes it easy. (Maheswaran 
2004:02:00) 
Later, other aspects became important. He has now started his own business, and it 
is easier to get a large loan from the bank when you are a citizen. 
Social Support  
Mr. Maheswaran has relied upon the social welfare office only once: the one 
summer he did not apply early enough for summer jobs, he got a 3000-crown loan, 
which he, like any other student, had to pay back in the autumn, when he got his 
student loan.  
Cultural theory would predict that in an individualistic household social support is 
viewed negatively: people are guided by their natural self-interest, and social 
support will destroy a healthy structure of incentives.  
Mr. Maheswaran’s statements fit well into cultural theory’s predictions. He thinks 
that the medically disabled should be allowed permanent support, and refugees 
should get a starting package, but there should be more restrictions:  
Mr: But they should not give social support over prolonged periods, so that 
people will not want to work anymore.  Otherwise, I think that 
everybody will go to the social welfare office to get some money. 
(Maheswaran 2004:16:20) 
If everybody uses the social welfare office, then human nature is indeed both selfish 
and lazy, which is as predicted of an individualistic household.  
Not so Long-Term Politics   
Cultural theory predicts that individualistic households have a short-term 
perspective on the economic matters and they have little interest in giving forms of 
support that are not reciprocated. 
Mr. Maheswaran fits this prediction well as he thinks that the biggest mistake in 
public politics today is the state oil fund:183 
Mr:  I personally think that the oil fund (.hh)  should have been used here in 
Norway to reduce taxes and gasoline prices, instead of that my 
grandchildren will have it a little better (they are saving for the long 
term). But, I am not having it that great. Why should I worry about my 
grandchildren hundred years down the line? The state should use some 
                                                     
183 The oil fund is the Norwegian state’s way of saving some of the currently high tax revenues from 
oil- companies for future generations (which is an argument used to sell it to hierarchs and 
egalitarians), and to prevent overheating of the economy (which is an argument individualists can 
accept, because it prioritizes the present). 
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money now, invest more money into the society. (Maheswaran 
2004:09:35) 
The individualistic cultural bias cares about the present, not the future generations, 
because history shows that progress and growth are almost inevitable. Thus, saving 
for the future is counterproductive: it is better to invest the money now, in order to 
create growth in the economy.  
Norwegian Political System has Weaknesses  
Mr. Maheswaran sees several weaknesses in the Norwegian political system. First, 
he tells me in a very engaged manner how people in Sri Lanka are more politically 
interested and engaged than Norwegians. There 75 percent of voters participated in 
the election, while only 61 percent184 participated here in Norway (Maheswaran 
2002a:00:35). It is clear that he has a good knowledge of politics, and that he feels 
strongly about it. This should not be a surprise, for even though he came to 
Norway as a student, he was actually fleeing because of his student political 
activities. 
Secondly, and as expected in an individualist household, he is critical of the political 
system because it is not able to produce results. Politics is similar to business: if the 
leaders are not able to deliver results, something is wrong. In addition, the scope of 
politics is too large, as it limits the possiblities for people to make their own 
choices.  
E: So, you think that people should be allowed to decide more.  
Mr: Yes, today’s political system in Norway is not good enough.  They must 
change the whole culture.  I think politicians cannot get things through 
because of a lot of rules and regulations. (Maheswaran 2004:13:20) 
The blame is placed on rules and regulations, which fits well with predictions about 
individualistic views of institutions. An egalitarian household could have joined in 
in blaming the red tape, but the criterion for evaluation of a political system would 
have been the sufficient participation of the people, not just the ability to produce 
change. A hierarchical household would have probably emphasized how these rules 
and regulations actually are the core of the political system.  
Summary of the Household’s Way of Organizing and the Predictions  
The Maheswaran household shows the type of consistency between a household's 
way of organizing and their view of society and politics that cultural theory predicts. 
The Maheswaran household shows many individualistic traits in their internal 
                                                     
184 The average electoral participation in the 1999 municipal elections was 60.4% in Norway. (SSB 
1999). The average electoral participation in the 2001 parliamentary election was (SSB 2001b) 
75.5% in Norway. 
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organization and social relations: their flexible, skill-based internal organization of 
the household (I); their strong sense of entrepreneurship, with an emphasis on goal 
orientation; their being on alert for opportunities (I); their economic management 
strategy, in which income is increased to match the expenses, the ability to cut 
down on spending when needed, his lack of accountability, and the willingness for 
visibly high consumption (I); their view of careers as a means for self-development 
(I);185 their social relations, which consist of a large network of people, with a 
mixture of different helping relations, however, with an emphasis on symmetrical 
exchange (I); friends are not shared (I); and they are critical of, or at least distance 
themselves from, a fixed dining schedule (h) and controlling relatives (h).  
How do the Maheswaran household's political attitudes and behavior fit with the 
predictions made about individualistic households (on pages 78-91)? I did find, 
several traits that do fit the predictions: a view of social support as corruptive (I) 
and people as self-interested (I); a priority for present generations, together with a 
critique of long-term planning (I); a view of the scope of the democratic game as 
too large (I), combined with a critique of the political system’s ability to produce 
changes, because of too many rules and regulations (h). There are no traits that fail 
to fit well with the predictions, as the critique of hierarchical solutions just 
emphasizes why the individualistic solutions are better. 
                                                     
185 This is connected to the justification of division of household work, and thus a trait about the 
household, not politics and society in general. 
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The Truongs: What Happens, Happens 
The Truong household is included as an example of a household that relies on the 
fatalistic way of organizing in many situations.  
Quick Summary: 
The Truong household is a couple from Vietnam with two children born in a 
refugee camp before the family’s arrival in Norway in the early 1990s. They have 
both studied a trade in Norway and easily found work related to their education at 
the end of the 1990s, but due to bad business both have been laid off at least once. 
Currently he is employed in a factory, because it pays better and it is probably a 
stable company. She has been unemployed for the last two years. Nevertheless, they 
own their own apartment in a suburb. 
The Household 
The Truong household relies regularly on the fatalistic way of organizing. Their way 
of organizing can be identified based on cultural bias (their fatalistic attitude to life), 
behavior (time use and help), and their social relations.  
Mrs. Truong is my main informant in the household, perhaps because, being 
unemployed, she has more time available. I had a chance to talk with Mr. Truong 
during both interviews, and he seemed eager to participate and help, but left soon 
due to other engagements.  
Due to a request by the Truongs, the interviews are not taped. My notes contain the 
main statements only and not a complete word-by-word transcript as I have for 
most of the other households. However, the statements are reconstructed and 
presented as closely to the originals as possible. The references after quotes are to 
pages in my notes, and not to the duration of interview.  
Random Time Use & Division of Labor 
Mrs. Truong likes their household’s random schedule: 
Mrs: We don’t have a fixed schedule.  We take it as it comes.  I do not want a 
fixed schedule.  It is a sick thing. (Truong 2002:4)  
Mrs. Truong prefers to take things as they come, which fits well with the fatalistic 
lack of planning. Simultaneously, she protests against a more hierarchical fixed 
schedule, which strengthens this interpretation.  
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However, their division of labor at home is not random, as one would have 
expected of a fatalistic household: she does most of the domestic work, while he 
makes the money, cleans the house, and drives their children to various activities. It 
seems like two constraints have influenced their division of labor heavily. First, he 
has employment, while she does not. Second, he has a driver’s license, while she 
does not. In a fatalistic way of organizing, these kinds of external constrains are 
expected to have a large influence (others in Mrs. Truong’s situation might just 
acquire a drivers license). However, this same division of labor could be justified in 
several ways. Unfortunately, I do not have enough information about their 
justifications, and therefore this particular interpretation in terms of cultural theory 
is only tentative.  
Making decisions is an important part of the household’s division of labor: 
Mrs: HE does not want to make decisions.  In the beginning, I liked that in 
him, but not any more.  The one who makes decisions must take 
responsibility. (Truong 2001:1) 
She was making a point of how his dislike for making decisions, something she 
considers a personality trait in him, attracted her in the beginning, however, now 
she has started to see the flip side of the same behavior: the lack of taking 
responsibility. She does not like being the one who takes responsibility in the 
household.  
Mrs. Truong manages the household economy alone: 
Mrs:  He is not so good in planning.  He gives all his salary to me. (Truong 
2001:1) 
Mr. Truong has, hence, no economic freedom. I do not know if this is his own 
choice (allowing Mrs. Truong to make all the financial decisions) or if it is Mrs. 
Truong who requires it because “he is not so good in planning.” Nevertheless, the 
image of a household relying on the fatalistic way of organizing starts to emerge. 
Resources and Consumption: Buy First and Worry Later. 
Economically they rely on his salary and her unemployment benefits. They have a 
fixed income, and exorbitant expenses. They have a light-hearted relationship to the 
household’s financial situation in both the long- and short-term: 
Mrs: We have been making money all the time in Norway.  First, when we 
went to school we got a grant.  Then later when I have been taking 
courses through the unemployment office, they pay us.  Also, the state 
educational loan fund has paid for studies.  And then we make money 
through working.  Financially we have been fine. (Truong 2001:2) 
Nowadays their largest single expense is housing. In addition to their home, their 
children are a strong economic priority, and I got the impression that they would 
go quite far in providing for their two children’s education and hobbies. 
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The Truongs have recently purchased a nice apartment. Even if they had some 
extra savings, the extra security provided by the municipality was necessary to get 
the loan from the bank.186 Several statements make it clear that frugality is not a 
priority: 
Mrs: It does not matter if the apartment is expensive or not.  The most 
important thing is that it is spacious. (Truong 2001:4) 
The apartment is beautiful, decorated in a style that one would expect to find in a 
Norwegian interior decorating magazine. When I probed a little more on the 
subject, I found that Mrs. Truong had always wanted to become a designer, but her 
lack of language skills put a stop to her dream in Norway. Mr. Truong’s dream had 
been to become an artist, but he did not have good enough grades in the 
Norwegian school system to get an education in fine arts. The Truongs are a couple 
with broken dreams and good esthetic sense.  
The few items present in their living room look like designer objects. I was curious 
about how they can afford such nice things, especially as they had purchased the 
apartment only recently, and she was still unemployed. 
Mrs: I buy only a few, but perhaps a bit expensive, things that I really like. I 
have many credit cards, and I buy first and worry about the money later. 
(Truong 2001:3) 
Mrs. Truong does not calculate their spending, and has no real overview, which can 
be problematic when the bills start to come. Moreover, they had a tough period a 
short while ago, because they had shopped too much with their credit cards. 
The interaction in the Truong household is a textbook case of a fatalistic strategy 
for making ends meet: he avoids decisions and responsibility; she dislikes being left 
with the responsibility, and solves it with credit cards—buy first and worry later. As 
a consequence, the constraints on their economy are now external. The real 
boundaries and limits of their spending are enforced by the credit card companies.  
Isolate Social Relations 
For a Vietnamese family the Truongs have a relatively small social circle. They keep 
in touch with family both in Vietnam and in Europe. They give some help to the 
family members in Vietnam, whereas their European relatives are not in need of 
any help. 
The main source of face-to-face social contact seems to be the Catholic Church, 
and they keep in touch with four families in their church, beyond the organized 
activities. In addition, they keep in touch with two families they met in the refugee 
camp. One of them lives in town, while the other lives in a remote part of Norway. 
                                                     
186 This is a program for all low income families. 
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Mr. Truong’s best friend in Norway, a refugee from another Asian country, moved 
down to Central Europe four years ago; however, they still keep in touch. When 
they became friends, they were both new to Norway, and lacked a common 
language, nevertheless, they managed to communicate enough to become friends 
(Truong 2002:2). In addition, he has a few colleagues he considers friends: 
Mr: I have some Norwegian collegues in town, one or two of them are 
friends, but I do not invite them home.  I do not want to.  They have 
their lives,  I have my life.  So why bother?  We call sometimes, and I 
have visited them a few times.  One of them did help me with moving 
here.  We talk, we talk about women…  (Truong 2001:2) 
I find it interesting that he emphasizes the separateness of their lives, while the 
same person is also intimate enough to talk about women. This friend can give 
emotional support if needed, however, the relationship does not involve the rest of 
the family, and it is confined within the workplace.  
She does not have close friends in the same way. Her answers give us several 
explanations for this:  
Mrs: I have no friends left in Vietnam. One loses many things when one 
leaves a country (Truong 2002:3). 
Mrs: I do not have good Norwegian friends because of the language (Truong 
2001:3). 
Mrs: I am not unhappy even if I do not have collegues or friends.  I need it, 
but I have a problem with taking contact.  I cannot do anything about it.   
(…)  I am not easy to talk with.  People are different.  God created us 
different. (Truong 2002:2) 
To exaggerate a bit: Mr. Truong emphasizes the separateness of his and his local 
friends’ lives—“why bother?” Whereas Mrs. Truong has no close friends, and 
cannot do anything about it. Thus, it looks like they lack the will or the ability to 
create new social relations, which makes change difficult. She considers her lack of 
friends to be a personality trait, in the same way that she considers his reluctance to 
take responsibility a personality trait. By labeling something a personality trait (given 
by God), she makes it a permanent, unchangeable feature of life.  
In addition, there are many people they wanted to list as ambiguous or conflictual 
social contacts. The number of these persons is close to half their non-kin social 
contacts, which is far beyond the ratio in the other households I interviewed. One 
should also notice that all positive social relations in town are through the church 
or his work. All other local contacts are negative or indifferent according to their 
own account.  
What is the significance of the high proportion of ambiguous or negative social 
contacts? Is this a feature that could be used to identify other isolate households or 
is it just a random feature? One could argue that in a hierarchy these negative 
relations are kept private and out of public view, while egalitarian institutions are 
likely to collectively exclude these people, and individualists would not bother to 
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sustain these relations, so they would just disappear. Perhaps isolates do not have 
the same kind of control over their own social relations. It is possible that isolates 
have social relations forced upon them (just as the rules are forced upon them) and 
they are quite happy to talk about these, in contrast to the other ways of organizing. 
Broken Dreams 
Two typical traits of the fatalistic way of organizing are, firstly, that the households 
are forced to do things against their will and, secondly, that they believe more in 
fate than their own ability to control their lives, as events have their own logic that 
overwhelms their plans. The Truongs have been subjected to several experiences in 
which important decisions have been made outside the household: being forced to 
leave their homes in Vietnam; as boat refugees they had no control over whether 
they would survive or where they would end;187 they did not get into the schools 
they wanted in Norway; and Mr. and Mrs. Truong both have been fired. In the 
stories they told me they find themselves most of the time on the receiving end of 
the events.  
There were many broken dreams in this household. For example, they have one 
unsuccessful voluntary relocation behind them. While they both were unemployed, 
they decided to move, because he wanted to live closer to his relatives in the EU. 
They sold their first apartment and moved out of Norway, however, after a few 
months it became clear that Mrs. Truong and the children did not like the new 
social setting, and they moved back to Norway.188  
Another example is Mrs. Truong’s failed attempt to become self-employed. She 
wanted to start her own business, and everything was ready, with the exception of a 
bank loan for the start-up costs. Unfortunately, the bank was not willing to lend her 
the funds, so she saw no other alternative than to give it up (Truong 2001:2). As 
one would expect, the fatalistic solidarity (isolate social relations) does not carry 
enough long-term social obligations for this type of help to materialize. Had the 
Truong family been part of either the hierarchical or the individualistic social 
networks, they might have been able to find enough backing for the project to 
succeed, either through loans from friends or through friends willing to provide the 
bank with the required security for the loan.  
This kind of a streak of broken dreams and unmet aspirations is characteristic of 
the fatalistic way of organizing. All these broken dreams have influenced Mrs. 
Truong’s view of herself. She considers herself a failure in life, and repeatedly called 
                                                     
187 I am not suggesting that any experience will automatically define what kind of cultural bias one 
aquires, as different people give the same experiences different meaning. However, it seems likely 
that such extreme experiences make it easy and perhaps efficient to turn to the fatalistic bias, while 
others choose to resist and fight against the events they are faced with. (Thompson, Ellis, and 
Wildavsky 1990) 
188 I suspect that had they relied on some other way of organizing, they would have stayed for longer, 
or never left in the first place. 
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herself a loser. Nevertheless, she thinks that the children have the possibilities to 
succeed where she did not. Their children go to a private school, and take music 
and other lessons, which all cost extra: 
Mrs: I am a loser, so it is important for them to have a good education.  Ten 
to twenty years from now, education will be the most important thing to 
give. (Truong 2001:3)  
My Destiny 
Belief in destiny is one of the hallmarks of the fatalistic way of organizing. Mrs. 
Truong herself states: 
Mrs: Happiness does not come to everyone.  Every person has a destiny. 
(Truong 2001:4) 
Destiny helps to explain both the good and the bad things that happen. This is 
quite different from the individualistic way of organizing, which believes that 
everyone can succeed if they just try hard enough. If one shares this belief, the 
natural conclusion for failing is that the person is to be blamed, whereas the fata-
listic belief in destiny removes some of this blame, as it is all a question of luck or 
predestination. What happens, happens. 
Do Not Expect Help 
Helping others is an important form of behavior that defines social relations. The 
two following quotes crystallize the Truong household’s position toward helping 
others:  
Mrs: People can ask me for help: if I can help, I will; if not, I say no.  People 
must not expect me to help them no matter what. (Truong 2002:4) 
Her first statement displays a conditional willingness to help: If helping each other 
works out, that is fine, and she is glad to help, but on the other hand, if it does not 
work out, nobody should be able to demand it from her. She is thus positioning 
herself in opposition to both the egalitarian and hierarchical solidarities.  
In her second statement Mrs. Truong positions herself in opposition to the 
individualistic solidarity: 
Mrs: I do not want people to help me, and then expect to get some help back! 
I help someone, and then this person can help somebody else.  That is 
when I feel that we are fellow humans. (Truong 2002:3) 
The Truongs do not want their social bonds to be too inclusive, and by making it 
clear that helping others should not be based on exchange (individualistic solidarity) 
they are sustaining their own isolated style of social relations.  
The Truongs have no social relations that include help as an important component. 
This stands in stark contrast to all the other households I have interviewed: to Mr 
Natan (hierarchical), who has earned his social position by helping others (on page 
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165); to the Ngas (individualistic), who refuse to have contact with people that do 
not reciprocate help (on page 210); and to the Herreras (egalitarian), who mainly 
help people within their own in-group, but who emphasize that everybody deserves 
help (on page 197).  
Despite the Truong household’s attitude toward helping others, they are not 
without social obligations. Mrs. Truong feels a strong obligation to help her parents 
back in Vietnam. Since they were both students, the Truongs have been sending 
money regularly to their parents.  
Mrs: It is my duty to help my family. (Truong 2001:2) 
One should not make the mistake of assuming that the isolates are without social 
obligations: in an ideal-typical case of fatalistic organizing, the obligations that are 
present are forced upon the household from the outside and not by their own 
choice. In this case Mrs. Truong separates clearly between obligations toward 
family and obligations toward others. She prefers the non-committal isolate 
solidarity, while the obligations within the family are a duty that she has not chosen.  
The opposite interpretation, this being a household so burdened with obligations 
that it is incapable of taking up any new obligations and therefore resists them, does 
not receive empirical support. The amounts they send to Vietnam are modest by 
Norwegian standards, and a household so burdened by their social obligations 
should show clear signs of a reduced standard of living in their home, something 
that was not the case. 
Politics and the Welfare State 
As we have seen so far the Truong household has many fatalistic traits. How do 
their views about society and politics fit into the fatalistic predictions? 
A Norwegian Citizen Estranged from the Civic Society  
Even if the Truongs are Norwegian citizens, they have a more negative view of 
Norwegian civic society than most of my other informants.  
Mrs: In the future I will live here.  I belong here, therefore I must take 
Norwegian citizenship.  I am from Vietnam.  It is only a paper that 
makes it easier to be in the society, but I will not become more 
Norwegian. (Truong 2001:4) 
Mrs. Truong feels a belonging to Norway, but even if it is possible to become a 
citizen, it is not possible to become one of them—that is, more Norwegian. 
Mrs: Typically Norwegian is “Norway is for the Norwegians.”  They do not 
care (...) they do not want foreigners to live in their country. (Truong 
2002:3) 
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Mrs. Truong feels excluded and ignored by Norwegians. She feels like a stranger in 
the country that she is a citizen of and to which she has committed herself and her 
children.  
Mr. Truong believes that Norwegians are not welcoming: 
Mr: The social welfare is very good, but people are not open. They do know 
very little about Asian countries. Norwegians are predisposed.  At work 
people believe that things that go wrong is our fault. (Truong 2002:3) 
Mr. Truong argues here for discrimination beging caused by lack of knowledge, and 
a negative predisposition. It is also interesting the way he contrasts Norwegian 
people and Norwegian institutions: “social welfare is good, but people are not 
open.”  
Mixed Identity 
The Truongs are happy to be in Norway, even if they feel excluded, because it has 
given them safety and freedom, and they plan to stay here, because of the children, 
who now have Norwegian as their mother tongue.  
Mrs: We talk both Norwegian and Vietnamese with the children.  I do not like 
to talk Norwegian at home.  The children must learn where they come 
from.  They have Norwegian citizenship, but they are not Norwegian.  It 
is important with self-respect. (Truong 2001:3) 
Again, the theme of not being Norwegian is highlighted. They are trying to remedy 
feeling left outside the society by giving their children a Vietnamese identity, too. 
Politics  
When I inquire about following politics Mrs. Truong replies: 
Mrs: I do not read Norwegian.  So much has happened that I just want to take 
it easy. (Truong 2001:2) 
The Truongs are not interested in politics (according to their own words), because 
they are not proficient in Norwegian. Therefore, the language barrier can also be a 
hindrance to political interest, not just participation. Nevertheless, I believe that the 
language barrier is one way of expressing their feeling that politics is an arena for 
the “Norwegians.”  
There is some similarity here to Mr. Herrera, who also has given up on politics in 
Norway (on page 202). However, Mr. Herrera was an active participant in Chile, 
and he has not given up on being part of the civic society in Norway. Nevertheless, 
they share the tiredness of large events and the search for a peaceful life. 
Politics in Norway are also less important than in Vietnam: 
Mrs: Vietnam is a country with only one party.  It is better with many parties.  
Therefore [politics] does not matter. (Truong 2001:4) 
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Mrs. Truong was also quite critical about the politicians, because she believes that 
while they have the power to change things they do not exercise it (Truong 2001:4). 
This argument relies on the fatalistic idea of one’s own powerlessness, which 
requires that others have the power, in this case the politicians.  
So far the Truongs fit the fatalistic predictions: they view politics as something 
other people do (they decide what we must do); they do not look upon themselves 
as political actors; and they seem to possess the necessary obedience and 
indifference to fill the fatalistic role. However, the interpretation is not strong. I 
suspect that it is difficult to have strong, reliable interpretations of the absence of 
activity, randomness, and indifference. Where a few key statements are enough to 
recognize patterns in the other ways of organizing, they are not enough to see the 
fatalistic pattern.  
Their voting for the first time in the autumn of 2001 is the one trait that does not 
fit the predictions, as fatalists are not expected to vote. The Truongs chose the 
Conservative Party, for the following reasons: they believed that Labor had not 
done much for the poor; they wanted to try something new (which I interpret as a 
wish to change the government); and, in addition, they were happy with the 
Conservative government that was in power when they came to Norway (the 
gratitude-for-asylum effect is something I have seen in several families). In addition, 
the Truongs have shown some ambition for entrepreneurship, which can partially 
explain their preference for the Conservative Party.  
Users of Social Benefits 
There are a few fixed points in their relation to the welfare state. The first one is 
their own situation as newcomers to a society: 
Mrs:  It is difficult to be a foreigner in a country.  You have to start over again.  
It is a new country, new language.  You start empty-handed. (Truong 
2001:2) 
The second one is their good knowledge of the institutions of the welfare state. 
When I inquired about their experiences with the municipality, they stated that they 
were quite happy with it, even if they had to call many people before they found the 
right one to talk to. For them it was important to get extra security, through the 
municipality, for a bank loan to buy their apartment. Another type of help they 
mentioned was a loan from the social welfare office, for the summer months, to 
unemployed students. 
Mrs: We borrowed money for two months from the social office.  We had to 
write a contract and pay the money back.  It is a right, so one just has to 
ask.  It is not embarrassing. 
(…) But not for a whole life.  We work and pay back through taxes. 
(…) the taxes are high in Norway. (Truong 2001:3) 
I was surprised by this, because not many people are aware that the social welfare 
office is actually part of the city administration, and not a state agency. The right to 
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social welfare is granted by the state, but it is the municipalities that administer it 
and cover much of the costs. Mrs. Truong even comes with a suggestion for 
restructuring the social welfare system. She thinks that the social welfare office 
should be closed and one should instead establish an office for social security and 
labor.189 She argues for her suggestion by way of her own experiences and 
observations from the social welfare office: 
Mrs: It is ironical that everyone who goes there feels down already before they 
go there, and the laws and people who work there make it worse.  It 
gives me a bad feeling.  I have been there every summer, but I do not 
feel myself so good. (Truong 2001:3)  
There is nothing particularly fatalistic about this, with the exception, perhaps, of the 
uninhibited proclamation regarding the frequent use she makes of their services.  
In addition to social support there are other types of formal money transfers that 
she sees as a right, like the child benefit. As a parent she thinks child benefits are 
important for the household, and dislikes that they are paid only for sixteen years. 
Mrs: Child benefits.  Children, they use much money when they become 
older.  Now they cut out the child support when the kids become 
sixteen.  It should continue to eighteen years. (Truong 2001:2) 
Sometimes Mrs. Truong does not differentiate between receiving and making 
money:  
Mrs: We have been making money all the time in Norway.  First, when we 
went to school, we got a grant.  Then later, when I have been taking 
courses through the Unemployment office, they pay us.  Also, the state 
educational loan fund has paid for studies.  And then we make money 
through working.  Financially we have been fine. (Truong 2001:2)  
Mrs. Truong puts the unemployment office, the student educational loan fund, and 
their employers in the category of those who “pay us.” For households that rely on 
other ways of organizing, it would be odd to mix different types of sources 
together. However, somebody using an individualistic voice would perhaps argue 
that “money is always money,” but, like the Lorcas, they would probably resent the 
element of control involved (see page 224).  
Summary of the Household’s Way of Organizing and the Predictions  
The Truongs are a household with a fatalistic attitude to life, partly isolate social 
relations, and behavioral patterns that sustain these. Nevertheless, if things had 
worked out better for them, they might have come out as individualists. The 
attempt to start a business shows that they do have some initiative and willingness 
                                                     
189 Actually, the newly created Norwegian labor and welfare organization resembles her suggestion 
(www.nav.no). 
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to try (I). They are, however, missing some of the crucial traits of individualists: the 
large ego-focused networks, where information and other resources can flow, and 
the ability (or willingness) to cut down on consumption. If the Truongs had cut 
down heavily on their consumption over a few years, they could have saved enough 
to get a start-up loan from the bank.  
There are several traits in the Truong’s way of organizing their household that point 
toward a fatalistic household: they critique the notion of a fixed daily schedule (h); 
decision-making is characterized by an unwillingness to take responsibility (F); their 
economic management style is light-hearted, based on the extensive use of credit 
cards, which leads to external constraints on their household economy (F); their 
social relations are characterized by separateness from, or the lack of, friends (F); 
there is a large proportion of ambiguous or conflictual social relations (F); there is 
only a conditional willingness to help, without obligations (F); they reject exchange 
(i); and there is a strong belief in destiny, which has formed their lives and their 
characters (F). 
How do the Truongs fit the predictions made about the fatalistic view of society 
and politics (on pages 78-91)? When it comes to being a new citizen, it is interesting 
to see that they have knowledge of the political-administrative system and ideas 
about how things should be, but nothing implies that they actually think they could 
do something about it. The politicians are the powerful actors, who, for some 
unclear reason, do not use their powers for the good of the Truongs and others in 
need of help (F). The Truongs are thus left at the receiving end of the political 
process: they pay their taxes, collect their benefits, and let the flow of life carry 
them to an unknown future. They seem to have the obedience and indifference to 
fill the role of the fatalistic citizen (F). 
Their view of resources and the distribution of resources is somewhat random. 
Thus, the lack of differentiation between types of resources actually fits the 
prediction (F). Moreover, in this case, it seems impossible to interpret their view of 
resources as hierarchical, egalitarian, or individualistic. In addition, their view of 
social support is neither hierarchical nor individualistic.  
Overall, the interpretation of the Truong household’s internal life and social 
relations as fatalistic is solid, while the interpretation of their political activities and 
attitudes is weaker. It is difficult to argue for a fit to randomness, but they do fit not 
any of the other profiles either, which would have been a strong indicator of lack of 
fit.190 
We have now become familiar with the internal organization of eight households, 
their external helping relations, and their views of politics and society. We have 
seen two individualistic, two egalitarian, three individualistic households, and one 
                                                     
190 To observe randomness one needs many statements from closely related topics, so that one can 
observe a lack of cohesion in the argumentation. While the other ways of organizing can be 
identified and presented through a good quote, it is almost impossible to depict randomness in the 
same way. Perhaps the impossiblity of finding the “right” quote is an indicator of randomness?  
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fatalistic household. Overall, the concepts of cultural theory allow us to see new 
similarities and differences between these households, and their views of politics 
and society fit the predictions given by cultural theory in general. We have also seen 
that the ways of organizing are not directly related to country of origin; in many 
respects, households with the same way of organizing resemble each other more than households 
with the same country of origin. 
In the second chapter (on page 58) I presented five criteria for a better classification 
of migrants, of which the last one was being helpful in everyday situations. I believe that 
the presentation in this chapter has demonstrated how the categories of cultural 
theory shed light on many aspects of these households’ everyday life. Cultural 
theory allows us to see the pattern that households are weaving into their 
presentations of themselves, their behavior and their justifications of their behavior. 
However, before cultural theory can be used to guide behavior, it must be 
operationalized into a particular context. 
In the next chapter, we will look more closely at how these eight households’ ways 
of organizing and their views of politics and society fit with the predictions given in 
the theory chapter. 
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C h a p t e r  6   
 FINDINGS FROM THE 
HOUSEHOLD STUDY 
This chapter contains four discussions. First, I briefly discuss the degree to which 
cultural theory allows us to describe a household’s ways of organizing, understood 
as its internal organization and its external social relations that carry some form of 
help. These two areas are presented and discussed here as one subject area in order 
to keep the discussion brief. Second, based on information regarding the 
household’s way of organizing, I will discuss cultural theory’s ability to predict a 
household’s views on politics and society. In relation to the eight households I have 
studied, these two discussions allow me to answer questions about how a household’s 
way of organizing is related to its views on politics and society. The third discussion is about 
the utility of cultural theory as an alternative way to categorize and deal with migrants, and the 
final discussion sums up with a list of conclusions. 
Describing Households 
In the fifth chapter we saw eight households presented through the conceptual 
apparatus of cultural theory. How well do these households match the ideal-typical 
ways of organizing? How consistently are they applied in daily life? Did cultural 
theory enhance our understanding of these households?  
We have so far, in Chapter 5, observed a good fit between each household’s way of 
organizing and their views of politics and society. However, the presentation of 
households is rich in detail, which makes concluding difficult. Simplification is 
necessary to allow us to see the traits that are not specific to a particular household, 
but generic, and allow us to gaze beyond these eight households. I have argued that 
there is a dominant way of organizing in each of these eight households. However, 
in many of them there were also signs of support for several ways of organizing.  
Cultural theory is not about bird watching! Putting households into theoretically 
defined categories simplifies the use of the theory, while in real life pure forms do 
not exist. Cultural theory is about social dynamics in institutions, not static boxes. It 
helps us to see why certain divisions of labor, certain justifications, and certain 
behavior go together, and why certain helping relations work for one household but 
not for another. 
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All four ways of organizing have their blind spots and flaws. Therefore, one should 
be careful not to use the pure or extreme versions of the four ways of organizing as 
ideal families. A household that is based on only one way of organization, while the 
other three ways of organizing are rejected, is fanatic by nature, and not a model to 
strive after. 
Figure 8, below, presents a count of pro and contra traits mentioned in Chapter 5 
concerning households’ internal ways of organizing and their helping relations. 
Thus, it is a simplification that hides a particular indicator's centrality and the area 
of life to which it belongs. Pro and contra traits are counted separately from the 
summary of each household and presented respectively with positive and negative 
values. Pro traits support one way of life, while contra traits are either statements or 
behavior that is anti-egalitarian, anti-hierarchical, anti-individualistic or anti-fata-
listic. For example, if we look at the second household, the Natan household, we 
can see that five traits are identified as supporting hierarchy, there is one pro egali-
tarian trait, and one pro and one contra individualistic trait. Similarly, the Nguyen 
household has six hierarchical traits and no other traits have been identified.  
We can see in Figure 8, below, the count of indicators of internal organization and 
social relations for each household. Households are both different from and similar 
to one another. The Nguyens, from Vietnam, and the Natans, from Sri Lanka, are 
both dominated by the hierarchical way of organizing. The Garcia and Herrera 
households, both from Chile, are dominated by the egalitarian way of organizing, 
but we can see how the Herreras also have traits which reject individualism and 
support fatalism. The Ngas, from Vietnam, the Lorcas, from Chile, and the 
Maheswaran, from Sri Lanka, show clear individualistic traits. The Truongs, from 
Vietnam, rely predominately on the fatalistic way of organizing. 
We can see that both hierarchical and individualistic households are from several 
different countries, while the egalitarian and fatalistic households have their roots in 
either Chile or Vietnam. However, I do believe that this is caused by the small 
sample. In a larger sample, I believe, there would have been more diversity.191 
However, even now, with only eight households in my sample, we can say that 
country of origin does not determine a household’s way of organizing. Each household has 
organized itself over the years in the manner it prefers, through a series of more or 
less conscious choices.  
                                                     
191 I have had contact with households that I suspect are fatalistic, but one has declined further 
participation in this project and in others it has been impossible to complete the interviews. See 
page 123 for more information. 
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Figure 8:  Eight Households’ Internal Organization and Social 
Relations (Count of indicators) 
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How consistent are households in terms of cultural theory? We can see that the 
Nguyen household organizes itself more consistently than the Natan household, as 
the Nguyens have only hierarchical traits, while the Natans are based on several 
ways of organizing. If we look at all eight households, we can see how they all have 
one dominant way of organizing. No household relies equally on two or more ways 
of organizing. However, in four of the eight households there is some support for a 
second or third way of organizing present. In other words, relying on one dominant way 
of organizing, and borrowing a little from another, seems to be common. 
Can we measure the strength of a way of organizing? I find the measurement of 
strength based on a count of traits lacking in precision, as there are differences in 
the centrality and degree of a trait, and in addition, there are differences between 
the interviews. Moreover, it is possible that my operationalization of these four 
ways of organizing does not identify the threshold for inclusion in a way that is 
comparable across all four ways. However, even if it is possible to question the 
exact count of the various items for a particular household, I am confident that the 
dominant way of organizing is identified correctly for every household. 
There are a few general observations concerning combinations of ways of 
organizing that can be made across the households. We can see that there are no 
contra indications of the dominant way of organizing. All households show consistency in 
relation to their dominant way of organizing. For example, none of the households 
relying mainly on the egalitarian way of organizing display anti-egalitarian traits. The 
same applies for all four ways of organizing. However, if a way of organizing is not 
dominant, there are sometimes traits both in favor of it and against it. This is the 
case in the Natan and Truong households, where we can find one trait supporting 
individualism and one trait rejecting individualism. These observations suggest to 
me that consistency is important in relation to the dominant way of organizing, 
whereas there is room for inconsistency when it comes to the non-dominant ways 
of organizing. More research is needed to find out about the nature of this 
consistency.192 
Rejecting alternative ways of organizing is one way to strengthen the dominant way of organizing 
and build a case for consistency. This defines, for example, the case of the Garcias, who 
support egalitarianism and reject hierarchy. Similarly, we can see how both the 
Lorcas and the Maheswarans rely on individualism and reject hierarchy as a way of 
organizing.  
Cultural theory enhances our understanding of these households’ internal 
organization and their helping relations in several ways. First, these organizing 
principles do not follow from its country of origin. We can see similarities and 
differences across several countries of origin. Cultural theory makes it possible for 
us to relate to these households on the basis of features that are central in their 
present lives, rather than features that point back to their past. Second, it allows us 
                                                     
192 Is it a structural feature that supports the theory or a methodological artifact caused by people 
succeeding to present a consistent “image” during the interviews?  
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to see how these households have more or less consciously chosen the way they 
organize their own lives. In addition, cultural theory shows how attitudes, norms, 
behavioral patterns, and social relations are connected to each other. This opens up 
possibilities for improving policy making as our understanding of households’ 
political views and their responces to policy improves.  
Predicting Households’ Views of Society and Politics 
How well does cultural theory allow us to predict a household's views of society 
and politics if we have knowledge of their way of organizing (internal organization 
and external helping relations)? Even if Part I is exploratory in nature, there is a 
confirmatory element built into the way predictions are either confirmed or rejected 
in this section. Here, I will present three different evaluation techniques: a variable-
oriented approach, a case-oriented approach, and an approach that compares the 
various combinations of ways of organizing.  
Matching the Predictions 
Each household had views of society and politics that were consistent in terms of 
cultural theory. They all created a consistent image of society and household that 
functioned as context for stories involving their own household. It is not possible 
to predict details, but the dominant way of organizing used to structure a 
household’s internal life and their helping relations also structures the household’s 
view of society and politics. 
However, if we look at the long list of predictions given in the third chapter (pages 
79-92), one notices that most households do not have the kind of precision in their 
views that matches the precision used in the predictions. This should not come as a 
surprise as most people are not political philosophers and do not spend much time 
trying to create detailed argumentation that covers most of the important aspects of 
politics and society. Nevertheless, as we have seen in the fifth chapter, all households 
do have arguments that echo or resemble the predictions given, even if in most households most of 
the predictions are not matched. There are two likely causes for this: the limited time 
used for each interview and the difference between manifest and latent views. 
During the interview manifest issues and opinions are presented, whereas latent 
views are left in the dark. One should not expect a household to have clear 
opinions on all issues.  
Is it cheating to have precise theoretical predictions of justifications, but only check 
some of them? No, I have organized my interviews around households’ experiences 
with institutions of the welfare state. Justifications are something chosen by 
households themselves. This increases the reliability, as they present only salient 
justifications. They are not just responses to stimuli. In some interviews many 
justifications are used, while in others only few. The households differ, not just 
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concerning which justifications they use, but also concerning how consistent their 
justifications are, and how many issues they justify. 
I suspect that the level of precision in argumentation and the number of manifest 
issues and opinions presented by the households interviewed are within the 
boundaries of what can be expected. There is no reason to expect them to differ 
much from the majority population. However, more research is needed to 
determine these levels for cultural theory.  
Looking at the Number of Indicators—a Variable Oriented 
Approach 
An alternative approach is to focus on the number of indicators. Figure 9, below, 
contains two columns: the first column is identical to Figure 8, which focuses on 
the households’ internal organization and their helping relations; the second 
column shows the count of indicators for a household’s view of society and politics 
from the presentation in Chapter 5. A pro indicator is a prediction that gets a clear 
confirmation. Several statements confirming one prediction are counted as one 
incident. Similarly, a contra indicator is an overt rejection of one of the predictions.  
If cultural theory helps to predict households’ views of society and politics, a high 
number of indicators supporting a way of organizing should result in a high 
number of indicators of a corresponding view of politics and society. We can see in 
Figure 9 that there is a clear pattern: high numbers go with high numbers and low 
numbers go with low numbers. Thus, this figure confirms what we saw in the 
presentations and comparisons of these eight households in Chapter 5: they display a 
pattern of internal organization, helping relations, and views of society and politics that fit into the 
four ways of organizing as predicted by cultural theory. How strong is this pattern? 
Because of the low number of households, there are clear limits to the utility of and 
the possibilities for a quantitative analysis. However, it is possible to measure the 
strength of correlation between the households’ internal organization (including 
helping relations) and their views of politics and society. There are several possible 
ways to do this. However, none of them tells us more than what we can already see 
in Figure 9, as they are just alternative ways to further summarize this information. 
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Figure 9: Eight Households’ Way of Organizing and their Views 
of Society and Politics (Count of Indicators) 
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We can summarize this along the four ways of organizing (as variables). In Table 12 
we can see how households’ way of organizing is related to their views of politics 
and society. If we assume that the four ways of organizing are independent of each 
other (i.e., one can get high scores on all of them simultaneously) and use Pearson’s 
r the correlation between a way of organizing and corresponding views of politics and society is 
extremely high. For each of the four ways of organizing Pearson’s r is 0.95, or larger, 
and statistically significant. In other words, many egalitarian traits in internal 
organization and helping relations are very likely to go together with many egali-
tarian views of society and politics. The same applies for each of the four ways of 
organizing.  
Simultaneously, we can see in Table 12 that all correlations across ways of 
organizing (for example hierarchical traits going together with egalitarian views) are 
negative and none of them is statistically significant. In other words, it is unlikely 
that a household that does not show many egalitarian traits internally would display 
many egalitarian views of society and politics. The same applies for all four ways of 
organizing.  
Table 12: Ways of Organizing and Views of Politics and Society 
(Correlations) 
Views of Society  
and Politics 
  
H
ierarchical 
E
galitarian 
Individualistic 
Fatalistic 
R .98 -.10 -.49 -.14 Hierarchical  
Sig. .00 .81 .22 .74 
R -.33 .97 -.36 -.21 Egalitarian 
Sig. .42 .00 .39 .61 
R -.37 -.63 .95 -.38 Individualistic  
Sig. .37 .10 .00 .36 
R -.20 -.19 -.35 .95 
Ways of 
Organizing 
Fatalistic  
Sig. .64 .65 .40 .00 
All Pearson correlations (r) are calculated based on the same 8 cases.  Values of significance are 2-
tailed.  Items marked with bold are significant on p<0.01 level 
 
The precise value of Pearson’s r is of less importance, as it only describes these 
eight cases, than the general pattern that emerges. For every way of organizing, a 
high number of items within the household is likely to produce a high number of 
Predicting Households’ Views of Society and Politics     • 
 
263 
items supporting the same view of society and politics, and a weak rejection193 of 
the competing views of society and politics (a complete correlation matrix is 
presented in Appendix on page 522). 
Correlations on this level will only appear when there is a very strong linear pattern 
between the variables.194 This level of correlation is normally alarming and possibly 
an indication of a tautological relation between two variables. Is the distance 
between variables sufficient? In other words, when I measure the degree of 
hierarchy within the household and the degree of hierarchy in their views of society 
and politics, am I actually measuring the same phenomena? I believe that my 
treatment of these issues in third and fifth chapter shows that the measurements are 
indeed of separate entities. A household’s internal organization and its helping 
relations both contain elements of social organization and justifications of behavior 
inside the household. Whereas views of society and politics contain elements that 
could be viewed as attitudes or norms on issues outside the household. However, 
there is a close connection between justifying the help a household gives and 
receives and arguing for a proper way to organize social support. These correlations 
should be treated as a finding supporting cultural theory (social relations, behavior, 
and cultural biases are related), not an overlap of measurements. From a cultural 
theoretical viewpoint, it is only natural that there is a strong correlation, for these 
are two measurements of one way of organizing: one measures a household’s 
internal organization and the other their view of society and politics. 
In addition to the substantial explanation above, possible methodological 
explanations must also be examined. The most likely methodological explanation 
for these high figures is that I have only coded and counted items that can be 
interpreted in terms of cultural theory. Thus, the pattern that emerges does not 
contain what would be noise in surveys. However, this should not influence the 
pattern, only the levels. Another possible methodological explanation is the biased 
selection of households.195 This should pose no serious problem, as the numbers 
describe my sample only and are not generalized to any population. Another 
possible, purely methodological, explanation for the high correlations is the biased 
                                                     
193 One should note, however, that none of these deviate enough from zero to be statistically 
significant. 
194 There is also a purely mathematical explanation for these extremely high correlations, as there are 
very marked differences between the score for the dominant way of organizing (5-6) and the scores 
for the non-dominant ways of organizing (-2-+2), while the mean is between these two extremes. 
Thus, no households score close to the mean and all households contribute to the Pearson’s r. 
Because Pearson’s r relies on squared distances, the contribution increases the further away we are 
from mean. Had the distribution been more even, including values closer to the mean, the 
correlations would have been lower too. Thus, the high correlation is symptomatic of a situation 
where there are nothing but marked deviations from the mean, and these deviations have a 
systematic relation to each other.  
195 I have excluded two of the hierarchical Tamil households I interviewed. Thus, it is possible that I 
am slightly overestimating the effects of hierarchy. In addition, the whole selection of households 
can be biased toward households that fit into one of the four ways of organizing; however, most of 
the households included were interviewed before I had any idea of their way of organizing.  
•    Findings from the Household Study 
 
264 
selection of stories. However, I have systematically included, in Chapter 5, all 
stories that provide counter evidence to the dominant way of organizing, my initial 
interpretation of a household’s way of organizing. Therefore, I hope that I have 
convinced the reader that the counter evidence is examined and counted. 
A Case-Oriented Approach 
In addition to the foregoing variable-oriented summary, it is possible to compare 
the degree of correspondence for each of the eight households (cases). In other 
words, how similar is each household’s way of organizing when compared with their 
views on politics and society (i.e., making a row-by-row comparison between the two 
columns in Figure 9 on page 261)?196  
In the first column in Table 13, we can see the count of observed traits, which 
equals the total number of marked squares for each household in Figure 9. I have 
11 to 18 relevant observations for each household. The second column is the count 
of differences between the household’s internal way of organizing and their political 
views, which is the same as the difference between the left and right side of Figure 
9. The highest degree of similarity is found in the hierarchical Nguyen household, 
where the images are identical. For some households, there is only one item that 
does not match. For example, in the Nga household, there are five pro-
individualistic internal traits that match the five the individualistic predictions 
concerning views on society and politics. There are no pro-hierarchical internal 
traits, although the household still fits with one of the hierarchical predictions on 
the views on society and politics. The highest number of difference between the 
households internal organization and their political views are in the Herrera and 
Truong households. Both have four observatiosn that do not match cultural theory. 
However, the Truong household has fewer indicators of views of society and 
politics present.197 Therefore, we should make the count of difference relative to 
the number of observations. 
Table 13 shows how similar the households internal organizing and their political 
views are. The third column uses as its baseline the total number of observed 
indicators for the particular household, that is, the lack of counter observations are 
excluded, while inconsistency is included.198 If we look, for example, at the Truong 
                                                     
196 To create a measure where 100% shows identical measures and 0% shows no similarity at all, we 
can calculate the share of identically colored squares. Each figure contains 32 small squares 
(ranging from –2 to +6 and multiplied by 4 ways of organizing).  
197 I suspect that this is partly caused by the difficulties in finding good indicators for fatalistic views of 
society and politics.  
198 By inconsistency I refer to the simultaneous presense of support and rejection of one way of 
organizing, as is the case for the Lorcas (egalitarianism) and the Truongs (individualism). An 
alternative way of calculating would be to remove these as one support added to one rejection 
equals zero (the expectation of a zero effect). I have chosen to include noise, as not to artificially 
increase the support for cultural theory. 
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household, where we have a difference of four items.199 In total we have observed 
12 relevant traits. The similarity between their internal organizing and political 
views is thus 67 percent.  
Table 13: Similarity between Way of Organizing and Views of 
Politics and Society 
 
Household Count of 
observed 
traits 
Count of 
different 
traits 
Per cent 
similar of 
observed 
Nguyen 12 0 100 
Natan 18 2 89 
Garcia 15 1 93 
Herrera 12 4 67 
Nga 11 1 91 
Lorca 17 3 82 
Maheswaran 13 3 77 
Truong 12 4 67 
Average 14 2 83 
Counts are made from Figure 9. 
 
We can see in Table 13 that on average the similarity between a households’ way of 
organizing and their views of politics and society is 83 percent. This is an 
extraordinary similarity.  
So far we have seen two quite different ways of describing the relation between a 
household’s way of organizing and their views of society and politics. The main 
difference between the measure of similarity and the measure of correlation is that 
the measure of similarity shows similarity within each case, across four dimensions 
simultaneously, whereas the measure of correlation shows association for one 
dimension across the eight cases. Both the variable-oriented measurement of 
correlation and the case-oriented measurement of similarity show a strong 
relationship between ways of organizing and views of politics and society.  
Is this strong connection between ways of organizing and views of politics a special 
feature of migrant households, or can we also expect to find something similar in 
majority households? One could argue that migrant households are less influenced 
by the common causes of political opinions, as defined by political scientists, and 
more by their culture. I, however, believe this is a false argument. I have chosen 
migrant households from three different regions of the world, so there is larger 
                                                     
199 As there is internally one trait rejecting individualism and one trait supporting individualism, these 
are counted as two observations, but the expected effect of these is zero.  
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than normal cultural variation among the households. Households from one 
country utilize different cultural biases, thus making them different, despite their 
common origin. What we are left with is the fact that the household’s present way 
of life or their way of organizing is a key factor in understanding their political 
preferences. 
Similarly, perhaps the migrants do not understand the political cleavages in Norway, 
or they do not understand enough about the Norwegian political system in order to 
act and vote in their own interests. In other words, are they ignorant voters who 
use cultural biases as a substitute for knowledge of how to promote their interests? 
I do not think so. The migrants I interviewed did not show any misunderstandings 
about how the political system works, and I believe that their competence as 
members of the polity is more than sufficient for them to act in their own self-
interest.  
I do not believe that the strong connection between the way of organizing and 
political views is a methodological artifact. I am measuring four different cultural 
biases, and the households score differently on these four biases. Had I been 
measuring only one dimension, or if all households had scored high on the same 
dimension, it could easily have been a methodological artifact. Here, however, we 
have large variations between households and a strong pattern of similarity within 
households.  
Nevertheless, in a semi-structured interview, the questions can be tailored and the 
answers interpreted more broadly than in a survey with fixed questions and 
response alternatives. Therefore, it is not surprising that the connection is stronger 
than what can be found in surveys. What would it look like if we drop the counts 
and focus on the patterns of combinations?  
Looking at Combinations of Ways of Organizing 
Both of the above methods rely on a simple counting of indicators, while they 
disregard the content of the indicators. Therefore, from a cultural theoretical 
viewpoint, a third approach, which focuses on the combinations of ways of 
organizing, is more appropriate. 200  
In Table 14 the households’ way of organizing is presented as a combination of 
four ways of organizing. The items are in order according to their frequency in the 
household,201 so that the dominant way of organizing is always mentioned first. 
Support is shown by use of a capital letter, and rejection by use of a small letter. 
Non-salient ways of organizing are not mentioned. For example, the Nguyens are 
                                                     
200 See Chapter 10 for more details on this kind of combinatory approach.  
201 The frequencies rely on the same count of items from Chapter 5: Eight Households as Figure 8 
and Figure 9. See page 521 in the Appendix for the scores used. 
Predicting Households’ Views of Society and Politics     • 
 
267 
organized hierarchically (H) and their views of society and politics are pro 
hierarchical (H). Similarly, the Natans are organized hierarchically with a rejection 
of the egalitarian way of organizing (He), and their views of society and politics are 
pro hierarchical and rejective of the egalitarian style of organizing (He). 
 
Table 14: Eight Households’ Ways of Organizing and their 
Views of Politics and Society presented as Combinations 
Household Internal organization  
and helping relations 
Views of Society  
and Politics 
Nguyen  H  H 
Natan  He  He 
Garcia  Eh  Eh 
Herrera  Ef  E 
Nga  I  IH 
Lorca  Ih  IEhf 
Maheswaran  Ih  Ih 
Truong  Fh  F 
 
Looking at the combinations in Table 14 we can see that the relationship between a 
household’s view of society and politics and their internal organization and helping 
relations is not deterministic, as one could easily believe looking only at the 
numbers. Nevertheless, there are four households out of eight (the Nguyens, 
Natans, Garcias, and Maheswarans) that have an identical pattern in their internal 
ways of organizing and their views of society and politics. 
We can see that for every household the dominant way of organizing is the same in both 
columns, while there is room for differences in the non-dominant ways of organizing.  
There are six households whose views of politics and society fit with the 
predictions supporting only one way of organizing; in other words, where the 
dominant view does not have visible competition. The Nguyen, Herrera and 
Truong households have views of society and politics that are based only on 
references supporting one way of organizing. The remaining three households 
strengthen their dominant views of society and politics by an explicit rejection of 
one or more other ways of organizing. The Natan household supports hierarchy 
and rejects egalitarian solutions. The Garcias support the egalitarian way of 
organizing, which is strengthened by their critique of hierarchy. The Maheswaran 
household shows support for individualistic solutions, while they reject hierarchy.  
The remaining two households show support for more than their one dominant 
way of organizing. The Ngas and the Lorcas share views that are dominated by the 
individualistic way of organizing, but they differ concerning their secondary choice. 
The Lorca household brings in some egalitarian elements, while the Ngas bring in 
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some hierarchical elements in their views of society and politics. The Lorcas reject 
hierarchy in their internal organization. It would, therefore, have been surprising if 
they had supported hierarchy in their views of society.  
The same dominant way of organizing was present in both domains for every household, and the 
weaker traits were not reversed across domains. However, a weak support or rejection does 
not automatically lead to similar presence in both domains. Households are free to 
mix and play with the non-dominant ways of organizing, as long as they present a 
consistent image. However, the relationship is so strong that if we know enough 
about a household’s internal organization and their helping relations it is easy to see 
what kinds of views are likely to be present, and what kinds of views are most likely 
absent. In other words, knowledge of a household’s way of organizing allows us to predict 
fundamental traits of a household’s views of society and politics.  
The discussion over the last eight pages shows that, whichever method is used—
the variable-oriented, the case-oriented, or the combinatory method—the 
conclusion stays the the same: a household’s way of organizing is very closely related to their 
views of society and politics.  
People Have Coherent Opinions 
A relatively common view among political scientists today is that highly educated 
and well-informed people have coherent opinions and political preferences, while 
the rest of the people lack the information or the interest to form proper opinions, 
which can be seen in their response instability on most issues in surveys (Converse 
1993; Kuklinski and Peyton 2007:4). Nevertheless, people have relatively stable 
underlying preferences that guide their opinion formation (Aardal 2007:71; Aardal 
and Valen 1995; Zaller 1992). I have two suggestions concerning this issue. 
First, I suggest that a person’s opinions are more coherent than some survey research suggests, 
when the questions are presented in a real-life context. Survey research often assumes that 
questionnaires are filled in alone, and that they represent people’s true personal 
views. Cultural theory suggests that a person’s opinions are formed by his or her 
social relations, in other words, one should be very careful in assuming that views 
expressed in one context can be generalized to all other contexts.202  
Second, I suggest that the coherency in a person’s opinions follows the four ways of organization, 
rather than political ideologies. In other words, people are rational and have 
cohesive preferences—they know what they want and how to proceed to get it—
but political scientists have been looking in the wrong place.  
                                                     
202 Survey research often excludes social relations as an explanatory variable, as it is difficult to 
estimate the effect of social relations on behavior in a reliable manner. Olli, Grenstad and 
Wollebæk have estimated that for members of environmental organizations the effect of social 
relations on private environmental behavior is in the same magnitude as all opinions seen together 
(2001).  
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We know from previous research that knowing what people think about the four 
ways of organizing gives a fairly good prediction of which party they will vote for, 
or at least which parties their choice is between (Olli 1999). This is also confirmed 
in Chapter 10 in this thesis. Is it possible that these kinds of opinions are more 
closely connected to political behavior than regular political opinions, because they 
are connected to behavior and social relations in their daily lives? 
Where Do Opinions and Values Come From? 
The empirical material in this thesis supports that there is a close relation between a 
household’s internal organization, their helping relations, and their views of politics 
and society. However, it is not obvious as to what the causal direction is. There is 
no a priori reason to believe that the causal direction is from a household’s internal 
organization to their opinions and values concerning society and politics.  
There are several different views regarding where preferences come from.203 One 
can argue, like many economists, for the priority of preferences, which, again, are 
the causes of all behavior and organization.204 In this manner, the household is a 
laboratory or testing ground for one’s political preferences and ideas about the 
good life. It is reasonable that one organizes one’s own household according to 
one’s own preferences. 
However, one can also argue the other way around. Preferences do not just pop up 
out of nowhere. They are a function of one’s social relations: Social relations are 
durable over time, and one’s opinions have a tendency to fit one’s social 
relations.205 For a long time one of the most popular views was that it was one’s 
social background, class position, or position in society that had the largest 
influence on political preferences.206  
From a cultural theoretical viewpoint, this is largely a chicken-and-egg problem. As 
social relations, behavioral patterns, and cultural bias are intertwined, it is 
impossible to claim as a general rule that one is the primary cause of another. 
However, if one is studying a particular change, it is sometimes possible to 
                                                     
203 For an overview of the literature on where political preferences come from see Classics in Voting 
Behavior and Controversies in Voting Behavior (Niemi and Weisberg 1993b; Niemi and Weisberg 
1993a). 
204 See Douglas and Nay for a thorough critique of this view (Douglas and Ney 1998).  
205 This view is well presented by Wildavsky: 
People use what matters most to them – relations with other people – to make sense 
out of life. Cultures answer questions about life with people: How is order to be 
achieved and maintained? Is there to be leadership and, if so, by whom? How are the 
goods of this world to be secured and divided up? How are envy to be controlled, 
inequality to be justified or condemned? ... What, in sum, is the good (or, at least, 
better) life? (Wildavsky 1989b:63) 
206 “Your standpoint depends on where you sit” is often tributed to Miles (1978). 
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determine where the change started. For example, the Lorca household's values 
have changed over the years, and I believe this change is caused by changes in their 
social relations (see page 229).  
One must not lose from sight that cultural theory describes a social system. 
Nevertheless, often for analytical purposes, it is necessary to isolate a small section 
of a larger system for analysis and argue for a causal direction in a particular 
relation, for example, for the use of regression.207 Cultural theory can provide the 
mechanism needed to explain how a household’s internal organization and helping 
relations influence its political preferences. The household’s internal organization 
and its helping relations are lived and reinforced everyday, whereas politics are less 
central for people in their daily lives. 
Cultural theory hence provides a model for political preferences and behavior, 
which connects many different aspects together. I have previously argued that 
cultural theory can, therefore, be used as a bridge between different theoretical 
traditions: 
Cultural Theory is a framework that allows us to include both 
cognitive aspects as a worldview, understanding of the society and 
nature, and affective aspects as evaluation of a policy or attitude 
towards a group in society.  Thus Cultural theory bridges cognitive 
and affective aspects, which previously have been used in two quite 
different theory traditions in social psychology. (Conover and 
Feldman 1991)  (Olli 1999:72 emphasis by EO) 
In cultural theory the cognitive aspects are closely related to the effects of cultural 
bias. In other words, not only our thinking but even our perception of the world 
around us is heavily influenced by the way of organizing we adhere to (See Douglas 
1992, 1982c, 1985; Kahan, Braman, Gastil, et al. 2007; Kahan 2010a; Kahan, 
Cohen, et al. 2010; Kahan 2012). Our perceptions are dependent on our social 
constructions of the world, and in this way the world looks quite different for 
households relying on different ways of organizing. Each way of organizing also has 
a blind spot (that cannot be observed and acted upon), compared with the other 
ways of organizing (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990). 
Cultural theory does not look at feelings toward groups or policies as the original 
source of motivation, but rather as a way to express one’s own social position and 
way of organizing. Thus, both the cognitive and the affective elements can be 
treated within the same theoretical framework. 
I have also suggested that 
                                                     
207 See, for example, the quantitive analysis in Food and Culture by Mary Douglas (Douglas 1984; 
Douglas and Gross 1981) 
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Cultural theory can partly fill the gap between the structural cleavages. 
(Rokkan 1967) and the Michigan model (Campbell 1960) by explaining 
how social structures and positions get translated to ideological 
positions (Olli 1999:72 emphasis by EO)  
Both these models use social structures as a way to explain political views and 
behavior, but neither of them gives a good account of the mechanism. The 
structural cleavages model identifies groups based on socio-economic position 
(farmers, workers, and petty bourgeoisie), language, religion or other factors, or 
combinations of these. It shows sensitivity to historical particularity and different 
alliances among the elites, and shows how the cleavages in society are reproduced 
in the political system. Cultural theory could be used to enrich this by showing why 
certain alliances are more likely than others, or why certain elites are bound to be in 
conflict with each other.  
The Michigan model is closely connected to survey research and converts social 
background and attitudes into political preferences. However, it does not give 
much theoretical guidance for how this happens. Cultural theory provides one 
account of how preferences are connected to social relations: how our social 
relations influence our preferences; how some political messages enforce our 
beliefs, while others are ignored. As cultural theory is both a theory of institutions 
and of people’s relation to institutions, it can be a bridge between the structural 
cleavages and the Michigan models. 
Cultural theory can also partly fill the gap between the rational choice 
and the Michigan model, by explaining where the preferences come 
from, why people have biased perceptions and how different 
preferences (cultural biases) allow for different forms of rationality. 
(Olli 1999:72 emphasis by EO) 
Rational choice theory explains political behavior with preferences, but does not 
really give explanations for where preferences come from, while self-interest is 
often assumed to be the main motivation, and efficiency in goal attainment the only 
form of rationality. Cultural theory can provide a valuable contribution that opens 
up for different forms of rationality matching the four ways of organizing.208  
                                                     
208 Wildavsky comments upon rational choice theories in the following manner: 
Rational choice theories could be improved, their scope broadened, and their 
explanations made more powerful by asking not only “How do people go about 
getting what they know they want?” but also “Why do people want what they want in 
the first place?”. The advantages of combining a theory of goal direction, which is the 
operational base of rational choice, and a theory of preference formation are 
manifold: a monistic conception of cause as self-interest is replaced by a pluralistic 
conception of culture allowing for a variety of motives for action; master objectives, 
which play out over a sequence of moves, supersede immediate objectives that cover 
only the next act; concentration on how institutional rules influence incentives, 
though valuable in and of itself, gives way to a parallel consideration of how 
individuals shape institutions; and the overwhelming concentration on material self-
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The above arguments were originally part of an article that tried to predict party 
preferences based on survey research. Now, after a completed qualitative research 
project on people’s political views and preferences, I believe even more strongly 
that cultural theory has earned its place among the mainstream theories in political 
science. It is a theory that contains institutional level aspects (formation and change 
in institutions, relations between institutions, the the four ways of organizing) and 
individual level aspects (like behavior, attitudes, beliefs, and perception). In 
addition, it explains how these individual level aspects are connected to the 
institutional aspects. Cultural theory thus focuses on many central issues of the 
classical individual vs. collective debate. 209 
Simplify Dealing with Migrants 
I propose in the following that we can use Ways of Organizing as stereotypes that 
in many situations can replace stereotypes based on country of origin.  
Use Ways of Organizing as Stereotypes 
A good stereotype is simple enough to be easy to use, while retaining some 
important information that provides guidelines for behavior. I suggest that the four 
ways of organizing are useful as stereotypes guiding our behavior when dealing with 
migrants.  
If one way of organizing is sufficient to represent a household, then ways of 
organizing can be useful as stereotypes. As we have seen in detail in Chapter 5, and 
in a summarized form in Figure 8, treating a household as relying on only one way 
of organizing is not quite correct, as most households have traces of several ways of 
organizing. However, every household did have one way of organizing that was 
dominant and manifested in many issues. Therefore, relying on a stereotype based on one 
way of organizing seems like a useful way to construct interaction with a household, at least until 
more information is available.  
The next question we need to ask is whether this is better than relying on ethnic or 
country of origin based stereotypes. First, the households originating from Vietnam 
are different from each other: the hierarchical and very loyal Nguyen household is 
quite different from the individualistic and entrepreneurial Nga household, and 
                                                                                                                                   
interest, which discomforts so many social scientists who might otherwise be well 
disposed to rational choice explanations, opens up into a diversity of selves who 
construct a variety of interests in the service of different ways of life (or cultures) 
(Wildavsky 1994). 
209 There is a good presentation of how cultural theory relates to the classics in political science in 
Cultural Theory (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:103-214). 
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equally different from the fatalistic Truong household. To treat these three 
households as similar would disregard the different strategies they rely on for 
coping with their lives. Second, the households originating from Sri Lanka are 
different from each other: the hierarchical helpers of the Natan household are quite 
different from the individualistic consumers of the Maheswaran household. To 
treat these two households similarly would disregard their different view of life and 
the vastly different sources of solidarity upon which they build their lives. Third, 
the households from Chile are also different from each other: the egalitarian 
Garcias, who view equality as a solution, and the egalitarian business of the Herrera 
household resemble each other, as they both are group-oriented, but they both 
differ from the individualistic Lorca household, who prefers differentiation based 
on skill and talent. Thus, relying on country of origin based stereotypes does not 
look useful. Especially since, as we saw in Chapter 5, households relying on the 
same way of organizing resemble each other in their internal organization, their 
organization of external social relations, and their views of society and politics, 
despite their coming from different corners of the world.  
I will therefore suggest that if the aim is to create, or facilitate, social interaction, and not just 
emphasize the differences, stereotypes based on the four ways of organizing are preferable to the ones 
based on country of origin. 
I am not trying to reduce the importance of national symbols and the feeling of 
belonging. One should recognize expressions of national traditions and symbols, 
like the cueca danced by the Chilean people. These kinds of traditions have a value 
and they deserve our support and admiration. However, one must be careful not to 
equate these with the way we categorize people. Even if national symbols and even 
something that can be called a national culture exists, that does not mean that 
people from one country are the same, or are carriers of values, views, and norms to 
such a degree that would form the core of a person.210  
People should be free to choose their identity and affiliation themselves. As long as 
others use country of origin as a proxy for who you are—he is Chilean, 
Vietnamese, or a Tamil—it is very difficult to change who you are or how others 
view you. People have a need to be seen as more than just representatives of their 
countries of origin. Traditions and national symbols are important for identity and 
belonging, but they should not determine how we deal with each other. 
Cultural theory allows us to see commonalities across ethnic boundaries: the daily 
life of minorities is not as different as the majority sometimes wants to believe. 
Cultural theory gives several possible common starting points for structuring social 
interaction. As social interaction is organized according to a limited number of 
fundamental principles, creating social interaction that includes participants from 
many countries of origin is feasible. The difficulties are perhaps related to problems 
                                                     
210 More about the creation and role of this kind of unity can be found in Anderson (1991) and in 
Hylland Eriksen (1993, 2004). 
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of language and interpretation, rather than problems of understanding fundamental 
social rules.  
Conclusion 
After a research process, it is always a great pleasure and time of excitement when 
one finally arrives to the writing of the conclusion. Has the work produced 
something new and contributed to our understanding of society and politics? 
One of the empirical findings is that the patterns of organization in migrant 
households are very familiar, and probably follow the same patterns that we know 
from many majority households. Cultural theory and its four ways of organizing can 
be used to describe a household’s internal organization, those social relations that 
carry help, and to describe peoples’ own political arguments.  
Cultural theory seems like a promising way to describe households’ internal 
organization and their external helping relations. Ways of organizing can even be 
used to form stereotypes that can replace the much-used country of origin, which 
does not determine a household’s way of organizing.  
There are some lessons that can be learned about ways of organizing: It seems 
common that a household has one dominant way of organizing and borrows a little 
from another way of organizing. Thus, support for several ways of organizing is 
commonly present, which can be confusing. It became clearer when I realized that I 
could not find any counter indicators for the household’s dominant way of 
organizing. The rejection of other ways of organizing was used to strengthen the 
position of the dominant way of organizing. However, the pure forms of these four 
ways of organizing are not the same as ideal households. 
The main finding is that there is a strong relationship between a household’s way of 
organizing (internal organization and their helping relations) and its views of politics and society. 
A household's views of politics and society were structured according to the 
dominant way of organizing in the household. It should not come as a surprise that 
hierarchically organized households had views that supported the hierarchical way 
of organizing in the society. The same applies for all four ways of organizing, with a 
small reservation concerning the fatalistic way of organizing, as expectations 
concerning fatalistic political views are unclear.  
Households showed a considerable degree of consistency in their views of society 
and politics; more than one would expect based on results from survey research. 
The consistency in their argumentation was built around one of the four ways of 
organizing, not a political ideology.  
Ways of organizing are not just ways of organizing a household; they are also ways 
of organizing society in general. The patterns of organizing can be observed in a 
wide range of everyday practices, helping relations, and attitudes and opinions 
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concerning society and politics. In other words, these patterns of organization cut 
across the private-public boundary, and the household seems to be a source for 
social practices and skills also applied outside the household.  
Even if the migrants’ origins give them particular language skills and many social 
contacts in their own language group, these social contacts do not automatically 
carry resources and become helping relations. The households seem to prefer 
helping relations that are organized through a form of solidarity that matches their 
dominant way of internal organizing. The households relate best to other 
households organized in the same way.  
These findings are based on a close study of eight households as cases, as well as 
comparisons between them. I have demonstrated that cultural theory works well on 
households when seen as institutions. Next, in Part II, I will operationalize cultural 
theory so it can be used on individuals. 
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PART II: OPERATIONALIZING 
CULTURAL BIAS IN THE SURVEYS 
The purpose of Part II is to provide us with a working operationalization of 
cultural biases as measured in surveys. This operationalization is required for the 
analyses in Part III. Thus, large sections of Part II are preparatory and technical in 
nature. Those readers who do not intend to conduct survey research of their own 
can probably read just Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 and skip the chapters in between. 
In Chapter 7, entitled Cultural Theory and Unfinished Business at the Micro-Level, I 
present four theoretical problems and suggest some solutions to each of these 
problems. First, there is no well-established method for measuring central concepts 
in cultural theory at individual level. Second, cultural biases are measured without a 
model of the relationship between the individual and culture. Third, with the 
absence of a clear theoretical difference between individuals and institutions, 
sometimes the analytical levels become confused. Fourth, it is tempting to start 
making calculations on cultural biases just because they have a numeric 
representation in a dataset. These calculations should be limited to operations that 
appreciate the meaning of cultural biases. 
Entitled Measuring Cultural Bias in the Nordic Cultures Survey, Chapter 8 will create 
scales for measuring the four cultural biases as continuous variables by using items 
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inspired by Dake and Wildavsky’s work. The data contains representative samples 
from all five Nordic countries in 1999. Because these scales suffer from yes-saying, 
or acquiescence bias, I will try to evaluate the degree of acquiescence and propose 
some solutions for it.  
In Chapter 9, entitled Measuring Cultural Bias in The Norwegian Environmental Protection 
Survey, I create similar scales by using a different data source. This survey has 
representative samples taken in 1995 from the general Norwegian public and 
members of 12 environmental organizations. This survey has been scarcely utilized 
for cultural theory research largely because it fails to include enough cultural bias 
items for creating reliable cultural bias scales. Therefore, I create new scales by 
adding new items to the scales and evaluating their performance. 
Combinations of Cultural Biases is the title of Chapter 10, where I exploit the data from 
the Nordic Cultures Survey in an effort to empirically test different 
operationalizations of cultural theory. The various assumptions concerning the 
relationship between the individual and culture are reflected in the variety of ways 
the data can be coded. I make alternative versions of the cultural combinations 
variable, and use these to make hundreds of tables. An analysis of these cross 
tabulations tells us which assumptions best explain party preferences.  
Finally, Chapter 11, entitled Party Preference and Cultural Bias, opens up for a 
demonstration of how cultural combinations can be used to make sense of party 
preferences, when parties are grouped together by their ideology to party families at 
Nordic level. This demonstration is required in order to create trust in the approach 
based on cultural bias combinations; as in Part III, the analyses here rely extensively 
on these combinations. Indeed, it would be reckless to jump into the theoretically 
more complicated analyses without first exploring the actual viability of culturally 
bias combinations. 
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C h a p t e r  7   
CULTURAL THEORY AND UNFINISHED 
BUSINESS AT THE MICRO-LEVEL 
By presenting a set of problems that need to be solved, this chapter tries to answer 
to the question as to why cultural theory has failed to live up to its expected value 
in survey research.  
In his presidential address, entitled Choosing preference by constructing institutions: A 
cultural theory of preference formation, for the 82nd annual meeting of the American 
Political Science Association, Aaron Wildavsky established high expectations in the 
value of using cultural theory at the micro-level. Whereas Mary Douglas 
emphasized cultural theory as one about institutions, Wildavsky pulls cultural 
theory into the heart of political science research and suggests that cultural theory 
can explain the origins of the preferences that people act upon. For Wildavsky, 
preferences come from social relations: 
What is it that enables everyone to come up with reliable solutions 
to the problem of preference formation whenever it arises? The one 
source all human beings know something about is their social 
relations. (Wildavsky 1987:17) 
While cultural explanations for political phenomena have often been complicated 
and required trained professionals, Wildavsky insists that the power of cultural 
theory lies in its simplicity:  
Overall, it cannot be too difficult to arrive at preferences on most 
matters, because everyone does it. ... Near universal preference 
formation requires that preferences can be inferred from all possible 
directions. ... By knowing who or what is involved, the arena or 
institution of involvement, the subject or object of involvement, 
people know whether they are supposed to have preferences and 
what these preferences ought to be. (Wildavsky 1987:16) 
If cultural theory really is so accessible to anyone, then it should also be easy to 
research by deploying well-known survey methods. The great expectations and 
promises conveyed by the presidential address make it is even more disappointing 
that the results from survey research have been rather meager (Verweij and 
Nowacki 2010). 
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I will start this chapter with a brief summary of how cultural theory has been used 
in surveys. I will then present four different kinds of problems related to collecting 
data on individual level—problems that need to be solved before we can expect to 
obtain the results that Wildavsky was hoping for. First, we lack good measurements 
of those concepts that are so central to cultural theory. Second, cultural bias is 
measured without a clear model of how individuals and institutions relate to each 
other, which makes it problematic to use surveys without providing for a context. 
Third, given the prevailing differences on how cultural biases work in people and in 
institutions, we must be more careful about the level of analysis and the level of our 
conclusions. Fourth, many analytical techniques assume the ability to calculate 
cultural biases as if they were numbers. 
Surveys and Cultural Theory 
Cultural theory is one that operates best at the level of institutions, or what is also 
referred to as society’s meso-level. Part I of this thesis is an example of such 
research as applied to migrant households. This chapter attempts to look at how, 
with the help of surveys, cultural theory can be used at the level of the individual. 
This chapter also looks into the kinds of theoretical and methodological problems 
that must be solved before one can enter into such an unholy union between 
cultural theory and individual-level analysis.  
Much of the research derived from cultural theory is critical of methodological 
individualism and supportive of a variety of institutional explanations (Douglas and 
Ney 1998; Grendstad and Selle 1995). Nevertheless, in political science, population 
surveys have become a major tool because they allow us to answer questions about 
democracies, predict election results, and study changes in popular opinion.  
There are few areas in political science where scholarly knowledge 
has made greater progress in the past two generations than the field 
of political behavior. From Aristotle’s time until the 1950’s, the 
descriptions and explanation of public opinion were based on the 
impressions of political “experts”. We could not systematically study 
what citizens actually believed, how they acted, or why they voted 
for one party rather than another. The advent of systematic, 
scientific public opinion surveys dramatically changed our 
knowledge of the average citizen. (Dalton and Klingemann 
2007b:vii)  
The development of survey methodology has coincided with the development of 
economic sociology and a philosophy of science called methodological individualism 
(Hodgson 1986; Hodgson 2007). The core of methodological individualism lies in a 
belief that individuals are the most basic and most important unit of study. Public 
opinion is simply an aggregate of individual opinions. Changes in prices are 
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reflections of changes of the relation between total demand (sum of all individual 
demand) and total production. Similarly, institutions and the society as a whole, or 
at least the most important aspects of them, can be best studied by analyzing 
individuals.  
In addition, the survey literature to a large degree disregards an individual’s social 
relations as a context that shapes values and action (Achen and Shively 1995:7-8). 
When this literature deals with context, it does so mainly by discussing how 
wording, question ordering, and other questions in the same survey influence the 
results, or how using phone versus mail interviews influence the results (Schuman, 
Presser, and Ludwig 2004; Rockwood, Sangster, and Dillman 2004; Bishop, 
Oldendick, and Tuchfaber 2004b). Thus, the contextual influence that is taken most 
seriously is the one provided by the interviewer. What seems to be lacking from the 
mainstream survey literature is an awareness of how the social setting the 
respondent is in when providing survey answers will ultimately influence the 
respondent’s answers.211 Will we actually give the same answers if we are alone or if 
there are other people in the room? Are the answers the same if the people present 
are co-workers or one’s spouse? 
Given that surveys have such a dominant position as the tool for making social 
science, it is not surprising that several attempts have been made to use cultural 
theory in surveys. Common to these attempts is that information is collected on the 
individual level. These attempts differ, however, concerning the level of analysis 
and conclusions, as we can see in Table 15. The references are not to surveys, but 
to publications and the phenomena they explain, as the same data can be used in 
several ways. Some research uses cultural theory on the level of society or 
institutions, for example to describe the cultural biases present in an electorate and 
a party system. Some research makes conclusions about individuals, for example 
how an individual’s perception of risk differs according to his or her cultural biases.  
The categorization presented in Table 15 can easily be contested, as several of the 
researchers move back and forth between their individual-level data and analyses 
and engage in calculations and discussions on several levels simultaneously. The use 
of regressions on individual-level data can be especially challenging because they 
usually require the presence of an individual-level causal mechanism. 
                                                     
211 By mainstream survey literature, I mean literature that can be found in collections like Questionnaires 
and Secondary Analysis of Survey Data, which together contain close to two hundred important articles 
or book excerpts (Bulmer 2004; Bulmer, Allum, and Sturgis 2009). 
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Table 15: Examples of Research based on Surveys using Cultural 
Theory 
 Individual-level analyses  Higher-level analyses Descriptive 
G
en
er
al 
po
pu
lat
io
n 
su
rv
ey
 
Risk perception (Wildavsky and Dake 1990; 
Jenkins-Smith and Smith 1994; Lockhart and 
Coughlin in Boyle and Coughlin 1994; 
Sjöberg 1995; Brenot, Bonnefous, and Mays 
1996; Brenot, Bonnefous, and Marris 1998; 
Kahan, Braman, Slovic, et al. 2007)212 
Attitudes toward nuclear power (Peters and 
Slovic 1996) 
Environmental attitudes and post-materialism 
(Grendstad and Selle 1997) 
Environmental risk (Steg and Sievers 2000) 
Nanotechnology (Kahan et al. 2008) 
Gun control (Braman and Kahan 2001) 
Political ideology (Coughlin and Lockhart 
1998; Swedlow 2008, 2009) 
Party preference (Olli 1999) 
Political knowledge (Michaud, Carlisle, and 
Smith 2009) 
Biased assimilation and credibility heuristics 
(Kahan, Cohen, et al. 2010; Kahan et al. 
2008) 
Perception of police brutality (Kahan, 
Hoffman, and Braman 2009) 
Perception of  rape (Kahan 2010a) 
Foreign policy (Grendstad 
2001) 
Party system (Grendstad 
2000) 
Party space (Grendstad 
2003b) 
 
 
Socio-demo-
graphic 
composition 
(Grendstad 
and 
Sundback 
2003) 
In
st
itu
tio
na
l 
po
pu
lat
io
n Environmentalists (Ellis and Thompson 
1997) 
Students and social relations (Boyle and 
Coughlin 1994) 
Cultural bias in a party. 
Data from members of 
political parties 
(Grendstad 1995b) 
Environmental protection. 
General population and 
members of env. org. 
(Strømsnes and Selle 
1996) 
Environmentalists (Ellis 
and Thompson 1997) 
 
O
th
er
 
po
pu
lat
io
n Environmentalists and recycling (Olli, 
Grendstad, and Wollebæk 2001)213 
Scientists’ risk perception (Silva and Jenkins-
Smith 2007)214 
 
Social capital and 
entrepreneurship. Data 
from immigrant groups 
(Caulkins and Peters 2002) 
 
 
                                                     
212 Boyle and Coughlin refer to work by (Lockhart and Coughlin 1992), which does not contain 
information about this survey. Perhaps their reference should instead be to (Coughlin and 
Lockhart 1992). 
213 Their study consists of two samples: general population and members of environmental 
organizations. Only egalitarian bias is used.  
214 Only hierarchical and egalitarian cultural biases are included. 
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To the best of my knowledge, the largest survey that measures the four cultural 
biases designed to test cultural theory is the Nordic, five-country survey from 1999 
(Grendstad et al. 1999).215 Another particularly interesting survey is a 1995 study on 
environmentalism in Norway, which contains two separate samples: one of the 
general public and one of the ten largest environmental organizations (Strømsnes, 
Grendstad, and Selle 1996). I will later use both of these surveys to test some of my 
ideas. 
A commonality between most of the individual-level analyses in surveys with 
samples drawn from the general public is that they have failed to achieve those 
results that one might expect to find given the lofty claims made about the utility 
and importance of cultural theory. This is probably one reason why so few of these 
large-scale surveys have been undertaken during the last few years. I believe, 
however, that survey-based research informed by cultural theory contains a number 
of potential problems. I also believe there are at least some partial remedies to 
those problems. Whatever the case may be, conclusions about the utility of cultural 
theory at the individual level should be postponed until more information is 
available.  
 
Problem 1: Lack of Good Measurement of Concepts 
Central to Cultural Theory 
Describing Institutions or Groups 
Political scientists using cultural theory typically study a conflict between two 
institutions and explain the competing policy positions by referencing the 
characteristics of these institutions. More commonly, however, institutions are 
described in a rather rough manner and lack the proper measurement of 
institutional traits. One possible cause for this is a tradition in organizational 
research where the discussions are mainly theoretical and the weight of empirical 
observation comes from their centrality in the argument, without any attempt at 
representativeness.216 Describing these kinds of institutions usually requires 
intensive research strategies that either limit us to small sample sizes or require 
more resources than what is usually available.217  
                                                     
215 There is another study with a similar sample size, but it measures cultural biases as two dimensions 
(Kahan, Braman, Slovic, et al. 2007). 
216 There are several good overviews of research on organizations (Scott 1987; Greenwood et al. 
2008). 
217 Some cultural theory research has in a systematic manner described and measured institutional 
traits (Douglas 1984; Peck et al. 2004; Caulkins and Peters 2002; Mars 2005).  
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Gross and Rayner’s suggestion to measure both organizations and individuals 
(1985) is perhaps the most proper way of capturing cultural theory, but it is too 
demanding for practical use. 
Gross and Rayner stress that these indices [detailed inventory of 
questionnaire responses] need to be combined with extensive 
ethnographic fieldwork to cross-check their validity. Admittedly, this 
method is “expensive of time and resources and is therefore 
principally applicable to small-scale units. (Gross and Rayner 
1985:115)” Perhaps for this reason, their methodology has not, as 
far as we know, been used in actual research. (Boyle and Coughlin 
1994:192) 
This kind of approach, where information is collected about many participants 
embedded in a situation of social conflict (involved organizations, involved 
companies, involved public officials and politicians, the local population, etc.) 
demands a large amount of resources. Like Boyle and Coughlin, I have not 
succeeded in finding research that uses the method described by Gross and Rayner.  
According to cultural theory, three characteristics must be mutually supportive for 
an organization to be stable over time—i.e., to institutionalize or become and 
institution. These characteristics include behavioral patterns, social relations, and 
cultural biases, which are all mutually dependent on each other. Change in one is 
likely to cause changes in the two others (see Figure 2 on page 12).  
The authors claim that some combinations of worldviews (cultural bias), social 
relations, and behavioral patterns will not be compatible in the end.  
The viability of a way of life, we argue, depends upon a mutually 
supportive relationship between a particular cultural bias and a 
particular pattern of social relations. These biases and relations 
cannot be mixed and matched. We call this the compatibility condition. 
... Social relations generate preferences and perceptions that in turn 
sustain those relations. (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:2) 
In the above quotation, preferences are seen as a central component of an 
institution and thus context-dependent. Likewise, earlier in this thesis, we saw how 
closely connected each household’s political views were to their internal 
organization. 
A typical way to apply cultural theory at the institutional level is to study two of 
these three aspects (social relations, behavior, or cultural bias) within one 
institution, or perhaps compare them across a few institutions. Instead, 
institutional-level sources, like policy documents, are preferred and more often used 
Problem 1: Lack of Good Measurement of Concepts Central to Cultural Theory     • 
 
285 
rather than surveys that ask policy makers or voters what they believe to be good 
policies.218 
Nevertheless, many projects have focused on single institutions by deploying 
surveys that are tailored to their specific target audiences, which is perhaps the 
safest way to use surveys within cultural theory, especially if one is trying to map 
out people’s social relations. In addition, it is difficult to ascertain a person’s 
position in relation to the four cultures in a way that is not limited to a particular 
context.  
Can Cultures be Measured at the Individual Level? 
In order to perform a quantitative analysis of a dynamic system in a manner that 
allows for a numeric representation of the dynamic system, time-series data from a 
sufficiently large number of points is required. Since such data is not available for 
social systems, we must simplify our theory prior to measurement and analysis.  
For measurement purposes, cultural theory can be presented as a linear model, even 
if the theory actually posits that behavioral patterns, social relations, and cultural 
biases are all part of a dynamic system (Thompson 2008). In Figure 10, we can see 
the social relations model of cultural theory.219  
Figure 10: The Social Relations Model of Cultural Theory 
 
The cultural theory model depicted above has one big weakness for use at the 
individual level: It is very difficult to measure actual social relations with the help of 
surveys. As a remedy, Boyle and Coughlin propose using Wildavsky’s idea of 
studying individuals’ preferred social relations instead of their actual relations 
(1994:192). This is depicted in figure below.  
                                                     
218 There is a great body of research that uses cultural theory on the organizational level (Douglas 
1986; Rayner 1986; Thompson and Wildavsky 1986b; Wildavsky 1987; Rayner 1988; Ellis 1991; 
Caulkins 1995; Sivan 1995; Frosdick and Odell 1996; Coyle 1997; Caulkins and Weiner 1998; 
Maesschalck 2004; Mars 2005; Verweij and Thompson 2006; 6 and Mars 2008; 6 2011). 
219 This figure is basically similar to one in presented by Boyle and Coughlin, but they label the cultural 
bias as worldview 1,2,3 and 4 (1994: 191).  
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Figure 11: The Preference Model of Cultural Theory 
 
 
A somewhat similar logic can be found in Rippl (2002). She discusses whether 
cultural theory can be tested based on measurements made on individuals, and 
whether the empirical measurements of cultural biases using Dake’s items relate to 
each other in the way the theory claims. When concluding the discussion 
concerning whether cultural theory can be tested based on measurements made at 
individual level, Rippl states that “a measurement on the level of individuals is not a 
direct measure of culture but a measure of processes that are connected to culture” 
(2002:151). 
She considers this as sufficient for testing the theory. The measurements will be 
indirect, but some patterns should be detectable. Moreover, she writes that  
Empirical evidence for the influence of ‘culture’ is found in social 
(in contrast to individual or random) variations in value preferences 
in different segments (groups) of society, which are based on 
distinctly different experiences according to their position in the 
social structure. (2002:151) 
By insisting that the measures used need to be tested and developed further, Rippl 
makes an important contribution toward improving the measurement of cultural 
theory. However, I believe she is not taking into consideration two important 
aspects. First, she does not present a clear model of how an individual actually 
relates to a culture. It appears as if Rippl has left one black box in her measurement 
model: the nature and form of those ‘processes that are connected to culture’. 
However, reading between lines reveals the possibility that she is assuming that 
cultural bias in an individual is a miniature version or a reflection of cultural bias in 
society.220  
It is also possible to construct a cultural theory that starts from individuals by 
simply disregarding their institutional attachments. The Cultural Cognition Project 
at Yale Law School has borrowed from cognitive psychology in order to build their 
own version of cultural theory. They have tested mechanisms like identity-
protective cognition, biased assimilation, group polarization, cultural credibility, 
cultural availability, and cultural identity affirmation. Since these mechanisms are 
present in individual-level experimental data, there is no need for institutions nor 
functionalism. Their approach is pragmatic and started from their interests in the 
                                                     
220 The individual-culture relation is dealt extensively in (Olli 1995, 1996, 1999). 
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political conflicts around issues of risk. They begin with the individual-level 
measurements of two cultural bias scales,221 and then divide the population into 
four classes based upon differences in cultural predispositions. They have 
successfully created an application tailored to explaining the basis for political 
debates in the US by showing how four cultural predispositions, as opposed to 
social background and other common variables, are more robust explanations for 
the nature of disagreement in politically difficult issues.222  
Do We Really Need the Grid-Group? 
There has been a lengthy debate among cultural theorists about the importance of 
grid-group. Originally designed by Douglas as a heuristic device, the grid-group 
concept later made its way into Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky’s work entitled 
Cultural Theory (1990) as a starting point for theory building. The following 
quotation draws from Selle’s reply to Wildavsky concerning the role of grid-group: 
Not only do the dimensions remain unclear, but we are not really told 
very much about them. In Cultural theory, we find surprisingly little about 
the dimensions themselves, i.e. the theoretical basis of the theory. ... 
The truth is that most of what is written within the tradition starts 
out from the four (or five) cultures and not from the dimensions as 
such. Instead of trying to specify how to move from the dimensions 
towards the different combinations of cultures—the most important 
and the most difficult question—most of the literature is mainly 
about the cultures, trying to relate preferences (and biases) to the 
different cultures, but decoupled from the dimensions as such. (Selle 
1991:362) 
Rippl uses grid-group as a starting point for her critique of the operationalization of 
cultural theory. In her view, the relations between cultural biases follow their 
placement in the grid-group dimensions. However, I am not convinced that it is 
theoretically wise to define grid-group as two dimensions that are unrelated to each 
other, and then place the four cultures or cultural biases as ‘directions’ with equal 
distances from these two dimensions. From this, one can then deduce that 
hierarchy and individualism are two opposite directions (with a strong negative 
correlation) and similarly that fatalism and egalitarianism are opposites (with a 
strong negative correlation) (Rippl 2002:152 H1 and H2).  
I see the four cultural biases as independent from each other and, at least in theory, 
negatively correlated with each other at the level of institutions. However, given 
                                                     
221 The scales are hierarchical-egalitarian and individualistic-communitarian. 
222 See (Braman and Kahan 2001; Braman, Kahan, and Grimmelmann 2005; Kahan and Braman 2006; 
Kahan, Braman, and Gastil 2006; Kahan, Braman, Gastil, et al. 2007; Kahan, Braman, Slovic, et al. 
2007; Kahan et al. 2008; Kahan, Hoffman, and Braman 2009; Kahan 2010b; Kahan, Braman, et al. 
2010; Kahan 2010a; Kahan, Cohen, et al. 2010; Kahan 2012). 
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that we are measuring biases on the individual level, the measures are going to be 
tainted by the individuals’ multiple cultural allegiances.  
As cultural theory theorizes about social contexts, it is perfectly 
appropriate for a person to face one way in business, another way in 
the army and a third way at home. Predicting behavior becomes 
feasible by ascertaining cultural context from history. Of course, a 
corporate executive could be a vegetarian if she viewed her eating 
style as part of egalitarian family or club relations. (Wildavsky 
1991:359) 
The aforementioned executive spends her time in both individualistic and egali-
tarian environments, and her answers are likely to be a mixture of individualistic 
and egalitarian biases, which will contribute to a positive correlation between these 
two measures. Thus, individual-level correlations between two biases can also be a 
sign of people living their lives within a number of different cultural contexts.  
There is a tradition of drawing the grid-group and four cultures in one diagram, as 
in  Figure 12 below, so that the four cultures are presented in a two dimensional 
space (a Cartesian surface is the best you can hope for from a sheet of paper). I 
suspect that those of us in the research community have been fooled by the 
simplicity of this practice. I have yet to hear a convincing argument that explains 
why the four cultural biases are on the same ‘plane’ as the grid-group dimensions, 
or why the content of the cultural biases follows from the grid-group dimensions.  
One debate concerns whether the intersection of grid and group is 
most appropriately viewed as a typology (i.e. four basic categories in 
a 2 x 2 table) or as the coordinates of a Cartesian surface. The 
consequences of adopting one approach over the other are not 
trivial, particularly in any attempt to develop operational measures 
for empirical analysis. (Boyle and Coughlin 1994:193) 
Cultural theory research in some of its formulations starts from grid-group. This 
makes sense on the level of institutions: The two-dimensionality of the the four 
biases is postulated because they are drawn in the grid-group space. However, it is 
quite possible that on the individual level the cultural biases are not related to each 
other as four trajectories in a two dimensional space. Perhaps it is better to regard 
them as four independent dimensions. The main problem with the two-dimensional 
model of cultural biases is that if you are moving away from the egalitarian bias, you 
are always moving toward the individualistic bias. I do not believe that this is what 
happens on the individual level—on the level of institutions, perhaps, but not in 
people’s minds. Cultural biases are patterns of values and ideas. There are four 
distinct patterns that are in conflict with each other, but reducing the strength of 
one pattern does not automatically imply strengthening the other patterns. It can 
simply mean less patterning—a poorer fit with the patterns described by cultural 
theory. The lack of an egalitarian pattern should not be used as evidence of the 
presence of an individualistic, hierarchical, or fatalistic pattern. 
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Mary Douglas has called the grid-group a heuristic tool, and I believe it is best 
regarded as such, rather than the building block that everything else rests upon. It is 
a neat way to explain why these four patterns are more important than other 
patterns, but I would be careful to assume that grid-group is the ‘cause’ of the four 
cultures. 
Figure 12: Grid-Group and Four Cultures 
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Instead of relying on Figure 12 above, I will be treating grid-group as two 
dimensions that describe social relations (Figure 3 on page 13), while I treat cultural 
biases as a typology of worldviews that people can support or reject in varying 
degrees (Figure 5 on page 17). In this manner, if cultural biases are measured as a 
scale, they need to be divided into four independent dimensions. The relationship 
between the social relations (grid-group) and mental constructs (cultural biases) is 
postulated in cultural theory. However, if we were to use this relationship to 
constrain our measures, we would be unable test this postulate within the very core 
of the theory. There is research focusing on a few institutions that finds the 
presence of this relationship between social relations and cultural biases. As far as I 
know, however, no large-scale surveys have been able to establish this in a 
convincing manner.223  
Kahan and others at Yale claim that they are measuring grid and group, but the 
questions they are asking people show that they are actually asking questions about 
cultural biases, and they even refer to these as “two attitudinal scales” (Kahan 
                                                     
223 According to Boyle and Couglin, a study done by Kohn and Schooler (1983) is an exeception: a 
longitudinal study of the effects of the grid dimension in work settings on attitudes and personality 
variables (Boyle and Coughlin 1994: 193). 
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2012:8). Within the scales, no questions about social relations can be found, and 
several of the questions are identical or similar to those used by Dake (Kahan, 
Braman, Gastil, et al. 2007; Kahan et al. 2008; Kahan, Cohen, et al. 2010).  
As Thompson demonstrates in his recent presentation of cultural theory, it is 
possible to present the theory without the use of grid and group. Moreover, if one 
can remove both dimensions, one for sure should be able to add a third dimension. 
The most likely candidate for a useful third dimension is power or grip (Thompson 
1982, 1996:82, 2008:143). Pepperday has recently suggested a reformulation of grid-
group from two dimensions into three dimensions: competition, cooperation, and 
coercion. Coercion is in many ways the same as power. Out of these, he deduces a 
typology of four cultural biases. His formulation is different from cultural theory, 
and he calls it the Way of Life Theory, or WOLT for short, but he still ends up 
with the same four cultural biases (Pepperday 2009:Chapter 4).  
Measuring Cultural Bias on the Level of Individuals 
Boyle and Coughlin give a very insightful discussion about the content of cultural 
biases and how to measure them. 
The issue of how to measure worldviews (or even what a worldview 
consists of) is by no means resolved. ... We suggest that it may be 
preferable to conceptualize worldview in terms that clearly reflect 
the basic structure they are assumed to acquire from grid-group 
patterns: Fatalism and distrust are appropriate measures for the 
high-grid-low-group corner; scales of traditional morality or 
attitudes toward authority are reasonable for the high-grid-high-
group corner; and distinctive orientations toward the environment 
are appropriate for all corners. But more specific attitudes toward 
political and economical policy issues may be too context-dependent 
to be useful for comparisons over time or across cultures.  (Boyle 
and Coughlin 1994:215-216) 
Boyle and Coughlin compare different methods for capturing cultural biases and 
relate these biases to each other and to socially defined groups, like Catholics or 
low-income farmers. Unfortunately, the General Social Survey does not provide a 
better way to connect people to social relations. However, as I stated previously, I 
am skeptical toward also using grid-group as a way to define the content and 
measurement of cultural biases. Nevertheless, it is important to continue with 
efforts to find some more or less harmonized way to capture cultural bias.  
The most widely used approach for deploying cultural theory at the individual level 
was developed by Karl Dake, who proposes using 20 Likert-type items to establish 
respondents’ position toward cultural biases (Dake 1991; Likert 1974). This 
instrument poses no questions about social relations or behavior, thus leaving out 
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some important aspects of cultural theory.224 Each of the four cultural biases is 
captured by five items that are supportive of only one bias. Thus, support for a 
statement is counted as support for particular cultural bias. This structure is based 
on measuring degrees of support rather than degrees of rejection, and is prone to 
measurement errors caused by acquiescence, as I will show later (see page 326). 
A few example statements will make the question structure clearer. The first is one 
of the statements supporting individualism: 
Competitive markets are almost always the best way to supply 
people with things they need. 
People are asked if they strongly disagree, disagree, neither agree nor disagree, 
agree, or strongly agree with this statement. The logic behind the item is that people 
who support the individualistic cultural bias are more likely to agree with this 
statement. In addition, those who support hierarchical, egalitarian, or fatalistic 
biases will have reasons for disagreeing with the statement. However, disagreement 
cannot be used for establishing which one of these three other biases the 
respondent prefers.  
A similar logic applies to this statement, which is supportive of hierarchy: 
Different roles for different sorts of people enable people to live 
together more harmoniously. 
Respondents who adhere to the hierarchical cultural bias thrive with higher levels 
of labor and role differentiation, while it is trait that clashes with the egalitarian 
preference for equality. It is a bit unclear if an individualistic bias would necessarily 
lead to the rejection of this, or if this statement can be reconciled with an ideal of 
rich and poor living harmoniously. Not all respondents will understand the concept 
of roles in the same way as social scientists. My goal is not to have a discussion 
concerning the content validity of these items, but to focus on the ways the 
structure of the answers to these items influences the results we get.  
These items are abstract positions, and not reflections of a particular political issue. 
They are removed from particular political positions. In this way, they are much 
closer to ideological positions than they are to attitudes (Kuklinski and Peyton 
2007; Converse 1993; Zaller 1992).  
In cultural theory, a widely used concept is justification. People justify their 
behavior and way of life by making references to underlying principles (See for 
example Douglas 2001:9). Making judgments is very similar to making justifications 
with one obvious difference. Justifications are by definition directional and 
supportive of something, while judgments can be both positive and negative 
                                                     
224 On the other hand, this makes it possible to test if social relations, behavior, and cultural biases 
relate to each other as described by cultural theory. 
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(Stoker 2001).225 In some sense, one could argue that the cultural bias items suffer 
methodologically by being based on justifications rather than judgments.226 
However, the reason for this is built into the theory. If you make judgments on a 
one-dimensional scale going from A to B, rejecting A always entails accepting B. 
However, since cultural bias exists in a four-dimensional space, rejecting one bias 
does not necessarily imply a direction toward any of the other biases, as there can 
be different reasons (i.e., cultural biases) behind the rejection. In other words, the 
measurement of cultural bias is confined to a four-dimensional space where the 
dimensions are defined as support for or rejection of a bias. 
I have previously argued that rejection of a bias is important information (Olli 
1999). For example, if a respondent strongly disagrees with the individualistic 
statement given above, we can already start to make predictions about how they are 
likely to relate to several other political issues. In other words, the disagreement 
provides insights into the kind of attitudes he or she has. Moreover, I have 
suggested that combinations of biases are important, and their effects cannot just 
be added together (Olli 1999). Translating pro-egalitarian biases to political views 
obviously leads to different answers if we combine it with strong support for 
hierarchy or rejection of individualism. I will treat this issue separately later on in 
the piece.  
I believe that when people make judgments, they start from cultural biases 
(knowledge and preferences). Judgments are made in a context, and they bring in 
the social relations into the process of converting cultural biases to value-loaded 
statements concerning political issues.  
A new star among the attempts to measure cultural worldviews is presented by the 
Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law School: 
My collaborators and I take a pragmatic attitude. We are more 
interested in finding a scheme for measuring cultural worldviews 
that is internally valid and that has explanatory utility than in finding 
one that fits a profile dictated by axiomatic, abstract theorizing. 
(Kahan 2012:13) 
They have created two scales: the individualistic-communitarian scale, which runs 
in same direction as the group dimension, with high values for individualism and 
called the individualism-scale; and the hierarchical-egalitarian scale, which runs in the 
same direction as group, with high values on hierarchy and called the hierarchy scale. 
These scales have consistently high reliability (Cronbach’s alpha > 0.7 in every 
                                                     
225 This is true unless one assumes the existence of a mental drawer where answers to these questions 
are waiting for the occasion to be used. See, for example, Taber for a presentation of the different 
models of memory that are assumed to be involved in responding to survey questions and related 
to judgments (2001). 
226 In the household study, I allow households to justify their behavior and choices, which gives much 
more information than a simple score. 
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survey). The reason they give for choosing this solution is that if you measure the 
four worldviews independently,  
it becomes theoretically possible for a single individual to exhibit 
multiple competing orientations—for example, to be simultaneously 
both a hierarchist and egalitarian … it is not uncommon for subjects 
to have high scores on competing scales. … This feature of the 
Dake scales makes them unsuited for empirically testing cultural 
theory. (Kahan 2012:7) 
I see this empirical finding as one of the most intriguing findings in cultural theory, 
something that should be explained and researched. I am aware of the fantastic 
empirical results Kahan and his collaborators have received when researching the 
political controversies concerning risk-related issues in the United States, but I 
strongly disagree with the above argument. Kahan assumes here that a dominant 
cultural bias exists and chooses a measurement technique that supports his view. In 
this thesis, I will target the same question about the lack of consistency. However, I 
ask if the postulated dominance is present, and how the lack of it can be explained, 
rather than choosing a measurement model that hides the problem. In order to 
score high on individualism by using Kahan’s measurement model, you need to 
simultaneously reject communitarianism; and to score high on hierarchy, you need 
to simultaneously reject egalitarianism. Even if one takes the pragmatic view and 
accepts that the scale’s ability to discriminate between the heated moral issues is 
good, it remains an empirical fact that on the individual level, people have 
conflicting opinions. Simply taking an average of these conflicting opinions does 
not make them go away. This measurement model will give the same score for a 
respondent who chooses the middle point on every question as one who returns 
maximum scores on items loading on the opposite ends of the scale. Thus, we have 
lost the ability to test one central aspect of cultural theory, even if we have gained 
simplicity.  
To sum up, there is still confusion and fundamental disagreement concerning how 
to measure an individual’s position in cultural theory. Researchers measure either 
social relations, preferred social relations, grid-group, cultural biases as four 
dimensions, or cultural biases as two dimensions. In many ways, we are still in a 
phase of scale development and experimenting with different measurement 
techniques (DeVellis 2003). Until there is a standard questionnaire for cultural 
theory, researchers must develop their own questionnaires—ones that require a 
large amount of resources to develop and administer and are of limited use. 
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Problem 2: Cultural Bias is measured without a Model of 
the Individual-Culture Relationship 
As long as the relationship between individual and institution is unclear, it is 
difficult to interpret the results from survey data. The source of this confusion is 
the different models of how an individual relates to the four cultures. As early as 
1990, Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky were aware of the critique against classifying 
individuals as hierarchical, egalitarian, individualistic, or fatalistic. 
We often hear, in conversation and from readers of our work, 
because these people see part of themselves in all or most of these 
five ways, that our classification of individuals into five ways of life 
cannot be correct. (1990:265) 
They do provide two different solutions to this dilemma. 
Given that individuals find themselves in different social contexts in 
different areas of their lives, the interesting question is how they 
cope with this situation. Is there a strain to consistency on the part 
of individuals or du individuals compartmentalize the rival ways of 
life (1990:266)? 
These two different ways of understanding the relationship between individual and 
cultural biases require different operationalizations. In earlier work, I presented 
three different ways to code and analyze survey data, depending on the 
understanding of the relationship between individual and cultural biases (Olli 1995). 
First, the coherent individual model assumes that individuals are carriers of one cultural 
bias, or at least that they tend to adhere to one particular way of life. As Douglas 
writes, “Personally, I believe the limits are real, that it is not to stay in two parts of 
the diagram at once” (Coyle 1994:229). Douglas has, for the most part, continued 
to use her model of the individual as coherent actor, which assumes that each 
person’s thoughts and actions are characterized by a single way of life. In Thought 
Styles, however, she acknowledges this as extreme (Douglas 1996b:99). Not 
surprisingly, several authors rely on this model. In her survey, for example, Palmer 
treats individuals as coherent actors (1996). Similarly, Wildavsky asks about the 
“relative proportions of hierarchists, individualists, egalitarians and fatalist in a 
population” (Swedlow 2002:273). 
The consistency at the individual level does not need to be absolute.  
Yet for all the means by which biases are compartmentalized and 
morselized, most individuals do find themselves inhabiting one way 
of life more than others. As within Goethe’s Faust, there may be 
more than one soul dwelling within an individual’s breast, but the 
competing allegiances are not equally divided among the possible 
ways. (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:267) 
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According to Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky we can have several biases within us, 
but one takes the lead. One cultural bias is the dominant one. I will later test this 
assumption about the existence of a dominant bias (see page 432). 
Thus, context will not create short-term changes, as the cultural bias is likely to be 
the result of primary socialization. According to this model, many people can be 
coded as supporters of a cultural bias (individualist, egalitarian, hierarchic, and 
fatalist), and then one is likely to have a number of people who do not quite fit.227  
Second, the sequential individual model accepts that people belong to several social 
contexts, and change of context will have a swift effect on a person’s worldview. 
Thus, it is possible to be individualistic at work and hierarchical at home. We 
change out worldview when we change our roles. This model resembles Rayners 
mobility hypothesis, where “individuals may flit like butterflies from context to 
context, changing the nature of their arguments as they do so” (Rayner 1992:107). 
Given this model, it is difficult to use surveys to measure cultural bias in general 
simply because there should be no general cultural bias on the individual level. 
Instead, cultural bias is utterly dependent on context and, therefore, all questions 
that seek to entertain questions of bias need to be tailored to particular contexts. 
Unfortunately, the questions posed by Dake are nowadays used in surveys to 
measure bias in general, independent of context.228  
The following is an example of what I have called the sequential individual 
approach in cultural theory. In this example, Lockhart and Coughlin are asking 
about the consequences of this kind of understanding of the individual-culture 
relationship: 
… We need to shed light on how hybrid cultural biases actually 
operate across time and social context within societies. One 
possibility is that the actual or perceived variations among multiple 
spheres of life—for example, a predisposition towards individualism 
in the workplace versus egalitarianism (or hierarchy) in the family—
can be directly traced to the primary socialization processes within 
these respective spheres. If this is the case, then an important related 
question is whether or not people apply cultural biases only within 
the context in which the socialization occurred, or follow additional, 
presumably more complex, principles of application. This 
knowledge is critical, for without some capacity to explain when 
people will act on particular cultural biases, cultural theory and 
                                                     
227 Palmer includes respondents who score in the top 15% in a bias as supporters of one bias (Palmer 
1996). 
228 Dake was originally interested in nuclear risk. Nevertheless, we should not forget that the 
important work to test and validate these questions, by comparing them with interviews and 
observations, was done in the context of household consumption (Dake, Thompson, and Neff 
1994).  
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socioeconomics have only ex post facto utility. (Lockhart and 
Coughlin 1992:804) 
Third, as a solution to the problems with changing worldviews, I proposed the 
synthetic individual model, which assumes that people can belong to several contexts, 
and their worldview is a hybrid or blend of their contexts. Cultural biases change 
slowly, which can then create tensions when people operate in several different 
contexts. It is easy to assume that people would then seek out social arenas that are 
not in conflict with their biases. Given this model, it is possible to use biases as 
scale variables, and a person’s cultural bias can be described by their score on the 
four cultural biases (Olli 1995).  
In Table 16, we can see these different cultural bias models at the individual level 
summarized according to the stability of individual cultural bias, the number of 
biases an individual has, and the role played by the institutional context. If the 
stability of individual cultural bias is low, we are then dealing with the sequential 
individual approach, given that the immediate context has a strong influence on 
cultural bias. If stability of individual cultural bias is low, and these changes are 
triggered by something other than the institutional context, we then have a situation 
that does not fit with cultural theory. If the stability of the individual cultural bias is 
high, we are dealing with the coherent or synthetic individual models. They are 
differentiated by the number of cultural biases on the individual level. The coherent 
model claims that one bias is enough, while the synthetic individual models claims 
that a person can relate to several cultural biases simultaneously. 
Recently, I have recognized the need for a variation of the synthetic model—a 
variation that does not assume that the effects of the four cultural biases can be 
captured through summation. The logic of culture is more complicated than just 
adding values or biases together. I call this fourth model, the cultural bias combination 
model. In this model a person’s cultural bias can be described, for example, as 
supporting egalitarianism (E) and hierarchy (H), rejecting individualism (i), and 
indifferent to fatalism (), which can be presented as EHi. Capital letters indicate 
support, small letters rejection, and a missing letter shows indifference to a bias. 
When making judgments the indifferent biases can be ignored, while all other biases 
must somehow be handled to create consistent judgments. I will operationalize the 
cultural bias combination model in Chapter 10 and use it extensively in Part III to 
discuss cultural theory.  
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Table 16: Models of Cultural Bias at the Individual Level 
Stability of individual cultural bias  
High Low 
 The influence of immediate institutional context on individual bias 
 High Low High Low 
Only one 
Special case 
of 
coherent229 
Coherent 
Special case 
of 
sequential230 
Against 
cultural 
theory 
Number of 
cultural biases 
at the 
individual  
level  
One or 
several 
supported 
Unknown Synthetic or combination Sequential 
Against 
cultural 
theory 
 
Thompson has resolved some of these dilemmas on a theoretical level by insisting 
that individuals are not the proper unit of analysis. Cultural theory is about 
relationships, and the smallest possible unit is a dividual (the relationship between 
two individuals), and the proper unit of analysis are the four solidarities. 
Nevertheless, you cannot talk to a solidarity and sometimes we need to ask 
questions to people in a particular context (Thompson 2008:19-20). 
The Relative Autonomy People Have in a Culture—Knowledge, 
Preferences, and Social Relations  
The debate over the autonomy of individual thought and action within a culture is 
an old but central debate.231 Cultural theory is primarily a framework to be used on 
the meso-level,232 but it is possible to build a bridge toward the individual level. It is 
too simplistic to put a person into one of the four categories; we should also take 
into account that people live their lives in different spheres and have various roles 
(Olli 1995, 1999, 1996). People’s relations with these four ways of organizing can be 
described by their knowledge of them, by their preference for or rejection of them, 
and by their actual social relations. These three aspects together give us a picture of 
a people’s ability and willingness to utilize the social resources around them. 
                                                     
229 This special case consists of settings where the individual is likely to meet only one kind of 
institution, each of which will have a strong immediate influence on the person’s cultural make up. 
In some ways, this is what totalitarian regimes have hoped for: a populae that can be formed by the 
institutions. 
230 In this case, individual-level studies of culture are meaningless unless they are firmly rooted in an 
institutional context. This approach is valid if individuals only display traits of the institution they 
are currently a part of, and are unable to bring values or behavioral patterns from one context to 
another. However, these assumptions do not seem to have support in the research community. 
231  A good description of the main features of the debate can be found in Alexander and Seidman 
(1990). 
232 Thompson sees cultural theory as valid for all levels and having qualities similar to fractals (2008: 
f15). 
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People have varying levels of competence or knowledge about these four ways of 
organizing. Each way is a complete system of organizing, into which a person must 
be socialized. My first assumption is that even if a person is not able to verbalize 
the structural characteristics of her social relations, she is still able to bring her 
knowledge from one situation to another. In other words, an immigrant who has 
been socialized into a hierarchical way of organizing will find it much easier to 
participate in a new setting if that setting is also hierarchical. My second assumption 
is that people have varying levels of knowledge about quality (not everyone is able 
to grasp the nuances of the social life) and quantity (some people have experience 
of only one way of organizing, whereas others are fluent in all four). A person can 
be fluent in one way of organizing and bit rusty in another.  
People also differ in their preferences. Knowledge of one way of organizing does not 
automatically provide a disposition toward it. It is easy to imagine how refugees 
might dismiss the way of organizing from which they have been fleeing, even if, or 
perhaps rather because, they know how it works. Rejections of ways of organizing 
are also important when we choose political parties because the rejections limit our 
options. Rejection is not just a lack of preference for particular ways of organizing. 
Indeed, rejection can be just as strong as or even stronger than our support for a 
way of organizing. I believe that rejections can have a more important role in our 
thinking and behavior than previously thought. I will return to this in Chapter 13. 
In addition to these two mental characteristics, one should also describe a person’s 
actual social relations. People do not exist in a vacuum. They have to find their place 
in a society. It is not a given that a person will be able to create and uphold the 
relations he or she desires, which might force this person into isolation. This is 
especially relevant for migrants, who almost by definition leave one set of social 
relations behind them and enter into a new set of social relations in their new home 
country.233 However, in a survey-based approach it is difficult to capture social 
relations in a meaningful way. 
Figure 13 below provides an overview of the knowledge model of cultural theory. 
In my view, this model provides a better description of how cultural biases work at 
the individual level when compared to the social relations model depicted in Figure 
10 or the preferred social relations model depicted in Figure 11. Nevertheless, in 
the surveys I have, only two aspects of this model are available: preference for a 
way of organizing and present attitudes. For future research, this model would 
provide the means for a powerful test of how individuals relate to cultural biases 
and to institutions.  
                                                     
233  However, we must remember that social bonds can be stretched over oceans, and some have 
relatives and friends (many of who helped/encouraged them to come to Norway) waiting for their 
arrival. In other words, both transnational communities and migration chains are important. 
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Figure 13: The Knowledge Model of Cultural Theory 
 
A combination of knowledge, preferences, and social relations tells us how flexible 
and resourceful a person is. Troubles arise when one has the knowledge of a social 
system, but lacks the social relations needed to get the rewards. The obvious 
remedy is the acquisition of the necessary social relations, which is not always 
possible, especially if one is subject to social exclusion by the majority population. 
It also does not help to be inserted into social relations if one lacks the knowledge 
needed, or if one rejects the particular ways in which relations are organized. Some 
people are also more flexible than others. Social chameleons have knowledge of 
different ways of life and are able to participate and feel at home in many different 
social settings. Because each of these four ways of organizing has its own logic, and 
because each controls the distribution of resources and burdens, those people who 
are able to bridge two different systems of organizing are likely to be among the key 
players in the society.234 Their opposite would be those who accept only one way of 
organizing and strongly reject all others, which is something we can find in politics 
both among supporters of the extreme right (pure individualism) and the extreme 
left (pure egalitarianism) (Olli 1995).  
To sum up, in order to measure cultural biases and analyze survey data, a model of 
the individual-culture relationship is required. The knowledge model of cultural 
theory is promising, but the survey data available does not allow for the analysis of 
knowledge about ways of organizing nor knowledge about social relations. 
Therefore, in reality, I will be measuring only how the preferences toward cultural 
biases influence party preferences. I will be using the cultural combinations model 
to conceptualize how cultural biases work in the individual. 
                                                     
234 Steve Nay calls these social entrepreneurs.  
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Problem 3: Jumping between Levels 
In their book entitled Cross-level inference, Achen and Shively show that many of the 
phenomena social scientists are interested in actually involve two levels. In this 
thesis, these levels are referred to as the individual level and the institutional level. 
Nevertheless, we rarely have data from both levels. Therefore, we need theories if 
we are to make assumptions that allow us to use data from one level for making 
conclusions concerning the other level. Unfortunately, there are a multitude of ways 
of being wrong about cross-level analyses, both in the way the theories are 
constructed and in the way the statistical analyses are done and interpreted (Achen 
and Shively 1995:3). 
In cultural theory the causality is commonly seen as going from institutions to 
people, like in How Institutions Think (Douglas 1986) or in the social relations model 
(see page 285). Methodological individualism understands this causality as working 
the other way around: individual participants’ cultural biases make the institution. 
This is a position that I find difficult to accept. Therefore, we must be very careful 
when we make conclusions based on individual-level data. Nevertheless, the use of 
individual level data is necessary if we want to know how individuals are influenced 
by the institutions they participate in .  
Individual-level studies offer the only real hope of teasing out 
genuine contextual effects. Even with individual data, however, the 
task is not easy, and much of the theoretical and methodological 
foundation remaings unbuilt. Traditional sociological theorizing has 
often been muddled, and contemporary sociological studies of 
networks commonly emply ad hoc measures and methods with little 
connection to statistical theory. (Achen and Shively 1995:233) 
As long as we do not know how the relationship between individual and culture 
works, it is difficult to use data collected on one level to say something about 
another level. I believe there is no inherent problem in using survey data to study 
culture so long as the level of analysis corresponds with the level of culture we are 
studying. A good example is Hofstede’s study of national cultures by using surveys 
of IBM employees: When his research interest is the difference between national 
cultures, he aggregates the individual-level data to the national level; when his 
research interest is organizational culture, he aggregates the data to the level of 
organizations instead of searching for individual-level associations (Hofstede 2001).  
One of the clearest expressions that reject the use of individual-level data to explain 
phenomena on higher levels is made by Rayner, who argues that “methodological 
individualism that extrapolates from individual behavior to social action has no 
place in cultural analysis” (Rayner 1992:86). Rayner’s point has some validity, but it 
needs to be rephrasing and qualified.  
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Describing People or Institutions 
How can we use individual-level data to describe institutions or anything else above 
the individual level? Assuming that the sequential individual model is correct, and 
we all shift our preferences when moving from context to context, it is rather 
impossible to use survey data that are not solidly rooted in a particular context or 
institution to make claims about the cultural level. Similarly, if the synthetic 
individual model is correct, and our cultural biases reflect the sum of our 
institutional attachments, we must be very careful of using the individual-level data 
to describe any higher-level phenomena because we do not know which institution is 
the cause of the individual-level biases. 
The lack of a model for the individual-culture relationship, which I discussed 
previously, should stop us from making any conclusions across analytical levels. 
Using individual-level data to draw conclusions about institutions or cultures 
renders those conclusions as rather meaningless if we cannot define the direction of 
the causality. More research is needed to find out how people’s cultural biases and 
institutions interact. Even if cultural theory, which is in fact a systems theory, 
rejects the idea of simple causal directionality, the direction of causality is a 
necessary assumption in many statistical procedures like regression analysis. The 
least we can do is to be explicit and consistent in our use of assumptions. 
Aggregating from Hybrids to Pure Bias 
Lockhart and Coughlin point to what they see as a troubling oversight within 
cultural theory: “If the persons who compose various groups are themselves 
characterized by hybrid biases, then how can the groups be pure in cultural bias?” 
(Lockhart and Coughlin 1992:803). This problem is connected with methodological 
individualism and its assumption that an institution is the sum of its parts, which 
makes the cultural bias of an institution just an aggregate of the members’ cultural 
biases. Perhaps people’s biases never have a one-to-one match with the institution’s 
cultural bias. People are more or less adapted and more or less at home in an 
institution. Even if people’s biases are hybrids, there can still be strong pressures 
within the organization to allow for only one type of cultural bias to dominate in its 
official documents and policies. It is quite possible, perhaps even reasonable, to 
assume that institutions are more than just the sum of its individual members. 
Thus, this is not a problem if we depart from methodological individualism and 
embrace an institutionalist perspective. 
Another solution is to say that Lockhart and Coughlin rely upon the sequential 
individual model, where people’s cultural biases are heavily context dependent, 
while most survey measurements are not. This disconnect could be a 
methodological rather than a theoretical problem. However, it is still possible that 
people actually have hybrid biases, in which case we simply do not understand the 
mechanisms behind the ways that changes in context influence the judgments we 
make.  
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Sum of Opposites is Zero, or What Happened to the Institutions? 
One type of problem with aggregation, or a theoretical confusion between levels, 
arises when one aggregates too high up into the level of society. According to 
cultural theory, in every society you will find institutions relying on the four ways of 
life. Thus, assuming that the aggregates of all individuals’ cultural biases relate to 
each other the way cultural theory claims they do is, in reality, not such a 
straightforward assumption. It would be much more true to the theory if individual 
biases were measured within the context of different institutions. If the institutional 
and social placement of the individuals is important, one should expect aggregate 
means across all institutions in the society to be close to zero. This is what happens 
in a normal survey, where the measurements are not connected to a particular 
context. If measurements are made in a particular context, there should be clear 
deviations from zero.  
I am not claiming that all societies are the same. There is national-level research on 
cultural theory, showing that it is possible to also describe large-scale institutions 
with the help of cultural theory (Mamadouh 1999; Grendstad 1999b; Kahan 2010a; 
Kahan, Braman, and Gastil 2006; Kahan, Braman, Slovic, et al. 2007).  
To sum up, jumping between levels is possible as long as our assumptions, 
measures, and statistical techniques match each other. This requires a heightened 
awareness of the assumptions about the individual-culture relationship, direction of 
causality, and the measurement models we use. 
Problem 4: Ignoring the Meaning Cultural Biases Carry  
The fourth problem at the micro-level is that researchers have been deploying 
survey research as if cultural biases are somewhow devoid of meaning. I believe 
that cultural biases inherently carry meaning, and meanings behave differently from 
numbers. Previous research has measured cultural bias, in one way or another, and 
represented cultural bias through numbers. This alone poses no particular problem. 
However, when analyzing the effects of cultural biases, the researchers have used 
techniques that are well suited for analyzing numbers, but not at all suitable for 
analyzing meanings. The analyses are dependent on assumptions that have not been 
checked and unfortunately ones that often cannot be met.  
Most of the research mentioned in the first column in Table 15 (on page 282), 
including my own, violates some assumptions.235 For example, in an otherwise great 
article, Coughlin and Lockhart use four continuous cultural biases as additive 
variables in a multivariate regression that explains political attitudes (Coughlin and 
                                                     
235 I am concerned with claims made about the thoughts and behaviors of individuals. I am not 
making any claims about the institutional level. It is quite possible that these assumptions are valid 
when individual-level data is used to make claims about institutions or ‘cultures’.  
Moving Forward     • 
 
303 
Lockhart 1998). Even if their results are consistent with cultural theory, I believe 
that the assumptions required to do multivariate regression do not fit with how 
cultural biases actually function at the level of the individual. They are breaking at 
least two assumptions.  
First is the additivity assumption, which states that the effects of biases are additive at 
the individual level. In other words, you can add the effect of a hierarchical bias to 
the effect of an egalitarian bias, and this will be identical to the effect of having 
both egalitarian and hierarchical biases. However, holding two meanings can just as 
well become a third meaning, which might have an effect that differs from the sum 
of the two first ones. If the sum of biases does not work at the individual level, 
then using the average of these two to represent an individual’s position is also 
questionable.  
Second is the independency of effects assumption, which states that you can analyze the 
effects of one bias on its own: You do not need to know anything about the 
individual’s position on the other biases. However, if the effects from interactions 
between biases are sufficiently large, then it does not make much sense to analyze 
the effects of one bias alone because in real life several biases are likely to be 
present anyway. Analyzing just one bias at a time greatly distorts the understanding 
of the true effects.  
In Chapter 12, I will test these two assumptions, along with the assumption of a 
dominant bias, and empirically demonstrate that they are indeed fallacious.  
Moving Forward  
Despite of these obvious challenges, I believe it is possible to move forward and try 
to operationalize and analyze cultural theory in a manner that is clearer than the 
previous attempts. Many of the theoretical problems can be solved or made 
obsolete by allowing for the rejection of cultural bias and using combinations of 
cultural biases at the individual level.  
First, we need a way to measure cultural bias. I will develop ways of measuring 
cultural biases and evaluate their reliability and validity in two different surveys: the 
Nordic Cultures Survey of 1999 (NOS99) and the Norwegian Environmental 
Protection Survey of 1995 (NEPS95). In NOS99, the cultural biases are thoroughly 
measured, but here only party preference can be used as the dependent variable. In 
NEPS95, the cultural biases are originally measured in a less reliable way (only two 
or three items per bias), but I will add new items that can be used to create 
sufficiently reliable measurements of cultural biases. The next two chapters will 
operationalize cultural theory in these two surveys and evaluate the quality of these 
measurements. 
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Second, I have chosen to present my own solution to how the analysis of cultural 
biases should be done, and not just criticize others. Assuming the four cultural 
biases are carriers of meaning and cannot be analyzed and understood in isolation 
from each other, one possibility is to analyze them as combinations. Since little 
work has been done on cultural biases as combinations, there are no precedents 
that point to the best practices for operationalizing the cultural biases Therefore, in 
Chapter 10, I will compare hundreds of different ways to operationalize cultural 
biases, and, by using empirical criteria, I will select some assumptions that seem to 
work better than others.  
This will lead to a demonstration of two alternative ways of operationalizing the 
combinations of cultural biases, which will be used in Chapter 11 to analyze party 
preferences. I hope that such a demonstration will convince the readers that using 
combinations is a valid way to use cultural biases, which retains the meaning 
dimension.  
Third, in Chapter 12, I will use statistical tests on my preferred operationalization of 
cultural theory—i.e., the ranked combination of two strongest biases—to 
demonstrate that the dominant bias assumption, the additivity assumption, and 
independency of effects assumption, are fallacies that lack the empirical backing to 
qualify them as robust assumptions for guiding future research.  
Fourth, by using both qualitative data from the household study and quantitative 
data from the surveys, Chapter 13 discusses the rejection of cultural biases. The role 
and manner of rejecting cultural biases used in the households is compared with the 
effects of rejecting party preferences as they appear in the surveys. 
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C h a p t e r  8   
MEASURING CULTURAL BIAS IN THE 
NORDIC CULTURES SURVEY 
In this chapter, I will build four one-dimensional scales for measuring the 
respondents’ hierarchical, egalitarian, individualistic, and fatalistic cultural biases in 
the 1999 Nordic Cultures Survey (NOS99).236 A lengthy discussion is included 
because, as I pointed out in the previous chapter, the measurement apparatus is not 
yet well established. This discussion will hopefully give readers trust in the 
measurements used and help us to improve future research. Since the 
measurements will not be perfect, it is useful to know about the weaknesses prior 
to any analysis in order to separate the effects created by research methods used 
from any substantial effects.  
I will first present the items used and some of my choices in transferring the 
cultural bias items to scales that measure underlying dimensions. Second, I will 
discuss the reliability of the measurement and show that the responses are 
consistent enough to be used as a scale. Third, I will check the construct validity of 
these scales and show that they are measuring what we expect them to measure. 
Fourth, since these items are prone to yes-saying, I will discuss the acquiescence 
problem connected with the resulting scales. Finally, I present the manner in which 
these scales are constructed from the cultural bias items and give some suggestions 
for how to improve these items.  
Cultural biases are not attitudes; nevertheless, the following quote about the 
measurement of attitudes applies equally to the measurement of cultural biases: 
                                                     
236 The data file can be ordered from www.nsd.uib.no. The data is provided by the LOS Center, and is 
made available by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD). Neither LOS nor NSD are 
responsible for the analyses and interpretation of the data presented here.  These analyses in this 
chapter, with the exception of those related to acquiescence, are made with the syntax file 
Nordic1999_Validity&Reliability.sps.  
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The question has been raised whether the concept of attitude as 
here used and as measured by an attitude scale is not hypothetical 
rather than “real”. It is just as hypothetical as the concept of 
intelligence which is measured by what it supposedly does. But these 
concepts are hypothetical in the same sense that the concepts force, 
momentum, volume, are hypothetical in physical science.  No one 
has ever seen or touched a force or a momentum or a volume. They 
are measured by what they supposedly do. The legitimacy of these 
abstractions can be tested only in the consistency by which they 
operate in experience. (Thurstone 2004:291) 
Several authors have discussed how culture, as understood in cultural theory, 
should be measured.237 Since cultural theory has its roots in social anthropology, the 
great majority of those who employ Mary Douglas’s concepts rely on qualitative 
methods and avoid the problems involved in reducing complex cultural elements to 
numbers. There are also authors who have advised against the use of 
methodological individualism in cultural analysis (Rayner 1992:86). Nevertheless, 
there is also a considerable body of work based on survey data that has more or less 
succeeded in measuring cultural bias. 238  
The 1999 Nordic Cultures Survey  
The survey best suited for my purposes is the 1999 Nordic Cultures Survey, which 
contains 20 questions on cultural biases and a question about party preference. The 
survey draws from representative samples from all five Nordic countries (The Nordic 
Cultures Survey  1999). When considering the potential that NOS99 has for helping 
us to understand the relationship between culture and the individual and how 
cultural biases relate to political preferences, it is surprising that this survey has not 
been used more frequently by other researchers.239 Indeed, this is the largest 
multinational survey that employs items derived from or inspired by the items 
created by Dake and Wildavsky. 
                                                     
237 (Caulkins and Peters 2002; Grendstad et al. 1999; Caulkins 1999; Coughlin and Lockhart 1998; 
Jenkins-Smith and Smith 1994; Gross and Rayner 1985; Douglas 1984; Hampton 1982; Dake and 
Thompson 1999; Dake, Thompson, and Neff 1994; Olli 1995, 1999; Kahan, Braman, Slovic, et al. 
2007; Kahan et al. 2008; Kahan 2012). 
238 See the discussion on page 280 (Jenkins-Smith and Smith 1994; Sjöberg 1995; Marris, Langford, 
and O'Riordan 1996; Peters and Slovic 1996; Ellis and Thompson 1997; Brenot, Bonnefous, and 
Marris 1998; Coughlin and Lockhart 1998; Grendstad 1999a, 1999b; Grendstad et al. 1999; Olli 
1999; Grendstad 2000, 2001; Caulkins and Peters 2002; Grendstad 2003b, 2007). 
239 At least the following publications make references to this survey: (Grendstad et al. 1999; 
Grendstad 2001, 2003b; Grendstad and Sundback 2003; Grendstad 2007). However, Grendstad 
himself was the principal researcher behind the survey. 
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The survey was conducted as a computer assisted telephone interview in the local 
language by the national Gallup offices in each of the five Nordic countries 
(Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Finland, and Iceland) in late March and early April in 
1999. The principal researcher behind the survey was Gunnar Grendstad with 
support from Lotte Jensen in Denmark, Gunnar-Helgi Kristinsson in Iceland, 
Lennart Sjöberg in Sweden, and Susan Sundback in Finland (1999). More 
information concerning the sampling procedure in each of the countries can be 
found in the appendix (see page 523). 
In Table 17 we can see how each one of the samples from Norway, Sweden, 
Finland, and Denmark are close to 1000 respondents and representative for the 
population above 15 years of age, according to Gallup. The sample size for Iceland 
was a bit smaller with 817 respondents.  
Table 17: The Sample—Non-weighted and Weighted. NOS99. 
  Non-weighted Weighted 
   Frequency Per cent Frequency Per cent 
Valid Norway 997 20.6 1002 20.7 
  Sweden 1000 20.7 1000 20.7 
  Denmark 1015 21.0 1015 21.0 
  Finland 1003 20.8 1003 20.7 
  Iceland 817 16.9 817 16.9 
  Total 4832 100.0 4837 100.0 
 
Gallup has assigned weights to Norwegian, Swedish, Finnish, and Danish data to 
compensate for small sampling errors affecting age and gender. For Iceland, no 
such weights are use because the sample bias was accounted for in the gross 
sample. I will use these weights when the cultural bias scales are standardized.  
The Items Used to Measure Cultural Bias 
In Table 18 below, we can see a list of the 20 cultural bias items in this survey—
items designed to measure four cultural biases. These are largely based on items 
originally selected from existing English language survey items drafted by Carl Dake 
and Aaron Wildavsky (Dake 1990; Wildavsky and Dake 1990; Dake 1991) and later 
used in original or modified form by several other researchers (see footnote 238). 
The members of the international research team translated them into their own 
local languages. Small-scale pilot surveys were conducted in Finland and in Norway 
by using student samples and a focus group (Grendstad et al. 1999:7). The original 
items in English and their translations into Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, Finnish, 
and Icelandic are available in the appendix on page 525. 
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Table 18: List of Cultural Bias Items in NOS99.  
Variable 
name 
Statement Mean Std Mode Valid 
N 
rh1 One of the problems with people today is 
that they challenge authority too often. 
2.7 1.38 2 4473 
rh2 The best way to provide for future 
generations is to preserve the customs and 
practices of our past. 
3.8 1.23 5 4707 
rh3 Society works best when people obey all rules 
and regulations. 
3.7 1.30 5 4744 
rh4 Respect for authority is one of the most 
important things that children should learn. 
3.7 1.32 5 4699 
rh5 Different roles for different sorts of people 
enable people to live together more 
harmoniously. 
3.4 1.33 4 4333 
re1 The world would be a more peaceful place if 
its wealth were divided more equally among 
nations. 
3.8 1.34 5 4665 
re2 What our country needs is a fairness 
revolution to make the distribution of goods 
more equal. 
3.9 1.24 5 4599 
re3 I support a tax shift so that burden falls more 
heavily on corporations and people with large 
incomes. 
3.6 1.41 5 4588 
re4 We need to dramatically reduce inequalities 
between men and women. 
3.8 1.32 5 4662 
re5 Decisions in business and government should 
rely more heavily on popular participation. 
3.9 1.25 5 4547 
ri1 Everyone should have an equal chance to 
succeed and fail without government 
interference. 
4.1 1.12 5 4555 
ri2 If people have the vision and ability to 
acquire property, they ought to be allowed to 
enjoy it. 
4.5 .81 5 4736 
ri3 People who are successful in business have a 
right to enjoy their wealth as they see fit. 
4.2 1.11 5 4712 
ri4 Competitive markets are almost always the 
best way to supply people with things they 
need. 
3.7 1.25 4 4452 
ri5 In a fair system, people with more ability 
should earn more. 
3.6 1.33 4 4624 
rf1 It seems that whichever party you vote for 
things go on pretty much the same. 
3.1 1.60 5 4713 
rf2 Cooperation with others rarely works. 1.9 1.22 1 4678 
rf3 The future is too uncertain for a person to 
make serious plans. 
2.6 1.48 1 4674 
rf4 Most people make friends only because 
friends are useful for them. 
1.9 1.25 1 4719 
rf5 I feel that life is a lottery. 2.6 1.51 1 4714 
Cases are weighted. 
 
All the questions intended to measure cultural bias are Likert-type questions . The 
respondents were given five alternative responses to each of the 20 statements. 
These alternatives were strongly disagree (SD), moderately disagree (MD), neither 
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disagree or agree (Nth), moderately agree (MA), and strongly agree (SA). These 
responses are coded from 1 to 5.  
I will briefly comment on the distribution of the responses to these items at Nordic 
level.240 Some of the items are probably too easy to agree strongly to. If the items 
do not differentiate well, we will lose information about either those who agree 
most strongly or those who disagree most strongly. The first five items are intended 
to capture hierarchical cultural biases, and next five are egalitarian cultural bias 
items. We can see that the egalitarian cultural bias items have some unfortunate 
distributions. First, the mode is 5 for each of the five items. The mode shows us 
the answer with highest frequency, which in this case is ‘strongly agree’. 
Fortunately, the mean for each question is below 4, so the problem of having an 
‘extreme’ response as the most frequent response is somewhat moderate. Among 
the individualistic cultural bias items, there are three items (ri1, ri2, and ri3) that 
have a mean above 4, which reduces the available variation and makes it perhaps 
impossible to detect respondents who have even stronger support for the 
individualistic bias. The hierarchical, egalitarian, and individualistic items are thus 
skewed toward agreement. The fatalistic cultural bias items are skewed the other 
way. There are two items (rf2 and rf4) that have a very low mean, below 2, and on 
four of the items the most frequent response is ‘strongly disagree’.  
The cultural bias items were presented to the respondents in a random order, thus 
the question ordering cannot have an systematic influence on the responses 
(Grendstad et al. 1999). However, it is possible that it has an effect on the 
individual level. This aspect needs further study.241 Nevertheless, I will not discuss 
this here since for my present purposes, it is enough to know that the systematic 
effect of question ordering can be ignored.  
The presentation in this chapter does not follow the order in which my choices are 
made. I will first construct the four cultural bias scales and later evaluate the 
reliability and the construct validity of these scales. 
                                                     
240 For those planning to create surveys of their own, a downloadable file is available at 
http://eero.no/publ/The_1999_Nordic_Cultures_Survey_Responses_to_Cultural_Bias_items.pdf
. This file contains the distribution of the 20 cultural bias items one by one according to county, 
together with some comments concerning translations and other weaknesses. See also (Grendstad 
et al. 1999) for the documentation report for this survey.  
241 In the previous Norwegian surveys that utilized ct-items, the 1993 ISSP and the 1995 Environ-
mentalism surveys, the question ordering was fixed. The fatalism questions have been the last ones. 
So, would respondents be more fatalistic if these questions came first? These surveys have used 
only a selection of Dake’s cultural bias items, and questions relating to the same bias come 
together. This will probably create more consistency than if the items were presented in a mixed 
order. Unfortunately, the data file from Gallup does not contain information about the order in 
which the cultural bias items were presented to each respondent. If this information were available, 
it would have been possible to study the effects of order, which to my knowledge has never been 
done for the cultural bias items.  
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Constructing Scales 
Scale construction is a technical exercise which tends to be carried out without an 
explanation. Several choices need to be made along the way. What level of 
measurement should we use? How do we deal with missing responses? How many 
missing responses can we accept? How do we optimize the quality of measurement 
against the number of respondents available? Should the scales refer to the actual 
responses given or to the respondents’ relative positions? How are scales that are 
constructed with the use of simple methods, like the mean, reconciled with scales 
constructed through the use of advanced techniques, like factor analysis? These are 
the questions this section will attempt to answer, and in the end, I hope the reader 
will approve of the choices I have made. For the impatient reader, I will reveal here 
that a person’s deviation from the national average will be used as the basis for their 
score on cultural bias. 
Level of Measurement 
The choice of statistical techniques used in scale construction and analysis depends 
on the level of measurement. The answers given to the cultural bias items in these 
surveys are, by their very nature, measured at the ordinal level. Indeed, it is difficult 
to argue that the distance from strongly agree to moderately agree is equal to the distance 
from moderately agree to indifferent. At the same time, there are several positions 
concerning what types of analyses can be performed on ordinal-level variables. 
According to Stevens, variables at the ordinal level do not have properties that 
allow the use of the mean, and one is restricted to using descriptors like median and 
percentiles (Stevens 1946). The limitations put forth by Stevens are sound and have 
guided social scientists for decades. Nevertheless, I have chosen to standardize the 
responses, which requires the use of the mean. According to Stevens, this is 
permissible first on variables measured on the interval level. However, by taking a 
cue from other practitioners, I argue that ordinal-level analyses can be justified by 
the fact that many social constructs are conceptualized as continuous ones. As 
Borgatta and Bornhsted suggest, 
… what makes an appropriate ordinal scale is not merely the 
assignment of ranks to observations. An ordinal scale is appropriate 
if we assume that only the properties of “greater than” and “less 
than” define the underlying construct. We doubt this is the case for 
most variables to social scientists. As it seems to us that most 
constructs are conceptualized as continuous and can be thought of 
as reasonably distributed in the population using a bell-shaped curve 
as model, we see no reason not to analyze the manifest data using 
parametric statistics, even though they are imperfect interval-level 
scales. (Borgatta and Bohrnstedt 1980:160) 
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As we can see in Figure 15 on page 316, the distribution of the standardized 
responses roughly follows the theoretical normal curve. I believe that the 
continuous nature of the underlying cultural bias permits the use of techniques that 
otherwise require interval-level variables with only small errors. In other words, we 
can use standardization in our construction of the scales and analytical techniques 
like significance testing in factor and regression analyses without violating this 
particular assumption. 
 
Dealing with Missing Responses 
Because some respondents have not answered all the cultural bias questions, a 
minimum of three valid answers is required for a value on any of the cultural bias scales. A 
respondent with only two valid responses to the hierarchical bias statements will 
have a missing value on the hierarchical bias scale. In Table 19, we can see how the 
number of valid responses varies depending on the set of cultural bias statements. 
For egalitarian and individualistic cultural biases, there are quite a few respondents 
with only three valid responses. If the requirement were four valid responses, we 
would have had only 95.3 and 95.6 per cent of cases with values on the egalitarian 
and individualistic bias scales. Therefore, the limit for inclusion is set to three valid 
responses, which gives between 98 and 99 per cent valid responses on the cultural 
bias scales. 
Table 19: Number of Valid Responses to the Cultural Bias 
Statements (non-weighed). NOS99. 
Hierarchical Bias Egalitarian Bias Individualistic Bias Fatalistic Bias Valid  
responses Freq Cum. % Freq Cum. % Freq Cum. % Freq Cum. % 
5 3985 82.5 4084 84.5 4062 84.1 4399 91.0 
4 627 95.4 519 95.3 557 95.6 307 97.4 
3 156 98.7 158 98.5 162 98.9 82 99.1 
2 39 99.5 45 99.5 32 99.6 25 99.6 
1 15 99.8 16 99.8 7 99.8 9 99.8 
0 10 100.0 10 100.0 12 100.0 10 100.0 
Total 4832  4832  4832  4832  
 
Another relevant consideration is that the number of respondents is close to 1000 
for each country, which is rather small to start with when conducting analyses 
country by country. This means that the cost of loosing respondents is higher than 
if the analyses would be performed at the Nordic level. Moreover, in the later 
analyses that use cultural combinations, multiple valid cultural biases are required 
for every respondent. Therefore, it is important to keep the number of missing 
values as low as possible for each bias.  
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Excluding Respondents with 20 Identical Answers 
It seems unlikely that a respondent can answer seriously while having identical 
answers to every one of the 20 cultural bias items. Nevertheless, in Table 20 we can 
see that 18 respondents gave the same answer to all 20 statements. There are 5 
respondents with missing responses only on the cultural bias items. They are of 
course not at all included in the analysis. In addition, there is one respondent who 
answered only do not know, four who only agree, and eight who only strongly 
agree. These 13 respondents are excluded from the analysis because it is likely that 
they did not answer seriously.242 
Table 20: Respondents Who Gave the Same Answer to 20 
Cultural Bias Items. NOS99. 
  Frequency Percent 
Valid Do not know  1 .0 
  Agree  4 .1 
  Strongly Agree  8 .2 
  Missing 5 .1 
  Total 18 .4 
Missing System 4814 99.6 
Total 4832 100.0 
 
Measuring the Relative Value of Cultural Bias 
Several choices must be made when transforming these items to a scale. First, 
should the items be transformed into a fixed or a relative scale? These fixed scales 
are commonly just simple additive scales (Spector 1992). For example, given that 
the answers to each item are scored from 1 to 5, the minimum value for a scale 
consisting of 5 items would be 5 and the maximum value would be 25. Secondly, a 
scale can be made relative: Instead of measuring a respondent’s position on a fixed 
scale, we are more interested in the respondent’s position on the scale relative to 
other respondents. Examples of this kind of relative scaling techniques are ranking 
(the respondent belongs to the top 10%) or standardization (the respondent 
deviates so and so much from the average).  
Had there been only one behavior or opinion that would identify a position on the 
hierarchical, egalitarian, fatalistic, or individualistic cultural bias scales, it would have 
been possible to calibrate our fixed scales in relation to behavior or opinion. 
However, cultural biases do not work in this manner. There is no one single 
opinion nor behavior that could be used to test and calibrate our fixed scales. 
                                                     
242 Out of these 13 cases, 3 are from Norway, 6 are from Sweden, 1 is from Denmark, and 3 are from 
Iceland. The breakdown according to age groups is as follows: <30 = 2, >40 = 4, >50=2, >60=1 
and >70 = 4. 
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Culture does not determine thoughts or behavior, even if it is more likely that 
certain behaviors or opinions go together with certain cultural biases. 
The scores from 1 to 5 given to the responses are ultimately just random numbers, 
and it is safe to assume that the way respondents relate to language varies.243 What 
is the difference between agree strongly and moderately agree, and what is the difference 
between neither agree nor disagree and moderately disagree? We do not know whether the 
respondents describing their relation to the statements are using the scale in 
consistent manner.  
The interpretation of scores falling between the extremes is 
problematic except in relative terms. The ‘neutral’ point on the 
continuum is not known. There is no evidence to suggest that it 
corresponds to the midpoint of the scale values. (McIver and 
Carmines 1981:28) 
The most common way to make responses relative is to calculate standardized 
scores (z-scores).244 The standardized score shows the respondents position relative 
to the mean, which is always zero.  
If we used the mean of the group as our point of origin, then each 
of the individual attitude scores can be expressed as a deviation 
from this origin. We assume that the mean represents the typical or 
average attitude of the group. The scores that are higher than the 
mean can be interpreted as scores that are more favorable than the 
average for the group and scores that are lower than the mean can 
be interpreted as scores that are less favorable than the average …. 
(Edvards 1957 quoted from McIver and Carmines 1981:28) 
Which group should define the baseline for calculating the respondent’s deviation? 
In this survey, it is possible to use either the Nordic average or the countrywise 
average for each cultural bias statement as the baseline for standardization. 
Using the Countrywise Average as a Baseline 
There are differences between the countries from item to item (See footnote 240). 
Some of these differences are caused by differences in attitudes and values in the 
population, some by differences in the item wording, and some by unrelated 
phenomena like sampling errors. 
The scales measuring each of the cultural bias items have been constructed by using 
the average of the standardized responses to the questions (the z-score). These give 
                                                     
243 There are differences between languages and there are differences in response styles between 
countries (Harzing 2006; Curtice 2007). 
244 Every response is represented through its deviation from the mean divided by the standard 
deviation of the sample. Thus, some of the sample’s typical characteristics are removed, and only 
the component that is relative to the sample mean is used for further calculations. 
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the average of 0 with a standard deviation close to 1 if the distribution is 
symmetrical. The data has been weighed prior to standardization to counter 
sampling error on age and gender.245  
The Nordic average will better highlight the differences between the countries, as 
every country is likely to have an average that differs from zero, even if the average 
is zero for all respondents. The countrywise average will reduce the differences 
between countries as the average in every country will be zero. This average will 
also highlight the difference in attitudes within countries (as the difference between 
country average and Nordic average is ignored).  
I will be using the countrywise average for several reasons. First, I am most 
interested in using cultural bias to explain party preference, which is mainly a 
national-level phenomena. Second, I am not very confident that all the translated 
statements are comparable with a high degree of precision. Using countrywise 
averages will reduce the differences caused by translation (assuming that the 
translation errors are related to the degree rather than the content of the statement). 
Third, I believe that cultural biases are by their very nature a relative phenomenon. 
An institution that is viewed as representing a hierarchical way of life in one context 
can be interpreted differently in another context.246 Fourth, by using countrywise 
averages, the relative positions of groups defined by cultural bias are more similar. 
Thus, it is easier to compare groups that register high on the hierarchical bias in 
each country because I know their relative cultural bias positions within the country 
rather than their fixed cultural bias position. By using countrywise averages, I claim 
that the national context is more important for party preferences than the Nordic 
context. As always, a different research problem could have led to a different 
choice. 
 
 
                                                     
245 These weights are calculated by Gallup based on the information about the sampling errors in this 
survey. 
246 For example, The Officer’s Club could be seen as an egalitarian sanctuary within a hierarchical 
army, a place for recreation where rank does not matter (until it is called upon). The same officers 
club could be interpreted as a rather traditional carrier of hierarchical values if they would receive a 
large group of egalitarian environmental protesters.  
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Figure 14: Cultural Bias by Country (Deviation from the Nordic 
average). NOS99. 
Even if countrywise standardization has become a popular method for removing 
cross-national response bias from scale responses, this method does has some 
disadvantages (Harzing 2006).247 In Figure 14, we can see the differences between 
countries when using the Nordic average as a baseline.248 The disadvantage of using 
the countrywise average as the baseline is that these differences will disappear. We 
can see how Norway is less individualistic and less fatalistic than the other 
countries, while Sweden is more fatalistic. Denmark is much less egalitarian than 
the other countries, while Finland is more hierarchical and fatalistic. Moreover, 
Iceland is more individualistic and less fatalistic, which leads me to suspect that the 
financial crisis during the autumn of 2008 surprised many in Iceland and challenged 
the institutional climate. If my research problem would focus on differences 
between these countries, it would be a better choice to use the Nordic average as 
baseline and deal with the potential problems introduced by translation in more 
detail. 
                                                     
247 Harzing suggests that one should instead use a mixture of positive and negative statements, a larger 
number of response categories for the Likert scale, wording that reflects opposites rather than 
degrees (fixed answers), or rank statements (Harzing 2006: 260-261). Unfortunately, none of these 
suggestions are easily applicable to a secondary analysis of survey data.  
248 The bars show how the mean for a cultural bias within each country deviates from the Nordic 
mean (which is zero by definition). 
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In Figure 15 below, we can see the resulting distribution of respondents on these 
cultural bias scales after they are standardized country by country. Each of these 
scales has a mean of zero.249 The most interesting aspect with these figures is the 
measured distributions’ deviations from a theoretical normal distribution drawn in 
the same figure. The assumption of normality, or normal distribution, is not a direct 
requirement for any of the later analyses, but it confirms my assumptions about the 
level of measurement.  
Figure 15: Distribution of Respondent’s Scores on the 
Hierarchical, Egalitarian, Individualistic, and Fatalistic Bias 
Scales (Countrywise standardization) with a Normal Curve. 
NOS99. 
In addition, the deviations from normality can tell us something about the items 
and the scale we are using. The distribution of respondents on the fatalistic bias 
scale lacks the left toe. This tells us that either there are no people who strongly 
reject fatalism or that our measurement tool fails to capture them. The hierarchical 
                                                     
249 Since each of the countries has a mean of zero, their combined mean will also be zero. The mean 
for the fatalistic bias scale is -4.5E-4 in scientific notation, which equals -0.00045 and is for all 
practical purposes equal to 0.  
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bias scale quite closely resembles the normal distribution. The distribution of the 
egalitarian bias scale lacks the right toe. It looks like it does not capture differences 
among those who strongly favor egalitarianism. In other words, we will end up 
underestimating the effects of strong egalitarianism. In addition, the measurement 
of individualism has a similar weakness. The fall in the distribution of the 
individualistic bias is abrupt on the supporting side. Either very large parts of the 
population are supportive of individualism or we are not adequately measuring the 
strong support for individualism.250  
One can also notice a pattern across cultures: The three active cultures are 
differentiated well between those people who reject the culture (that is those who 
have negative values on these cultures) while the one passive culture, namely 
fatalism, is differentiated well between those people who support it. I am not clear 
on how to interpret this. It can be just a coincidence resulting from the way the 
items are constructed (caused by the research methods used) or by something more 
substantial.  
 
Use Average Value, not the Factor Score? 
There are several ways to take the information from five items and combine it into 
a scale. First, we could simply use the average response as I am planning to do. 
Alternatively, we could use factor analysis to extract the dimension underlying the 
items. The result can then be saved as a factor score. In purely mathematical terms, 
the factor score can be a better measurement of the underlying cultural bias 
dimensions than a simple mean because the former uses information from all 20 
items simultaneously and includes items in varying degrees so that those items with 
larger contributions exert a greater influence on the score. For example, the first 
fatalistic cultural bias item will contribute less to a fatalism factor than the other 
fatalistic items (see table 23 on page 324) because it correlates less (0.36) with the 
fatalism factor than the other fatalism items (around 0.6) . By contrast, in a simple 
mean or summary scale, all items contribute in equal proportions. In addition, if an 
item designed to measure hierarchical bias is actually influenced by fatalistic bias, 
this item will also be used to improve the measurement of fatalistic bias.  
In Table 15 we can see a correlation matrix for three alternative ways of measuring 
cultural bias. On the top, we have a mean based on countrywise standardization of 
cultural biases. On the left, we have regression scores from both the varimax 
rotation, which produces orthogonal factors (uncorrelated factors) and oblimin, 
which produces factors that can correlate with each other. The order of factor 
scores reflect the biases they are identified as measuring. We can see that the mean 
of the hierarchical cultural bias items correlates with both the varimax and oblimin 
versions of the same measurement at a Pearsons coefficient that is greater than 0.9. 
                                                     
250 For those interested in developing the cultural bias scales further, item-by-item distributions from 
all five Nordic countries are available. See footnote 240. 
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Similarly, the means of egalitarian, individualistic, and fatalistic items correlate at 0.9 
or more with their factorizised versions regardless of rotation.  
Table 15: Pearson Correlations between Cultural Bias Measures: 
Standardized Countrywise, Regression Factor Scores from 
Varimax and Oblimin Rotations. NOS99. 
  Mean of  Countrywise Standardized items 
  Hierarchical  Egalitarian Individualistic  Fatalistic  
Varimax factor 3 = H .92 .08 .17 .12 
Varimax factor 2 = E  .08 .93 -.06 .11 
Varimax factor 1 = I .17 -.09 .94 .07 
Varimax factor 4 = F .21 .10 .02 .89 
 
Oblimin factor 1 = H .94 .14 .26 .24 
Oblimin factor 2 = E .14 .95 -.07 .20 
Oblimin factor 4 = I .28 -.09 .96 .14 
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We can see that the varimax rotated factor, which produces four orthogonal 
factors, has a variety of features that are similar to what we have observed 
previously. The individualistic and fatalistic varimax factors are positively correlated 
with the countrywise standardized measures of hierarchical bias (but of course, not 
with the hierarchical varimax factor). All other correlations with the varimax factors 
are low. The pattern produced by the oblimin rotation is very similar and somewhat 
stronger. Thus, the factorized solutions are comparable with the simple mean.  
At the same time, however, one reservation remains when using the factor analysis: 
As the factorized solution requires five items, when we correlate the mean with a 
factor solution, we are excluding all respondents with only three or four valid 
responses. Stated differently, the disadvantage of using factor analysis is that it 
requires a higher number of items. There are only 3269 respondents who have 
answered all 20 items, while there are over 4700 respondents who have answered 
three or more items for each cultural bias scale. Information is lost for more than 
1400, or roughly a third, of our respondents when using the factor solution. 
Therefore, since we are measuring the same concepts with both rotated factor 
solutions and the mean, which allows us to use many more respondents, the simple 
mean is clearly preferable to the more complicated factor score. 
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What does it mean when a hierarchical cultural bias correlates with individualistic 
and fatalistic cultural biases? There are at least two interpretations if we assume that 
cultural biases are a fixed trait of the individual, and if we assume that the 
measurement of biases is independent of context. First, this could be a 
measurement error and the true biases are independent of each other. In other 
words, the questions are not good enough to separate the biases from each other. 
Second, it is possible that there are certain combinations of cultural biases that are 
more frequent than others, and this is the reason why the measurements correlate 
with each other. However, a measurement error will also affect the frequencies of 
the combinations. At this stage, it is impossible to separate these effects from each 
other. If we change our assumptions, and assume that people’s biases change from 
context to context, it is possible that these correlations reflect the kinds of 
institutions that people participate in. 
Reliability of the Cultural Bias Items  
One aspect that can limit the quality of data is reliability of the measurement, which 
refers to the internal consistency of the items used in one scale (Carmines and 
Zeller 1979). The reliability of a Likert-type summary scale is largely dependent on 
how consistently people answer the questions pertaining to the cultural bias items.  
All these 20 items have the same direction, each one focusing on support for one 
cultural bias. Thus, people who are so called “yes-sayers” are likely to score high on 
all four cultural biases. Later in this chapter, I will come back to the measurement 
problems this creates. But first, I will discuss the reliability of the items used in each 
cultural bias scale. 
Each bias is constructed by combining responses to five statements, which 
increases our ability to reliably measure a cultural bias.  
With a single measure of each variable, one can remain blissfully 
unaware of the possibility of measurement error, but in no sense 
will this make his inferences more valid ... In the absence of better 
theory about our measurement procedures, I see no substitute for 
the use of multiple measures of our most important variables ... 
(Blalock 1970:111) 
For improving scale reliability, a higher number of items is better (given that all 
items are measuring the same phenomenon), and scales consisting of five items are 
considered relatively good in social sciences. 
•    Measuring Cultural Bias in the Nordic Cultures Survey  
 
320 
… measures of social and political concepts do not usually go 
through the same process of development and assessment that is 
expected in psychometrics, and published reports of their reliability 
and validity are rare. Moreover, social science instruments tend to be 
much shorter than psychometric ones, and even a six-item measure 
is unusual. (Heath and Martin 1997:72) 
The most commonly used measure of a scale’s internal consistency is Cronbach’s 
alpha (DeVellis 2003:28).251 There is a rule of thumb saying that Cronbach’s alpha 
should be 0.6 in order for a scale to reliably measure one underlying construct 
(Heath and Martin 1997).252 I consider this a decent value for a five-item scale 
where the items are not repetitions of each other. These five statements refer to 
different domains, and one should not expect higher values from them.253  
I will in later analyses use classifications that divide respondents into very small 
groups. Therefore, I have chosen to include in the analysis those respondents with 
only three valid items, even if this reduces the reliability of the scales.  
In Table 21 below, we can see the reliability measured in Cronbach’s alpha for four 
different versions of the cultural bias scales. The two first are unweighted. The first 
one requires valid answers on all five items, while the second one requires valid 
answers on only three out of five items. We can see how the reliability of the 
hierarchical, egalitarian, and individualistic cultural bias scales declines when we 
include those respondents who have only three or four valid responses. The 
reliability of the fatalistic cultural bias scale is not affected by the inclusion of these 
respondents. 
The scales that accept three valid answers out of five items are at or just below the 
0.6 threshold for a reliable scale. The scales with five items are slightly above, with 
the exception of the fatalistic bias scale, which is just below this threshold. Thus, we 
know that the five items included in each of the scales seem to measure one 
underlying dimension with satisfactory consistency. However, the consistency is 
reduced when we include those respondents who provided valid answers to only 
three or four items. For these respondents, the measurement quality is not as high 
as it is for the rest of the respondents.  
Table 21 also shows that the difference between the reliability of the weighted and 
unweighted data is minimal. The only change is a small reduction of the five-item 
reliability of the individualistic and fatalistic cultural biases. 
                                                     
251 Cronbach’s alpha ranges from 0 to 1. If each respondent give totally consistent answers alpha 
equals 1. If each respondent give totally inconsistent answers alpha equals 0. 
252 DeVellis argues that the 0.60 level is undesirable, but still acceptable for research purposes (2003: 
95-96).  
253 For measurements of less constrained phenomena like ideology, sometimes a lower alpha value is 
considered sufficient. There is a rule of thumb presented by Nunnally, who writes that for 
measurements of ideology, an alpha value of 0.5 should be considered as the lower limit for a scale 
(Berglund 2004: 576) 
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Table 21: Reliability of Cultural Bias Scales. NOS99. 
(Cronbach’s Alpha and N) 
 Unweighted data Weighted data 
Cultural bias 
scale 
All 5 items 
unweighted  
Minimum 3 
valid items 
unweighted 
All 5 items 
weighted 
Minimum 3 
valid items 
weighted 
Hierarchical .60 (3985) .56 (4768) .60 (3955) .56 (4766) 
Egalitarian .65 (4084) .60 (4761) .65 (4060) .60 (4764) 
Individualistic .63 (4062) .58 (4781) .62 (4040) .58 (4783) 
Fatalistic .59 (4399) .59 (4781) .58 (4837) .59 (4783) 
All Cronbach’s alphas are calculated on standardized items. 
 
Reliability at the Nordic Level and at the Country Level. 
The discussions and measures of reliability presented in the previous pages pertain 
to reliability at Nordic level, where all five countries are considered as one large 
sample and where the original one to five scales are standardized in relation to the 
Nordic means. However, I will later argue for the use of countrywise 
standardization of responses, which slightly improves reliability. In addition, many 
analyses concerning party preferences must be done country–by-country. 
Therefore, it is necessary to ensure that our scales are created with the same 
procedures in each country in order to certify that the results are comparable 
between countries.  
The Cronbach’s alpha scores presented in Table 22 allow us to see how reliable the 
measurement of each bias is on a country-by-country basis. As the table shows, all 
four biases in the Norwegian and Finnish samples are measured with an acceptable 
level of reliability, while the measurement of biases in the Swedish sample are just 
below this threshold. In Denmark, the measurement of fatalism is under this 
threshold while the others are above it. In Iceland, only egalitarianism is measured 
adequately enough to be above this threshold. However, all biases are measured 
close to this threshold in every country. If Cronbach’s alpha had been presented 
with only one digit, every one of the values below the threshold would have been 
rounded up to it. Therefore, I argue that the scales can also be used on national 
samples.  
In addition to purely theoretical considerations, we can also compare the reliability 
of these cultural bias scales with the reliability of a four-question, left-right scale in 
Norway. Among the members of parliament, the reliability is exceptionally high 
with an alpha value of 0.93, while in the general public the alpha value is 0.56 
(Berglund 2004:577). Thus, the cultural bias scales have a similar or stronger 
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reliability than the best-known scale for measuring ideology among the general 
public in Norway.254 
Table 22: Reliability of Countrywise Standardized Five-item 
Scales by Country. NOS99. (Cronbach’s Alpha)  
Country Hierarchy Egalitarianism Individualism Fatalism 
Norway .67 .63 .67 .61 
Sweden .56 .57 .57 .57 
Denmark .62 .62 .61 .57 
Finland .62 .70 .63 .62 
Iceland .58 .69 .57 .59 
 
One additional reservation should be made. As with the factor analysis described a 
few pages ago, the calculation of Cronbach’s alpha requires five valid responses to 
five items for each of the cultural biases. This causes quite a considerable drop in 
number of respondents, ranging from 8 to 28 per cent, depending on the bias and 
the country. Later in this piece, I will accept scales with only three valid responses. 
This will increase the number of valid responses quite a lot, but since the responses 
include less reliable measurements, this increase will come at the expense of 
reduced measurement quality. However, I believe that the large increase in number 
of valid responses outweighs any potential reduction in reliability. 
Construct Validity 
Perhaps the most important measurement issue in social science is ensuring that we 
are measuring the theoretical phenomenon of interest. So, how well are we able to 
actually measure the true underlying cultural bias? There are several approaches for 
evaluating the validity of a measure. Criterion-related validity is not very useful, as it 
requires comparing the measurement with external criteria. There are no variables 
in this survey that can be used as an external criterion for evaluating the 
measurement. Content validity depends on the extent the measurement reflects the 
content of the concept one is trying to measure. Do the statements cover only 
central aspects of a bias—i.e., are there questions that are actually measuring 
something else? Are there central aspects that are not covered? Content validity 
must be evaluated by the researcher; it cannot be measured (Carmines and Zeller 
1979:26). Finally, construct validity depends on the level of consistency between the 
                                                     
254 Alpha is related both to the number of items used and the mean interim correlation of the items 
used (Niemi, Carmines, and McIver 1986). From this we can deduce that the five cultural bias 
items have a lower interim correlation than the four item, left-right scale. Given the same interim 
correlation (0.245), alpha is 0.56 on a four-item scale and 0.62 on a five-item scale. 
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cultural bias measures and the theoretically derived hypotheses concerning the 
concepts (or constructs) that are being measured (Carmines and Zeller 1979:23).  
Since I am relying on scales developed by others, I will here only discuss construct 
validity. A measure has strong construct validity when it relates to other 
measurements in a systematic manner as predicted by theory. According to Zeller 
and Carmines,  
Construct validation involves three distinct steps. First, the 
theoretical relationship between the constructs themselves must be 
specified. Second, the empirical relationship between the constructs 
must be examined. Finally, the empirical evidence must be evaluated 
in terms of how it clarifies the construct validity of the particular 
measure (Zeller and Carmines 1980:81)  
One way to establish construct validity of a multi-item index is to use factor 
analysis to study all 20 items and their relations to each other. I expect to find the 
following traits in a factor analysis of the principal components. First, there should 
be four clear factors that describe the four underlying cultural biases. Second, after 
the rotation all five items, measuring one cultural bias, should load on the same 
factor, while no other items should load strongly on it. Third, the fifth component 
extracted should be statistically unimportant and impossible to interpret 
substantively. Fourth, given that the four cultural biases are independent of each 
other, the emerging factors should not correlate with each other. This requires the 
use of non-orthogonal rotation, which will allow for correlations between the 
factors.255  
In Table 23 on page 324, we can see how the items relate to the first five 
dimensions, which are also the only ones with eigenvalues over 1. The first factor 
can be identified as the hierarchical bias, as the five items with highest loading on 
this factor are the five hierarchical items. In addition, there are a two individualistic 
items that contribute to this factor, but their loadings are much lower than the 
hierarchical items. The second factor has high loadings on the five egalitarian items. 
However, these loadings are negative, making this the anti-egalitarian factor. The 
third factor loads negatively on the fatalistic items, which allows us to identify this 
as the anti-fatalistic factor. However, two of the hierarchical items contribute to this 
factor in the same direction as the fatalistic items, which is unfortunate. The fourth 
factor loads positively on all five individualistic items, which allows us to identify 
this as the individualistic factor. Finally, the fifth factor loads inconsistently on the 
cultural biases, as there are both positive and negative loadings on each of the four 
cultural biases. It cannot be identified as measuring cultural bias, but perhaps it is 
related to belief in political efficacy. Unfortunately, its contribution to explaining 
variance is not much less than those of the third and fourth factors. In addition, the 
first fatalism item loads twice as strong on this factor when compared to its loading 
on the anti-fatalism factor, making it the poorest item of the 20 constructs.  
                                                     
255 In SPSS this can be achieved by using the oblimin rotation.  
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Table 23: Factor Analysis of Cultural Bias Items. The Structure 
Matrix after Oblimin Rotation. NOS99. 
  Component 
  1=H 2=e 3=f 4=I 5 
Eigenvalues 3.1 2.4 1.4 1.2 1.0 
% of Variance 15  12 7 6 5 
One of the problems with people today is that 
they challenge authority too often. 
.54 -.01 -.40 .14 .04 
The best way to provide for future generations is 
to preserve the customs and practices of our 
past. 
.64 -.10 -.05 .13 -.26 
Society works best when people obey all rules 
and regulations. 
.61 -.18 -.12 .14 .32 
Respect for authority is one of the most 
important things that children should learn. 
.77 -.07 -.20 .21 -.11 
Different roles for different sorts of people 
enable people to live together more 
harmoniously. 
.39 -.11 -.30 .27 .14 
The world would be a more peaceful place if its 
wealth were divided more equally among nations. 
.04 -.65 -.10 -.05 .27 
What our country needs is a fairness revolution 
to make the distribution of goods more equal. 
.20 -.72 -.15 -.11 -.18 
I support a tax shift so that burden falls more 
heavily on corporations and people with large 
incomes.  
.18 -.61 -.07 -.21 -.31 
We need to dramatically reduce inequalities 
between men and women. 
-.03 -.61 -.11 .12 .14 
Decisions in business and government should 
rely more heavily on popular participation. 
.11 -.57 -.11 .01 -.33 
Everyone should have an equal chance to 
succeed and fail without government 
interference. 
.07 -.17 -.14 .53 -.03 
If people have the vision and ability to acquire 
property, they ought to be allowed to enjoy it. 
.09 .09 -.04 .72 -.13 
People who are successful in business have a 
right to enjoy their wealth as they see fit. 
.12 .17 -.03 .73 -.08 
Competitive markets are almost always the best 
way to supply people with things they need. 
.30 .01 -.09 .59 .15 
In a fair system, people with more ability should 
earn more. 
.24 .10 -.08 .53 .26 
It seems that whichever party you vote for things 
go on pretty much the same. 
.21 -.16 -.36 .16 -.62 
Cooperation with others rarely works. .15 -.11 -.66 .08 .09 
The future is too uncertain for a person to make 
serious plans. 
.18 -.21 -.69 .10 -.05 
Most people make friends only because friends 
are useful for them. 
.14 .05 -.62 -.02 -.10 
I feel that life is a lottery. .09 -.17 -.59 .12 -.29 
Extraction Method: PCA. Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser normalization. The five strongest loadings on 
each factor are in bold. Loadings <|.2| are hidden. 
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One should also notice how these four factors differ in their contribution to 
explaining variance. Hierarchical and anti-egalitarian factors explain roughly twice 
as much as the anti-fatalistic and individualistic factors. These four identified 
factors together explain 40 per cent of the variation in people’s responses to these 
items. The remaining 60 per cent of the variation in people’s answers either comes 
from other sources or is purely random.  
So far, we have confirmed several of the required characteristics of a valid measure. 
First, the four strongest factors are clearly related to cultural bias. Second, there are 
no ‘foreign’ items loading strongly on the factors related to one bias. One item, the 
first fatalism item, loads stronger on the fifth unidentified factor than on the anti-
fatalism factor, which is unfortunate. There are also two hierarchical items that load 
on the fatalism factor. The third requirement is only partially confirmed. Even if 
the fifth factor is unidentifiable, it is still closer to the fourth in strength.  
The remaining requirement concerns the correlations between the factors. The 
simple correlations between the extracted factors, which are identified as pro-
hierarchical bias, anti-egalitarian bias, anti-fatalistic bias, and pro-individualistic bias, 
can be seen below in Table 24. We can see that the extracted biases correlate less 
with each other than what was found in our original cultural bias scales.  
Table 24: Factor Analysis—Component Correlation Matrix 
Component H e f I 
H  -.11 -.22 .20 
e -.11  .14 .03 
f -.22 .14  -.13 
I .20 .03 -.13  
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis.  
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
One cannot assume that an item is only related to one bias; some of the items can 
touch upon several biases, thus creating some degree of correlation between the 
factors. Hierarchical factors are moderately and positively correlated with the 
individualistic factor and with the fatalistic factor (or actually a negative correlation 
with the anti-fatalistic factor). The other four possible correlations between the 
factors are weak. When seen together, the correlations between these factors are 
acceptable. The measurement is not perfect, but the cultural biases seem to be 
phenomena that exist independently from each other. 
The oblimin rotation searches for the factors that explain most of the variance 
without forcing the factors to be orthogonal. The correlations observed between 
factors are thus empirically sound: They reflect the underlying dimensions behind 
the 20 items. 
Interpreting the meaning behind the negative factors, like anti-egalitarian or anti-
fatalistic, is easy. First, the anti-egalitarian dimension can be seen as the egalitarian 
•    Measuring Cultural Bias in the Nordic Cultures Survey  
 
326 
dimension, but with a negative direction; turning it 180 degrees would produce the 
egalitarian dimension as expected. Turning 180 degrees can simply be done by 
multiplying all loadings by -1. Second, it can be that rejecting a cultural bias actually 
has an independent interpretation when evaluated in combination with the other 
biases (Olli 1999). I will discuss this in greater detail in Chapter 13. Third, one could 
speculate that the lack of differentiation on the positive side of the scales, as we 
have seen in the discussion above, creates a situation where the items differentiate 
well between the people who reject a bias, but lump together the different degrees 
of support for a bias. However, this third alternative does not seem to fit the fact 
that in the factor analysis, we could identify both an anti-egalitarian and an anti-
fatalistic factor, while these to biases differ depending on which side of the scale 
lacks differentiation. If we look at Figure 15 (on page 316), which shows what 
happens when we combine the items according to the cultural biases they are 
intended to measure, we can see how individualistic, hierarchical, and egalitarian 
bias measures have a long tail on the rejection side, while the fatalistic bias has a 
long tail on the supportive side. 
Kahan and his collaborators have chosen to measure cultural biases with two scales 
that go from pro-egalitarian to pro-hierarchical, and from pro-communitarian to 
pro-individualistic (Kahan, Braman, Slovic, et al. 2007; Kahan et al. 2008; Kahan 
2012). However, as we can see above, these two dimensions do not emerge in 
factor analysis. We have identified the two first factors as pro-hierarchical and anti-
egalitarian. If the measurement model proposed by Kahan is correct, then all ten 
statements loading on the two first factors should have been loading only on one 
factor. Similarly, we cannot identify one communitarian-individualistic factor, as 
both fatalism and individualism items load on separate factors. The empirical 
variation in responses fits better with a four dimensional model than a two-
dimensional one. I will come back to this in a discussion in Chapter 13. 
Acquiescence and Cultural Bias  
There is no theoretical expectation in cultural theory which points to cultural biases 
as being influenced by age and education. Nevertheless, my previous research has 
shown that increasing age increases support for each of the four cultural biases, and 
that simultaneous support for several cultural biases increases with age. In addition, 
education has a negative effect on the number of supported cultural biases.  
Social background is clearly related to cultural bias and cultural bias 
combinations. Older people seem to prefer hierarchy, while younger 
people show a tendency to prefer individualism or egalitarianism. 
Age also has a very clear effect on the number of cultural biases a 
respondent supports. Respondents who support four cultural biases 
have a mean age of 60 years, while respondents with only one 
cultural bias have a mean age of 37. Education has the opposite 
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effect; increasing amounts of education seem to lead to a reduction 
in the number of supported cultural biases, even when controlled 
for the effects of age. It is significant that age and education have 
opposite effects, and I suspect that they are sources of different 
types of knowledge. While age can provide an opportunity to 
experience several cultural biases, education is theoretical and most 
often has a strong socializing effect on the prevailing cultural bias. 
(Olli 1995:126-127)256 
These findings can be explained in two different ways. First, as I point out in the 
above quotation, cultural biases are a form of social competence that can be 
learned. The more experience we have from different social situations, the more 
willing we are to accept that there are may ways of organizing that could work. 
Second, all ten cultural bias items in the 1993 survey had the same direction, and 
some people tend to be ‘lazy’ and answer positively to many questions (Olli 
1995:50), which suggests that this is a result of a methodological artifact, namely 
acquiescence. Acquiescence, or yes-saying, is the tendency to respond by agreeing 
with a statement even when one in reality has no opinion or holds an opinion that 
should contradict this statement. Without a doubt, acquiescence can be a severe 
problem in surveys.  
In what follows, I will first present an overview of what the literature says about 
acquiescence as a phenomenon. By analyzing data from NOS99, I will then discuss 
how the different types of acquiescence influence the measurement of cultural 
biases. 257 
Acquiescence in the Literature 
Acquiescence can be a problem in surveys measuring cultural bias because the most 
frequently used battery of questions (Dake’s cultural bias items) are Likert-type 
items (Likert 1974). Respondents are asked to agree or disagree with statements 
that support a particular cultural bias. Thus, support for several biases can be the 
result of a respondent truly supporting many biases or the result of acquiescence, 
where the respondent selects the ‘easy’ answer by supporting a statement without 
actually relating to the content of the question.  
There are several versions of acquiescence: It can affect only some people who are 
more disposed to it, it can affect only some of the questions, or it can affect many 
people as a general cultural trait. It is easy to concede that ‘our understanding of 
how acquiescence works is far from satisfactory’ (Schuman and Presser 2004:343). 
                                                     
256 These findings are based on an analysis of ISSP survey data from 1993, sampled from the general 
population in Norway, and based on 8 of Dake’s 20 cultural bias items (see page 530). 
257 These analyses are done by using the script nordic1999_acquiescence.sps. 
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Research on acquiescence is somewhat limited,258 possibly because it is a difficult 
subject to research. What is clear is that the lack of a proper theory behind the 
phenomena makes it difficult to build analytical models that compensate for 
acquiescence. 
Acquiescence does not influence everybody equally. Unfortunately, it is difficult to 
identify those persons whose answers are influenced by acquiescence. 
Whether in fact acquiescent persons come mainly from the pool of 
people of those who would otherwise give random responses or 
mainly of those who otherwise give consistent answers over time is 
an important theoretical issue that we are unable to resolve. 
(Schuman and Presser 2004:328) 
Schuman and Presser have estimated that with simple agree-disagree type questions, 
the acquiescence has a 10 per cent to 15 per cent effect on the marginal 
distributions (2004:343). Uncontrolled effects of this magnitude are somewhat 
devastating for survey researchers and can undermine published results. 
The most commonly used technique to estimate the size of the acquiescence is to 
include different wordings of a question in a large-scale survey and then compare 
the distributions. The often used design is an agree-disagree question for half of the 
sample and a question with forced choice for the other half of the sample. For 
example, a question like “do you agree or disagree with the idea that women should 
have an equal role with men in running business, industry, and government?” can 
also be presented as “what do you think—do you feel that women should have an 
equal role with men in running business, industry, and government, or do you feel 
that women’s place is at home?” (Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfaber 2004a:237). In 
this example, the simplest measure of acquiescence is the difference between the 
proportions of people in each question who support women having an equal role.  
What kind of consequence does acquiescence have for the measurement of cultural 
biases? If the effect is systematic and applies to all respondents, it should be 
possible to interpret the responses in light of an acquiescence effect. However, the 
literature suggests that the effect is not evenly distributed in the population. 
Particularly, the effect of acquiescence is expected to diminish as the level of 
education increases. One of the largest documented effects of education is made by 
Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfaber (2004a), who estimated a 2 per cent 
acquiescence effect among respondents with a college education, but a 25 per cent 
effect among those with less than a high school education. However, this effect was 
present only for questions related to government involvement in school 
desegregation. For the other four topics tested, education did not have an effect. 
                                                     
258 A search for “acquiescence” in any of the search fields in the Article First database (15th of 
November, 2009) shows only 143 articles, and only a few of these deal with the effects of 
acquiescence in on Likert-type scales in surveys. Many articles deal with the effects acquiescence 
has on relationships between doctors and patients, husbands and wives, offenders and victims, 
leaders and followers, and many other topics. 
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Indeed, one aspect of acquiescence that makes it difficult to deal with is that it does 
not affect all issues. Acquiescence, for example, does not have a statistically 
significant effect on the women’s equality issue, while on questions concerning 
government involvement in school desegregation, the effect of acquiescence is over 
10 per cent (Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfaber 2004a:230).  
There is also some evidence that acquiescence is diminished for 
persons who report feeling more strongly about the issue under 
inquiry, and also for individuals who report that they like to argue 
about political issues generally, but the evidence in these cases is too 
slight to suggest more than the desirability of further research on 
one or other possibility. (Schuman and Presser 2004:343) 
The cultural bias scales are constructed from agree-disagree responses to statements 
that all have the same supportive direction, thus these scales seem to be particularly 
prone to the acquiescence effect. However, it is unclear if the cultural bias 
questions are the kinds of questions where acquiescence has no effect or a 10 per 
cent effect. It is quite unclear how strongly the respondents do feel about issues 
included in the cultural bias items. It is also possible that there are differences 
between items. As we could see in the presentation of responses to the cultural bias 
items earlier in this chapter, there are many items with an overly skewed 
distribution, where a large majority of the respondents support the items. This 
could be partly caused by acquiescence.  
Acquiescence can also be seen as a general tendency. Some authors who study 
cross-cultural differences in an acquiescent response style use either a simple 
difference between agree-disagree responses or a more complicated structural 
equations model (Cheung and Rensvold 2000; Harzing 2006; Javeline 1999). 
Common among them is the idea that acquiescence is a phenomenon that 
influences many respondents rather evenly. One can thus see more yes-saying in 
polite cultures. A ‘do not know’ response in a polite culture might correspond in its 
intention to a ‘disagree somewhat’ response in an English-speaking country. 
When examining the data from NOS99, I will look for three types of 
acquiescence—ones found in the literature review. The first is acquiescence 
connected to particular items used in the scales, the second is acquiescence present 
only among a few respondents, and the third is acquiescence as a general tendency. 
Acquiescence Connected to Particular Items 
There is no good way to measure acquiescence in this Nordic survey. However, by 
subtracting the percentage of respondents who disagree or strongly disagree from 
the percentage of people who agree or strongly agree, one can obtain an indication 
of acquiescence balance, which is a rough measure of acquiescence (Harzing 2006). 
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This measure is probably influenced mainly by differences in support and only to 
some degree by acquiescence. 
In Table 25, we can see how acquiescence balance varies from item to item 
between each country and all five countries as a whole. Values close to 0 indicate a 
symmetric distribution, which is in many ways ideal for Likert-type scales, while 100 
is the theoretical maximum value. Those items that have a very high or very low 
number are more likely to be influenced by acquiescence. In addition, if all items in 
a scale deviate from 0 into the same direction, then the likelihood of an 
acquiescence problem increases. 
If we look at the first column under the Nordic figures, we can see that among the 
hierarchical items, the first one has a negative value while the rest are positive, 
which is good since it takes the average acquiescence balance down to 32.  
The egalitarian items have an average acquiescence balance close to 49 per cent at 
the Nordic level, which is a bit too high. Practically all the items in all countries 
have a solid and positive acquiescence balance. This indicates that the egalitarian 
scale as a whole possibly suffers from acquiescence. Among the items under 
Denmark, there are two, re3 and re5, that perform differently from the other three.  
The average acquiescence balance for the individualistic items is too high at the 
Nordic level and for every country. In particular, the first three individualistic items 
have a very high acquiescence balance. Almost everybody agrees on the second 
individualistic item: “If people have the vision and ability to acquire property, they 
ought to be allowed to enjoy it.” However, it is difficult to say if this is because the 
question is too easy to answer, if it is because the Nordic countries are very 
individualistic, or if it is because this question is very prone to acquiescence. In any 
case, it would be advisable to try to change this item so that it more adequately 
differentiates between respondents. 
The average level of acquiescence balance in the Nordic countries for the fatalistic 
cultural bias items is -32, making it the only cultural bias scale that is skewed toward 
disagreement. A good level of variation is found among the fatalistic items; some 
are slightly positive, while some are strongly negative. The first fatalistic item is the 
only positive one, even if it has negative value in Denmark.  
Altogether, the data in Table 25 reveal a distinct pattern. The three active 
cultures—hierarchy, egalitarianism, and individualism—tend to have a positive 
acquiescence balance. By contrast, the only passive culture—fatalism—has a 
negative acquiescence balance. 
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Table 25: Acquiescence Balance by Cultural Bias Item and 
Country. NOS99. 
Item Nordic Norway Sweden Denmark Finland Iceland 
rh1 -18 -19 -9 -16 -17 -32 
rh2 53 43 17 60 70 78 
rh3 44 57 50 36 33 45 
rh4 48 50 32 27 78 53 
rh5 31 5 56 13 34 52 
Average 32 27 29 24 40 39 
re1 50 59 58 40 38 55 
re2 54 43 56 35 64 74 
re3 39 53 23 18 52 51 
re4 48 42 62 35 30 78 
re5 55 63 61 17 68 63 
Average 49 52 52 29 50 64 
ri1 67 61 72 64 67 70 
ri2 87 81 89 86 90 91 
ri3 69 57 71 67 72 82 
ri4 45 28 59 31 41 68 
ri5 40 25 47 46 28 58 
Average 62 50 68 59 60 74 
rf1 10 6 9 -27 58 1 
rf2 -64 -56 -48 -65 -70 -81 
rf3 -26 -36 -1 -21 -49 -18 
rf4 -62 -73 -58 -52 -41 -89 
rf5 -17 -39 -1 -14 -12 -21 
Average -32 -40 -20 -36 -23 -42 
Acquiescence balance = (strongly agree + moderately agree) – (moderately disagree + strongly disagree) 
given in percentage points. Values >|70| in bold. 
 
I have several interpretations of the item-level findings. First, if we look at Figure 
15 on page 316, we can see the same skewness in the distributions of the cultural 
bias scales. We can observe that the measurements of the three active cultures tend 
to max out abruptly. One explanation for the skewness we see in the acquiescence 
balance is that the items are too easy to agree to: Too many respondents strongly 
agree with them. Second, it looks like the hierarchical and fatalistic scales have more 
variation, making them less prone to acquiescence than the egalitarian and 
individualistic cultural bias scales. Therefore, we should expect some acquiescence 
in the egalitarian and individualistic cultural bias scales. 
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Acquiescence among some Respondents 
There is evidence from several studies that acquiescence occurs more often among 
the less educated respondents when compared to those with higher levels of 
education (Bishop, Oldendick, and Tuchfaber 2004a; Schuman and Presser 
2004:343). In Figure 16 below, we can see how the mean acquiescence balance is 
affected by age and education. Acquiescence balance here is a given respondent’s 
total number of disagreements subtracted from his or her total number of 
agreements across all cultural bias items. Because of differences in the educational 
systems between the countries, and because of changes over time, the respondents’ 
highest completed educational levels are recoded in only three categories: 9 years or 
less, 10 to 12 years, and more than 12 years. Unfortunately, the data does not 
include any information concerning the Swedish respondents’ educational levels. 
Therefore, the Swedish respondents are excluded from the next analysis, which 
leaves us with 3757 respondents. 
Figure 16: Mean Acquiescence Balance by Age and Education. 
NOS99 
The line on top shows the respondents with less than 9 years of education. Among 
them, those below 30 years of age have an average of 6 more agreements than 
disagreements, while those over 60 years of age have an average 9 more agreements 
than disagreements. The group with most education is depicted by the unevenly 
dotted line on the bottom. Among them, all age groups below 50 years show an 
average of 2 more supports than rejections. When increasing the age to 70 years or 
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older, the acquiescence balance goes up to slightly over 4. The affect of age thus 
seems to be in the range of 3 more agreements when controlling for the effect of 
education. The effect of education seems to be in the range of 4 more agreement 
when controlling for the effect of age. It also looks like increasing the level of 
education postpones the effect of age. 
What consequences can this have on the distribution of each cultural bias? In the 
Nordic sample, support for cultural biases increases with age. In Figure 17, we can 
see how the mean support for hierarchical and fatalistic biases is lowest in the age 
group of 30 to 40 years and highest in the above 70 age group. Since the national 
samples are combined into one Nordic sample, with a Nordic average established 
after a countrywise standardization, each of the scales has a mean close to 0 and 
one standard deviation that is slightly greater than 0.6. The difference in support 
between these two age groups is a little less than one standard deviation. Egalitarian 
and individualistic biases are less influenced by age. The support for egalitarianism 
increases with age almost in a linear manner. The difference in the means from the 
youngest age group to the oldest is about half a standard deviation. The support for 
individualistic bias starts to clearly increase from the age group of 50 to 60 years. 
However, this effect is roughly one-third of the effect of age on hierarchical and 
fatalistic biases.  
Figure 17: Mean Cultural Bias by Age Groups. NOS99 
In Figure 17, one can also notice how the relationships between fatalistic and 
hierarchical cultural biases and age groups have the same form. I have no 
explanation for this similarity. 
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Estimating the Magnitude of Acquiescence  
There are two other variables in NOS99 that have the same agree-disagree structure 
and are thus equally prone to the effect of acquiescence: “the so-called ‘ecological 
crisis’ facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated” and “the balance of nature is 
strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations”. These items 
are intended to measure attitudes toward an ecological crisis and are anti-
environmentalist in their direction.  
I suspect that the effect of acquiescence is the same for cultural bias questions as it 
is for these anti-environmentalist items.259 The four cultural biases are of course 
expected to influence the responses to these items, but that influence pertains to 
each cultural bias separately. When we are looking at the number of disagreements 
with all 20 cultural bias items at once, there should be no such relationship. 
Therefore, the magnitude of this relationship can give us a rough estimate of the 
magnitude of acquiescence. 
To understand acquiescence, it might be useful to study not only the average level 
of support, but also how it affects rejection. Since the level of support is so high for 
many of the cultural bias items, we might be able to learn more by studying 
rejection. Acquiescence should reduce rejection: The greater the level of 
acquiescence, the higher the number of people who do not reject any more than 
one cultural bias.  
In Table 26, we can see how the lack of disagreement with ecological crisis items is 
dependent on the lack of disagreement with cultural bias items and education. I am 
particularly concerned about our ability to measure cultural bias for those who 
disagreed only once or less with the twenty cultural bias items. The respondents in 
this column are either heavily influenced by acquiescence or they have an ‘anything 
goes’ attitude toward life and social organization.260  
The opinions of the environmentalists have a prominent position in the political 
climate in the Nordic countries. As the direction of the ecological crisis items is the 
opposite of what is politically correct, it is not surprising to find that few 
respondents agree with these items. If we first look at those respondents with more 
than 9 years of education, 8 per cent do disagree with several cultural bias items and 
agree with both of the no ecological crisis statements. If we then compare these 
numbers with respondents who are candidates for being strongly influenced by 
acquiescence, as depicted in the second column, we can see that the proportion 
goes up to 21 per cent in agreement with both no ecological crisis statements. If we 
then look at those respondents with 9 years of education or less, we find that 11 per 
                                                     
259 These are likert measured with two type items: “The so-called 'ecological crisis' facing humankind 
has been greatly exaggerated” and ”The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the 
impacts of modern industrial nations”. 
260 If the respondents do not reject any kind of cultural bias, and these responses reflect their true 
cultural bias, then they truly support all four cultural biases. This universal support can be 
translated as reflecting an ‘anything goes’ attitude, othwise known as the hermit’s position. 
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cent disagree with several cultural bias items and agree with both no ecological 
crisis statements. In the first column we can see how this proportion increases to 
27 per cent agreement with both no ecological crisis statements for those who 
disagree with a maximum of one cultural bias item.261 In other words, many of 
those 247 respondents who disagree with none or just one of the cultural bias items 
also agree that there is no ecological crisis. When compared to the rest of the 
sample, the likelihood of agreeing with both no ecological crisis items increases 
almost threefold, or 13 to 16 percentage points, for those who disagree with none 
or just one of the cultural bias items.  
Table 26: Agreement with No Ecological Crisis according to 
Education and Disagreement with Cultural Bias Items. 
NOS99. (Count and Column percent). 
   Count of Disagrement with the 20 cultural bias 
items 
    Disagrees 
with 2-20 
items 
Disagrees 
with 0-1 
items Total 
U  
Sign. 
0 66.0 49.4 65.3 
1 26.1 29.5 26.3 
2 7.9 21.1 8.4 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
Count of 
agreement to no 
ecological crisis 
items 
 N 3680 166 3846 
.02 
.000 
 
More than 9 
years of 
education 
     
0 58.7 34.6 56.7 
1 30.8 38.3 31.4 
2 10.5 27.2 11.9 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 
9-years or less 
of education Count of agreement to no 
ecological crisis 
items 
 N 905 81 986 
.04 
.000 
 
 The uncertainty coefficient used here shows the effect of disagreement with cultural bias items according to 
agreement with no-ecological crisis.  
 
By using an uncertainty coefficient,262 we can estimate the degree to which 
acquiescence effects depend on the level of education. The strength of the 
relationship is significant in both educational groups, making it rather unlikely that 
the pattern of agreement with cultural bias items and no ecological crisis items is 
just a coincidence. In my view, the simultaneous lack of disagreement with cultural 
bias items and the lack of disagreement with no ecological crisis is likely to be 
caused by acquiescence. However, the effect is weak. Acquiescence seems to have a 
                                                     
261 The ratio between these percentages allows us to compare the relative effects of acquiescence. For 
those with more than 9 years of education, 22.1/7.9 = 2.7. For those with 9 years of education or 
less, 27.2/10.5 = 2.6. The relative effect is thus equal in both groups. 
262 This measure is presented more in detail on page 368. 
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2 per cent effect on variance among those with more than 9 years of education and 
a 4 per cent effect among those with 9 years or less.  
To sum up, some respondents are more prone to acquiescence than others. The 
elderly are more supportive of cultural biases. The magnitude of the effect of age is 
close to one standard deviation. Education reduces and postpones this effect. 
However, it is difficult to separate the acquiescence effect from the true effect of 
age and education. Moreover, the lack of disagreement with cultural bias items 
increases the lack of disagreement with no ecological crisis statements by a range of 
13 to 16 percentage points among some respondents. If we can expect this kind of 
effect among those most prone to acquiescence, what about acquiescence among 
all respondents?  
Acquiescence among all Respondents 
Acquiescence is not just limited to some respondents, but can also affect all 
respondents. A regression analysis shows how these variables are related among all 
respondents. In Table 27, we can compare different regression models that explain 
acquiescence balance. Even if we only have 2777 respondents left in the analysis, 
partly because we do not have information concerning the Swedish respondents, 
the number of respondents is still high enough for performing the analysis. 
The first model, where only age acts as an explanatory variable, explains only 4 per 
cent of variation in acquiescence balance. When we add educational level into the 
model, its ability to explain variation increases to 15 per cent. Within this model, 
the linear effect of education is twice as strong as that of age. The number of 
disagreements with the ecological crisis is a proxy for negative acquiescence effects. 
In the third model, we can see that it has an effect in the expected direction, 
suggesting the presence of acquiescence. The effect of this variable is almost as 
strong as the effect of age. The second new variable in the third model, a dummy 
for not knowing which party to vote for, contributes positively to acquiescence 
balance. Adding these two variables to the models barely strengthens their ability to 
explain variation, even if the effect is significant.263  
The fourth model adds a dummy for disagreeing with a maximum of one of the 
cultural bias items. This variable is closely connected to the dependent variable and 
should be interpreted as removing those respondents who show little disagreement 
with cultural biases. Thus, we can interpret the coefficients for the other variables 
as valid for those respondents who actually do show some disagreement with the 
cultural bias variables. We can see that effect of education is increased and the 
effect of age is reduced, while the effects of the two other variables are small. When 
adjusting according to model four, there is a clear improvement in the ability to 
                                                     
263 In analyses with this many respondents it is relatively easy to get statistically significant results.  
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predict variation in the dependent variable, but this does not mean much because 
the additional dummy variable is so similar to the dependent variable. 
 
Table 27: Acquiescence Balance Explained controlled for by 
Age and Education. Regression Analysis. NOS99. 
Model R R square Adjusted R 
square 
Std. error of the 
estimate 
Sign. of F change 
1 .21 .04 .04 5.94 .000 
2 .39 .15 .15 5.59 .000 
3 .41 .17 .17 5.55 .000 
4 .49 .24 .24 5.29 .000 
 
Model   
Unstandardized 
coefficients 
 
Standardized 
coefficients 
   
    B 
Std. 
error Beta t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 1.23 0.33   3.7 0.000 
 Age in 1999 0.08 0.01 0.21 11.3 0.000 
2 (Constant) 8.05 0.47   17 0.000 
 Age in 1999 0.06 0.01 0.15 8.7 0.000 
 
Educational level in 3 
categories - N,D,F,I -2.77 0.15 -0.34 -19.0 0.000 
3 (Constant) 8.96 0.5   17.8 0.000 
 Age in 1999 0.05 0.01 0.14 8.1 0.000 
 
Educational level in 3 
categories - N,D,F,I -2.67 0.15 -0.32 -18.3 0.000 
 
Count of disagreement with 
ecological crisis items -0.86 0.14 -0.11 -6.0 0.000 
 Don’t know what to vote 0.98 0.32 0.05 3.0 0.003 
4 (Constant) 8.04 0.48   16.6 0.000 
 Age in 1999 0.04 0.01 0.12 7.0 0.000 
 
Educational level in 3 
categories - N,D,F,I -2.42 0.14 -0.29 -17.3 0.000 
 
Count of disagreement with 
ecological crisis items -0.49 0.14 -0.06 -3.6 0.000 
 Don’t know what to vote 0.85 0.31 0.05 2.7 0.006 
 
Disagreeing with max 1 out 
of 20 cultural bias items 8.49 0.51 0.28 16.5 0.000 
 
All the findings point to an acquiescence effect. Nevertheless, it does not resolve 
the acquiescence issue. It looks like there is a small effect among most of the 
respondents, and there is a slightly larger effect among those who do not disagree 
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with the cultural bias items. Education elicits the strongest effect—one that is 
nearly twice as strong as the effects of age when controlled for other variables. 
However, as we can see in the fourth model, the effect of low levels of 
disagreement is in the same range as the effect of education. Both types of 
acquiescence effects seem to be present in the data.  
What is more problematic is that one could also interpret these results as showing 
that support for cultural biases increases with age and decreases with education. In 
other words, we cannot reliably separate the effects of acquiescence from the 
potential effects of age and education on our measurement of cultural bias. 
Nevertheless, it looks like the positive effect of acquiescence is much smaller than 
the negative effect of education and slightly smaller than the positive effect of age. 
Therefore, we cannot dismiss the learning hypothesis. The findings are consistent 
with people learning about cultural biases, even if acquiescence is present in the 
data. 
Summary of Measuring Cultural Bias in NOS99 
The scale I will be using to measure cultural biases later in this thesis is a simple 
additive scale with the following modifications. First, the responses to every 
question are standardized within each country because it is possible that there are 
differences in the translations between the countries, and some questions are more 
prone to acquiescence than others. By standardizing the responses countrywise, we 
remove at least some of the item-to-item differences within countries and all 
differences between countries. Second, I require only three valid responses out of 
five cultural bias items because this strikes a good balance between the number of 
respondents being excluded from further analyses and the quality of the 
measurement. To compensate for the varying number of responses, the mean of 
the standardized responses is used to indicate a respondent’s position on a cultural 
bias scale. Using the standardized mean gives us scales that are very similar to factor 
scores, but have the advantage of simplicity and including many more respondents.  
The scales created are relative scales. I am not trying to measure the position on a 
fixed cultural bias scale; direct comparability between countries would require much 
more experimentation in each country.  
We have seen that the reliability of the cultural bias scales at the Nordic level is on 
the border of what is acceptable, but reliability at the national level is slightly better. 
Given that there are only five questions to each bias, and each one covers several 
domains, I think that we cannot expect any higher consistency in people’s 
responses. The limits to the scales’ reliability are in reality set not by theoretical 
problems, but by the need to keep the questionnaire short in order to increase 
response rates and to keep the research within the budget.  
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The analysis of construct validity revealed that the items and the four cultural biases 
relate to each other as expected. The items load strongly on the biases they are 
intended to measure and weakly on the other biases, with a few exceptions. There is 
thus reason to believe that this survey allows us to make  a valid measurement of 
the cultural biases. 
It seems apparent that the measurement of cultural bias is influenced by 
acquiescence because it is a Likert-type scale with only positive items. In this 
chapter, I have looked at three different types of acquiescence. The first, is 
acquiescence connected to particular items. In this case, the analysis of 
acquiescence balance suggests that the individualism and egalitarianism scales in 
particular suffer either from acquiescence or from items that are too easy to agree 
to. The second type consists of acquiescence connected to particular groups. In this 
case, the analysis shows, as expected, that those with lower levels of educational are 
the most prone to acquiescence, and that acquiescence increases as age increases. In 
addition, having more than 12 years of education postpones the effect of age until 
one is 50 years old or more. For those respondents who are prone to acquiescence, 
it is possible that we obtain over 10 per cent more agreement than what is obtained 
from the rest of the sample. However, because this group is relatively small, the 
effect is also generally small. Third is the acquiescence among all respondents. The 
analysis shows that acquiescence is likely to have an effect that is much smaller than 
the effect of education, and slightly smaller than that of age.  
How does acquiescence distort our analysis of the extent to which cultural biases 
affect political views? It is difficult to give a good answer to this question simply 
because acquiescence is still poorly understood. Political preferences are not 
influenced by acquiescence because agreement alone is not a sufficient answer to 
questions about party support; after all, you need to pick one party among several 
parties. Age and education will, however, have their own direct or indirect influence 
on political preference. Therefore, our measurements of cultural biases include a 
systematic error that increases the level of support of the three active cultural biases 
and reduces the level of fatalistic support. However, standardizing the responses to 
the cultural bias items has the potential to remove some of the effects of 
acquiescence, but it does not influence the reduction in variation caused by 
statements that are too easy to answer. In other words, we are probably slightly 
underestimating the effects of cultural bias. 
Suggestions for Improvement 
The discussions in this chapter have revealed some weaknesses in the cultural bias 
items and the scales based on these items. I believe that some of these problems are 
not inherent to cultural theory, but caused by a lack of systematic scale 
development (DeVellis 2003). The data in NOS99 are already collected, and they 
are what they are. I will, nevertheless, give some suggestions for possible 
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improvements in these scales, hoping that they can be useful in future applications 
of cultural theory. 
Consider Forced Choice Questions  
There is one simple solution to acquiescence: Use forced choices instead of agree-
disagree items (Schuman and Presser 2004:344). Unfortunately, this cannot be easily 
applied to Dake’s cultural bias items. If cultural biases are actually only two-
dimensional (only a reflection of the underlying grid-group dimension), then one 
could construct questions where respondents are forced to choose between 
hierarchical vs. individualistic answers and fatalistic vs. egalitarian answers (Boyle 
and Coughlin 1994:Figure 10.1 b). However, if cultural biases are four-dimensional, 
as I have argued, the rejection of one bias does not imply support for any of the 
remaining biases. Rejecting hierarchy does not imply support for individualism.  
Instead, one could create more items so that all six pairs are covered: 1) egalitarian 
vs. hierarchical, 2) egalitarian vs. individualistic, 3) egalitarian vs. fatalistic, 4) fata-
listic vs. hierarchical, 5) individualistic vs. fatalistic, and 6) individualistic vs. 
hierarchical. These pairs are identical to those conflicts pointed out by cultural 
theory—namely the cultural conflicts revolving around the four ways of organizing. 
In other words, people are asked to take sides in these conflicts. If one is interested 
in only a particular situation or social context, just a few questions with six answers 
each could give interesting information. However, a large number of questions are 
needed if one is interested in respondents’ cultural dispositions across a wide range 
of situations.  
Therefore, I suggest that one should try to develop a battery of items for survey 
questionnaires, where respondents are forced to choose one of the four presented 
alternatives (biases). Dake, in Great Britain during 1991 and 1992, engaged in some 
experiments with this type of questioning, but the details have not been 
published.264 Below is an example of a question with a forced choice that focuses 
on the justification of behavior. These reflect how the respondents in the migrant 
household study justified their helping relations. 
 
                                                     
264 The Survey of Public Opinions and Life Styles (rating version) by Dake and Unilever Research is 
presented in chapter 7 of Household Cultures. In the Household Cultures project, lots of efforts were 
invested in developing valid measures (Dake, Thompson, and Neff 1994: Chapter 7). They 
conducted two separate studies: a questionnaire-based study and a qualitative study based on a 
subsample of these households. These studies were then compared for consistency in classifying 
households by their way of life. A year later a revised version of the same study was conducted 
partly on new households and partly on the same ones, thus providing a test-retest of some of the 
households.  
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Your family has a friend, who needs so much help next week that it 
will be a burden for you and your own family. Select the one of the 
following statements that best describes why you would choose to 
help your friend:  
I will help him if I can, but nobody can make any demands. (F) 
I will help him because I expect him to return the favor later. (I) 
I will help him because it is my duty.265  (H) 
I will help him because everybody can end in a situation where one 
needs help. (E) 
I do not think I would help him. 
By changing the who the recipient of help is, it is possible to see how the different 
solidarities apply in different social contexts. Examples of recipients could be 
parents, a sister, a cousin, or a distant relative; a workmate or the boss at work; a 
neighbor or perhaps the brilliant child of a poor neighbor; or a total stranger, a 
drug-addict, or maybe an acquaintance with same ethnic background. Recipients 
could also be organizations, such as the local sportsclub or the community reading 
program. 
An additional advantage with this question structure is that each question will start 
with a short story that sets a context. This facilitates a study of how different 
contexts influence the utilization of particular cultural biases. If the sequential 
individual model is correct, we can utilize different ways of organizing in different 
settings. The present way of creating the cultural bias scales makes it very difficult 
to test the effect of context.  
Changes in Item Direction or Difficulty 
As we saw in Table 18, some of the items have very skewed distributions. The same 
items have a high acquiescence balance, as illustrated in Table 25. Changing the 
direction of these items, or making them more difficult to agree to, will improve the 
quality of the cultural bias scales. 
I suggest reversing and rewording of some of the items, as depicted in the following 
alternatives: 
                                                     
265 In the literature, the deserving poor are often mentioned as the favourite recipient of assistance 
among the hierarchical respondents. However, my own fieldwork suggests that duty and 
obligations connected to roles are perhaps more important to migrants in Norway. This can either 
be a trait specific to Norway or connected to friendship as a context (how often are we friends 
with the ‘deserving poor’?). 
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Reverse rh4: The ability to question authority is one of the most 
important things that children should learn /  
Respect for authority is one of the least important things that 
children should learn.  
Reverse re5: Popular participation endangers good decisions in 
government and business. 
Reverse re3: I am against a tax shift so that burden falls more 
heavily on corporations and people with large incomes /  
I support a tax shift that stimulates investments by corporations and 
people with large incomes  
Reverse ri2: Just because people have the vision and ability to 
acquire property does not give them the permission to whatever 
they want. 
More difficult ri3: Being successful in business is the best possible 
contribution people can give to the common good. 
As always, any changes in items must be subjected to rigorous testing before their 
eventual inclusion into the battery of questions in a large survey. 
Now that I have established the principles I will use in calculating the continuous 
cultural bias scales in NOS99, and suggested some improvements, it is time to see 
how well these same principles can be applied to a different set of data, namely the 
Norwegian Environmental Survey from 1999.  
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C h a p t e r  9   
MEASURING CULTURAL BIAS IN THE 
NORWEGIAN ENVIRONMENTAL 
PROTECTION SURVEY 
By using the principles for measurement discussed in the previous chapter, this 
chapter will establish a way to measure cultural biases in the 1995 Norwegian 
Environmental Protection Survey (NEPS95). Because several topics have been 
already dealt with in detail, I will be brief in this chapter. The key issue will be the 
extent to which I can improve the existing scales by including new items in the 
scales. I will first describe the survey and the items included in it that can be used to 
measure cultural bias in alternative ways before I evaluate the reliability of the 
items. Then I will briefly discuss the validity of these scales before presenting the 
distribution of these scales. Finally, I will chose between the alternative versions of 
the scales and establish which one I will be using in the rest of the thesis. 
Because NOS99 has very few available variables, which severely limits the 
possibility of hypothesis testing, I have chosen to incorporate a second survey, the 
1995 Norwegian Environmental Protection Survey, into this thesis. NEPS95 is 
quite a bit different from NOS99. It is a postal inquiry with an extraordinarily large 
number of questions; the original data file has 357 variables.  
NEPS95 consists of two parts: a sufficiently large survey of the general public 
(n=1019) and a survey of smaller samples of members from 12 environmental 
organizations (n ranges from 87 to 306, totaling 2087 respondents). (Strømsnes, 
Grendstad, and Selle 1996; The Enviromental Protection Study 1995 (Population)  2008; 
The Enviromental Protection Study 1995 (Organisation Members)  2008).266  
The data files come in two parts, each of which corresponds with the one of the 
two sample component. I have combined these by renaming and recoding the 
variables so that they match each other when possible.267 For many analyses, I will 
only use data from the general public, but for the study of the relationship between 
individuals and institutional cultures, the environmentalist sample is better suited 
                                                     
266 The data file and documentation can be downloaded from www.nsd.uib.no. The data applied in the 
analysis in this publication are based on the 1995 Enviromental Protection Study, which consists of 
NSD0367-1 (population) and NSD0367-2 (environmental organizations). The data are provided by 
the LOS Center and prepared and made available by the Norwegian Social Science Data Services 
(NSD). Neither LOS nor NSD are responsible for the analyses/interpretations of the data 
presented here.  
267 This is done with the productionscript m95_recode3.spj, which calls several SPSS syntax files.  
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because it contains information about degree and type of participation in the 
organization. 
The Cultural Bias Items in NEPS95 
NEPS95 has fewer cultural bias items available than what is found in the 1999 
Nordic survey. Luckily, other variables with well-defined relationships with cultural 
biases can be used to supplement the existing cultural bias statements. I will now 
present the scales I will be using, but without going into much detail about the 
other variables not included in the scale.  
All scale development is done based on the general population survey only, but the 
choices made are also implemented in the environmentalist sample. 268 For example, 
the starting points for scale development are the standardized responses to the 
cultural bias items in the general population sample. The responses in the 
environmentalist sample are standardized in relation to the mean and variance from 
the general population sample. This ensures that values in both samples are 
comparable.  
NEPS95 included only 2 or 3 items for of each bias, which did not give a high 
enough reliability for the measurement of cultural biases, and only the egalitarian 
cultural bias items perform well. Therefore, I will add new items to these scales. 
While these items are derived from questions not intended to measure cultural bias, 
they do cover domains that are well known and central to cultural theory. These 
new items cover topics like the distribution of wealth, the balance between 
continued growth and environmental protection, trust in different institutions, and 
attitudes related to environmentalism. The availability of items is decided by the 
main topic of the survey, namely environmentalism. Therefore, I am not suggesting 
that my selection of questions is transferrable to other surveys or other contexts. In 
this context, however, I believe that the questions I have chosen do in fact measure 
those concepts that I am trying to capture, even if there are some shortcomings 
with the questions. I will now present the items used and say a few words about the 
scales and their reliabilities.  
The original cultural bias scales are based on Likert-type questions. As mentioned 
in the previous chapter, this type of scale has one main weakness, namely 
acquiescence. In order to counter this tendency, I have evaluated questions with a 
reversed direction and two questions containing a forced choice.  
Table 28 presents the wording of these forced choice questions. The advantage 
with forced choice questions is that the respondents must choose between the 
cultural biases, which removes the effect of acquiescence and helps us to 
differentiate between people who give roughly similar answers on all items.  
                                                     
268 All calculations in this chapter are performed with g:\spss\M95_validity and reliability.sps. 
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Table 28: Wording of the Growth and Equality Questions in 
NEPS95. 
 Indicator of 
CB 
 
Which one of the following statements do you most agree with? 
 
Environmental protection must be prioritized even if it reduces economic 
growth. E 
It is possible to combine environmental protection with economic growth. H 
Economic growth must be prioritized even if it harms environment. I 
 
We use the concept “equality” in different ways when it comes to the distribution of goods in 
the society. Which one of the following forms of equality do you think is the most justifiable 
for the society as whole? 
 
Everyone should be given an equal share of the goods in the society. E 
Everybody should be given goods according to their contribution to the 
society. I 
Everyone should be given goods based on their position in the society. H 
None of these, do not know. F 
 
Responses to these forced choice questions are converted into dummy variables 
that indicate support for different cultural biases.269 How do these new questions 
work with the old items? 
Reliability and Content of the Revised Cultural Bias 
Scales 
Going from bias to bias, I will compare the reliabilities of the old and new revised 
scales. In Table 29 below we can see the items used for measuring hierarchical bias. 
The two first items are from the original cultural bias battery, while the rest have 
been selected by me. In the third column we can see Cronbach’s alpha which shows 
the reliability of a simple summary scale based on the original items, and, as seen in 
the final column, the reliability of the revised scale. The reliability of the scale only 
marginally improved after the inclusion of five more items. The strongest 
correlation between the single items is between the two trust variables (0.31). The 
wealth variable reduces the numeric reliability of the scale. Nevertheless, I have 
                                                     
269 These items are first made with dummies that are linearly transformed so that the average in the 
general population is zero and the maximum values are between one and two. Regular 
standardization creates large maximum values when there are only a few respondents who choose a 
particular answer. Therefore, the standardized values were afterwards divided so that the maximum 
value is between one and two, which reduced the variation in the variable. Moreover, it allows us 
to keep a variable’s contribution to the summary scale comparable with the contributions made by 
other variables.  
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chosen to include this variable because of the high face validity of the item. The 
weak correlations between this variable and the other items are caused by the fact 
that this is a dummy variable with a low number (37) of respondents agreeing with 
this item. Despite the poor performance when measured with correlations or 
Cronbach’s alpha, it will increase the score for the extreme hierarchists.  
Table 29: Items in the Hierarchical Cultural Bias Scale in 
General Population NEPS95 
Hierarchical items Variable 
name 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Name of  
the Scale 
One of the problems with people today is that 
they challenge authority too often.  
rh1   
The best way to provide for future generations is 
to preserve the customs and practices of our 
past.  
rh2 .48 2-item 
original H 
How much do you trust the Church of Norway? Zm272   
How much do you trust the Norwegian defense 
forces (military)? 
Zm273   
Humans are meant to rule over the rest of the 
nature.  
Zm199 .52 5-item H 
Wealth  should be awarded by position (dummy). wealth_h   
It is possible to combine economic growth and 
environmental protection (dummy). 
growth_h   
Humans will eventually be able to control nature 
by learning more about it.  
zm201 .56 8-item H 
 
In Table 30 below, we can see the items used in the egalitarian cultural bias scale. 
We can see that the reliability only slightly increases when increasing the number of 
items from three to ten. The largest correlations between the individual items are 
found in the first three items (.36, .37, and .38), and in many ways these three items 
are enough. The new items correlate between .09 and .28 with these three items, 
which is lower than the old items. Nevertheless, because there are several new 
items, the reliability of the scale increases. By including these new items that cover 
growth, wealth, trust, and nature, we are increasing the number of domains in 
which the egalitarian cultural bias is measured. All the new items have high face 
validity. Moreover, by including items for capturing growth and wealth, we 
somewhat counter the tendency of acquiescence (one-fifth of the total tendency for 
acquiescence).  
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Table 30: Items in the Egalitarian Cultural Bias Scale in 
NEPS95. (Cronbach’s alpha) 
Egalitarian items Variable 
name 
Cronbach’s 
 alpha 
Name of  
the Scale 
We must redistribute wealth more evenly 
to get more justice in the world.  
re1   
I support a tax shift so that the burden falls 
more heavily on corporations and people 
with large incomes. 
re2   
A better division of labour between us is 
necessary for reducing unemployment 
re3            .66 original 3-
item E 
Environmental protection must be 
prioritized even if it reduces economic 
growth (dummy). 
growth_e   
Everyone should be given an equal share of 
the goods in the society (dummy). 
wealth_e   
How much do you trust the environmental 
organizations? (only for general public 
sample). 
m292m   
Egalitarian view of nature indicator Znature_e .65 270 7-item E 
Humans seriously misuse nature.   m188*   
Human interventions in nature often have 
catastrophic consequences. 
m191*   
The balance of nature is fragile and easy to 
disturb. 
m200*   
If the current development continues we 
will soon experience a large ecological 
catastrophe.  
m202*   
Environmental protection often requires 
taking action even if we do not know how 
serious the situation is.  
m255*             .71 11-item E 
Znature_e, which is used in the 7-item scale, is calculated by taking the average of standardized items marked with 
*.  The 11-item scale uses, instead of Znature_e, the individual items marked with *. 
 
I have also made modifications to this 11-item egalitarianism scale, where the last 
five items relating to nature are first combined into an indicator of egalitarian views 
of nature and then standardized in relation to the general public before it is entered 
into the egalitarianism scale. This has a marginally lower level of reliability (0.65 in 
general public), and it reduces the weight of the view of nature to a level 
comparable with other domains.  
Turning our attention to Table 31 below, we can see the items used for the original 
individualistic cultural bias items and the revised scale. The original scale has a 
                                                     
270 Cronbach’s alpha underestimates the true reliability of this scale because it now includes a scale for 
nature, which is constituted by the items marked with *. This reduces the variability and number of 
variables that are included in the 7-item scale. 
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reliability of 0.39, while the reliability of the revised scale is increased to 0.53. The 
new items cover wealth, trust, and nature. Most of the many nature-related 
questions available in this survey differentiate egalitarian bias from hierarchical, 
individualistic, and fatalistic biases, but they do not thoroughly differentiate 
between hierarchical, individualistic, and fatalistic biases. The nature questions 
included here have been selected because they differentiate individualistic bias from 
hierarchy and fatalism, as only individualistic cultural bias accepts the idea that 
nature and even the human genome can be changed to fit our needs.  
Three items out of eight help to reduce the effects of acquiescence: the forced 
choice wealth item and two questions with reversed direction: It is OK to tamper 
with the human genome and natural catastrophes are not forthcoming. The natural 
catastrophe item contributes only slightly to the reliability of the scale, but is 
included because its reversed direction reduces acquiescence.  
Table 31: Items in the Individualistic Cultural Bias Scale in 
NEPS95 
Individualistic items Variable 
name 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Name of the 
scale 
Everyone should have an equal chance to succeed 
and fail without government interference.  
ri1   
If people have the vision and ability to acquire 
property, they ought to be allowed to enjoy it.  
ri2 .39 original  
2-item I 
Everybody should be given goods according to 
their contribution to the society. 
wealth_i   
How much do you trust businesses and 
companies? 
m271   
Humans have the right to modify the natural 
environment to satisfy human needs.  
m189   
Human skill and wisdom will keep earth fine.  m192   
If the current development continues we will soon 
experience a large ecological catastrophe 
(reversed). 
m202r   
It is morally despicable to tamper with the natural 
human genome (reversed).  
m253r .53 8-item I 
 
Moving on to Table 32, we can see the items included in the original and revised 
fatalistic cultural bias scales. The original 2-item scale had poor reliability (0.3) and 
needed to be improved. The problem with measuring fatalistic cultural bias is that 
in many issues, the fatalists can mimic one of the other biases. However, given the 
imperfections in survey measurements, it is very difficult to distinguish between a 
lack of pattern and poor measurement. Therefore, I have opted to use distrust to 
measure fatalistic bias. Hence, there are two new items based on a question 
concerning trust in institutions. The respondents are asked to what degree they 
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trust 12 different institutions.271 Respondents are then given the choice between 
very strong trust, strong trust, small trust, no trust at all, and do not know. I have 
converted the responses to these 12 items into two trust variables. The first one is 
based on a simple count of the “no trust at all” responses to the 12 institutions.272 
The second trust variable is a reversed average level of trust in institutions that are 
not trusted by the fatalistic way of life: political parties, United Nations, 
environmental organizations, and the government’s environmental authorities.273  
 
Table 32: Items in the Fatalistic Cultural Bias Scale in NEPS95 
Fatalistic items Variable 
name 
Cronbach’s 
alpha 
Name of  
the Scale 
It seems that whichever party you vote for things go 
on pretty much the same.  
rf1   
Cooperation with others rarely works.  rf2 .30 original 
2-item F 
Indicator of strong distrust to any institution. Trust_f   
Level of distrust in the political parties in Norway,  
environmental authorities in Norway, environmental 
organizations, and the United Nations (UN). 
Trust_f2 .51 4-item F 
Construct Validity of the Revised Cultural Bias Scales 
Factor analysis could be used as a test of construct validity for the items listed in 
Table 69 (see page 483), but only if all the items had the same structure. As we have 
seen, some of the new items are forced choice items rather than Likert-type items, 
and factor analysis would be “blinded” by this variation in structure. Similarly, any 
analyses of variance within the scales (between the items) will be negatively 
influenced by this variation in structure. Therefore, it is very difficult to achieve a 
high reliability score with these revised sets of items. Nevertheless, the content of 
the items is better than before. In other words, the values of the scale now provide 
a better indicator of the respondents’ true position, even if the some mathematical 
properties between the items in each scale are not as good. 
                                                     
271 The institutions mentioned in the survey are as follows: schools and the educational system, 
voluntary organizations, press and media, businesses and companies, the Church of Norway, 
Norwegian defence forces (military), political parties in Norway, environmental authorities in 
Norway, courts and justice, our national political system, the European Union (EU), and the 
United Nations (UN). 
272 This count has then been squared and the mean of the general sample has been deducted from it to 
make it comply better with the standardized variables. A regular standardization would have given 
this variable too much influence in the scale.  
273 The orignal 2-item F scale has a stronger negative correlation with trust in these four institutions 
than the other institutions. Other biases do not share this pattern (table not included).  
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Instead of a factor analysis, I discuss the correlations between the old and new 
cultural bias scales and show that the scales do in fact measure what they should. 
More important than these correlations here are the previous discussions 
concerning the content of the items used. In Table 33, we can see how the revised 
cultural bias scales relate to each other and to the old cultural bias scales. The 
correlations between the old scales and the revised scales are marked in italics. We 
can see that the Pearsons coefficients for these items range from 0.65 for 
individualism to 0.82 for fatalism. Their strong correlations indicate that they 
should be measuring the same hidden dimensions. One could hope for even 
stronger correlations, but the ones found here seem to be acceptable enough when 
considering the small number of items on the the original scales.  
 
Table 33:  Revised Cultural Bias Scales. (Correlation). 
 
H
ierarcical 
 - 5 item
 
H
ierarchical - 2 
item
 
E
galitarian  
- 11 item
 
E
galitarian  
- 7 item
 
E
galitarian  
 - 3 item
 
Individualistic - 
8 item
 
Individualistic  
- 2 item
 
Fatalistic  
- 4 item
 
Fatalistic  
 - 2 item
 
Hierarchy 5-
item 
1.00 .71 -.07 -.03 .07 .27 .20 .07 .27 
Hierarchy 2-
item 
.71 1.00 -.02 .01 .13 .21 .21 .27 .36 
Egalitarian 
11-item 
-.07 -.02 1.00 .92 .70 -.54 -.23 -.04 .08 
Egalitarian 7-
item 
-.03 .01 .92 1.00 .83 -.50 -.25 -.06 .08 
Egalitarian 3-
item 
.07 .13 .70 .83 1.00 -.34 -.17 .07 .16 
Individualistic 
8-item 
.27 .21 -.54 -.50 -.34 1.00 .65 .07 .13 
Individualistic 
2-item 
.20 .21 -.23 -.25 -.17 .65 1.00 .18 .23 
Fatalistic 4-
item 
.07 .27 -.04 -.06 .07 .07 .18 1.00 .82 
Fatalistic 2-
item 
.27 .36 .08 .08 .16 .13 .23 .82 1.00 
The correlations between the original and revised variables are marked in italics. Correlations between the revised 
variables are marked in bold.  
 
More interesting are the correlations between the revised cultural biases (marked in 
bold). For the most part, it looks like the measurement of cultural biases using the 
revised scales is a success. As expected, we can see that the revised 5-item hierarchy 
scale has weak correlations with both the old and revised versions of the 
egalitarianism scale. The old measurements of fatalism and hierarchy did correlate a 
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bit more strongly than they should have (.36), indicating that the old cultural bias 
items did not adequately separate fatalism from hierarchy.274 By contrast, the 
revised scales exhibit very weak correlations between fatalism and hierarchy (.07). 
The only problem, which perhaps is a severe problem, is that egalitarianism and 
individualism now have a strong negative correlation (-.50). There are several 
possible competing interpretations of this. First, in Norwegian politics the 
egalitarian-individualistic dimension is very strong, and therefore these dimension 
end up being conflated in the survey. However, this is not a very credible 
interpretation simply because politics is not that important in people’s lives. 
Cultural biases should be much more influenced by people’s close surroundings, 
such as the institutions they take part in during their everyday lives. A second 
interpretation comes from the multiplicity of environmental protection questions in 
the revised egalitarian and individualistic scales. It is possible that environmental 
protection, as a domain, gets conflated with only one dimension—i.e., support 
versus opposition to environmental protection correlates highly with egalitarianism 
versus the other measurements from the other three. In other words, the 
Norwegian political landscape does not have four distinct dimensions of 
environmental protection policies, or at least the general public does not show that 
kind of refinement in their environmental opinions.275  
The big question still remains: Is the strong negative correlation between 
individualism and egalitarianism a problem. It is difficult to find good theoretical 
guidance for answering this question because the importance of the correlation 
really depends how one defines the relationship between an individual’s cultural 
bias and his or her institutional setting. If this is best described through the 
coherent individual model, then all correlations between cultural biases are likely to 
be negative, and the stronger the relationship the better. Likewise, if the synthetic 
individual approach gives the most accurate description, then the negative 
correlation is not a problem, as it simply tells us that those supporting individualism 
use rejection of egalitarianism to strengthen their support for individualism, and 
vice versa. By contrast, if the sequential individual approach gives the most accurate 
description, then the negative correlations are indeed a problem. 
One reason for not using the revised 7-item egalitarian scale (alpha=0.65) or the 11-
item egalitarian scale (alpha=0.71) could be that the reliability of the 3-item scale 
was sufficient (alpha=0.66). Do the new items add enough to warrant their 
inclusion even if reliability decreases slightly? I believe that by including views of 
trust, growth, and nature, the content validity of the measure increases, and in 
terms of content, the measure will be more comparable to the other cultural biases 
in this same survey.  
 
                                                     
274 Compare these with the correlations from NOS99, which are even higher! 
275 Factor analyses of environmental protection questions and cultural bias questions confirm this. 
However, these are not included here because it is not the topic of this thesis. 
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Distribution of the Revised Cultural Biases Scales 
In Figure 18, we can see how the distribution of the hierarchical cultural bias scale 
changes when the number of items is increased from 2 to 5.276 The changes are 
small and the form of the distribution seems acceptable in both samples. We can 
see a nice toe on both sides of the mean, indicating that we are capturing the full 
range of rejection and support for the hierarchical cultural bias. Since the reliability 
of the 5-item scale is far better than it is for the 2-item scale, the 5-item scale will be 
used for measuring hierarchical cultural bias.  
Figure 18: Hierarchical CB 5-item and 2-item by Sample. 
NEPS95. Histogram. 
 
In Figure 19, below, we can see the distributions of 11-, 7-, and 3-item scales that 
measure egalitarian cultural bias. On the bottom we can see how the scale based on 
3-items does not separate the extreme egalitarians from the moderate egalitarians, 
particularly in the sample of environmental organization members. The greater the 
number of included items, the better the scale does in separating those with high 
scores on egalitarianism, but even the 11-item scale, as seen on the top, lacks a right 
toe in the environmental organization sample. This is probably not a problem 
unless we are interested in different forms of extreme egalitarianism. Particularly, 
we can see that both the 7- and 11-item scales have a nice toe in the general sample. 
What we do not know is if the extreme egalitarians in the environmental 
organization sample would have scored even higher with the inclusion of some 
even more extreme egalitarian items, or if this should be interpreted as a good 
measurement of egalitarian bias. 
                                                     
276 This section is produced with the syntax file m95_all_Social_Background_and_CB.sps. 
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Figure 19: Egalitarian CB 11-item, 7-item, and 3-item by Sample. 
NEPS95. Histogram. 
As expected, in Figure 19, above, we can also see that the environmental 
organization members are more egalitarian than the general public, which increases 
the criterion validity of both the 7- and 11-item egalitarian bias scales.  
Moving on to Figure 20, we can see the distribution of individualistic cultural bias 
scales measured with 2 and 8 items. The 8-item scale has nice toes on both sides, 
which indicates that we are capturing the whole range of individualistic bias 
rejection and support. 
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Figure 20: Individualistic CB 8-item and 2-item scales by Sample. 
NEPS95. Histogram. 
 
Figure 21: Fatalistic CB 4-item and 2-item scales by Sample. 
NEPS95. Histogram. 
 
Finally, in Figure 21 we can see the distribution of 2- and 4-item fatalistic cultural 
biases in both samples. Both samples contain distributions with nice toes, indicating 
that we are capturing the full range of both rejection and support for fatalistic bias. 
While the distributions for the other cultural biases were quite symmetrical, here we 
find a small asymmetry in the 4-item scale. Its distribution is skewed toward 
rejection: There are only a few people who strongly support fatalism, while there 
are a large number who reject it. Nevertheless, the deviation from normal is so 
small that it does not have any consequences for later analyses. 
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Different Scales by Age and Education 
One of the weaknesses with the cultural bias measurement designed by Dake and 
Wildavsky is the degree to which the scales are prone to acquiescence. Here, I will 
not try to establish the level of acquiescence, as in the previous chapter. Instead, in 
light of this weakness, I have tried to include items not prone to acquiescence: 
forced choice items and items with reversed direction. Can we see the effects of 
reduced acquiescence in the changed relationships between age, education, and the 
cultural biases? 
In Figure 22 below, we can see how age and education relate to cultural biases 
measured by the old and by the revised scales and applied to the NEPS95 general 
sample. The old scale is drawn with a dotted line and the revised scale with a solid 
line. For most biases measured with the old scales, we can see that increasing age 
increases support for cultural bias, while education has the opposite effect. The 
exception is age and individualism, where the effect seems to be curvilinear: ages 
from 30 to 59 being the least individualistic. In general, however, increasing 
education reduces support for cultural biases. I have previously shown how this is 
at least partly caused by acquiescence. As hoped, we can also see that for all cultural 
biases, the revised scale (solid line) reduces the effects that age and education have 
on cultural biases, given the forced choice and reversed questions included in the 
revised scale. 277  
Deciding on which Scale to Use 
In the previous pages, we have seen several ways to measure cultural bias in 
NEPS95. We have also seen the content of the scale, its reliability, its correlation 
with other cultural bias scales, its distribution in the general sample and among 
members of environmental organizations, and its relationship with age and 
education. Choosing a scale is easy for hierarchy, individualism, and fatalism. The 5-
item hierarchical cultural bias scale, the 8-item individualistic scale, and the 4-item 
fatalistic scale will from now on just be referred to as the hierarchical, 
individualistic, and fatalistic cultural bias scales. 
The original 3-item egalitarian bias scale did have a sufficient level of reliability. So 
why should we change it? Well, the revised scales have new content (growth, 
wealth, trust, nature) and they include forced choice questions (growth, wealth) that 
are not influenced by acquiescence. The other cultural biases include these new 
aspects, so changing the measurement of egalitarian bias makes it more similar to 
 
                                                     
277 Age and education still have an effect: The Pearson correlations for the revised scales range from 
0.3 (hierarchy 5 item and age) to -.02 (hierarchy 5-item and education). 
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Figure 22: Cultural Bias Scales by Age and Education. General 
Sample in NEPS95. 
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the other ones. For me the most important reason for revising the scales is the 
increased robustness of my later analysis concerning cultural theory and rejection of 
biases. By including a second survey, namely NEPS95, I can ensure that my 
theoretical findings based on NOS99 are not just a one-time phenomenon. 
However, if my measurement of cultural biases in NEPS95 were just a subset (2 or 
3 items) of the 5 items used in NOS99, my findings would quite possibly be 
applicable only to Dake’s cultural bias items, without reversed items. Since I have a 
special interest in the rejection of cultural biases, it is useful to have an alternative 
measurement that at least to some degree attempts to correct for this weakness.  
Choosing the best egalitarianism scale is not easy because the difference between 
the 7- and 11-item scales is small. Both the 7- and 11-item scales have sufficient 
levels of reliability, but Cronbach’s alpha decreases when combining the 5 nature 
items into one indicator on the view of nature.278 The 11-item scale does a better 
job in measuring extreme egalitarianism, but it has perhaps too much environ-
mental protection content. Both the 7- and 11-item scales correlate negatively with 
individualism, but the 7-item scale correlates a little less (-0.50 vs. -0.54). Both the 
7- and 11-item scales reduce the effect of age and education on the measured 
egalitarian bias. I will be using the 7-item scale to measure egalitarianism because it 
seems to balance the content better, and validity is more important than reliability.  
One of the problematic issues I presented in Chapter 7 was the tendency for 
researchers to use techniques that are well suited for analyzing numbers, but not at 
all suitable for analyzing meanings. Without making references to meaning, I have 
now established a way for measuring cultural biases as continuous variables in two 
different surveys. So far, the only thing we know is that some respondents are more 
hierarchical than others, some are more egalitarian, and so forth. However, in order 
to understand the effects of cultural biases, we must consider the mechanisms of 
influence at the individual level. Do we find effects only above or below certain 
thresholds? Do the cultural biases work one by one? Alternatively, do cultural 
biases work together in an additive way or only in combinations, or perhaps both? 
In the next chapter, I will construct measures of cultural biases that allow us to deal 
with many cultural biases simultaneously, without making calculations of meaning.  
                                                     
278 However, I believe that the calculation of Cronbach’s alpha underestimates the true reliability of 
the 7-item scale because it does not relate to the 5 items that are first combined to form the view 
of nature indicator.  
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C h a p t e r  1 0   
COMBINATIONS OF CULTURAL 
BIASES IN PEOPLE 
How can we convert the four cultural bias scales into a description of a person 
while still retaining the richness of meaning we saw in the household chapters?  
Most opinion studies, like most works of fiction, employ flat, 
abbreviated treatments of their subjects. We reject the reality of 
comic-book characters who are predictably heroes or villains, yet we 
too often settle for comic-book statistics on infinitely complex 
matters of opinion. It is the rare poll that allows us to see opinion as 
multifaceted, multi-layered, and intricate. (Bogart 2004: 272) 
We need to find a way to combine information from these four scales into a label 
that represents a person’s relation to these four cultural biases. The solution will be 
intertwined with our assumptions about the individual-culture relationship. 
This chapter will discuss and compare different operationalizations of cultural bias 
in relation to different theoretical views about the individual-culture relationship. 
The main goal of this chapter is to choose a practical operationalization. The choice 
of operationalization can be based on theoretical considerations, on previous 
research, or on an exploration of what is going on in the data. As theoretical 
considerations do not give much guidance, and previous research has not 
systematically dealt with this issue, an empirical exploration seems to be the most 
fruitful avenue to pursue.  
My analytical strategy is to create many alternative operationalizations of cultural 
biases, which can then be used to produce thousands of contingency tables. 279 This 
gives us an opportunity to empirically study how the assumptions we use influence 
our results and the performance of cultural bias as an explanation for party 
preference. This is an unusual strategy, but it will give me the opportunity to 
discuss the assumptions behind the individual-culture relationship.  
We can learn something about the individual-culture relationship in general by 
comparing the performances of the different operationalizations. As such, I will be 
asking the following questions in this chapter. First, how can we label the cultural 
                                                     
279 There is a windows command script Nordic1999_final_cutpoints.cmd that controls the whole 
process. This calls SPSS production scripts, which again call regular SPSS syntax files that are run 
multiple times with different parameters each time. See page 523 for more information. 
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biases that individuals have? Second, when dividing cultural bias scales into 
categories, what are the best cut-off points to use when assigning labels for support, 
indifference, and rejection? Third, how much can cultural biases actually explain? 
Fourth, is support for a bias sufficient, or do we also need to account for the 
rejection of a bias when studying political preferences? Fifth, does indifference to a 
bias really matter, or are political preferences mainly formed by our support and 
rejection of biases? Sixth, how many cultural biases do we use to make political 
choices?  
In survey-based, variable-oriented research, there is a general tendency to search for 
the variable or model that thoroughly explains our dependent variable (Ragin 1987; 
Ragin 2008). In Chapter 12, I will demonstrate the fallacies involved in three 
common assumptions that are typically used by variable-oriented survey research 
on cultural theory. The dominant bias assumption is one such fallacy, which 
suggests that we need to use more than one cultural bias on the individual level. 
Similarly, the independency of effects assumption and the additivity of effects 
assumption are fallacies. Given these three fallacies, we should be looking for an 
operationalization that is not dependent on these assumptions. My solution to this 
quagmire is to replace the four numerical values with one cultural bias combination. 
I will then create labels for individuals in an effort to describe their cultural bias 
combinations.  
Principles for Labeling Cultural Bias Combinations 
The different methods for labeling become clearer if we start with a fictive 
respondent, Sarah, who is clearly more positive to egalitarianism (1.2) and slightly 
more positive to hierarchy (0.5) than the average respondent. Her preference for 
individualism (-0.1) is slightly below the average, and her preference for fatalism (-
1.4) is far below the average.280  
There are many ways to label Sarah, although we do not yet know which one to 
use. We could label her as E because she supports an egalitarian bias. We could 
label her as f because her rejection of the fatalistic bias deviates more from the 
average than the support for hierarchy. We could just as well label her as Ef or 
HEif. Instead of trying out random combinations, I will approach this in a 
systematic manner and go through the set of principles used to make the labels. 
In order to create robust labels for cultural combinations, we need to take into 
account all four principles summarized in Figure 23: The selection principle, the 
number of levels to divide degrees of support for a cultural bias into, the ordering 
principle, and the number of biases to use in a label. 
                                                     
280 See two previous chapters how the cultural bias scales are calculated and what kind of values the 
scales have. 
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First, the selection principle is used to select which cultural bias should be included 
in the label. Are cultural biases about support or about difference in opinion? If biases 
are all about support, we should focus on the highest values. In other words, a 
positive value is always stronger than a negative value. If cultural biases are about 
differences in opinion, we should measure cultural biases in terms of deviations 
from the mean (0), in which case a strong negative value represents a stronger 
difference than a weak positive value. Using support as a selection principle will 
hide any effects of rejection, while using difference or the absolute value will allow 
us to see the effects of rejection as well. It is important to note that although I call 
this the selection principle, it is also used for the potential ranking of cultural biases.  
Figure 23: Principles for Labeling Cultural Bias Combinations 
 
Second, how many levels or categories should each cultural bias scale be divided 
into? One can use a label that indicates only support (one level), where capital 
letters show support, and the lack of a letter implies a lack of support. One can also 
use a binary system with separate labels for support and rejection (two levels). In 
the binary system, capitals show support (EH) and small letters show rejection (if). 
The difference between labeling by using one or two levels is that the latter enables 
us to distinguish between respondents who differ only in their rejection of a bias.  
One can also divide respondents into three different levels: support, indifference, 
and rejection. In this trichotomous system, capitals signify support, a missing letter 
shows indifference, and a small letter shows rejection. In the neutral system, a 
Number of biases used 
· 1 
· 2 
· 3 
· 4 
Ordering principle: 
· Fixed HEIF-order 
· Ranked  
Selection principle: 
· Support 
· Difference 
(absolute value) 
Divided into levels:  
· Only support 
· Binary 
· Trichotomy 
· Neutral 
 
 
•    Combinations of Cultural Biases in People  
 
362 
separate letter indicates neutral relation to each cultural bias so that we can 
distinguish respondents according to what they are neutral toward. 
Third, we must consider how to order the biases in the label. The biases can be either 
presented in a fixed HEIF order or ranked by preference. If cultural biases are 
selected based on support, they will also be ranked according to support. If cultural 
biases are selected based on difference, they will also be ranked according to the 
same principle. Using different principles for ordering and selecting would be 
contradictory, as they are both reflections of how we understand cultural bias. 
Finally, we must consider how many biases should be use in the label: one, two, three, 
or all four cultural biases. For example, respondents could be labeled according to 
their single most significant bias, their two most significant biases, and so on.  
Now that I have presented the principles behind the labeling, I can now start 
making labels for cultural bias combinations.  
Labeling According to Levels 
Making labels starts by assigning symbols to different cultural biases. In Table 34, 
we can see which letters and letterforms indicate the various cultural bias positions. 
The coherent cultural bias does not open up for rejecting a bias, hence the variable 
coherent contains only one letter indicating which cultural bias the respondent most 
strongly supports. The other labeling systems are dependent on particular cut-off 
points. In the support labeling system, a capital letter indicates support, while the 
lack of a letter implies rejection. In the binary labeling system, cultural biases receive 
two different values—support or rejection, as signified by a capital or lower-case 
letter. In the trichotomous labeling system, a lack of letter indicates an indifferent 
position in the middle of the scale. This emphasizes and clarifies the effects of 
support and rejection.281 The neutral labeling system gives the area between support 
and rejection its own symbol, as it is conceivable that being on the middle of a 
cultural bias scale is not just absence of support or rejection, but a legitimate, 
neutral cultural position that should be given the same weight as support and 
rejection.  
                                                     
281 A small change across the cut-off point does not entail a shift from support to rejection, from H to 
h, as there will be an area of indifference between H and h. 
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Table 34: Indicators for a Single Cultural Bias by Levels 
 Alternative Categorizations of Single Cultural Bias Positive Indifferent Negative 
Coherent Cultural Bias H, E, I , F - - 
Cultural Bias Support—Hierarchy H -  
Cultural Bias Support—Egalitarian E -  
Cultural Bias Support—Individualistic I -  
Cultural Bias Support—Fatalistic F -  
Cultural Bias Binary—Hierarchy H - h 
Cultural Bias Binary—Egalitarian E - e 
Cultural Bias Binary—Individualistic I - i 
Cultural Bias Binary—Fatalistic F - f 
Cultural Bias Trichotomous—Hierarchy H  h 
Cultural Bias Trichotomous—Egalitarian E  e 
Cultural Bias Trichotomous—Individualistic I  i 
Cultural Bias Trichotomous—Fatalistic F  f 
Cultural Bias Neutral—Hierarchy H r h 
Cultural Bias Neutral—Egalitarian E g e 
Cultural Bias Neutral—Individualistic I d i 
Cultural Bias Neutral—Fatalistic F t f 
 
Selecting and Ordering Biases 
The next phase in labeling is to select whether we want to use support or difference 
when differentiating between opinions. If we look at Sarah again, she is supportive 
of hierarchy (0.5) and egalitarianism (1.2), making these her two strongest biases, 
while her support for the fatalism is by far the weakest bias. However, if we look at 
the absolute value of the differences, her rejection of fatalism (-1.4) is the strongest 
bias, while her support for egalitarianism is the second strongest.  
If we select the labels for Sarah’s biases according to support, we then get two 
biases—H and E—because these are the only ones above the cut-off point. The 
fixed order presents these as HE, while the ranked order is EH because the 
support for egalitarianism is stronger. 
When selecting the labels by using the binary method, the fixed order of the biases 
would be HEif, and the ranked order would be fEHi because the biases are sorted 
according to their absolute values.  
Labels can also be selected by using the trichotomous method. In this case, the 
fixed order of the biases would be HEf, and the ranked order would be EHf. When 
compared with the binary version, we can see that the trichotomous method 
obscures the i because it is classified as indifferent.  
Finally, if we select the labels by using the neutral method, the fixed order of the 
biases would be HEdf, while the ranked order would be fEHd.  
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We can see that the way we understand how of cultural biases work—i.e. through 
support, rejection, or differences between levels of support—has significant 
consequences on which biases are selected for analysis and on the order of the 
biases. As seen in case of our fictive person named Sarah, very different labels can 
be used for representing the same individual.  
Fixed combinations of biases that ignore the relative strength of biases at the 
individual level work well with the sequential individual model that sees people as 
strongly influenced by context—in most contexts, the institutional pressure would 
trigger a cultural bias change in the individual. Sarah’s responses could be 
interpreted as showing that she spends lots of time in an egalitarian context 
behaving in an egalitarian manner and some time in a hierarchical context. The 
relative strengths of these biases are not so important because in the egalitarian 
context, she will be guided by a familiar egalitarian bias, and in the hierarchical 
context, she will be guided by a familiar hierarchical bias. In other words, in most 
situations of life our choices are constrained by the context in which we operate.  
In its logic, the ranked preferences are closer to the synthetic individual model. A 
person will utilize his or hers complete social repertoire in an institutional context, 
and knowing the full range of their cultural preferences is needed to predict their 
behaviors and political preferences. Therefore, the order of their cultural biases is 
paramount for understanding their preferences and choices. 
Each method for labeling cultural combinations is saved as a new variable. So, what 
kind of properties do these new variables have?  
Cultural Bias Combinations as Variables 
In Table 35, we can see the new cultural combination variables. There is one 
variable for each set principles or assumptions involved, and the variables’ names 
reflect the principles used. One should notice that not all combinations are 
possible. Trichotomous and neutral combinations require rejection to be 
meaningful categories, hence they cannot be combined with support. The last 
column shows the label our example respondent, Sarah, has according to each 
particular variable. I will not present the content of these variables one by one, as I 
have already presented the principles behind them.  
I have also included one cultural bias combination that mixes together several 
principles: CultRankTriA1_3 selects the first bias according to its difference from 
the mean and keeps the remaining three biases in a fixed order. In some sense, it 
assumes that the first bias is what really matters. However, the other three biases 
have enough effect to be included in the label. Keeping the three least important 
biases in fixed order reduces the number of categories. 
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Table 35: Variables used for Cultural Bias Combinations, 
arranged by Levels, Ordering, N of Biases in the Label, and 
Selection Principle 
Levels Ordering 
principle 
behind 
labeling 
Number 
of biases 
used in 
label 
Variable name 
Selection 
principle: 
support or 
difference 
Sarah’s label 
 
Only the 
strongest 
support 
1 CoherentS1 S 
E 
1 CultFixSupp1 S E 
2 CultFixSupp2 S HE 
3 CultFixSupp3 S HE 
Fixed - 
HEIF 
4 CultFixSupp4 S HE 
1 CultRankSupp1 S E 
2 CultRankSupp2 S EH 
3 CultRankSupp3 S EH 
Support 
Ranked 
4 CultRankSupp4 S EH 
1 CultFixBinA1 D f 
2 CultFixBinA2 D Ef 
3 CultFixBinA3 D HEf 
Fixed - 
HEIF 
4 CultFixBinA4 D HEif 
1 CultRankBinA1 D f 
2 CultRankBinA2 D fE 
3 CultRankBinA3 D fEH 
Binary 
Ranked 
4 CultRankBinA4 D fEHi 
1 CultFixTriA1 D f 
2 CultFixTriA2 D Ef 
3 CultFixTriA3 D HEf 
Fixed - 
HEIF 
4 CultFixTriA4 D HEf 
1 CultRankTriA1 D f 
2 CultRankTriA2 D fE 
3 CultRankTriA3 D fEH 
Trichotomous 
Ranked 
4 CultRankTriA4 D fEH 
 
First one 
by 
strength + 
rest by 
HEIF 
1+3 CultRankTriA1_3 D fHE 
1 CultFixNeutA1 D f 
2 CultFixNeutA2 D Ef 
3 CultFixNeutA3 D HEf 
Fixed - 
HEIF 
4 CultFixNeutA4 D HEdf 
1 CultRankNeutA1 D f 
2 CultRankNeutA2 D fE 
3 CultRankNeutA3 D fEH 
Neutral 
Strength 
of 
preference 4 CultRankNeutA4 D fEHd 
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It is possible to use a different approach when making variables. I have also tried to 
keep support and absolute values as equal alternatives, and used them equally with 
all the other alternatives. The advantage of this manner of coding is that support is 
divided into three levels, just like rejection. Therefore, I call this the S3 coding (see 
page 551 for more details). Theoretically at least, several levels of support should 
allow it to perform better in the analyses presented later in this piece. As it turned 
out, however, having a multiplicity of levels simply complicated the analyses 
because many of these variables did not help to explain party preference and added 
too much noise to the analysis. In addition, some of these variables were a poor 
match to the theoretical assumptions presented in Chapter 7.  
Even if it is tempting to create categories that precisely reflect the individuals’ 
cultural positions, there is a limit to how complicated our categories can be when 
using them in research. If we want to compare a few cases like families or parties, 
case studies can deal with high levels of complexity. However, simplification is 
needed if we are working on thousands of cases and surveys. One of the potential 
problems with these variables is the high number of categories they divide 
respondents into. In Table 77 in the appendix, we can see that some variables 
divide respondents into hundreds of categories according to their cultural biases. 
On one hand, it is highly interesting if we can actually do that while being able to 
predict party preferences in a precise manner. Perhaps this is the level of precision 
we should be at. On the other hand, however, statistical analysis requires a certain 
number of similar respondents before we can start to generalize.282  
The real question is what is the best way to simplify cultural bias combinations? 
The answer probably depends on the research interest. Therefore, we need to know 
more about the dependent variable used in this chapter, namely party preference. 
The Dependent Variable: Variations in Party Preference 
In the surveys, party preference is the only interesting variable with enough 
complexity to meet my present research purposes.283 Party preference can be coded 
as the simple choice between parties in each national parliament or as a proxy for 
political ideology that travels across national borders. Because of the possibility that 
certain cultural bias combinations affect only one of these, we should test them 
both. However, exploring party preference in detail will have to wait until next 
chapter.  
                                                     
282 A crosstable with 400 categories for cultural bias combinations and 8 political parties yeilds 3200 
cells. We need very large samples to deal with this kind of precision when working with cultural 
biases. Furthermore, on paper, a table like this would take perhaps 8 pages in this thesis. 
283 The respondents were asked “Which party would you vote for if the parliamentary election were 
tomorrow?” 
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Party preference can first be understood simply as choice of one out of several 
parties in parliamentary elections. As the survey is conducted in five countries, 
there are five national parliamentary party systems and elections, each of which will 
be analyzed one by one as a dependent variable (see list in Table 36).  
Table 36: List of Party Preference Variables 
Variable name Variable label 
N2_PARTY Norway: Parliamentary party preference 
D2_PARTY Denmark: Parliamentary party preference 
S2_PARTY Sweden: Parliamentary party preference 
F2_PARTY Finland: Parliamentary party preference 
I2_PARTY Iceland: Parliamentary party preference 
LSOC_dummy Nordic Left-Socialist Party preference dummy 
SOCDEM_dummy Nordic Social Democratic Party preference dummy 
CONS_dummy Nordic Conservative Party preference dummy 
LIBER_dummy Nordic Liberal Party preference dummy 
AGRAR_dummy Nordic Agrarian Party preference dummy 
CHRIST_dummy Nordic Christian Party preference dummy 
PROGR_dummy Nordic Progress Party preference dummy 
GREEN_dummy Nordic Green Party preference dummy 
TOTPARTY Nordic Party Family preference (without don’t know) 
Don’t know_dummy Nordic  No vote or don’t know what to vote dummy 
 
Second, it is possible to see parties as representatives of political ideologies. To 
analyze this conceptualization of party preference, I look at support for 
ideologically similar party families across the Nordic countries one by one. In 
addition, there is also one variable that contains all party families across all five 
countries. Finally, there is a dummy variable representing those who do not know 
what to vote for or those who state that they would not vote. 284 
Now that we have created the labels for cultural bias combinations and we know a 
little bit about the dependent variable, party preference, we can start to search for 
the best cut-off points for the cultural biases. 
Empirical Exploration in Search of Cut-off Points 
Cut-off points are one of the several aspects of operationalization that need to be 
discussed and decided upon before cultural bias combinations can be used in a 
reliable way. The first stage is to assign cut-off points that allow us to convert 
                                                     
284 See Table 75:  National Parties by Nordic Party Family on page 533. These ideological party families 
are taken from Grendstad (2003b). 
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values into labels. In other words, how strong does support have to be before it 
qualifies as support? 
Since selecting cut-off points has not been explicitly treated in cultural theory 
literature before, here I will provide a thorough treatment of this topic. Since I later 
on want to use the cultural bias combinations to evaluate some theoretical 
questions, the cut-off points should not favor any particular assumption. I will first 
look for cut-off points for dividing the cultural bias scales into two, and then into 
three levels.  
Dividing Respondents and Cultural Bias Scales into Two 
For future analyses, it will be important to try to find out which cut-off point gives 
the most useful proportions of respondents. This can be done by studying the 
average improvement in our predictions of the respondents’ party preferences. 
In Figure 24, we can see how using percentiles as a ‘rule’ for dividing respondents 
into two categories on a given cultural bias produces a predictable number of 
people within each category. First, we order respondents according to their value 
on a cultural bias scale and then divide them into two groups. For example, a cut-
off point of 50 will divide respondents into 50 percent that support and 50 percent 
that reject a given cultural bias within each country. Similarly, a cut-off point of 60 
will classify 60 percent of the respondents as rejecting and 40 percent as supporting 
a particular bias. The actual value of the cultural bias that is used to divide 
respondents is calculated on a country-by-country basis.  
Figure 24: One Cut-off Point Divides Respondents into Two 
At this stage, there will be no difference between the support and binary levels 
because they both share the same cut-off points and they will be treated together. 
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The tables and figures apply also to support even if some of the labels only refer to 
binary.  
So which one of the above cut-off points works best? To find the answer, I decided 
to try them all out. I tried 9 cut-off points on 4 cultural biases and made cross 
tables containing 15 dependent variables (5 national parliaments and 10 ideological 
party family variables), 285 which yields 540 contingency tables in total. Instead of 
printing them all out, I decided to just present their mean uncertainty coefficients, 
as pictured in Figure 25, below. 286  
Although the uncertainty coefficient (U) is not a widely known measurement, I 
have decided to use it as the measurement of association because among the 
nominal level measures of association, U is the only one that can be interpreted as 
the proportion of reduction in variance of the dependent variable when we know 
the value of the independent variable. In other words, the interpretation of U is 
similar to the interpretation of R2 in regressions (Colignatus 2007; Garson 2008 ).  
In Figure 25 below, we can see how the explanatory power of each cultural bias 
item depends on the cut-off point used. The figure contains two different sets of 
dependent variables. In the left column, the dependent variables are dummy 
variables for Nordic ideological party families. In the column on the right, the 
dependent variables are National parliamentary party preferences. A few main traits 
are worth noticing. First, when used alone rather than in a combination, the 
explanatory power of each binary cultural bias is low. In this case, we increase our 
ability to understand respondents’ party preference by only a few percentage points. 
Second, cut-off points at 30 or 40 seem to work best for all of the binary cultural 
biases. However, I do not intend to use the biases one by one, but in combinations. 
Choosing a cut-off point can be made after we have seen how combinations of 
these binary cut-off points perform. 
                                                     
285 I have excluded the Don’t Know dummy. 
286 Uncertainty coefficient is also know as Theil’s U and as an entropy coefficient (Uncertainty Coefficient  
2011). 
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Figure 25: The Explanatory Power of a Single CB by Cut-off 
Point. NOS99. (U) 
 
In Figure 26 below, we can see a summary of 2245 cross tables that explore the 
relationship between cultural bias combinations, cut-off points, and the ordering 
principle used. The dotted lines show the strongest U that is present in a set of 
contingency tables, and solid lines show the average U for these contingency tables. 
The figures in the column on the left have preferences for Nordic ideological party 
families as the dependent variables. The figures in the column on the right have the 
national parliamentary party preferences as the dependent variable. On the upper 
row, the order of the cultural bias labels is fixed, while on the bottom row the 
cultural bias labels are ordered by their strength of preference. I will later return to 
this issue of label ordering. For now, the only task is to select a cut-off point that 
works for both of these approaches.  
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Figure 26: The Explanatory Power of Cultural Bias 
Combinations, by one Cut-off Point and Ordering Principle. 
NOS99.  (Maximum and Mean U)  
 
We can see in Figure 26 above that when the labels are in a fixed order, the cut-off 
points can be placed almost anywhere without destroying the analysis. The stability 
of the mean across all cut-off points is remarkable. The best explanation for 
national party preferences as a dependent variable is reached when the cut-off point 
is between 20 and 80.  
When we order or rank the labels according to the strength of preferences, we find 
that the strength of the relationship between cultural bias classifications and party 
preferences is more dependent on cut-off points. We can see that the best mean 
results can be found from cut-off point 40 to cut-off point 70. For future analyses, 
I will be using the cut-off point 50 for the binary labeling, as these seems to 
perform well across all dependent variables and ordering principles.  
In addition, we can see that the maximum values are quite sensitive for the cut-off 
point choice. However, these maximum values refer to just one contingency table 
among many and should not be used for selecting a cut-off point for general use. 
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Moreover, some of the high maximum values are probably a sign of trouble, which 
I will come back to later. 
Dividing Respondents and Cultural Bias Scales into Three 
I will repeat the previous analysis in order to find the best cut-off points for 
dividing respondents into three categories on each cultural bias. Each of the three 
cultural bias levels can be labeled in one of two ways—the trichotomous version 
and the neutral version. They both use the same two cut-off points because they 
differ only by how the middle category is labeled. Therefore, they are treated 
together here. 
In Figure 27, we can see how our choice of cut-off points will divide the 
respondents into three different categories of varying sizes.  
Figure 27: Two Cut-off Points Divide Respondents into Three  
In order to evaluate the cut-off points, we need to see how the combinations of 
cultural biases perform. In Figure 28 below, we can see a summary of the 
explanatory power of cultural bias combinations when using two cut-off points 
from 1049 tables. The solid line shows the mean of the uncertainty coefficients for 
a given set, and the dashed line shows the maximum value. 
We can again see how the analysis is less dependent on the our cut-off point choice 
when ordering the labels in a fixed manner. From cut-off points 15 and 85 to 45 
and 55, there are only small differences in the mean performance, even if the 
highest single values can be found at cut-off points 30 and 70. Ordering by strength 
of preference (ranking) makes the analysis more dependent on the cut-off point 
choice, but it also gives us better overall results.  
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Figure 28: The Explanatory Power of Cultural Bias 
Combinations, by Two Cut-off Points and Ordering 
Principle. NOS99.  (Maximum and Mean U)  
If I would use only national party preference as the dependent variable, perhaps 45 
and 65 would be the best choice. However, since I am attempting to find a good 
balance between both political preference types, it looks like 35 and 65 is a better 
choice. In all four sections of Figure 28, this cut-off point performs in an 
acceptable manner. It would not be the obvious choice for any of these cells alone, 
but it seems to work well enough for any combination of the assumptions used. 
Using a cut-off point that would clearly favor one assumption would make our 
discussion of the different assumptions’ strengths useless. 
In Figure 29 below, we can see how the number of cultural biases used in the labels 
has a huge impact on the mean strength of the uncertainty coefficient. 
Nevertheless, as we can see in the solid line, the strength of relationship is quite 
robust across different cut-off points when using only one cultural bias in the label. 
Perhaps this is the reason why cut-off points have not been given explicit treatment 
in previous research. However, as the number of cultural biases in the label 
increases, the effect of the cut-off point increases, especially if we order the biases 
used in the label according to strength. The suggested 35 and 65 cut-off point 
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seems to perform well under all assumption combinations presented in Figure 29, 
which makes it look like a prudent choice.  
Figure 29: The Explanatory power of Cultural Bias 
Combinations, by Two Cut-off points, Number of Biases, 
and Ordering. NOS99. (U)  
I have included here only those cut-off points that were organized in a symmetrical 
manner around the middle point of 50 because they are easy to present in a graph. 
Nevertheless, I also ran the same analyses with non-symmetrical cut-off points like 
10 and 30, 10 and 40, 10 and 50, and so forth. These non-symmetrical cut-off 
points behave in a similar manner and the symmetrical 35 and 65 cut-off point is 
the best overall choice. 
To sum up, we have empirically explored what kind of consequences using 
different cut-off points will have given different sets of assumption combinations 
used to measure the relationship between cultural bias and party preference. 
Thousands of contingency tables have been compared, and summaries of these 
have been presented in several figures above (Figure 26 through Figure 29).  
Two different sets of cut-off points have been selected. First, cut-off point 50 will 
divide the respondents into two equally large groups according to their view of one 
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cultural bias, where half of them support and the other half reject this way of life. 
These views were consistent across all combinations of assumptions. Second, cut-
off points 35 and 65 divide the population into three groups according to their 
cultural biases and performed well across all combinations of assumptions. They 
create a distribution where the lowest 35 percent in each country reject a bias, the 
middle 30 percent are indifferent, and the highest 35 percent accept a bias. A 
complete listing of the empirical cut-off points used for each of the cultural biases 
in each of the five countries can be found in the appendix on page 533. For the rest 
of this thesis, I will use cut-off points 50 for the support and binary versions and 
cut-off points 35 and 65 for the trichotomous and neutral versions.  
We have also seen some extremely high values in the uncertainty coefficient for 
cultural combinations that divided respondents into a high number of categories. It 
is perhaps possible that some uncertainty coefficients are not comparable with each 
other. 
Creating Comparability  
One problem still needs to be solved. There is a risk that the uncertainty 
coefficients from different contingency tables are not mutually comparable because 
the U is also related to the number of cultural bias categories: The higher the 
number of categories, the higher the U. In particular, there are no low U values 
when we divide respondents into hundreds of categories, where each one has its 
own label.  
Is this a problem? A high U can be interpreted as a strong ability to explain party 
preference. It is a problem because, as we can see in Figure 30, there is a strong 
curvilinear relationship between the number of cultural bias categories and U. Thus, 
the winner of the assumptions race would always be those cultural bias 
combinations that divide people into a high number of categories. The effect of the 
number of categories will mask the other effects from cultural biases.  
I have tried three different remedies to this problem. First, it is possible to remove 
all categories that have only a few people in them, which is my preferred remedy. 
Second, it is possible to estimate the effect of the number of categories used. This 
estimate then can be used to adjust the U. Third, it is possible to remove from the 
analysis those cultural bias variables that have, for example, less than 40 categories. 
I will present these remedies in detail in order to justify my choice.  
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Figure 30: The Curvilinear Relationship between U and Number 
of Categories. NOS99.  
 
Require a Minimum Number of Respondents in each Category 
The first remedy modifies the cultural combination variables by reducing the length 
of the tail.287 I have decided to require at least 10 respondents in each category in 
each country. For the joint Nordic sample, which contains all 5000 respondents, I 
have required two limits: In addition to at least 10 respondents in a country, at least 
40 respondents are required in each category at the Nordic level.288 Respondents 
who have a less frequent cultural bias combination are labeled as missing a cultural 
bias combination. This reduces the number of categories and respondents available, 
which reduces the U and increases the comparability between the contingency 
tables.  
In Table 37 below, we can see the number of categories the respondents fall into 
for each of the cultural bias variables after the limits have been applied. These 
categories are counted both country-by-country and for all five Nordic countries 
together. In addition, the table contains the number of respondents in these 
categories. Preference is given to variables that keep as many of the respondents as 
possible.  
                                                     
287 The analyses in rest of this chapter are stored in the script 
nordic1999_all2_analyse_crosstabs_UC_8.sps. The datafile used is created with the script 
Nordic1999_neut_make_final_data.cmd.  
288 Because parliamentary party preference is the most imporant dependent variable, I prioritize 
reliability on the national level. For example, if there are 4 respondents with He in Finland, and 
more than 10 in every other Nordic Country, only these 4 responents in Finland would be 
classified as missing. The category of He would still be included because there are more than 40 
respondents at the Nordic level. 
National parliamentary 
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Nordic ideological party 
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Table 37: The Number of Cultural Bias Combinations and 
Respondents by Variable and Country. NOS99 Limited. 
  Norway Sweden Denmark Finland Iceland Nordic 
  NC NR NC NR NC NR NC NR NC NR NC NR 
CoherentS1 5 997 5 1000 5 1015 4 1003 5 817 5 4832 
CultFixSupp1 4 873 4 893 4 896 4 890 4 733 4 4285 
CultFixSupp2 10 879 10 896 10 899 10 896 10 740 10 4310 
CultFixSupp3 14 880 14 896 14 899 14 898 14 740 14 4313 
CultFixSupp4 15 880 15 896 15 899 15 898 15 740 15 4313 
CultRankSupp1 4 873 4 893 4 896 4 890 4 733 4 4285 
CultRankSupp2 16 867 16 889 16 889 16 885 16 724 16 4254 
CultRankSupp3 31 788 32 820 30 812 31 807 31 650 29 3643 
CultRankSupp4 25 648 26 696 28 719 27 690 22 520 23 3018 
CultFixBinA1 8 995 8 999 8 1013 8 1003 8 813 8 4823 
CultFixBinA2 24 993 24 999 24 1011 24 1001 24 812 24 4816 
CultFixBinA3 31 980 31 984 32 1004 31 989 32 809 32 4766 
CultFixBinA4 16 967 16 949 16 984 16 976 16 796 16 4672 
CultRankBinA1 8 995 8 999 8 1013 8 1003 8 813 8 4823 
CultRankBinA2 37 908 40 938 42 962 43 964 39 739 41 4382 
CultRankBinA3 21 292 17 232 21 299 17 226 7 88 10 632 
CultRankBinA4 2 24 3 37 5 61 4 44 . . . . 
CultFixTriA1 9 995 9 999 9 1013 9 1003 8 804 9 4814 
CultFixTriA2 30 953 27 936 28 947 30 963 27 758 27 4444 
CultFixTriA3 32 686 34 711 35 723 36 714 30 504 29 2881 
CultFixTriA4 39 686 32 600 38 698 41 687 26 407 27 2310 
CultRankTriA1 9 995 9 999 9 1013 9 1003 8 804 9 4814 
CultRankTriA2 40 864 41 874 44 911 46 912 39 671 43 3923 
CultRankTriA3 15 205 16 207 18 239 13 166 6 68 8 446 
CultRankTriA4 7 94 9 118 9 120 8 106 4 45 5 276 
CultRankTriA1_3 18 997 15 1000 22 1015 14 1003 6 817 6 4832 
CultFixNeutA1 8 973 8 981 8 995 8 980 8 804 8 4733 
CultFixNeutA2 24 872 24 886 24 888 26 905 24 718 24 4246 
CultFixNeutA3 23 566 27 604 27 617 27 600 27 462 24 2574 
CultFixNeutA4 39 686 32 600 38 698 41 687 26 407 27 2310 
CultRankNeutA1 8 973 8 981 8 995 8 980 8 804 8 4733 
CultRankNeutA2 33 758 35 786 37 805 40 823 35 618 36 3502 
CultRankNeutA3 7 96 7 86 10 131 3 38 . . 2 109 
NC is the number of valid categories, i.e. categories where the number of respondents is above the limit (c10 and n40). 
NR  is the number of  the respondents in these categories. Variables with too few cases after the limit are marked with a 
strikethrough (n < 500 in a country or <2000 at Nordic level). 
 
Those variables that had a small number of categories have not been affected by 
this, while variables that had a large number of categories have lost both categories 
and respondents. We can see an example of successful transformation near the 
middle of Table 37: CultRankTriA2 divided respondents into 57 cultural 
combinations before the limit (see Table 77 in the appendix). However, only 40 
categories remain after the limit was imposed. There has been a decline in the 
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number of respondents, but the size of this decline is acceptable. The benefit of 
this transformation is that when we make the tables, we have enough respondents 
in every column.  
These transformations did not work well for five variables, as it removed too many 
categories and respondents. For example, CultRankTriA4 had respondents evenly 
distributed in close to 400 categories. Unfortunately, in each of the countries, there 
were only a few categories containing more than 10 people. Common for these five 
variables is that they originally divided respondents into more than 200 categories, 
which is quite impractical. Therefore, the loss of these variables is not a big 
concern.  
I will now justify this choice by presenting the two rejected remedies.  
Adjust According to the Effect from the Number of Categories Used 
The second remedy, which adjusts according to an estimate of the effect from the 
number of categories used, is possible but not preferable. In Figure 30 above, we 
can see the strong curvilinear relationship between U and the number of CB 
categories. In particular, if the variables with a high number of categories are 
included, a curvilinear regression can explain most of the variation in U.  
It looks like cultural bias combinations that balance the different concerns have less 
than 50 and more than 10 categories, which matches the number of categories for 
many of the limited versions of cultural bias variables in Table 77 below. When 
variables have hundreds of categories, many categories have only one respondent; 
in these categories, the cultural bias gives a perfect explanation for party preference, 
which obviously increases the U. However, this is a statistical artifact and should be 
regarded as a problematic feature. In addition, and as expected, when the number 
of categories is smaller than the number of parties, the explanatory power of 
cultural bias combinations is very low.  
In theory, it is possible to use the coefficients from the regression analysis to 
remove the curvilinear effect (for the coefficients, see Table 81 in the appendix).289 
However, even if the theoretical comparability would increase, most of the 
contingency tables have a small n, where this estimate is less accurate. In those 
contingency tables with hundreds of categories, where the estimate is more 
accurate, we do not have samples large enough for sufficiently populating the table. 
This could have been a decent remedy if my goal was only to compare the 
assumptions. However, I am also looking for a cultural bias combination with a 
capacity that is sufficient enough to explain party preference. Instead, this remedy 
removes our ability to distinguish between the good and poor explanatory variables. 
                                                     
289 If the relation between two variables moves from full independence to full dependence, the U will 
describe this linear relation as a curve. When compared with other measures of association, like 
Pearson’s r, the U resembles R2 more than r (Olszak and Ritschard 1995). However, the curve we 
see in Figure 30 is the opposite curve, so this is a different phenomena.  
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Therefore, I prefer the first remedy: to limit the number of categories to those with 
enough respondents.  
Remove Variables with a High Number of Categories 
The third remedy—i.e. to remove variables where the number of categories is too 
high (for example, more than 50 categories)—is not preferable since it removes 
many theoretically interesting variables. Just because a variable is impractical in a 
contingency table does not imply that it is not of theoretical importance. In Table 
77 (on page 535), we can see that we would loose all ranked variables with 3 or 4 
cultural biases in the label.  
I believe that the comparison of the assumptions concerning the individual-culture 
relationship takes one-step forward when removing the long tails from the cultural 
bias combinations. Using the first remedy will create contingency tables that are 
more comparable in terms of the strength of the relationship (as the curvilinear 
effect from the number of categories is smaller when the range becomes limited). 
In addition, we do not loose theoretically interesting variables, which helps us to 
answer the questions posed. For the rest of this chapter, all results refer to limited 
data where cultural combinations are required to have at least 10 respondents in 
each country or 40 at the Nordic level. 
Now that we have established the cut-off points and have created some 
comparability, we can move on to answer the next question, namely to what extent 
can cultural biases explain of party preferences? 
How Much Can Cultural Biases Explain? 
In Table 38 below, we can see the ability of the different variables to explain 
national party preferences, as measured by the uncertainty coefficient that shows 
the proportion of explained variance from 366 contingency tables.290 The 
dependent variables in this table are the five national party preference variables and 
the Nordic party families. In the upper part of the table, we can see the cultural bias 
combinations and their performances. In the middle part of the table, we can see 
the effects of each cultural bias (not combinations). In the lower part of the table, 
we can see the effects of three well-known background variables: education level, 
household income, and position on the left-right dimension. 291  
There are some variables that contain less than half of the respondents. These are 
marked with a strikethrough in Table 38 and Table 39. One should be very careful 
when using these variables. They might give valuable and interesting insights into 
                                                     
290 These tables are available in full at 
http://eero.no/publ/How_Much_Can_UC_explain_Neut_Fin_tri3565_bin50_c10_n40.htm. 
291 Education levels are not available in the data from Sweden. 
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how cultural biases interact with each other, but they should not be used to 
generalize to the population directly.  
As can be seen in Table 38 below, many of the cultural bias combinations explain 
more than the left-right dimension, which itself explains only 18 percent of the 
variation (these are in bold). 292 The best cultural bias combinations explain a 
quarter of the variation in people’s party preferences, which is better than the left-
right dimension. For example, CBAbsNeutFix4 explains 32 percent of party 
preference in Sweden. However, given that the left-right dimension is just one 
dimension, and the party systems are multi-dimensional, one should expect that a 
multi-dimensional measure like cultural bias combinations would do better. This is 
especially true since the left-right dimension is based on just one question, while the 
cultural bias combinations here are formed based on a 20-question battery. 
From Table 38, one should also notice how low the explanatory power is for each 
one of the single cultural biases (from Cultural bias binary—hierarchy to cultural bias 
neutral—fatalistic). They explain from 1 to 7 percent of the party preference at the 
national level and from 1 percent to 3 percent at the Nordic level. When using 
cultural biases in a one-by-one fashion, as was previously common to do, this is 
what we would end up believing that the effect of cultural biases on party 
preferences looks like.  
What about ideological party families? In Table 39, we can see how cultural bias 
combinations explain ideological party family preference at the Nordic level. Parties 
having a similar ideology belong to the same party family.293  
We can see that there are large differences between the different variables. For 
example, we can see that the poorest cultural bias combination, coherent cultural bias, 
explains only 1 percent of the variation in preferences for progress parties. At the 
same time, the left-right dimension explains 7 percent. The best cultural bias 
combination variables, CBAbsFixTri4 and CBAbsFixNeut4, explain 14 percent of 
the preferences for the progress parties.  
 
                                                     
292 U multiplied with 100 gives explained variance in percentage terms. 
293 This classification is presented in Table 75 in the appendix. 
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Table 38: Cultural Bias Combinations Predict Party Preference, 
by Country. NOS99 limited. (U)  
CultCombLabel N S D F I Nordic 
Coherent - Strongest Support 1 .05 .07 .07 .05 .04 .04 
CB Support Fixed - 1 in HEIF-order .05 .07 .07 .05 .04 .04 
CB Support Fixed - 2 in HEIF-order .09 .11 .11 .08 .07 .05 
CB Support Fixed - 3 in HEIF-order .11 .12 .12 .11 .08 .06 
CB Support Fixed - 4 in HEIF-order .11 .13 .13 .11 .09 .06 
CB Support Ranked - top 1 .05 .07 .07 .05 .04 .04 
CB Support Ranked - top 2 .12 .14 .14 .10 .10 .06 
CB Support Ranked - top 3 .18 .22 .20 .18 .15 .08 
CB Support Ranked - top 4 .18 .23 .19 .18 .13 .09 
CB Abs Bin Fixed - 1 in HEIF-order .08 .07 .08 .06 .08 .05 
CB Abs Bin Fixed - 2 in HEIF-order .13 .17 .15 .13 .12 .07 
CB Abs Bin Fixed - 3 in HEIF-order .16 .20 .18 .18 .14 .08 
CB Abs Bin Fixed - 4 in HEIF-order .11 .13 .13 .11 .09 .06 
CB Abs Bin Ranked - top 1 bias .08 .07 .08 .06 .08 .05 
CB Abs Bin Ranked - top 2 bias .19 .25 .22 .20 .19 .08 
CB Abs Bin Ranked - top 3 bias .29 .38 .34 .34 .08 .16 
CB Abs Bin Ranked - top 4 bias . . . .19 .01 .15 
CB Abs Tri Fixed - 1 in HEIF-order .08 .08 .09 .06 .08 .05 
CB Abs Tri Fixed - 2 in HEIF-order .15 .21 .17 .16 .14 .07 
CB Abs Tri Fixed - 3 in HEIF-order .22 .29 .26 .25 .17 .11 
CB Abs Tri Fixed - 4 in HEIF-order .27 .32 .28 .27 .19 .12 
CB Abs Tri Ranked - top 1 bias .08 .08 .09 .06 .08 .05 
CB Abs Tri Ranked - top 2 bias .21 .28 .23 .23 .21 .09 
CB Abs Tri Ranked - top 3 bias .28 .38 .33 .35 .06 .12 
CB Abs Tri Ranked - top 4 bias .26 .36 .28 .33 .03 .09 
CB Abs Tri Pref + 3 in HEIF-order .11 .11 .10 .10 .07 .05 
CB Abs Neut Fixed - 1 in HEIF-order .08 .07 .08 .06 .08 .05 
CB Abs Neut Fixed - 2 in HEIF-order .14 .20 .16 .14 .12 .07 
CB Abs Neut Fixed - 3 in HEIF-order .21 .27 .25 .24 .13 .11 
CB Abs Neut Fixed - 4 in HEIF-order .27 .32 .28 .27 .19 .12 
CB Abs Neut Ranked - top 1 bias .08 .07 .08 .06 .08 .05 
CB Abs Neut Ranked - top 2 bias .20 .27 .23 .22 .19 .09 
CB Abs Neut Ranked - top 3 bias .31 .42 .37 .34 .03 .17 
CB Abs Neut Ranked - top 4 bias . . . . . . 
Cultural Bias Support - Hierarchical .02 .01 .02 .02 .01 .01 
Cultural Bias Support - Egalitarian .02 .05 .04 .03 .02 .02 
Cultural Bias Support - Individualistic .04 .03 .04 .02 .02 .02 
Cultural Bias Support - Fatalistic .01 .00 .01 .01 .01 .01 
Cultural Bias Binary - Hierarchy .02 .01 .02 .02 .01 .01 
Cultural Bias Binary - Egalitarian .02 .05 .04 .03 .02 .02 
Cultural Bias Binary - Individualistic .04 .03 .04 .02 .02 .02 
Cultural Bias Binary - Fatalistic .01 .00 .01 .01 .01 .01 
Cultural Bias Trichotomous - Hierarchy .03 .02 .03 .02 .02 .01 
Cultural Bias Trichotomous - Egalitarian .03 .07 .06 .04 .03 .03 
Cultural Bias Trichotomous - Individualistic .04 .04 .04 .03 .02 .03 
Cultural Bias Trichotomous - Fatalistic .02 .01 .02 .02 .01 .01 
Cultural Bias Neutral - Hierarchy .03 .02 .03 .02 .02 .01 
Cultural Bias Neutral - Egalitarian .03 .07 .06 .04 .03 .03 
Cultural Bias Neutral - Individualistic .04 .04 .04 .03 .02 .03 
Cultural Bias Neutral - Fatalistic .02 .01 .02 .02 .01 .01 
Educational level in 3 categories. N, D, F, I .02 .02 .01 .05 .01 .02 
Household income  .02 .02 .02 .03 .02 .01 
Left-Right position .17 .24 .13 .20 .19 .14 
Variables with a small N are marked with strikethrough.  These are not significant at the 0.05 
level.  National U ≥ 0.18 and Nordic U≥ 0.07 are in bold 
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Table 39: Cultural Bias Combinations Predict Ideological Party 
Preference. NOS99 limited. (U) 
  Left-Soc. 
Soc.D
em. 
Liberal 
A
grarian 
Christian 
Conserv. 
Progress. 
G
reen 
N
 
Coherent - Strongest Support 1 .07 .02 .01 .01 .02 .08 .01 .06 4832 
CB Support Fixed - 1 in HEIF-order .07 .02 .01 .01 .03 .07 .02 .06 4285 
CB Support Fixed - 2 in HEIF-order .10 .02 .02 .01 .02 .09 .04 .06 4310 
CB Support Fixed - 3 in HEIF-order .10 .04 .03 .02 .03 .10 .05 .06 4313 
CB Support Fixed - 4 in HEIF-order .10 .03 .03 .02 .03 .10 .05 .06 4313 
CB Support Ranked - top 1 .07 .02 .01 .01 .03 .07 .02 .06 4285 
CB Support Ranked - top 2 .11 .03 .03 .02 .04 .09 .04 .08 4254 
CB Support Ranked - top 3 .12 .04 .05 .02 .07 .11 .07 .10 3643 
CB Support Ranked - top 4 .12 .04 .04 .02 .07 .12 .07 .10 3018 
CB Abs Bin Fixed - 1 in HEIF-order .07 .02 .03 .01 .02 .08 .03 .05 4823 
CB Abs Bin Fixed - 2 in HEIF-order .10 .03 .04 .01 .03 .10 .05 .09 4816 
CB Abs Bin Fixed - 3 in HEIF-order .11 .04 .05 .03 .05 .12 .07 .10 4766 
CB Abs Bin Fixed - 4 in HEIF-order .09 .03 .03 .02 .03 .10 .05 .05 4672 
CB Abs Bin Ranked - top 1 bias .07 .02 .03 .01 .02 .08 .03 .05 4823 
CB Abs Bin Ranked - top 2 bias .12 .05 .07 .02 .05 .12 .08 .11 4382 
CB Abs Bin Ranked - top 3 bias . .07 .13 .03 .12 .26 .08 .13 632 
CB Abs Tri Fixed - 1 in HEIF-order .07 .02 .03 .01 .02 .08 .04 .06 4814 
CB Abs Tri Fixed - 2 in HEIF-order .10 .04 .04 .02 .04 .11 .06 .09 4444 
CB Abs Tri Fixed - 3 in HEIF-order .14 .05 .07 .03 .06 .17 .11 .11 2881 
CB Abs Tri Fixed - 4 in HEIF-order .15 .07 .08 .04 .09 .18 .14 .12 2310 
CB Abs Tri Ranked - top 1 bias .07 .02 .03 .01 .02 .08 .04 .06 4814 
CB Abs Tri Ranked - top 2 bias .14 .05 .06 .03 .06 .13 .09 .11 3923 
CB Abs Tri Ranked - top 3 bias .06 .03 .10 .02 .08 .07 .08 .10 446 
CB Abs Tri Ranked - top 4 bias . .04 .12 .02 .05 .06 .03 .05 276 
CB Abs Tri Pref + 3 in HEIF-order .05 .01 .00 .01 .02 .03 .00 .01 4832 
CB Abs Neut Fixed - 1 in HEIF-order .07 .02 .03 .01 .02 .08 .03 .06 4733 
CB Abs Neut Fixed - 2 in HEIF-order .10 .04 .04 .02 .03 .12 .06 .09 4246 
CB Abs Neut Fixed - 3 in HEIF-order .14 .05 .07 .03 .06 .19 .11 .12 2574 
CB Abs Neut Fixed - 4 in HEIF-order .15 .07 .08 .04 .09 .18 .14 .12 2310 
CB Abs Neut Ranked - top 1 bias .07 .02 .03 .01 .02 .08 .03 .06 4733 
CB Abs Neut Ranked - top 2 bias .14 .05 .06 .03 .05 .14 .10 .11 3502 
CB Abs Neut Ranked - top 3 bias .00 .02 .00 .01 .14 .01 .00 . 109 
Cultural Bias Support - Hierarchical .02 .00 .02 .01 .01 .00 .01 .03 4781 
Cultural Bias Support - Egalitarian .04 .02 .00 .00 .00 .06 .00 .01 4770 
Cultural Bias Support - Individualistic .03 .01 .00 .00 .00 .03 .02 .03 4832 
Cultural Bias Support - Fatalistic .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .03 .00 4832 
Cultural Bias Binary - Hierarchy .02 .00 .02 .01 .01 .00 .01 .03 4781 
Cultural Bias Binary - Egalitarian .04 .02 .00 .00 .00 .06 .00 .01 4770 
Cultural Bias Binary - Individualistic .03 .01 .00 .00 .00 .03 .02 .03 4832 
Cultural Bias Binary - Fatalistic .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .03 .00 4832 
Cultural Bias Trichotomous - Hierarchy .02 .00 .03 .01 .01 .00 .02 .03 4781 
Cultural Bias Trichotomous - .05 .02 .01 .00 .01 .08 .00 .02 4770 
Cultural Bias Trichotomous - .05 .01 .01 .00 .01 .04 .02 .03 4832 
Cultural Bias Trichotomous - Fatalistic .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .04 .00 4832 
Cultural Bias Neutral - Hierarchy .02 .00 .03 .01 .01 .00 .02 .03 4781 
Cultural Bias Neutral - Egalitarian .05 .02 .01 .00 .01 .08 .00 .02 4770 
Cultural Bias Neutral - Individualistic .05 .01 .01 .00 .01 .04 .02 .03 4832 
Cultural Bias Neutral - Fatalistic .00 .00 .00 .00 .00 .01 .04 .00 4832 
Educational level in 3 - N, D, F, I .01 .01 .03 .03 .03 .01 .05 .02 4757 
Household income .00 .00 .00 .01 .00 .03 .01 .01 3971 
Left-Right position .20 .13 .06 .04 .03 .24 .07 .10 4229 
Variables with a small N are marked with a strikethrough. These are not significant at the 0.05 level.  
U ≥ 0.1 are in bold 
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We can see that the ability of cultural bias combinations to explain Nordic 
ideological party family preferences is weaker than their ability to explain national 
party preferences, which is not surprising given that the ideological party families 
are dummy variables. Nevertheless, some of the cultural bias combinations perform 
better than the background variables. We can also see that there are some parties, 
like the agrarian ones, where cultural bias combinations explain very little of 
respondents’ party preferences. 
All in all, we can see in Table 39 that the left-right dimension gives a better 
explanation for the preferences for left-socialist parties, conservative parties, and 
social democratic parties. These are parties firmly rooted on the left-right 
dimension. However, some of the cultural bias variables give better explanations 
for support for the Christian parties, the green parties, the liberal parties, and the 
progress parties. The left-right dimension and cultural bias variables are equally 
capable of explaining support for the agrarian parties. 
By comparing Table 38 and Table 39, it is possible to see that cultural bias 
combinations predict ideological party family preferences far better than the single 
cultural biases do. It is perhaps easier to recognize the patterns if we look at Figure 
31, where each line displays the mean uncertainty coefficient. Figure 31 is drawn 
based on data from Table 38 and Table 39, but excludes those associations that are 
not significant at the 0.05 level or ones based on too few respondents. In the left-
hand column, we can see the results for Nordic ideological party families as the 
dependent variable, and in the right-hand column, we can see the results for 
National parlamentary parties as the dependent variable.294  
There are separate lines showing combinations based on support, binary, 
trichotomous, or neutral labeling systems. The top row shows the results for fixed 
bias ordering, and the bottom row shows the results for when the biases are ranked 
according to their strength. Finally, the x-axis distinguishes between how many 
biases are included in the label. 
We can see that there are many interesting patterns that might be able to teach us 
something about the individual-culture relationship and let us answer the remaining 
questions asked in the beginning of this chapter: Does rejection matter; does 
indifference make any difference; and how many cultural biases do we need? I will 
come back to Figure 31 when I answer these questions. 
 
                                                     
294 The right-hand column shows the numbers from Table 39, and the left-hand column from Table 
38. 
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Figure 31: The Explanatory Power of Cultural Bias Combinations 
controlled for by Levels, Ordering Principle, and Number of 
Biases used. NOS99 limited. 
Is Support Sufficient or does Rejection Matter?  
The fourth question, does rejection matter, is intended to allow us to choose 
between different ways of operationalizing cultural bias combinations.295 In order 
to find out what kind of effects support and rejection have, we can look at the 
average performance of cultural combinations in Figure 31 above. In other words, 
we are asking if the only continuous line (denoting support) is different from the 
three other lines.  
                                                     
295 Earlier, I addressed the role of rejection of a cultural bias at the individual level. My previous 
research indicates that the rejection of cultural bias does influence individuals’ party preferences. 
However, this research was based on two different Norwegian surveys from 1993 and 1995, using 
a short 8 or 10 question version of the cultural bias questions (Olli 1995, 1996, 1999). The present 
survey contains twice as many questions on cultural biases, which results in much more reliable 
scales and contains respondents from five different countries with five times as many respondents, 
which should lead to more reliable answers than my previous efforts. In any case, confirming this 
pattern in four new countries and in a new survey in Norway will add weight to my belief that this 
is a general trait of how cultural biases function at the individual level. 
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We need to place all variables relying on the support only version of cultural biases 
into the support category. Those variables that rely on binary, trichotomous, or 
neutral versions of cultural biases are placed into the category called absolute value,296 
which shows that they do actively use information concerning the rejection of a 
cultural bias. If rejection does not have a role, then support should perform best. If 
rejection does have a role, then it should have an uncertainty coefficient that is 
equal to or higher than what is found for support. We can test this by comparing 
means. Just to complicate things a bit, we should also consider the difference 
between predicting support for parties at the national level and support for 
ideologies at the Nordic level. 
The small circles in Figure 32 below show the mean ability to predict preferences 
for parties. The error bars show the size of the 95 percent confidence interval 
around the mean. If confidence intervals overlap, we can conclude that the means 
do not differ from each other. If we compare within Nordic ideological party 
families, we can see that when cultural bias combinations are selected according to 
support, the mean ability to predict party preference is 4 percent. When selecting 
according to absolute value, the mean is 6 percent. Since the error bars for the 
confidence intervals do not overlap, we know that this difference is statistically 
significant. In addition, if we compare within the national parliamentary parties, we 
can see that the mean increases from 9 to 16 percent when we go from using 
support only to using rejection (absolute value), which is also a statistically 
significant increase (See Table 78 in the appendix).  
We are thus increasing our ability to predict preferences for Nordic ideological 
party families, and for national parliamentary parties, we are almost doubling the 
performance of cultural bias combinations if we include rejection into our 
analyses.297  
We should also remember the discussion concerning the tendency for yes-saying 
among respondents, or acquiescence (starting on page 326), which increases with 
age and is reduced by education. The cultural bias questions are vulnerable to 
acquiescence because there are no reversed questions. We have performed a test 
above which shows that rejection is important, despite the fact that the effects of 
acquiescence work in the other direction. The presence of the acquiescence effect 
increases my belief in the importance of accounting for rejection. We have now 
shown that rejection does make a difference, particularly if we are predicting 
national party preferences. Therefore, whenever possible in this thesis, I will rely on 
labels that employ rejection (absolute value).  
 
                                                     
296 These variables are marked with D in Table 35. 
297 I have also checked this for other ways to operationalize cultural bias combinations. One of these, 
the S3 coding, which allows for degrees of support, is included in the appendix on page 551. In 
this version, rejection and support explain national party preferences equally well. However, there 
are large differences for some particular combinations.  
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Figure 32: Confidence Intervals for Explanatory Power by 
Support and Absolute Values and Dependent Variable. 
NOS99 limited. (Mean U). 
This does not mean that one should never use a cultural bias version that is based 
on support only, but rather that the rejection of cultural bias is a phenomenon at 
the individual level that should be accounted for in the theory. The main goal here 
is to choose an operationalization rather than resolve a theoretical dilemma. The 
latter will have to wait until Chapter 13, where I discuss what rejection is in more 
detail by using tests that are more specific and targeted than the ones presented 
here. Now I will discuss the fifth question asked in this chapter, does indifference 
make any difference?  
Does Indifference Make Any Difference? 
Is there a difference between the results from trichotomous and neutral versions of 
cultural bias? Do we only use the extremes of the scale, like rejection and support, 
or do we rely on indifference too when we choose a party?  
The differences between means of the ability of the various cultural bias 
combinations to explain preferences for parties can provide answers to these 
questions.  In Figure 33 below, we can see how the means differ if we sort them 
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according to the four different ways of labeling cultural biases (support, binary, 
trichotomous, and neutral). The small circles show the mean strength of 
association. We can see that the means for Nordic party ideology are practically the 
same. Trichotomous explains 7 percent of the ideological family preferences, while 
neutral version explains only 5 percent. Moreover, this difference is not statistically 
significant.  Similarly, trichotomous explains 17 percent of national parliamentary 
party preferences, while the neutral version explains only 12 percent. This 
difference is statistically significant, as the confidence intervals do not overlap.  
Figure 33: Confidence Intervals for Explanatory Power by Levels 
and Party Preference. NOS99 limited. (Mean U) 
If we do the same analysis, without differentiating between ideological party family 
dummies and the National parliamentary party preferences, the neutral version 
explains significantly less of the party prefrences than the trichotomous version of 
cultural biases (See Table 79 in the appendix). Thus, including indifference reduces 
the ability to predict party preference. 
We can thus conclude that including the neutral category does not add to the 
explanatory power of cultural bias combinations in general (the averages) when we 
explain preferences for ideological party families or national parties. People seem to 
use the ends of the cultural bias scale (rejection and support) more than the neutral. 
The trichotomous version performs better and is simpler than the neutral version. 
Therefore, I will use the trichotomous version of cultural bias combinations 
whenever possible. 
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How Many Cultural Biases are Needed? 
The sixth and final question asks how many cultural biases are needed in order to 
predict preferences for particular parties? Knowing which kind of variables perform 
best can tell us something about the relationship between the individual and 
culture. However, since variables are the units of the following analysis, we should 
be careful by not claiming that this is how cultural biases function in people. An 
imprecise and general answer to a general question is worthwhile pursing during 
our wait for answers that are more precise. 
This question can be reformulated as such: How does our ability to predict party 
preferences change when going from a label with one cultural bias to a label with 
two, three, or four cultural biases? The simple answer is “it depends”.298 In Figure 
31 on page 384, we can see which assumptions together give the highest mean 
values on the U.  
When predicting national party preferences, the best set of assumptions seems to 
be four biases in fixed order based on either trichotomous or neutral cultural bias 
versions, as can be seen in the top right-hand part of the figure. As shown in the 
lower right-hand quadrant, we also obtain respectable performance when ranking 
two biases based on the trichotomous or neutral versions, or when ranking three or 
four biases based on support only. The complexity of the label is increased when 
ranking labels, using the neutral category, and adding a fourth bias into the label. 
However, using all of them simultaneously gives too many categories for our 
purposes. 
When predicting ideological party preferences, the best performance seems to be 
had when four biases are arranged in a fixed order and based on the trichotomous 
version. Interestingly, if we rank three or four biases, the support only cultural bias 
version does the best job. 
These results suggest that sometimes three or four different cultural biases are 
needed in order to predict party preferences. However, the increased predictive 
ability comes with the cost of additional categories. Moreover, using the two 
cultural biases will be sufficient enough for many purposes.  
                                                     
298 By using unianova in SPSS, it is possible to estimate that the explanatory power of the cultural bias 
combinations rises by 2.8 percent every time we add one more cultural bias item into a 
combination when controling for the different principles established in this chapter. Nevertheless, 
I have not included this because it does not provide enough new information when compared with 
what we can learn from Figure 31. In some combinations, two biases are enough, and adding more 
biases will not help. 
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Summary 
The main goal of this chapter was to create and select a way to operationalize the 
cultural bias combinations. Here, I will summarize the answers given to the six 
questions I asked at the beginning and try to draw a conclusion. 
First, I illustrated how individual-level cultural bias combinations can be created in 
a systematic manner based on a set of principles. The biases used to describe an 
individual's cultural combination can be selected based on level of support or 
absolute deviation from the mean. There can be from one to four biases included in 
the label. Each bias can be divided into levels by support, binary, trichotomous, and 
neutral labeling system. Finally, the included biases are either ranked or in a fixed 
order.  
Second, an analysis of thousands of cross tables found that when dividing the 
respondents into two categories, cultural bias combinations do a thorough job in 
explaining respondents’ party preferences at cut-off point 50. Similarly, if we want 
to divide respondents into three categories according to their degree of support and 
rejection of particular cultural biases, cut-off points 35 and 65 perform well across 
different assumptions. 
 When the number of categories (labels used on individuals) becomes so high that 
only a few people are left in each category, we are faced with artificially strong 
explanations of variance. Therefore, as a remedy, I have applied a limit on the 
cultural combinations by requiring at least 10 respondents in each category in each 
country and at least 40 respondents in the full Nordic data file. This increases the 
comparability between the different sets of assumptions. 
Third, the different sets of assumptions have varying abilities to explain party 
preferences. The single cultural biases explain very little (from 0 to 7 percent) of the 
variation in party preferences. The worst cultural combinations explain only 1 
percent, while the best explain up to 32 percent. With such large differences 
between the ability of the different sets of assumptions to explain party preferences, 
the choice of assumptions becomes important.  
Fourth, cultural combinations using information about support and rejection 
perform slightly better than combinations only using support. Therefore, we should 
utilize information about respondents’ rejection of cultural bias whenever possible. 
However, sometimes the simplicity of the support variant makes it the best choice. 
This weakens the coherent and sequential individual approaches. 
Fifth, accounting for indifference did not make any difference. The neutral version, 
which assigns labels for indifference toward a bias, did perform worse than the 
trichotomous version, which just ignores indifference. Therefore, we should use the 
simpler trichotomous version. 
Sixth, people use several biases when they choose a party to support. Fixed four-
bias combinations best explain party preferences; however, ranked two- bias 
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combinations come close. Because two biases are simpler than three biases, and if 
using two biases is sufficient, it should be used whenever possible. Ranking the 
biases used does give a small advantage. 
These results contradict the coherent individual approach in cultural theory, which 
claims that one supporting cultural bias is enough, and weakens credibility of the 
sequential individual approach, which claims that rejection is not needed. The 
synthetic individual view is strengthened, as it is the only one that fits well with all 
these findings. 
Based on these answers, I believe that the most fruitful variables are the 
combination of the top two cultural biases ranked by absolute values, and the 
combination of all the neutral version of all four biases in fixed order, depending 
on the analytical needs.299 In other words, we get the best predictions of party 
preferences if we assume that people use their two top-ranked biases divided into 
three levels or four cultural biases in a fixed order using the neutral values.  
There are a few limitations in the analyses in this chapter. First, only one dependent 
variable, namely party preference, has been used, even if I have tried to remedy for 
this by using several versions of the variable. Generalizability is limited by the fact 
that that cultural biases do not necessarily relate to other phenomena in ways 
consistent with their relation to party preferences. Second, despite the wide 
approach adopted here, which explores multiple assumptions simultaneously, I 
have been forced to make some choices in an effort to make an analysis possible. 
There are alternative ways of creating sets of cultural bias combinations that, at 
least in theory, could give different answers. I have included one such set in the 
appendix on page 551. Third, this chapter uses a broad approach where many 
different combinations of cultural biases have been explored. Some of these seem 
to perform quite poorly, while others perform much better. In some sense, the 
poor combinations create noise in the analysis, and one should be careful and not 
assume that these results are valid for cultural theory in general. Nevertheless, I 
believe that these kinds of explorations are needed until we have firmly established 
the nature of the individual-culture relation.  
In Chapter 13, I will return to the issue concerning rejection, but with a much more 
tailored and specific analysis, where much of the noise has been removed. 
However, I believe that the present analysis, despite its limitations, allows us to 
select the kind of cultural combinations that are worthwhile pursuing further. In the 
next chapter, I will try out two of these combinations and see how they explain 
party preferences. This will demonstrate that cultural combinations actually 
influence our political views, and that even if we are in fact labeling individuals, we 
still end up with labels that are multi-faceted, multilayered, and intricate enough to 
become useful. 
                                                     
299 In other words, the variables labeled as CB Abs Tri Ranked top 2 bias and CB Neut Fixed top 4 bias. 
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C h a p t e r  1 1   
PARTY PREFERENCE AND CULTURAL 
BIAS COMBINATIONS 
The results from the previous chapter need to be validated in more detail. Earlier in 
Chapter 10, entitled Combinations of Cultural Biases, we have seen a purely 
numerical analysis of the relation between cultural bias combinations and party 
preferences, but without any consideration of the contents and meanings of the 
different combinations. I believe that such quantitative analyses need to be 
supplemented by the use of cultural biases to explain a phenomenon. If the 
application does not make sense, then it is likely that there is something wrong. If 
the application makes sense, this increases my trust in the way I operationalize 
cultural biases. 300 
I am not attempting to challenge old explanations of party preferences, nor am I 
claiming that cultural biases are a better explanation. I will not delve deeply into any 
discussions about party preferences and political behaviors because my main 
purpose is to demonstrate that these variables can provide an explanation of 
political preferences that makes sense.  
I will now turn away from the questions concerning the relation between individual 
and culture and focus on the practical use of cultural bias combinations in the 
prediction of party preferences. I will demonstrate the use of two very different 
operationalizations of cultural combinations. First, I will present ideological party 
families, which are used as the dependent variable in this chapter. Second, I will 
then use all four cultural biases in fixed order as cultural space to explore the Nordic 
political landscape. Third, I will move closer to the choice of a party and look how 
the two top-ranked biases are related to ideological party family preferences at the 
Nordic level.  
Cultural Biases Shape Political Views 
In political science there was once a belief that the electorate voted based on their 
political ideology. By the 1960’s, however, a new understanding emerged which 
argued that voters are not so ideological (Converse 1964). This lack of political 
ideology has been described as a problem for democracy. Other explanations point 
                                                     
300 All tables and figures in this chapter are created with the script Nordic party preference.sps. 
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out how people choose their representatives not out from ideology, but out from 
issues they care about, or out from a more general trust toward a party or 
representative (Hetherington 1998).  
Describing cultural biases is one way to describe a worldview, which again can be 
interpreted as an understanding of how society works and a set of norms or values 
concerning the big questions in life. Political ideology is often defined as a 
description of a present state of affairs, a description of the future, and the means 
used to get there. An understanding of the present state of affairs and the path that 
leads to the future is closely related to an understanding of how society works, 
while values and norms from cultural biases can guide the choice of a preferred 
future. Thus, cultural biases and real life political ideologies are somehow related to 
each other.  
Similarly, for rational choice models that study how voters make choices between 
parties in an ideological or issue space (Downs 1957; Fiorina 1981), it is possible to 
conceive of a cultural space defined by the cultural biases, where voters are likely to 
choose a party close to their own position. Moreover, parties would tailor their 
messages of how to organize, on whom to blame, and on which values to 
emphasize in efforts to comport with the cultural composition of their own 
supporters and to attract new supporters. 
Studies of how voters make their choices have shown that we are not rational 
decision makers, nor is the electorate fully informed (See overviews in Niemi and 
Weisberg 1993c; Dalton and Klingemann 2007a; Zaller 1992). There has been 
much research on schemas, cognition, attitudes, and perceptions as shortcuts that 
we use when we are making voting decisions (Kuklinski 2001; Lau and Redlawsk 
2006). These shortcuts can become institutionalized and studied as a political 
culture. Political culture has been widely used as an explanation in studies of 
democratization and modernization (Verba and Almond 1980; Almond and Verba 
1963; Inglehart 1990; Putnam, Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993).  
Cultural theory is a theory that can incorporate both shortcuts and schemas studied 
in social psychology and the institutionalization of core values. Our core values 
have a structure that is systematically related to an overall belief structure (Coughlin 
and Lockhart 1992, 1998). Cultural biases show great promise for unpacking the 
various social logics used in important political processes and institutions 
(Wildavsky 1987, 1988, 1989a; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990, 1992). In 
some sense, the social psychological studies of shortcuts and schemas are about 
how individuals think and understand the world, while cultural theory is a study of 
how these same shortcuts are patterned on the institutional level. People use their 
cultural preferences to make choices concerning issues like who to trust, how to 
organize the society, who is to blame for problems, how to interpret political 
messages during an electoral campaign, and, consequently, which party or 
representative to vote for. In other words, cultural theory has the potential to be an 
explanation that can be linked both further down and further up in the chain of 
norms and attitudes that influence our voting. Unfortunately, with the survey data 
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available, it is not possible to test the mechanisms through which cultural biases 
influence our political choices. What can be done is to show the connection 
between cultural bias and political parties on the Nordic level.  
Parties with similar ideological position have been labeled by their ideological 
position. I follow Grenstad in my classification of parties within party families 
(2003b).301 The party families used are socialist left, social democratic, agrarian, 
liberal, Christian, conservative, progressive, green, and other. Those respondents 
who do know what to vote for or answer that they will not vote are excluded from 
the analysis. I have not accounted for detailed information concerning the issue 
positions of these parties. Instead, using preferences for ideological party families as 
a proxy for ideological positions is sufficient for my purposes in this piece. 
In Table 40 below, we can see how popular the different party families are in each 
of the five Nordic countries, and clear differences are discernable between each of 
the countries. In Norway, the social democratic Labor Party and the Progress Party 
constitute the two largest parties. The Progress party is a populist party that is 
against migration, taxation, and government control, and in favour of government 
spending on care of the elderly, healthcare, and roads. Sweden and Iceland are 
dominated by conservative parties, while agrarian parties dominate in both 
Denmark and Finland. It is evident that by treating the Nordic party space as one 
single space, I am reducing the available variation and hiding some of the important 
differences between each country. However, by analyzing these five countries as 
one political space, even if they each have their own party system, the ideological 
characteristics of the cultural biases as they relate to the party families should 
become more rather than less visible. Unfortunately, if party families are weak and 
the sister parties within each family have only little in common, there will not be 
much systematic variation for the cultural bias combinations to explain. In addition, 
as was previously illustrated Table 38 and Table 39 cultural bias combinations 
explain national-level party preferences two to three times better than their ability 
to explain preferences for party families at the Nordic level. There is no doubt that 
a country-wise analysis would yield some very interesting findings. Nevertheless, in 
what follows, I will not do a complete analysis of each of the five countries because 
that would require too much space in this thesis.302 In addition, if cultural theory 
makes sense where it is weak, it most likely will make sense on the national level 
too, where its ability to predict party preferences is much stronger. 
                                                     
301 A listing of which party belongs to which party family is provided on page 533. 
302 These treatments would require a 2 to 3 page introduction to each country, a figure or table for 
each of the 40 parties, and a one page discussion per party. It is hard to see how this could be done 
in a systematic manner with less than 100 pages.  
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Table 40: Voter Preference for Party Family by Country. 
NOS99. (Percent within country) 
  
Socialist left 
Social democrat 
A
grarian 
Liberal 
Christian 
Conservative 
Progress 
G
reens 
O
ther 
Total  
Norway 8.1 34.0 5.2 4.9 10.0 15.3 19.9   2.5 100.0 
Sweden 12.2 29.7 4.5 5.6 12.2 29.0   6.1 0.7 100.0 
Denmark 14.9 21.3 37.1 4.7 1.8 5.9 1.4 2.0 10.8 100.0 
Finland 7.3 17.2 23.3 9.9 3.7 20.7   6.0 12.0 100.0 
Iceland   26.8 14.3 1.1   49.9   5.4 2.6 100.0 
Total 9.1 25.6 17.9 5.4 5.6 21.7 4.8 3.6 6.1 100.0 
n = 3085 
 
Cultural Space  
Cultural theory sometimes portrays society as a space where institutions compete 
for influence and supporters (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990: 1, 83-99). I 
believe my operationalization of cultural space is consistent with this view. If we 
look at the four biases simultaneously, we can describe the society as a four 
dimensional cultural space, where each dimension is divided into three values: 
rejection, indifference (the neutral position), and support.303 A total of 4672 
respondents have four valid cultural biases and can be located within this cultural 
space.304 Even if we lose information concerning the relative strength of each bias, 
there are several advantages with this operationalization: It gives a new description 
to the political landscape, and almost all respondents can be included in the 
analysis.  
There is no reason to expect an even distribution of individual biases within the 
cultural space. In Figure 34, we can see the distribution of respondents within the 
cultural space, and indeed, some combinations are more frequent than others. On 
the top row, we have respondents that reject hierarchy, and on the bottom row, we 
find respondents that support hierarchy. The columns vary according to support 
for fatalism: Supporters are found on the right-hand side, and those who reject 
fatalism are found on the left-hand side. The floor of each quadrant shows the 
relation to egalitarian and individualistic biases. 
                                                     
303 Cultural space is almost identical with CultFixNeutA4. However, cultural space requires four valid 
cultural biases, while CultFixNeutA4 requires only two valid biases. 
304 The neutral position is labeled with consonants from the names of the biases: hierarchical (r), 
egalitarian (g), individualistic (d), and fatalistic (t) cultural biases.  
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There is a clear pattern when we look at the combinations, despite the fact that 
each cultural bias has been divided into three in a manner that ensures equal 
proportions of people supporting and rejecting each bias in each country.  
Figure 34: Cultural Space. NOS99. (Count of Valid Respondents) 
The most frequent combination is support for all four biases, as seen in the lower-
right quadrant. Another part of the cultural space that is more densely populated is 
the upper-left quadrant with rejection of hierarchy and fatalism, combined with 
either rejection of individualism or egalitarianism.  
There are also several cultural combinations with less than 50 respondents in the 
Nordic countries. These rare cultural combinations are not likely to have much 
political influence, but they are included in order to avoid having holes in the 
figures. 
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This same layout of the cultural space will be used to present the respondents’ 
preferences for particular party families.  
Party Preferences in Cultural Space 
I will present several figures like Figure 35. Each figure shows support for one of 
the parliamentary parties in the Nordic countries. Only those 3015 respondents 
who volunteered a party preference and have four valid cultural biases are included, 
thus the percentages are comparable to a popular vote, with the obvious 
reservations concerning generalizations from a sample to a population. Statistically 
significant increases in support for a party family is marked with a red top on the 
bar (looks dark gray in print). Statistically significant reductions in support for a 
party are marked with white.305 
In Figure 35, we can see how there are several locations with strong support for the 
socialist left party family. The maximum level of support is in the upper-left 
quadrant, with support for egalitarianism and rejection of individualism, hierarchy, 
and fatalism. Within this quadrant, some 39 percent of the respondents prefer a 
socialist left party.306  
It is also striking how respondents in the front corner (Ei) of the graphs within the 
upper and neutral rows support socialist left parties across all fatalistic bias values 
and across rejection and indifference to hierarchical bias. However, support for 
hierarchy seems to obstruct an increased support for the socialist left.  
Some cultural combinations decrease the support for socialist left party family. 
These are marked with white. On the lower-left quadrant, we can see that rejection 
of egalitarian, individualistic, and fatalistic cultural biases, together with support for 
hierarchy, reduces preferences of socialist left parties. Two of these are not visible: 
rejection of egalitarianism with support for individualism (in the back corner of 
floor of the figure), and rejection of hierarchical bias with either rejection or the 
neutral position of the fatalistic bias (the two upper-left quadrant) are hidden 
behind the high columns in the front. 
                                                     
305 To be precise, the adjusted standardized residuals that deviate more than ±1.96 from zero are 
marked, which corresponds with a 0.01 significance level.  
306 The numbers cannot be read from the figure. They are available in Table 82 on page 538.  
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Figure 35: Socialist Left Party Family Support in Cultural Space. 
NOS99. (Percent) 
  
In Figure 36, we can see how the increased support for green parties is located in 
the upper-left corner of the figure, making them a competitor of the socialist left 
and liberal parties. The strongest preference for green parties can be found where 
support for egalitarianism is combined with rejection of fatalism, individualism, and 
hierarchy. Here, 15 percent of the respondents say they would vote for a green 
party. It may not sound like much, but it is four times greater than the sample’s 3.6 
percent average support for a green party. If we loosen up the requirements for the 
neutral position on individualism or neutral position on fatalism, the support sinks 
to the 10 to 11 percent level. 
There is a second location where the greens receive increased support: support for 
individualism combined with the neutral position on hierarchy and egalitarianism 
and rejection of fatalism. Thus, there seems to be two culturally different strains of 
green party support. A check reveals this second cultural position as important for 
the green party in Finland, but not in the other Scandinavian countries. 
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Nevertheless, in Finland, too, the greens receive their strongest support from the 
same pro-egalitarian population segment that is opposed to all other cultural biases.  
Figure 36: Green Party Family Support in Cultural Space. 
NOS99. (Percent) 
 
There are some similarities between the socialist left and green party families. They 
both seem to be popular among respondents with hEif biases. However, the green 
party family’s cultural base seems to be much more narrow. Perhaps this can 
explain why the Socialist Left Party and the Liberal Party in Norway were able to 
block the Green Party’s entrance to Norwegian politics. The existing parties 
managed to occupy the cultural space, and there was not enough space for the 
newcomer to maneuvering and capture voter support. It would be interesting to see 
how cultural space is related to the success or failure of other new parties. 
Even if there are several cultural combinations where no one prefers the green 
party family, it is such a small party that the negative deviations are not statistically 
significant.  
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In Figure 37, we can see where the increased support for the social democratic 
party family is located in the cultural space.307 The common cultural denominator 
for three of the locations is the combination of support for egalitarianism and 
indifference to individualism. This can then be combined with either support or 
indifference to hierarchy and any kind of fatalistic view. There are also two 
locations where increased preferences for the social democratic party family 
coincides with support for all three active cultures (hierarchy, egalitarianism, and 
individualism) combined with either support for or indifference to fatalism. The 
last increased preference is characterized by support for egalitarian and fatalistic 
biases, rejection of individualistic bias, and a neutral position regarding hierarchy. 
Thus, Et and HEI seem to capture the cultural biases of the social democratic party 
family. It is worth remembering that the corner HEI is where we also found the 
strongest population concentration in Figure 34.  
Social democratic parties are known for their ideological history, although their 
growth in size and long periods rule have increased their pragmatism, and lately 
they have turned from fighting market forces to supporting the use of them for the 
common good. The HEI combination allows them to be pragmatic. A solution to a 
political problem can be based on any of the three active cultures, without 
becoming a cultural conflict. One must, however, ask how it is possible for an 
institution to be in favor of all three active cultural biases, which are supposedly 
always in conflict with each other (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990: 2). 
Perhaps social democratic parties should be studied as clumsy institutions. Clumsy 
institutions utilize procedures that allow for multiple voices and the presence of 
several cultural biases, thus avoiding some of the problems with the blind spots that 
each of the biases are hampered with (Verweij and Thompson 2006; Ney 2006; 
Thompson 2008: 15). It would be interesting to see if the concept of clumsy 
institutions could be used together with Kirscheimer’s catch-all party thesis to study 
if there is a cultural logic involved in party growth (Kircheimer 1966; Randall 2003). 
Another possible avenue is to study parties as clumsy institutions in relation to 
Michels’ theory of oligarchy (Larsen 2003). I suspect that dominant parties that 
have managed to stay more democratic and deliberative than others are relying on 
clumsy institutional solutions rather than allowing one cultural bias to dominate 
internally. 
 
                                                     
307 It is not as good for showing lack of support as there are 5 significant points where the lack of 
support is invisible: heIf, heIt, hgIf, redf, and rgIf are hidden behind bars in the front of the figure. 
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Figure 37: Social Democratic Party Family Support in Cultural 
Space. NOS99. (Percent) 
Social democratic parties are often viewed as quite similar to the socialist left, but 
guided more by pragmatism and less by ideology. However, we can see that they are 
culturally quite far apart from each other. It is not just a difference in degree, as it 
would seem like if we only considered their position on the left-right dimension. 
Instead, it is a difference in world views that for some are incommensurable.  
When turning our analysis to the agrarian party family, we can see that the most 
consistent cultural trait in Figure 38 is the lack of support for the agrarian party 
family if one rejects hierarchy and individualism, but supports egalitarianism (as 
seen in the top row). Moreover, its opposite is situated in the lower-right corner: 
Support for hierarchy, fatalism, and egalitarianism, together with rejection of 
individualism, increases support for the agrarian parties. 
In the middle row, there are two locations with increased support: 1) indifference to 
hierarchy combined with support for individualism, indifference to egalitarianism 
and rejection of fatalism, or 2) support for fatalism, indifference to individualism, 
Cultural Space     • 
 
401 
and rejection of egalitarianism. These two locations have only indifference to 
hierarchy in common. 
The highest level of support is found in the Hf quadrant, but since this has fewer 
people when compared to some of the other quadrants, it is difficult to obtain 
significant effects here. Hgif shows 36 percent support for the agrarian party family. 
 
Figure 38: Agrarian Party Family Support in Cultural Space. 
NOS99. (Percent) 
The agrarian party support comes from quite a variety of different cultural locations 
within the Nordic countries.308 Consequently, there are few commonalities between 
the countries and only a few significant effects at Nordic level. The agrarian parties 
clearly belong to the same party family with respect to one issue—namely the 
urban-rural conflict dimension, but culturally they seem to differ a lot, which 
                                                     
308 Significant increases in support by country are N: heit, rEiF, rEit. S: hEdF, HEiF, hEit, HgiF, HgIf.  
D: heIf, HeIf, hgIf, redF, reIf, rgIf.  F: HEIf, rEIf.  I: HEdF, HEit, Hgif, redF, rgif. 
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should not come as a surprise given their various sizes and histories from one 
country to the next.  
In slight contrast to support for the agrarian party family, we can see in Figure 39 
below how support for the liberal party family is concentrated into a few cultural 
locations. Common for them is the rejection of hierarchy and rejection of 
individualism. The first pair is indifference to egalitarianism with rejection of or 
indifference to fatalism and the second pair is support for hierarchy with either 
rejection of or support for egalitarianism. In these locations, the liberal party 
support varies from 14 to 22 percent, while in the whole sample some 5 percent 
support the liberal party family. 
Figure 39: Liberal Party Family Support in Cultural Space. 
NOS99. (Percent) 
 
It is interesting to notice how there is an invariable core: rejection of individualism 
and hierarchy. The cultural variability comes from two biases: fatalism and 
egalitarianism, which both can have values ranging from rejection to support, but 
only in certain combinations. The effects do not seem to be additive in the sense 
that more of any single bias would increase support for the liberal party. 
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Nevertheless, a particular cultural combination, namely ih, seems to make the 
respondents well attuned to the liberal message.  
I was expecting to find more support for the Christian party family among 
supporters of hierarchy in general, but it is present only in a few cultural spaces. As 
seen in Figure 40 below, the first obvious pattern is support for hierarchy in 
connection with rejection of fatalism (bottom row) and individualism in the lower-
left corner. Combined with indifference to egalitarianism, 29 percent of the 
respondents support this party family, which receives less than 6 percent support 
among all respondents. Among those who support hierarchy but are indifferent 
toward all other three biases, some 20 percent support the Christian party family. 
Figure 40: Christian Party Family Support in Cultural Space. 
NOS99 (Percent) 
The second pattern is indifference to hierarchy (middle row) combined with I was 
expecting to find more support for the Christian party family among supporters of 
hierarchy in general, but it is present only in a few cultural spaces. As seen in figure 
41, the first obvious pattern is support for hierarchy in connection with rejection of 
fatalism (bottom row) and individualism in the lower-left corner. Combined with 
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indifference to egalitarianism, 29 percent of the respondents support this party 
family, which receives less than 6 percent support among all respondents. Among 
those who support hierarchy but are indifferent toward all other three biases, some 
20 percent support the Christian party family. 
Third, indifference to hierarchy and rejection of all other biases (reif) is consistent 
with support toward this party family. However, if we move from indifference to 
hierarchy to support for hierarchy, the popularity of the Christian party family 
plummets. And if we in increase support for egalitarian bias from rejection of the 
neutral position, we find the strongest support for the Christian party family (29 
percent). All in all, we see strong interaction effects between hierarchical, fatalistic 
and egalitarian biases. In the next chapter, I will come back to this issue and test the 
additivity assumption. 
Cultural biases alone do not trigger preferences for the Christian party family. 
Regular church attendance is still one of the most important predictors for a 
person’s preference for a party within the Christian party family (Holberg 2007). 
Within NOS99, there are no questions concerning church attendance. Within the 
1993 ISSP survey from Norway, however, this question was presented together 
with ten cultural theory questions. A logit analysis shows that the effect of cultural 
biases is minute if the respondent does not attend church. However, for frequent 
church goers, hierarchical and fatalistic biases have clear effects (Olli 1995). In 
Figure 41, we can see a model based on the logit analysis that shows the effects of 
hierarchical and fatalistic biases when controlling for the other cultural biases and 
common social background variables. The figure on left accounts for respondents 
who attend church at least once a month, and the figure on right accounts for 
respondents who do not attend church regularly.  
Figure 41: Probability of Christian Party Preference in Norway in 
1993 by Church Attendance and Hierarchy and Fatalism  
 
Source: (Olli 1995: 170) 
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The combination of supporting hierarchy and rejecting fatalism seems to be the key 
to Christian party support both in Norway in 1993 and in the Nordic countries in 
1999. It would be interesting know more about the relationship between church 
attendance and cultural biases.309  
In Figure 42, below, we can see how the support for the conservative party family 
is distributed in the cultural space. As was the case with support for the socialist 
left, support for conservatives is strong in the upper-left corner, where supporters 
reject hierarchical and fatalistic biases. However, this increases the preferences for 
conservative party first when combined with support for individualistic bias and 
rejection of egalitarian bias. The strongest support can be found in reIf, where 62 
percent of respondents prefer the conservative party family. The combination of 
rejecting egalitarian and supporting individualistic biases creates support for the 
conservative party family regardless of the respondents’ view of hierarchical or 
fatalistic biases. It looks like rejection of egalitarian bias is more important than 
support for individualistic bias, as we find strong support for the conservative party 
family in five of the bars that lack support for individualism. The figure also 
clarifies how the combination of support for egalitarianism and rejection of 
individualism will turn voters away from the conservative party no matter what they 
think about hierarchy and fatalism. 
                                                     
309 Churches and religions have different cultures (Douglas 1970), so one must not assume that 
participation in a church automatically increases support for hierarchy and rejection of fatalism. 
But it is possible that this is the dominant cultural coalition in the Nordic state churches or among 
the regular church goers.  
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Figure 42: Conservative Party Family Support in Cultural Space. 
NOS99. (Percent) 
 
In Figure 43, below we can see how the support for progress party family is 
distributed in cultural space. There are two locations with strong support for the 
progress party. The core seems to be support for individualism combined with 
indifference to egalitarianism, with equally strong support for fatalism and hierarchy 
(neutral position on both biases or rejection of both). The strongest support is at 
HgIF, where 25 percent of respondents prefer a progress party. In the entire 
sample, 5 percent of the respondents prefer this party.  
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Figure 43: Progress Party Family Support in Cultural Space. 
NOS99 (Percent) 
Sometimes progress parties are presented as right-wing parties—ones even further 
to the right than the conservative party. Culturally, however, this does not seem to 
be the case. The lower-right corner, which denotes support for hierarchical and 
fatalistic biases, is also the corner where the social democratic party family has its 
strongest support, while the conservative party support is located in the opposite 
upper-left corner. What is common for the progress and conservative parties is the 
support for individualistic bias and rejection of egalitarian bias: If combined with 
support for fatalistic and hierarchical biases, respondents tend to lean toward the 
progress party family; if combined with rejection of fatalistic and hierarchical biases, 
the respondents lean toward the conservative party family. In other words, what 
separates progress party voters from the conservative party voters is exactly those 
cultural traits that social democratic voters have in common with progress party 
voters. 
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Summary of Party Preference in Cultural Space 
What does the ideological landscape look like when viewed as a cultural space 
where parties compete for voters? Culturally speaking, the socialist left and the 
social democratic party families differ more than expected. The socialist left, the 
green, and the liberal party families have many cultural traits in common. The 
progress party shares several cultural traits with the social democratic party (at least 
this was the situation in 1999). The sharing of traits might reflect the social 
democratic party as perhaps being a clumsy institution. The conservative party is 
culturally quite remote from the social democratic party, while the Christian party 
family appears to have its own cultural space.  
Overall, cultural space makes sense of the political landscape in the Nordic 
countries. As all four biases are presented, meaningful combinations using fewer 
biases can be detected. However, since it uses 81 categories, it requires such large 
samples that national-level analyses are not possible with NOS99. My trust in the 
operationalization of cultural biases as combinations presented in Chapter 10 has 
increased. Now I will go ahead with my second operationalization of cultural biases 
based on the two strongest cultural biases. 
Party Preference and the Two Top-Ranked Cultural Biases 
The main reason for engaging in the second operationalization, one that uses the 
respondent’s two strongest cultural biases, is to highlight the cues an individual uses 
to select a party. The first operationalization, cultural space, uses information on a 
respondent’s relation to all four biases. However, according to the analysis in the 
previous chapter, and as we saw using cultural space, sometimes two biases are 
enough.  
Voters seek and process information in a manner that helps them to avoid 
cognitive dissonance (Taber and Lodge 2006). A respondent that supports several 
cultural biases could easily find him- or herself in a situation of cognitive 
dissonance because cultural biases are related to those schemas through which 
people understand the world. In other words, a person supporting several cultural 
biases would also be operating out from several different worldviews. What 
happens to these processes of selection if the respondents support several cultural 
biases?  
One possible guide for selection could be the strength of a cultural bias. It is of 
course a simplification to assume that the salience of a cultural bias in a given 
situation can be directly measured by its strength. It is possible to picture a person 
who prefers moderate egalitarianism in many settings, even if there are other very 
high or low cultural bias scores so long as these scores apply only to a very few 
settings. I am here assuming that deviation from the mean is a sign of cultural bias 
strength because the analysis earlier indicated that this assumption has some 
Party Preference and the Two Top-Ranked Cultural Biases     • 
 
409 
merit.310 The sequential individual model claims that the strength of a bias is a 
reflection of the importance of an institution or context in a respondent’s life. The 
synthetic individual model claims that the strength of a bias is proportional to the 
salience of a bias, or how likely the respondent is to rely on this bias in a new 
setting. Nevertheless, I will here only demonstrate how the two top-ranked biases 
approach works on the individual level; I am not trying to test these models.311 
People are dependent on some kinds of cues to select which of their cultural bias to 
use in a setting. The sequential individual model assumes that these cues are present 
in the social situation; people switch from one culture to another when they change 
roles (survey answers would be dependent on their manifest role). The synthetic 
individual model assumes that people do not really change, and their answers would 
be the same across all domains of life.  
In a perfect research design based on the sequential individual model, we would 
have information about salience and which cultural bias applies in which social 
setting. However, this information is not available in NOS99 or NEPS95. The 
closest I can get is to use a standardized value of the cultural bias as a proxy for 
salience based on an assumption that it would be difficult to score very high or low 
on a non-salient bias.  
The two top-ranked biases approach uses one piece of information that is not 
available for the cultural space operationalization—the ranking of biases. 
Nevertheless, the operationalization of the two top-ranked biases does not use all 
available information, as it disregards information concerning the two weakest 
biases. In addition, the two top-ranked biases approach ignores information 
concerning the neutral position, which could also be interpreted as indifference. We 
are thus reducing the degrees of freedom by moving from four biases on three 
levels to two biases on two levels, but we are increasing degrees of freedom by 
ranking the biases.  
Overall, the ability of the two top-ranked biases approach to explain party 
preferences is somewhat weaker than the ability of cultural space. At the Nordic 
level, cultural space can explain 12 percent of differences in preferences for party 
families, while the two top-ranked biases method can explain only 9 percent of the 
differences. However, if we look at the results country by country, we can see that 
the two top-ranked biases method can explain from 21 to 28 percent and 
consistently out performs the left-right dimension. 312  
                                                     
310 Cultural biases explain party preferences better if we assume that the absolute deviation from mean 
is used as a criteria of selection and ranking, rather than relying on only degrees of positive 
support. See page 386. 
311 See page 294 for a presentation of these models.  
312 See Table 38 on page 381, where these variables are called CB Abs Tri Ranked - top 2 bias and CB 
Abs Neut Fixed - 4 in HEIF-order. 
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In Table 41 below, we can see the independent variable, two top-ranked biases, and 
it is distribution country by country. The first letter indicates the strongest bias, and 
the second letter indicates the second strongest of the four biases.  
Table 41: Two Top-Ranked Biases by Country. NOS99 limited. 
(Count) 
 Norway Sweden Denmark Finland Iceland  Total 
ef 41 36 40 37 25 179 
eh 30 34 25 29 20 138 
eI 29 39 39 35 27 169 
EF 19 10 23 18 13 83 
EH 21 22 21 24 18 106 
EI 10 26 18 17 11 82 
fe 14 18 24 19 20 95 
fh 21 31 14 20 15 101 
fI 13 28 15 15 17 88 
FE 34 29 30 30 24 147 
FH 47 53 40 42 32 214 
FI 24 18 19 22 16 99 
he 17 23 24 19 10 93 
hE 15 16 11 21 20 83 
hf 31 32 32 15 15 125 
hi 24 26 30 37 20 137 
HE 30 23 33 36 17 139 
HF 26 22 25 23 19 115 
HI 26 29 37 29 19 140 
iE 27 28 34 15 27 131 
if 41 27 25 16 24 133 
ih 40 29 39 27 15 150 
IH 23 10 16 26 16 91 
 Total 603 609 614 572 440 2838 
A Nordic limit of n ≥80 for every combination is used.  
In the data file the two top-ranked biases method is called CultRankTriA2  
 
In the Nordic countries there are 57 cultural bias combinations of the two top-
ranked biases present (the two largest absolute values of cultural biases ranked to 
represent the view of an individual).313 Some of the cultural combinations have very 
few respondents. If I would only be concerned with random error, a more suitable 
limit would have been 40 respondents (see page 376). However, now that I am 
concerned with the meaning these cultural combinations carry, it useful to simplify 
the presentation by limiting the number of categories in cross tables even more. 
Therefore, I have excluded cultural bias combinations with less than 80 
respondents in the Nordic countries. After this limitation, there are 2838 
                                                     
313 See Table 77: Count of Respondents and categories by Variable. NOS99.   
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respondents with a valid cultural bias combination. Without this limit there would 
have been 4823 valid respondents. I have thus removed close to two thousand 
respondents from the analysis in order to focus the analysis on the 23 most 
common cultural bias categories rather than on the rare combinations. However, 
there is no reason to assume that the less frequent cultural biases have any lesser 
effect; we just have less data about it.  
The sample used here is not representative of the population as a whole since only 
the most common cultural combinations are included. In order to understand the 
relationship between political views and cultural biases we do not need to describe 
the whole population. Numeric representation is, after all, one defining trait of 
democracy. Focusing on the common biases and ignoring the rarer ones will help 
us to focus on those cultural combinations most likely to have political 
consequences.  
None of the 23 most common cultural bias combinations in NOS99 resemble the 
pattern we saw in the household chapters, where each household had one dominant 
bias and the second most important bias was typically a rejection. I will come back 
to this issue in Chapter 13. 
Now that we have familiarized ourselves with both the party families in the Nordic 
countries and the distribution of the two top-ranked biases in the Nordic countries, 
we can better understand how cultural biases influence preferences for particular 
party families.  
In Table 42 below, where a total of 1865 respondents have both a valid cultural 
combination and an expressed party preference (excluding the non-voters), we can 
see which party family the respondents with a particular combination of the two 
top-ranked biases would vote for in a hypothetical parliamentary election held 
today.  
On the bottom row, we can see the proportion of total votes for each party family. 
Ten percent of respondents would vote for a socialist left party, 25 percent would 
vote for a social democratic party, 23 percent would vote for a conservative party, 
and so forth. This deviates a bit from the distribution presented in Table 40. This 
deviation is caused by the removal of respondents with rare cultural bias 
combinations (n<80). I have chosen to prioritize the ability to analyze robust 
patterns between party families and cultural bias combinations. 
I have done the same analyses for country by country, which yielded much stronger 
results because some parties in some countries have unique cultural combinations 
as their support bases. When the data is analyzed at the Nordic level, the results are 
watered down by the historically unique differences within a party family and 
between countries, but we get more robust results concerning the political views. 
Country-by-country tables can be found in the appendix (see pages 544 to 547). 
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Table 42: Ideological Party Family Preference by Two Top-
Ranked Biases. NOS99 limited. (Row percent) 
Ranked  
top 2 bias 
SocL SocD Agr Lib Chr Cons Prog Gr Oth Total  
(Count) 
ef 1 10 24 4 4 49 3 1 4 134 
eh 3 17 12 4 2 51 2 3 4 89 
eI 2 7 17 8 2 54 4 1 6 127 
EF 6 34 22 8 2 12 6 6 4 50 
EH 22 33 17 0 9 7 2 2 7 54 
EI 6 29 16 2 8 16 6 6 10 49 
fe 4 12 20 7 5 45 1 0 5 75 
fh 12 32 12 9 8 15 0 9 3 66 
fI 4 8 21 6 9 40 2 9 2 53 
FE 8 41 15 3 5 7 6 3 12 86 
FH 4 34 23 4 3 13 12 1 5 115 
FI 2 31 17 3 7 17 12 3 7 58 
he 10 25 17 8 0 27 5 2 5 59 
hE 11 34 8 11 2 11 2 7 13 61 
hf 17 24 11 14 3 21 3 2 3 90 
hi 20 24 12 12 5 11 1 7 7 94 
HE 6 36 22 1 7 13 5 2 8 86 
HF 2 30 24 2 10 21 10 0 3 63 
HI 5 24 23 2 10 22 9 0 6 93 
iE 28 33 12 3 2 4 4 11 2 93 
if 20 36 13 9 7 4 2 5 5 101 
ih 26 23 13 11 5 7 0 8 6 108 
IH 2 23 28 2 3 28 10 2 3 61 
 Total 10 25 17 6 5 23 5 4 6 1865 
U = 0.093. Sign. = 0.000  
Cells with statistically significant (Adj.s.res. ≥|1.96|) deviations are marked in bold. The adjusted standardized 
residuals are listed in Table 84 on page 542.  
 
Table 42 is a key table for the rest of this chapter. Cells that have a particularly high 
or low proportion of supporters for a party preference are marked in bold. In the 
second column, we can see how support for the socialist left party family ranges 
from 1 to 28 percent depending on their cultural bias combination. There are thus 
certain cultural combinations where almost nobody voted for a socialist left party, 
and in the other end of the range we find a combination where more than a quarter 
of the respondents voted for this party family. Support for social democratic parties 
range from 7 to 41 percent, while support for agrarian parties range from 8 to 24 
percent. Liberal party support ranges from 0 to 14 percent, and support for 
Christian parties range from 0 to 10 percent. There is a wide range of support for 
conservative parties, with a range from 4 to 54 percent, whereas support for 
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progress parties range from 0 to 12 percent. Support for green parties is a narrow 0 
to 11 percent, and support for other parties range from 0 to 13 percent.  
To sum up, there is a connection between cultural biases and preferences for 
Nordic party families. The two top-ranked biases approach explains 9 percent of 
the variation in respondents’ choices of party families at the Nordic level. This does 
not sound like much since we know that cultural biases explain twice as much when 
we look at single countries. However, now my purpose is to focus on the big 
picture and create a robust understanding of the relationship between cultural bias 
combinations and party families at Nordic level as a proxy for political views and 
ideologies. If I wanted to predict a respondent’s party choice, I would obviously do 
better by studying the relationship on a country-by-country basis and by including 
more respondents. 
Just because cultural bias combinations can explain variation in a cross table does 
not mean that they actually help us to understand why and how people vote. Do 
these combinations make sense? I will try to answer this question by looking at the 
support for one party at time. What do the cultural combinations of party 
supporters look like? Do they form some kind of cultural core or are there perhaps 
several cultural fractions present in the large parties? I will use the information from 
Table 42 in smaller portions to make the interpretation easier. In addition, I will 
convert the percentages to adjusted standardized residuals that show the extent to 
which the content of the cells deviate from an even distribution (as if there was no 
relation between the variables).  
Support for the Socialist Left Party Family 
What are the defining cultural bias traits of those that support socialist left parties? 
In Table 43 below, we can see those cultural biases listed that are associated with a 
significant increase in preferences for the socialist left party family. The adjusted 
standardized residuals show how much each cultural combination influences party 
preferences, as measured in standard deviations.314 Positive residuals indicate that 
there are more people preferring this party than expected, and negative residuals 
show that there are less people preferring this party than expected. Values greater 
than 1.96 standard deviations above or below the mean (zero) are likely to be 
statistically significant deviations.315 
                                                     
314 The adjusted standardized residual is the residual for a cell. It is calculated by subtracting the 
expected value from the observed value, and divided by an estimate of its standard error. Adjusted 
standardized residual is expressed in standard deviation units above or below the mean. The 
adjusted standardized residuals have a asymptotically normal distribution and thus can be used for 
hypothesis testing. However, some caution should be shown when interpreting multiple cells 
simultaneously (Haberman 1973). 
315 This corresponds with a 0.01 significance level. 
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Table 43: Support for the Socialist Left Party Family (Adj.s.res.) 
CB SocL SocD Agr Lib Chr Cons Prog Gr Oth 
iE 6.0 1.8 -1.4 -1.2 -1.3 -4.3 -.1 3.6 -1.5 
ih 5.8 -.5 -1.2 2.3 -.2 -3.9 -2.3 2.6 .3 
hi 3.5 -.2 -1.5 2.4 .2 -2.9 -1.7 1.9 .7 
if 3.5 2.5 -1.2 1.2 .9 -4.6 -1.3 .7 -.3 
EH 3.1 1.4 -.1 -1.9 1.5 -2.7 -1.0 -.7 .5 
hf 2.2 -.2 -1.6 3.4 -.7 -.4 -.5 -.8 -1.0 
This table contains selected rows from Table 87 on page 547 . 
 
 
We can see that rejection of individualism combined with either rejection of 
hierarchy or support for egalitarianism are the two combinations with the highest 
level of support for the socialist left party family. In addition, support is increased 
when rejection of individualism or hierarchy is combined with rejection of fatalism. 
The only bias that is not rejected among these is the egalitarian bias.316 In several 
countries, the socialist left parties are widely critical of incumbent regimes—a fact 
that also fits well with rejection. It looks like these supporters are more united by 
what they do not want (individualism and hierarchy) than by what they want. 
So far, this is what one could expect. Accounting for cultural biases brings about 
the ability to see new similarities and differences between parties. Socialist left, 
green party, and liberal party families all receive support among ih and hi. Rejection 
of individualism and hierarchy seems fit all three parties well. However, if we do 
not include rejection of individualism, we seem to lose the green party: At hf we 
find increased support for the socialist left and liberal party families, but not the 
green parties. Similarly, by including support for the egalitarian bias iE, we find 
support for the socialist left and the greens, but not for the liberal party family. The 
fact that these parties compete with each other can seem counterintuitive if we only 
look at the left-right dimension, but cultural biases show that these party families 
sometimes can share a cultural base.  
The combination EH—supporting egalitarianism and hierarchy—is also known as 
the social democratic alliance (Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:89). However, 
it is interesting to note that when support for egalitarianism is stronger than 
hierarchy, as it is in this combination, there is strong support for the socialist left, 
but only minor support for the social democratic party family.  
The largest cultural distance is between the socialist left and the conservative party 
families, with strong negative values indicating that supporters of these cultural 
                                                     
316 If we think of the three active biases and reject two of them, we are left with preferences for pure 
egalitarian solutions. In cultural theory, those who support only one cultural bias and reject all 
other ways of life are sometimes called for fanatics because they see only one right way of doing 
things and find it difficult to make compromises. 
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combinations are very unlikely to vote for those within the conservative party 
family. 
Support for the Liberal Party Family 
All three cultural combinations that significantly increase support for the liberal 
party family were also included in the table for the socialist left party family. In 
other words, in all these three cultural combinations the liberal party and socialist 
party families are competing for the same voters. In Table 44, the combinations are 
sorted by the strength of support for the liberal party family. Rejection of hierarchy 
seems to be the common denominator among these cultural combinations. We can 
see how hf has the strongest effect on liberal party support, while it also provides 
some support for the socialist left. There is one more party family competing of 
these voters: Combinations hi and ih also increase the vote for the green party 
family.  
Table 44: Support for the Liberal Party Family (Adj.s.res.) 
CB SocL SocD Agr Lib Chr Cons Prog Gr Oth 
hf 2.2 -.2 -1.6 3.4 -.7 -.4 -.5 -.8 -1.0 
hi 3.5 -.2 -1.5 2.4 .2 -2.9 -1.7 1.9 .7 
ih 5.8 -.5 -1.2 2.3 -.2 -3.9 -2.3 2.6 .3 
 
It is understandable how voters can move between liberal and green parties, as 
supporters of each party family share many ideological traits. Similarly, the greens 
and the socialist left share much of the same ideological critiques of the modern 
capitalist society, but differ in the solutions they propose. However, it is hard to 
give an ideologically informed explanation of what is common between the socialist 
left and liberal parties. Nevertheless, we can see that they both receive support 
from respondents with similar cultural backgrounds.  
We can see that for the rejection of hierarchy and individualism combination, it 
does not make much difference which of these two rejections is the strongest one. 
People vote quite similarly, even if ih increases support for the socialist left party 
family to a greater extent than the increase from hi.  
Support for the Green Party Family 
Cultural combinations that show significantly increased support for the green party 
family are listed in Table 45 below. We can see that rejection of individualistic and 
hierarchical biases and support for egalitarian bias are common. These same 
combinations give increased support for the socialist left. It looks like the socialist 
left and the green parties are competing for the same voters (iE, ih and hi). In 
addition, rejection of fatalistic bias, combined with support for individualistic bias, 
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increases the vote for the conservative party family. However, there is one cultural 
combination, namely fh, where the green party is the only one that receives 
increased support.  
Table 45: Support for the Green Party Family (Adj.s.res.) 
CB SocL SocD Agr Lib Chr Cons Prog Gr Oth 
iE 6.0 1.8 -1.4 -1.2 -1.3 -4.3 -.1 3.6 -1.5 
ih 5.8 -.5 -1.2 2.3 -.2 -3.9 -2.3 2.6 .3 
fh .6 1.2 -1.1 1.1 1.0 -1.5 -1.8 2.3 -1.0 
fI -1.5 -3.0 .7 -.1 1.5 3.0 -.9 2.2 -1.2 
iE 6.0 1.8 -1.4 -1.2 -1.3 -4.3 -.1 3.6 -1.5 
 
The biases behind green party support seem to be pointing in several different 
directions. Perhaps this has something to do with differences between countries.317 
In Denmark, the Green Party’s support base is in found in ih and iE, which also 
gives strong support to the socialist left, and FE, which supports only the Green 
Party. Norway does not have a green party in the parliament. The Norwegian iE 
and ih respondents support either the socialist left or the liberal party. Together 
these two countries influence the pattern we see in Table 45. In Sweden, the Green 
Party receives support from FI and if, which are in fact cultural opposites. In 
Finland, the green party receives support from fh and FH without any competition 
from other parties. Here too, we have two opposite cultural combinations. This 
indicates a possible cultural conflict inside the both the Swedish and Finnish green 
parties.318 In Iceland, the increased support comes from iE, EF, and EI, and also 
without any successful competition from the other parties. The green parties thus 
seem to be quite different and culturally divided, and therefore the weak pattern on 
Nordic level is susceptible to influence from Norway, where there is no green party. 
Support for the Social Democratic Party Family 
In Table 46, we can see the four cultural bias combinations with the strongest 
tendency to prefer one of the social democratic parties. We can see that common 
for these are the support for egalitarian, hierarchical, and fatalistic cultural biases.  
                                                     
317 See Table 86 and Table 87 for a country by country overview of party preferences. 
318 In the cultural space version, it is more difficult to make inteferences about conflicts because we 
know nothing about the salience of the four biases. Here, we know that the two strongest biases 
have opposite directions. If the two strongest biases are what people actually use, this will make it 
very difficult to strike compromises, and conflict is the likely result. 
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Table 46: Support for the Social Democratic Party Family 
(Adj.s.res.) 
CB SocL SocD Agr Lib Chr Cons Prog Gr Oth 
FE -.5 3.4 -.5 -1.0 -.1 -3.6 .6 -.1 2.4 
if 3.5 2.5 -1.2 1.2 .9 -4.6 -1.3 .7 -.3 
HE -1.3 2.3 1.2 -1.9 .9 -2.2 .1 -.7 1.0 
FH -2.0 2.2 1.6 -.8 -.8 -2.5 4.1 -1.7 -.2 
 
HE is known as the social democratic cultural alliance (Thompson, Ellis, and 
Wildavsky 1990:89). This combination seems to belong to social democratic parties 
alone, while the others are contested. Moreover, we should remember from the 
previous table how EH showed strong support for the socialist left, but not for 
social democrats. Thus, the relative strength of preferences on the individual level 
does seem to have an obvious influence on whether people choose the social 
democratic or the socialist left parties.  
The strongest positive effect is found among support for fatalism and 
egalitarianism. These respondents tend to prefer either social democratic parties or 
progress parties. In Table 42, we can see that 47 percent of the respondents with an 
FE combination prefer one of these two parties.319 It is somewhat surprising that 
the progress parties compete for voters whose cultural biases are also positively 
related to support for the social democratic party family. The second combination 
shared by these two party families is FH—support for fatalistic and hierarchical 
biases. Here, 46 percent of respondents choose either the progress party family or 
the social democratic family.  
The two top-ranked biases approach does not seem to create much support for the 
social democratic party family. For the smaller parties, we can find cultural 
combinations where the probability of preferring the party is perhaps fivefold. By 
contrast, support for the social democratic party family increases from the average 
support of 25 percent to 41 percent maxim support (Fi).  
There are several possible was to interpret this. The first has to do with selection 
bias, but even among the rarer combinations that were removed, support for the 
social democratic party never exceeds 46 percent. Second, perhaps the two top-
ranked biases approach is not very good in explaining preferences for social 
democratic parties. Perhaps several biases are needed. Earlier, we did see that with 
cultural space, the four bias solution did yield up to 55 and 62 percent support for 
the social democratic party family from their two most significant cultural 
strongholds. Third, perhaps the neutral position on cultural biases is what actually 
defines social democratic party supporters. The strongest support comes from 
HEdt and rEdf—i.e. neutral-level support for individualism combined with support 
for egalitarianism and neutral-level support for either hierarchy or fatalism. Thus, 
                                                     
319 41 percent prefer the social democratic family and 6 the progress party family. 
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both of these have two neutral-level supports, while the two top-ranked biases used 
in Table 46 above ignore the neutral position. Fifth, the two top-ranked biases 
approach seems to be better in predicting who will not vote for the social 
democratic party family. Sixth, perhaps there is something about large parties—
ones that have catchall ambitions—that make them culturally ambiguous or clumsy. 
Support for the Agrarian Party Family 
In Table 47, we can see the two combinations with increased support for the 
agrarian party family at the Nordic level. The two top-ranked biases approach does 
not have much influence on preferences for the agrarian party family. There are 
two cultural bias combinations that have a positive effect on agrarian party 
preferences at the Nordic level: support for individualism combined with support 
for hierarchy and rejection of egalitarianism combined with rejection of fatalism. 
However, we can see that ef increases support for the conservative party family 
much more than for the agrarian party family. 
Table 47:  Support for the Agrarian Party Family (Adj.s.res). 
CB SocL SocD Agr Lib Chr Cons Prog Gr Oth 
IH -2.2 -.4 2.2 -1.5 -.6 1.0 2.0 -.9 -.8 
ef -3.7 -4.1 2.1 -1.2 -.3 7.4 -.9 -1.9 -.7 
 
The situation is different when looking at the source of support for the agrarian 
parties country by country. In three of the countries, the agrarian parties are small, 
and thus it is difficult to obtain significant deviations. Voting for the agrarian 
parties increases according to iE in Norway, HF in Sweden, and EF and IH in 
Finland. However, in Iceland and Denmark the agrarian party is larger. In Iceland, 
FH increases preferences for the agrarian party, while in Denmark ef, eI, and fI 
increases preferences for the agrarian party. Culturally speaking, these agrarian 
parties do not have much in common. In Norway and Denmark, their supporters 
seem to be at the opposing ends when it comes to egalitarianism and individualism, 
while respondents in Iceland, Sweden, and Finland share a predilection for fatalism. 
Denmark, which has by far the largest agrarian party, rejects fatalism altogether. It 
looks a like the Danish agrarian party is culturally very similar to conservative 
parties in the other countries.320 
Since preferences for agrarian parties are often considered to be connected to the 
rural-urban divide, this divisions should be accounted for when studying the effects 
of cultural biases. In Table 48, we can see a sample of those respondents who live 
                                                     
320 The Danish Agrarian party has diversified its electoral base, and relies very little on the farmers 
(Cotta and Best 2007:227). See Table 86 and Table 87 for a country by country overview of party 
preferences. 
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in the countryside or who work as farmers or fishermen.321 Denmark is excluded, 
because Venstre is quite different from the other agrarian parties. In this sample, 30 
percent of the respondents prefer one of the agrarian parties (in urban areas only 4 
percent would support agrarian parties). Thus, we are left with a better picture of 
the agrarian party family’s cultural position in the rural areas. 
Table 48: Agrarian Party Family Support among Rural 
Population in N, S, F and I (Adj.s.res) 
CB SocL SocD Agr Lib Chr Cons Prog Gr Oth 
IH -.7 -1.6 2.5 -.7 -.6 -.1 -.4 -1.0 1.7 
FH -1.0 -.4 2.1 -.1 -.9 -.1 1.0 -1.5 -.8 
HI -.7 -1.0 1.9 .6 1.1 -.5 -.5 -1.1 -.5 
 
We can see that support for individualistic and hierarchical biases (IH and HI) 
increase the support for the agrarian party family, even if only one of the biases is 
significant. Of rural respondents with an IH bias, a full 63 percent would vote for 
the agrarian party. Similarly, support for fatalism combined with support for 
hierarchy (FH) increases support for the agrarian party family. This is interesting 
because the same combination in the urban population increases support for social 
democratic and progress party families.   
One must remember that even if voting for agrarian parties out from these two 
cultural bias segments (IH and FH) seems to be the obvious choice for 
respondents, these respondents are only a small number of those that vote for 
agrarian parties (8 percent of them). Thus, this is not a good description of all 
agrarian party supporters. For a better picture of the preferences for agrarian 
parties, the analysis should be done on a country-by-country basis and include the 
rarer cultural combinations. Nevertheless, it looks like supporting hierarchy 
together with either individualism or fatalism increases votes for the agrarian party 
family. 
Support for the Christian Party Family 
The Christian party family is often understood as being less about political ideology 
than about promoting Christian values. To be sure, church attendance is often a 
good predictor of Christian party voting.  
In Table 49, we can see how there is only one cultural bias combination that 
significantly increases support for the Christian party family: support for 
hierarchical and individualistic biases. The combination with the next strongest bias 
                                                     
321 There are 778 respondents in this sample, of these 70 are selected because of their occupation and 
722 because their municipality or county can be characterized as rural (Finland, Sweden, and 
Iceland) or becuase their municipality is classified as a primary producer or a mixture of primary 
production and industrial production (Norway).  
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is support for hierarchical and fatalistic biases, but this increase is not statistically 
significant.  
Table 49: Support for the Christian Party Family (Adj.s.res.) 
CB SocL SocD Agr Lib Chr Cons Prog Gr Oth 
HI -1.5 -.4 1.4 -1.6 2.1 -.3 2.0 -2.0 .3 
HF -2.2 .9 1.4 -1.5 1.7 -.4 2.0 -1.6 -.9 
 
Support for hierarchy and individualism also increases voting for the progress party 
family, thus making these two parties successful competitors for voters within this 
cultural segment. 
In the case of support for Christian parties, the order of biases does make a 
difference. Change from HI to IH does increase the support for the agrarian party 
and actually reduces the voting for the Christian party family (see Table 47). In 
other words, changing the order of the two top-ranked biases changes the effect it 
has on voting for the Christian party family. Hierarchical values seem to be central 
for these voters. Typical hierarchical values are often called traditional values or 
“family values”, which refers to the hierarchical family ideal. When seen through 
the cultural theory lenses, this terminology is a successful public relations coup 
because it makes it possible in political debates to label the egalitarian, 
individualistic, and fatalistic family ideals as being anti-family.322 
There are clear differences between the countries. In Norway, the significant 
increase for Christian party support comes from if and HI, in Denmark from fh and 
fI, and in Sweden from HI, FI, and EI. In Finland, the support comes from ih.323 
The commonalities between Norway and Sweden make the HI combination the 
only significant one at the Nordic level. 
Support for the Conservative Party Family 
The two top-ranked biases with increased support for the conservative party family 
are listed in Table 50. We can see that five cultural bias combinations give a 
significant increase in the support for the conservative party family. These are the 
strongest effects that the two top-ranked biases approach has on party preferences. 
Common for three of these is the rejection of egalitarian cultural bias as the first 
bias. This is combined with support for individualism, rejection of fatalism, or 
rejection of hierarchy.  
The only supported bias among these is individualism, and in both cases 
individualism forms the second bias (eI and fI). Individualism is closely connected 
with economical liberalism. Culturally speaking, this shows that conservative parties 
                                                     
322 Each way of organizing has its own corresponding family ideal. See pages 61-74. 
323 Iceland did not have a Christian democratic party.  
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are more about rejecting egalitarian, hierarchical, and fatalistic solutions than about 
promoting individualism. Rejection of cultural biases is thus a defining trait of the 
conservative party. We could not understand their voters’ cultural bias positions 
without also accounting for the rejection of cultural biases. 
Table 50: Support for the Conservative Party Family (Adj.s.res.) 
CB SocL SocD Agr Lib Chr Cons Prog Gr Oth 
eI -3.2 -4.9 -.2 .9 -1.4 8.8 -.3 -1.8 -.1 
ef -3.7 -4.1 2.1 -1.2 -.3 7.4 -.9 -1.9 -.7 
eh -2.1 -1.9 -1.2 -.6 -1.2 6.5 -1.1 -.2 -.5 
fe -1.7 -2.7 .7 .2 .1 4.8 -1.4 -1.7 -.2 
fI -1.5 -3.0 .7 -.1 1.5 3.0 -.9 2.2 -1.2 
 
In Table 50, above, three cultural bias combinations (eI, eh, and fI) significantly 
increase support for the conservative party family only, while ef also increases 
support for the agrarians and fI for the greens. In this table, the support for social 
democratic and socialist left party families is severely reduced. Here, there seems to 
be a similarity with one of the best-known political dimensions—namely the left-
right dimension. In the literature on cultural theory, the left-right dimension is 
often seen as going diagonally from pro-egalitarianism on the left-hand side to pro-
hierarchy and pro-individualism on the right-hand side.324 However, when seeing 
these results we should ask if support for hierarchy really is part of the left-right 
dimension in the Nordic countries. Rejection of hierarchy is important for many of 
those that vote for socialist left parties. However, among supporters of the socialist 
left, we also find the EH combination—the so-called social democratic alliance. 
Thus, cultural biases are something other than the left-right dimension. They bring 
multidimensionality into the study of politics. 
Support for the Progress Party Family 
In Table 51, we can see those cultural combinations that significantly increase 
support for the progressive party family. We can see how the direction of support 
from FH goes mostly to the progress party family, but a bit also goes to the social 
democratic party family. Support for fatalistic and individualistic biases together 
increase support only for the progress party family.  
There are three repeated traits here: support for fatalistic, hierarchical, and 
individualistic biases. At least in the political debates in Norway, the Progress Party 
was accused lacking consistency and making populist policies. This fits well with 
the support for three different cultural biases, and the lack of rejection of cultural 
biases can easily contribute to arguments that point toward a variety of different 
futures.  
                                                     
324 (Coughlin and Lockhart 1998:46; Grendstad 2003a). 
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Table 51: Support for the Progress Party Family (Adj.s.res.) 
CB SocL SocD Agr Lib Chr Cons Prog Gr Oth 
FH -2.0 2.2 1.6 -.8 -.8 -2.5 4.1 -1.7 -.2 
FI -2.1 1.0 .0 -.8 .7 -1.0 2.8 -.1 .4 
IH -2.2 -.4 2.2 -1.5 -.6 1.0 2.0 -.9 -.8 
 
It can be difficult to place the progress party family on the left-right dimension, and 
depending on the issue, they can end up on either side of the conservative party. 
However, if we use cultural biases, we can see that that conservative and progress 
party families are quite far from each other in relation to hierarchy and fatalism.  
Do Biases Make Sense of Party Preference? 
We have now seen two different ways of applying cultural biases as combinations 
where both support and rejection are accounted for. Both of these combinations 
seem to make sense. Whether we use cultural space or the two top-ranked biases 
approach, we can interpret every one of the eight ideological party families in light 
of cultural biases.  
Naturally, the stories told by these cultural bias combinations are similar. The 
cultural bias combinations gave better explanations for some party families than 
others, which we knew already from Table 39 (on page 382). However, we did learn 
that those The Nordic-level party families, which were poorly explained by the 
cultural space approach and the two top-ranked biases approach, had rather large 
cross-national differences between their cultural compositions (most notability the 
agrarian and green party families), and in some party families the cultural biases 
become relevant only under certain conditions. For example, supporting hierarchy 
and rejecting fatalism was relevant for Christian party support only after accounting 
for regular church attendance. 
When using cultural space, we learned that the socialist left and the social 
democratic party family supporters differ from each other culturally, while the 
socialist left, the green, and the liberal party family supporters have many cultural 
traits in common. Similarly, the progress party supporters share several traits with 
those that support social democratic parties, while the conservative party is 
culturally quite remote from the social democratic party. In addition, the Christian 
party family does have its own cultural space. 
We obtain a more detailed picture when using the two top-ranked biases. We learn 
which particular cultural combinations influence party family preferences. I will not 
repeat these here. I will, however, mention that the two top-ranked biases approach 
emphasizes those cultural biases where the respondent deviates most from the rest 
of the respondents.  
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One of my findings is that preferences for some parties are triggered by just two 
cultural biases, while others require three. Norway serves as an example, where the 
Agrarian Party (SP) seems to be unrelated to cultural biases when we use 
CultFixAbsTri3, but if we use the ranked top two biases, preference for SP is greatly 
increased if the respondent belongs to iE.325 Similarly, the Liberal Party (V) scores 
higher when using the ranked top two biases, while the Conservative Party (H) 
scores higher if we use the top two biases in a fixed order. I believe this indicates 
the absence of any particular cultural bias combination that can be used for 
everything, but rather we should select a way to represent cultural biases that fits 
with the task. 
During the interpretation of the figures and tables presented in this chapter, the 
most important finding was that the rejection of a cultural bias helps to make sense 
of party preferences. Some cultural combinations defined by rejection of bias 
increase the preferences for particular party families. For example, rejecting egalita-
rianism, hierarchy, and fatalism increases support for the conservative party family, 
while rejecting hierarchy, individualism, and fatalism increases support for the 
socialist left party family. Some party families are defined by what they stand for: 
Social democratic party support is rooted in support for hierarchy, egalitarianism, 
and fatalism, which also leads to increased support for the progress party family. 
Information about rejection is what makes sense out of the relationship between 
party preferences and cultural biases. If we only had information about support, we 
could explain only a third of the variation in Nordic party family preferences when 
compared with the explanatory power of the cultural space approach.326 
Multidimensionality is both a blessing and curse. It is a blessing because it allows a 
study of people’s political preferences that goes deeper into their cultural fabric 
when compared to the depth achieved by many other perspectives (remember how 
Part I found a close connection between household structures and political views). 
It is a blessing because it has a complexity that resembles the real world (we are able 
to predict quite a lot of the party preferences that people have). However, it is also 
a curse because the whole point with theories is that they are supposed to simplify 
the world. It is very easy to end up with an application that is so complex that it is 
nearly impossible to use.  
One of my research goals for this thesis has been to try to operationalize cultural 
biases in surveys in a way that balances between ease of use and real life complexity. 
I believe I have succeeded in both: Both ways of operationalizing cultural bias 
combinations allow us to see respondents’ cultural biases in a manner that retains 
the complexity, similar to what we would expect in a large institution, rather than 
hiding or simplifying it. Unfortunately, the cultural space can hardly be described as 
easy to use, as it divides respondents into 81 categories, thus requiring samples that 
                                                     
325 These tables on the counts, but not the adjusted standardized residuals, are available at 
http://eero.no/publ/How_Much_Can_UC_explain_Neut_Fin_tri3565_bin50_c10_n40.htm 
326 In Table 38, coherent expains 4 percent of the Nordic party vote, while CultFixMid4 explains 12 
percent. 
•    Party Preference and Cultural Bias Combinations  
 
424 
are larger in size than what is commonly found in surveys. However, the two top-
ranked biases approach creates a compelling image of respondents with complex 
cultural compositions that can be accessed through regular surveys. Nevertheless, in 
order to keep the tables short, I excluded many respondents and focused the 
discussion on the most common combinations. Thus, both operationalizations 
have their own shortcomings. 
Is the Strongest Bias is more Important than the Second Strongest Bias? 
The cultural space version of cultural bias combinations treats all four biases as 
equally important for the respondent. However, it seems likely that it is not just the 
combination that matters, but also the relative strength of each bias. In Table 42 
(on page 412), we can see how the two top-ranked biases approach influences the 
preferences for particular ideological party families. Here, the strongest bias is 
always presented first, and it will be possible to distinguish for example between 
EH and HE. If the strongest bias is the most important, then these two 
combinations should have different effects. If the relative strengths of the biases 
are not important, then these two combinations should result in similar levels of 
support for the different party families. Instead, the analysis found the following: 
Those who prefer EH tend to vote for the socialist left party family. 
The supporters of HE tend to vote for social democratic parties. In 
addition, both combinations lead to reduced votes for the 
conservative party family.  
Those who prefer Ei or iE tend to vote for the socialist left party 
family, whereas only iE increases the vote for the green party family. 
Those who prefer hf tend to vote for the liberal party family, while 
those for prefer fh tend to vote for the green party family. 
Those who prefer HI tend to vote for the progress party family, 
while those who prefer IH tend to vote for the agrarian party family. 
Those who belong to ih or hi tend to vote for the socialist left, 
liberal, or green party families. For ih, the tendency to vote for the 
socialist left is twice as strong. 
Thus, it matters whether a bias is ranked first or second. In the next chapter, I will 
analyze this in greater detail in the discussion concerning the dominant bias and the 
independence assumptions.  
My trust in the cultural bias combinations has increased, as we have now seen that 
two different ways of using the cultural bias combinations—i.e. cultural space and 
two top-ranked biases—have categories that are informative and allow us to see 
how cultural biases are connected to political views. Since the two top-ranked 
biases approach allows us to explain a multidimensional phenomenon across 
national and sample boundaries, I believe it is an operationalization of cultural bias 
that is robust enough to be used for scrutinizing the assumptions behind survey 
research.  
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PART III: DISCUSSIONS 
The third part of this thesis will discuss, and try to reach some conclusions, about 
the relation between individual and culture. While in the second part of the thesis a 
set of tools were prepared and tested, in this part these tools are used to analyze, 
discuss, and make some tentative conclusions about the individual-culture 
relationship. Cultural theory has not delivered as expected in survey research. I 
believe the reason for this a poor understanding of the individual-culture relation, 
which has lead to the use of analytical techniques not well suited for the task.  
Part III is divided into three chapters. In Chapter 12, False Assumptions for Survey 
Research, three common assumptions used in quantitative analysis are scrutinized 
against survey data from seven different samples. It is demonstrated that the 
dominant cultural bias assumption is best understood as a fallacy. Similarly, the 
independence and the additivity of cultural biases effects assumptions lack 
empirical support. These findings indicates that the common statistical techniques 
are not well suited for analysing the effects of cultural bias on individual level data. 
I addition, the level of analysis is important, and I suggest that there are some 
parallels between the analysis of aggregated data, and the analysis of cultural biases, 
as both have to deal with cross-level inference. 
In Chapter 13, What is Rejection of A Cultural Bias?, I use data from households 
and from the surveys to discuss rejection as a theoretical and empirical pheonomen. 
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Rejection on individual level and on institutional level are different phenomena, and 
one should not assume that indivuduals are copies of institutions. Rejection of a 
bias does carry meaning that individuals use as to guide in their party preferences. 
Accepting rejection as a individual level trait makes it easier to deal with cultural 
biases on individual level.  
In Chapter 14, entitled Final remarks, I will summarize findings from the household 
research, and the surveys, and discuss the individual-culture relation in light of these 
findings. In addition, I will briefly comment upon how my findings can be used in 
the migration field. Finally, I give suggestions for direction for future research.  
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C h a p t e r  1 2   
FALSE ASSUMPTIONS FOR 
SURVEY RESEARCH  
I share Achen’s (1982:11) concern that “social scientists spend a great deal of time 
writing their results of statistical analyses, and very little time discussing the 
evidence that their [model] specifications are correct”. Therefore, I will now search 
for empirical evidence that allows us to discuss and evaluate the assumptions 
behind the statistical analyses. Any successful statistical analysis is dependent on a 
correct model specification. If the assumptions guiding the analysis are not met, 
neither the parameter estimates nor the conclusions can be taken at face value. I am 
limiting my discussion to the assumptions because  
cross-level analyses are complex, and the added assumptions or 
information are often very demanding of theoretical agility and 
contextual knowledge. In consequence, too many practitioners try 
to evade the problem, or else attack it with conventional but 
inflexible sets of assumptions that are inappropriate for the data. 
(Achen and Shively 1995:4) 
In this chapter, I will discuss and falsify three common assumptions behind survey 
research that uses cultural theory. Almost everyone using survey data to measure 
cultural biases at the individual level has been using one or more of the following 
three assumptions:327 First, some assume the presence of a dominant bias in 
individuals. Every time the researchers label people as hierarchical, egalitarian, 
individualistic, or fatalistic, they are relying on the truthfulness of this assumption. 
Indeed, the households I have studied all had a dominant cultural bias; and it is 
both easy and tempting to assume that individuals resemble institutions, including 
households, in this matter. Contrary to this, however, I will demonstrate that the 
idea of a dominant bias at the individual level is not compatible with the empirical 
evidence. 
A second assumption maintains that the effect of a cultural bias is independent of the values 
of the other biases. This allows us study the effect of one bias alone, while disregarding 
the values of the other biases. All bivariate analytical techniques, like bivariate 
correlations, bivariate regressions, or even a two-way cross table, rely on a particular 
                                                     
327 See Table 15: Examples of Research based on Surveys using Cultural Theory on page 282. As far as 
I can tell, all listed individual-level analyses using four cultural biases are relying on these 
assumptions. The higher-level analyses are not the subject of my analysis or critique. 
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value on a particular variable always having the same effect. However, if the effect 
of one bias is not the same across the values of another bias, these techniques 
estimate the effects with error, or in worst case, they become meaningless.  
In the qualitative analysis of households, cultural biases carry meanings, and these 
meanings influence each other. In surveys, variables are stored one by one in neat 
columns of numbers, which are numeric representations of meanings that do not 
invite interplay between two meanings. I will demonstrate that on the individual 
level, the effect of one bias is not constant, but dependent on the values of the 
other biases. 
The third assumption is that the effects of cultural biases are additive. The use of partial 
correlations and multivariate regressions require us to assume that the affects of 
each cultural bias can simply be added together. If the effects of two biases cannot 
simply be added together, we cannot trust that multivariate regressions give a 
correct picture of the relationship. In particular, the hypothesis tests are prone to 
fail when this assumption is violated, thus making inferences from the sample to 
the population questionable (Berry and Feldman 1985:10).  
When analyzing households, I used figures that present the four cultural biases in 
the households and in their views of politics and society (see page 257). 
Fortunately, in these figures we do not need to assume that the effects are additive. 
The qualitative methods can deal with meaning. The assumption of additivity 
arrives as an unfortunate by-product of multivariate regressions, when we are trying 
to describe the effect of several biases across all cases, and not just one case. I will 
demonstrate that the effects of cultural biases are not additive. 
In what follows, I will show that these three assumptions receive little or no 
empirical support on sample level, which leads me to conclude that these 
assumptions should be seen as fallacies. However, before I start the empirical 
analysis, I will present eight consequences and implications from these fallacies 
because all readers will benefit from knowing about the implications, while only 
those with quantitative research background will benefit from the numerous tests 
behind my argument. 
Implications from the Fallacies 
The dominant individual fallacy tells us that using only one bias, namely the 
dominant one, to represent a person’s cultural bias does not reflect what is going 
on in the data. People are not just hierarchical, egalitarian, individualistic, or 
fatalistic. Real people are in fact far more complicated—a fact that should force us 
to consider several implications. First, researchers should refrain from making these 
kinds of oversimplifications, where people are labeled as hierarchical, egalitarian, 
individualistic, and fatalistic, even if it is easy and tempting to do so.  
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Second, the dominant bias assumption fails because the coherent individual approach to 
cultural theory does not receive empirical support in the survey data. Since peoples’ cultural 
biases are not just miniatures of cultural bias present in institutions, we need to 
improve the model of the individual-culture relationship to cope with this 
challenge. One way to move on is to follow my suggestion and view individuals’ 
cultural biases as consisting of both knowledge and degrees of preference for 
particular ways of life (See page 299). 
A third implication is that the additivity of effects fallacy teaches us that we cannot 
simply add together the effects of two biases. This is probably caused by the effects from 
interaction between the cultural biases. A simple multivariate regression analysis is 
not well suited for this, unless the correct interaction effects are included in the 
analysis.328  
Fourth, the independence of effects fallacy teaches us that we cannot analyze cultural 
bias effects one by one. A bivariate analysis showing that one cultural bias, for example 
egalitarianism, has little effect on party preference should be dismissed as a poor 
analysis because now we know that the interaction between the biases requires us to 
use more than one bias at once.  
Fifth, combining these two false assumptions—i.e., additivity and independence 
assumtions—severely restricts the analytical techniques that can be used on individual-level data 
of cultural biases. We know that we should analyze several cultural biases at once, 
but at the same time, the most popular multivariate techniques are not well suited 
for this.  
Most researchers using cultural theory on survey data during the last twenty years 
have tried to make connections from people’s cultural biases to their attitudes or 
behaviors. Either these analyses rely on the dominant individual assumption and try 
to divide the respondents into four categories and use their dominant biases as an 
explanation, or they use correlational or multivariate techniques that rely on the 
additivity and independence assumptions. Sometimes authors have used only one 
cultural bias as an explanation, which requires the independence assumption to 
hold.329 There is, however, one type of analysis that avoids my critique. Some 
researchers characterize institutions like parties by referencing individual-level data, 
in which case the level of analysis is different. People’s cultural biases are 
aggregated up to the institutional level and this composite of cultural biases is then 
used either as an explanans or as an explanadum. I have only tested these 
assumptions in an individual-level causal chain; therefore, my critique does not 
apply to other levels of aggregation.  
                                                     
328 When the interaction effects become complicated and strong, compared with the direct effects, the 
meaning of additivity becomes purely technical. I am interested in the additivity of two biases, 
without accounting for the 72 potential interaction effects. 
329 An example of this is using degrees of environmental ideology and only one, the egalitarian, 
cultural bias as explanation for private recycling behavior (Olli, Grendstad, and Wollebæk 2001). 
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The sixth implication of my analysis in this chapter is that a reanalysis of some of the 
survey-based work that uses four-dimensional cultural biases might be warranted. 
There is a need to establish to what degree the conclusions are influenced by these 
fallacies. In this chapter, I have tried to establish if the assumptions are correct or 
not. This is an issue different from trying to establish the extent to which erroneous 
or divergent results will flow from analyses that rely on these false assumptions. 
Until this issue has been settled, we do not know if we can trust the conclusions 
from previous research. If a reanalysis changes the conclusions, then we should 
consider a reanalysis of not just a few projects, but most of the research projects 
that are based on survey data. 
The seventh implication is that these fallacies can give a methodological explanation for 
why transferring cultural theory to individual-level analysis was never the success 
Wildavsky expected it to be, despite 20 years of survey research (Wildavsky 1987; 
Verweij and Nowacki 2010).330 I have proposed the use of cultural combinations as 
one way to avoid the dominant bias, additivity, and independence fallacies. These 
combinations keep the meaning of cultural biases visible without assuming that 
individuals are small copies of institutions. However, one must not interpret my 
results as the success expected by Wildavsky. I merely give a few suggestions for 
how to analyze survey data in light of these three fallacies. Judging the merit of 
these suggestions should wait until others repeat these analyses while using my 
suggestions. 
Last but not least, researchers applying a two-dimensional measurement model should 
check whether these assumptions are valid in their data. In this chapter, my 
critiques of the assumptions apply only to analyses that rely on individual-level 
measurements of the four cultural biases as four potentially separate dimensions, 
not the grid-group as two fixed dimensions. A different measurement model 
changes what one can potentially find. Therefore, I am not willing to claim that my 
conclusions can be applied to research that uses a different measurement model. 
Overall, these eight implications of my research are quite important for research on 
cultural theory. Therefore, it is worthwhile to do a thorough analysis, even if it 
reduces the readability of this chapter. Since I am interested in the relationship 
between individual and culture, I will be testing hypotheses on the level of cultural 
biases, which is one step up from the level of individuals. An example of such a 
hypothesis would be that the first-ranked bias has a larger effect on party 
preference than the second-ranked bias. An example of a pure individual-level 
hypothesis would be that respondents who reject egalitarianism and support 
individualism vote conservative. However, as we have already seen in Table 42 on 
page 412, these kinds of hypotheses did not help us to understand the relationship 
between individual and cultural biases.  
The data I have is individual-level survey data. Therefore, in most cases I will 
classify individuals into categories according to their cultural biases and test if these 
                                                     
330 See introduction to Chapter 7 on page 279 for more details. 
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cultural bias categories have the properties they are expected to have. In many 
ways, this is comparable to aggregating individual-level data one step up to the level 
of cultural biases in order to test the hypothesis at the proper level (Achen and 
Shively 1995:2,23).331  
I will here briefly repeat some of the relevant findings from Chapter 10 and 
Chapter 11. If the reader accepts these findings, the reader should also accept that 
this particular way of operationalizing cultural biases could provide a valid basis for 
testing these assumptions. 
Chapter 10, entitled Combinations of Cultural Biases, lays out the different ways to 
create cultural combinations, and compares hundreds of these in the search for 
useful assumptions. Here we learned that rejection does matter (p. 384): Dividing 
cultural biases into rejection, indifference, and support is useful (p. 386); we can 
often ignore the indifference in order to simplify people’s cultural bias 
combinations; and adding a new bias to a combination increases its explanatory 
power, but less than the previous one (p.388). Unfortunately, a high number of 
biases increases complexity thus making it difficult to apply, and requires an 
increasingly higher number of respondents in order to be useful.  
Chapter 11, entitled Party Preference and Cultural Bias, applied two of the variables 
proposed in Chapter 10. The findings from this chapter demonstrate that the 
cultural biases carry meaning that can be combined in a way that makes sense of 
party preferences. These findings provide us with an external validation of the 
operationalization.  
In the current chapter, I will use size of effect on party preference as my independent 
variable because it can be calculated for every data source, and party preference is a 
variable that can contain multiple dimensions and meanings.332 As the dependent 
variable, I will use the combination of the two highest ranked cultural biases because 
previous tests and experience show that this performs well. However, I am not 
studying party preference as I did in Chapter 11; the current topic pertains to the 
assumptions behind statistical analyses using cultural bias as measured in surveys.  
It is difficult to keep analyses of dominance, additivity, and independence separate 
from each other because many of the empirical tests are dependent on several of 
the assumptions at the same time. Thus, no single test alone can determine any of 
the issues. However, the pattern emerging from a series of tests can reveal which 
one of the assumptions is failing, thus causing the rejection of the hypothesis. In 
particular, the tests of additivity are dependent on either dominance or 
                                                     
331 I am thus doing a form of cross-level inference in the easy direction. Since I have individual-level 
data, I will not suffer from under-indentification as there is plenty of data for most tests. However, 
I have tried many analyses where there are too few respondents left in each cultural bias category, 
or where the number of potential interaction effects between cultural biases becomes so large that 
the analysis breaks down. 
332 Using a simple scale, like degrees of political participation, as a dependent variable would not have 
allowed the multiple dimensions of meaning in cultural biases to be visible. 
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independence as mechanisms behind the additivity. Nevertheless, I will treat these 
assumptions one by one for the sake of clarity. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. First, I test the dominant bias 
assumption. Second, I test the additivity assumption. Third, I test the independency 
assumption. These three sections all use both sample and individual-level analyses. 
Fourth, I will explore some new possibilities for analysis on the level of 
combinations.333 
The Dominant Bias Fallacy 
Do individuals have a dominant bias? Even if a dominant cultural bias is common 
in households, one must be careful not to use this as an indicator of the presence of 
a dominant cultural bias on the individual level.  
Previous research shows that the large majority of households have a dominant 
bias. However, the findings demonstrated that some households did not have a 
dominant bias; they were in a transition from one bias to another, or the husband 
and wife had made an alliance that balanced two cultural biases against each other 
(Dake and Thompson 1999; Dake, Thompson, and Neff 1994).334  
For me at least, all households included in Part I presented a rather coherent image 
of themselves (see pages 145-255). The stories they told depicted the household as 
one culturally cohesive unit with one dominant cultural bias. I was expecting to find 
much more ambiguity or cultural biases just being less relevant in the households’ 
everyday life and self-presentation. Every one of the eight households was 
dominated by support for one bias.  
The presence of a dominant bias makes it easier to interact with these households 
because it creates predictability and offers a possibility to use cultural theory as a 
toolkit for intercultural communication and cooperation. However, social 
interaction is interaction between individuals, even if they are a part of institutions. 
The institutional version of cultural theory would perhaps claim that you could not 
remove individuals from their institutional contexts; an individual without a social 
setting is like an empty container. In social sciences, however, there is such strong 
pressure toward using survey methodologies that it is almost impossible for a 
theory to become accepted without relating to individual-level phenomena.  
It is effortless to treat individuals as hierarchical, individualistic, egalitarian, or 
fatalistic. However, this requires the presence of a dominant bias in individuals. If 
                                                     
333 The script “False assumptions for Survey Research v5.sps” has been used to produce all tables and 
figures in this chapter. 
334 This finding is trustworthy because the three researchers undertook classifications independently, 
each used their own methods, each examined the same 127 households, and each arrived at the 
same conclusions concerning which cultural bias was the basis for organizing each household. 
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there is no such dominant bias, other and more complicated ways to label and 
analyze cultural bias on the individual level must be used. The dominant bias 
assumption is also a prerequisite for using the coherent individual approach to 
cultural theory research (see page 294). 
Can the surveys used in this thesis tell us something about dominant biases in 
individuals? We have seen in the previous chapters how cultural biases have been 
measured in two different large-scale, multi-sample surveys, and how it is possible 
to deal with the lack of additivity of cultural biases on the individual level through 
presenting individuals’ cultural biases as combinations of support and rejection of 
each of the four cultural biases. None of the surveys available for my research are 
designed with the purpose of establishing the presence of a dominant cultural bias. 
Nevertheless, I believe there are several analyses that can reveal to us something 
about the presence of a dominant bias in individuals. 
I will now ignore the meaning carried by cultural biases. I will use the information 
concerning the level of the first-ranked bias, while ignoring which bias it is. There are 
four cultural biases, and at the level of cultural biases, they should behave in the 
same way and be treated in the same way. However, at the individual level they are, 
of course, kept separate. To test the dominant bias fallacy we do not need to know 
which bias is the strongest one; if the dominant bias assumption holds, the first-
ranked bias should always have the largest effect.335 Similarly, if the effects of the 
biases are additive, we do not need to know which biases produce the effects, just 
the sizes of these effects. 
The best way to test dominance is to search for the effects of the dominant bias. If 
the dominant cultural bias does not have an effect that is different from the three 
weaker biases, then the whole concept of dominant bias becomes rather 
meaningless. The first-ranked cultural bias is the best candidate for the dominant 
bias.336 The following empirical traits should be present if the dominant cultural 
bias exists at the individual level.  
H1 The first-ranked bias has a significant effect on party preference 
while the second-ranked bias does not. 
H2 The effect of the second-ranked bias on party preference is less 
than three quarters of the effect of the first-ranked bias. 
If these two traits are not present in the empirical material, we should treat the 
dominant cultural bias assumption as a fallacy.  
                                                     
335 To predict which party a respondent prefers, we need to understand the meaning carried by 
cultural biases. Therefore, we need to identify which cultural bias combination the respondent 
prefers. In this chapter, however, I am interested in the magnitude of the effect that cultural biases 
have on party preference, not which party the respondent prefers. 
336 This is identical with the variable CultRankTriA1 (see page 364). The strength of a cultural bias is 
here understood as the deviation from the sample mean, thus the more extreme your cultural 
biases are, the stronger the cultural bias. The four cultural biases are then compared and ranked on 
the individual level. 
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Hypothesis testing normally involves the formulation of a research hypothesis, 
which represents the theoretical statement we hope is correct, and the matching 
null hypothesis that one is testing. Rejection of the null hypothesis will then 
strengthen our belief in the alternative hypothesis. It does not mean that we have 
proven the research hypothesis to be true, but it increases our belief in the 
likelihood of its truthfulness (Rozeboom 1960:420; Hanushek and Jackson 
1977:341; Kanji 2006:2; Sheskin 2011:57). Since, my principal goal with this chapter 
is to demonstrate some fallacies, all hypotheses representing these fallacies are 
treated as null hypotheses, while the research hypotheses are only implied and never 
numbered.337 Instead of creating confusion by repeatedly referring to the “null 
hypothesis”, I will number each null hypothesis (as H1 and H2, above) so that it 
always will be clear which hypothesis is being tested. Each rejection of a hypothesis 
will thus weaken our belief in the particular assumption under scrutiny. 
The Single Effect Hypothesis 
In Table 52 below, we can see how the percent of variation explained is dependent 
on the number of biases used in the cultural bias combination. I will compare the 
effects of using only the first-ranked cultural bias with the effects of using only the 
second-ranked cultural bias as the independent variable. The explained variation is 
measured as the strength of association between a cultural bias variable and party 
preference from one table (like Table 42 on page 412).338 The data comes from two 
different surveys using different items to measure cultural bias, and covers seven 
separate samples from five different countries (See pages 305 and 343). 
The first five lines in Table 52 present the strength of association country by 
country. We can see that in Norway the effect of the first-ranked bias is 8.2 percent, 
while the effect of the second-ranked bias is 4.8 percent. The last three lines present 
the results from NEPS95.  
                                                     
337 I am not using the classical hypothesis testing model, but rather a modified version of a null 
hypothesis significance testing model. In addition, I will be testing based on confindence intervals 
whenever applicable (Sheskin 2011: 69-75). 
338 In other words, it is U for a whole table with all the different values for cultural bias (H, h, E, e, I, i, 
F, f, and a) and the different party preferences in variable TOTPARTY. One could of course 
measure the size of the effect for each value, each party, and the adjusted standardized residual, but 
this would give us 81 different Us to relate to in each country. Here, I instead simplify and present 
only one value for U. 
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Table 52: The Effect of First-Ranked and Second-Ranked Biases 
on Party Preference by Sample. NOS99 and NEPS95. 
(Percent explained variance) 
  First-ranked bias Second-ranked bias 
 
Country 
Percent 
explained 
variance
c 
U
ncertainty  
coefficient 
A
sym
p. std. 
error a 
A
pprox. sign. b 
Percent 
explained 
variance
c 
U
ncertainty  
coefficient 
A
sym
p. std. 
error a 
A
pprox. sign. b 
NOS99 Norway 8.2 .082 .010 .000 4.8 .048 .008 .000 
 Sweden 7.8 .078 .011 .000 7.7 .077 .011 .000 
 Denmark 8.0 .080 .010 .000 5.2 .052 .008 .000 
 Finland 6.0 .060 .009 .000 4.9 .049 .008 .000 
 Iceland 15.8 .158 .018 .000 4.9 .049 .012 .032 
 Total 4.7 .047 .004 .000 2.4 .024 .003 .000 
                
NEPS95 Env.Org. 8.4 .084 .005 .000 4.9 .049 .004 .000 
 General 8.1 .081 .008 .000 5.3 .053 .006 .000 
 Total 8.5 .085 .004 .000 5.1 .051 .003 .000 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Likelihood ratio chi-square probability.   
c. Percent explained variance = 100 * U. 
All data are unweighted.339  
 
The single effect hypothesis (H1) states that the first-ranked bias has a significant 
effect on party preferences while the second-ranked bias does not. If the dominant 
bias is dominant enough, the other biases should not contribute to explaining party 
preferences. We can see in Table 52 that in every sample, the association between 
the first-ranked bias and party preference is significant. Similarly, the second-ranked 
biases have small, but statistically significant effects on party preferences in every 
sample (p<0.05).340 We can thus conclude that both the first-ranked bias and the 
second-ranked bias do have an effect in every one of the populations. However, in 
Iceland, there is more uncertainty about the effect of second-ranked bias, and there 
                                                     
339 For NOS99, Gallup has provided a set of weights to correct for sampling errors in relation to age 
and gender, but these change the population estimates very little. The values of explained variance 
change slightly, but not so much that it changes which assocations are significant and the results of 
the hypothesis test. For NEPS95, no weights are provided. 
340 Here, we are performing multiple comparisons. Using an alpha of 0.05 means that the probability 
of making a type I error is 5 percent for every single test. This probability is the same for each test. 
Therefore, by repeating these tests, we are each time increasing the probability of getting significant 
results simply by chance. There are corrections that can be made that will make the total level of 
comparisons match the hypothesis (i.e. test the hypothesis for a whole familiy of tests at once). 
Examples of these kinds of corrections that could have been applicable in this case are Fisher’s 
LSD, the Bonferroni-Dunn correction, the Sidák correction, Tukey’s HSD, and the Scheffé test. 
(Sheskin 2011:903-916). These corrections are not made here because the repeated hypothesis tests 
are performed on different sets of data. However, the likelihood of getting a significant result is still 
equal to 1-(1-alpha)1/n of tests.  
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is a 3 percent probability of falsely rejecting the single effect hypothesis. For all the 
other samples, and with a high degree of certainty, we can reject the single effect 
hypothesis. Overall, there is no empirical support for the single effect hypothesis.341 
The Weak Second-Ranked Bias Hypothesis 
The weak second-ranked bias hypothesis (H2) is narrower than the single effect 
hypothesis: It allows the second bias to have a statistically significant effect, while 
restricting the size of the effect.342 Since the first-ranked bias is tested for 
dominance, it seems appropriate to require the effect of the second-ranked bias to 
be no more than 75 percent of the effect of the first one. If the effect of the 
second-ranked bias is larger than this, we can then reject the weak second-ranked 
bias hypothesis.  
The first column in Table 53 shows the size of the first biases effect found in each 
random sample. Each sample can deviate from the true population. Confidence 
intervals are commonly calculated around a parameter found in the sample. In this 
case, a 95% confidence interval is calculated for the three-quarters of the first-
ranked bias, which is the baseline for comparison with the effects of the second-
ranked bias. In Norway, the confidence interval for the three-quarters level in the 
population ranges from 4.1 to 8.1 percent. The fifth column shows the measured 
effect of the second-rank bias in the sample. In Norway, the second-ranked bias 
was measured to explain 4.8 percent of the variation in party preferences. Based on 
information in Table 52, it can be estimated with 95% confidence that among the 
population, this parameter will be somewhere between 3.2 and 6.4 percent.  
If the confidence intervals for the first- and second-ranked biases overlap, we know 
that the second-ranked bias is likely to have an effect among the population that is 
more than three quarters of the effect of the first-ranked bias. In the next to last 
column in Table 53, we can see the size of the overlap: With the sole exception of 
Iceland, the confidence intervals overlap in every sample.  
                                                     
341 I have checked this hypothesis by using a support version of the cultural biases, and in every 
sample we can reject the single effect hypothesis, which allows us to make the same conclusion.  
342 I have controlled this test for the proportional strength of the first- and second-ranked biases at the 
individual level. There is no statistically significant relationship between the strength of the second-
ranked bias (made relative to the strength of the first-ranked bias) and the effect of the second-
ranked bias (made relative to the first bias). 
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Table 53:  Confidence Intervals for the Effects of the First- and 
Second-Ranked Bias on Party Preference by Sample. NOS99 
and NEPS95. 
  First -
ranked bias 
75% of the 
first-ranked 
bias among 
the 
population 
Second-ranked bias Over-
lap 
test 
 
Country 
Percent expl. 
Sam
pling 
error
Low
er lim
it  
U
pper lim
it 
Percent expl. 
Sam
pling 
error
Low
er lim
it 
U
pper lim
it   
NOS99 Norway 8.2 2.0 4.1 8.1 4.8 1.6 3.2 6.4 2.2 Reject H2 
 Sweden 7.8 2.1 3.8 7.9 7.7 2.1 5.6 9.8 6.0 Reject H2 
 Denmark 8.0 1.9 4.2 7.9 5.2 1.5 3.7 6.7 2.5 Reject H2 
 Finland 6.0 1.8 2.7 6.4 4.9 1.6 3.3 6.5 3.8 Reject H2 
 Iceland 15.8 3.6 8.3 15.4 4.9 2.3 2.7 7.2 -1.1 Keep H2 
 Total 4.7 0.7 2.8 4.2 2.4 0.5 1.9 2.9 0.2  
            
NEPS95 Env.Org. 8.4 1.1 5.2 7.3 4.9 0.8 4.1 5.8 0.6 Reject H2 
 General 8.1 1.5 4.6 7.6 5.3 1.2 4.1 6.5 2.0 Reject H2 
 Total 8.5 0.9 5.5 7.3 5.1 0.7 4.4 5.7 0.2  
All numbers are calculated from Table 52.  Sampling error = 1.96*Standard Errors*100.   
Lower limit = Percent explained variance – Sampling error. Upper limit = percent explained variance + sampling 
error.  
 
The last column in Table 53 gives the results from a hypothesis tests for each 
sample, and for the NOS99 and the NEPS totals. We can see that H2 can be 
rejected in eight out of nine possible instances. Only in Iceland must we conclude 
that the second-ranked bias has a weak effect, while in all the other samples we 
must conclude that the effect of the second-ranked bias is too large to be 
considered weak. The weak second-ranked bias hypothesis is supported by the 
empirical findings of only the Iceland case, but not in any of the other Nordic 
countries.343  
Dominant Bias Assumption and Mixed-Level Data 
There is, however, one weakness in the above analysis. All analysis happens on the 
level of cultural biases as the effects of the first- and second-ranked biases are 
measured at the sample level. Since we are interested in whether there is a dominant 
                                                     
343 The same test using the support version of cultural biases allows us to reject H2 in every sample, 
except in Denmark and environmental organizations.  
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bias at the individual level, we need to check if the same phenomenon exists at the 
individual level.344 Unfortunately, we cannot measure the magnitude of the effect of 
cultural bias at the individual level because this in many ways is first visible in a 
group of people. Therefore, the measured effects from Table 52 are inserted into a 
data file containing all respondents from all samples. In this way, it is possible to 
see how differences in individual-level balances of first-ranked and second-ranked 
biases can influence the differences found at sample level.  
Individual-Level Check of the Single Effect Hypothesis 
The fact that some individuals have a dominant cultural bias does not imply that 
the presence of a dominant bias is a general trait within the distribution of cultural 
biases. If the dominant bias is a general trait, and the absolute values are a better 
choice, as I will argue in the next chapter, the following empirically verifiable trait 
should exist: 
H3 The effect of the first-ranked bias increases by the absolute 
value of that bias.  
In other words, the more extreme values that individuals have on the first-ranked 
bias, the larger the expected effects. If H3 is rejected, then the value of the first-
ranked bias at the individual level is unrelated to the size of the effect of the first-
ranked bias at the sample level. In order to see the influence of rejection, we must 
use the absolute value of the first-ranked bias.  
Cultural bias can be measured as support (every support is larger than any rejection) 
or as absolute values (a strong rejection is larger than a weak support).345 The 
choice between these two measurements is dependent on how we understand the 
role of rejection of cultural biases at the individual level, which is the main topic for 
the next chapter. In my tests of the three assumptions in will only refer to the 
absolute value version of cultural biases. However, I have conducted the same tests 
using the support version, and will comment upon these in the footnotes. 
We can also formulate a parallel hypothesis about the second bias. If the 
dominance assumption is correct, then increasing the value of the second-ranked 
bias should not reduce the effect of the first-ranked bias. It is impossible to imagine 
a mechanism that would allow the first-ranked bias to still be dominant even when 
its effect is reduced by increasing the value of the second-ranked bias. Therefore, 
the following empirically verifiable trait at the individual level should be present in 
data: 
H4 The effect of the first-ranked bias does not diminish by 
increasing the absolute value of the second-ranked bias. 
                                                     
344 Making individual-level conclusions from associations that exist at the sample level is called the 
ecological fallacy (Robinson 1950). 
345 See pages 360 and 388. 
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These two hypotheses are variations of the single effect hypothesis that was tested 
earlier. Given that we did not find a clear effect at the sample level (H1 and H2), it 
would be surprising, but still quite possible, to find a clear effect at the individual 
level (H3 and H4). 
In Table 54 below, we can see how some individual-level characteristics correlate 
with the sample-level effects across all samples. The columns contain individual-
level characteristics while the row contains the sample-level effect. The cells show 
how these are related to each other. 
Three individual-level characteristics are included: In the two first columns, we see 
the absolute values of both first- and second-ranked cultural biases, and in the third 
column, we see the individual-level difference between the absolute values of the 
two top-ranked biases. An example will clarify the difference. If a respondent 
scores 1 on the hierarchical bias and -2 on the egalitarian bias, the value of the first-
ranked absolute bias would be 2, while value of the second-ranked bias would be 1. 
The difference between the two absolute values would be 1 (2-1=1). We are thus 
disregarding information about which bias the respondent is using; only the 
relationship between the first- and second-ranked biases is of interest now.  
Table 54:  Correlations between Individual CB traits and Sample 
Effects. NOS99 and NEPS95. 
   
A
bsolute value of 
first-ranked cb 
A
bsolute value of 
second-ranked cb 
D
ominance A
 - 
difference between 
absolute values of 
two strongest biases  
Pearson 
correlation .01 -.03* .05 Effect of first-ranked bias A on party preference (sample level)b Significance .28  .00a .00 
 Test result Reject H3 Reject H4 Reject H5 
All surveys are combined into one data file with 7 895 cases. Statistically significant correlations are in bold (p ≤ 
0.01). H3  to H5 refer to the hypotheses tested.  Inconsistent combinations are marked with gray. 
a. Manually calculated one-tailed significance = 2-tailed / 2. 
b. The effect of CultRankTriA1 on party preferences measured in U for each sample.  
 
The correlations presented in Table 54 allow for an empirical check of several 
assumptions. Since I am disregarding the content of people’s values and looking 
only at some structural characteristics of the cultural biases, it is not surprising to 
find only very weak correlations.  
To evaluate H3, we must look at the first column, where we can see that the 
absolute value of the first-ranked bias does not have a statistically significant 
influence on the effect of the first-ranked bias at the sample level. Therefore, we 
•    False Assumptions for Survey Research 
 
440 
must reject H3. This tells us that the level of the first-ranked bias is not important 
when we do not know whether it is the hierarchical, egalitarian, individualistic, or 
fatalistic bias. The effects we can find in other sections of this thesis are mostly 
related to the content of a bias, not just the level. 
H4 has direction and therefore only statistically significant positive correlations will 
allow us to accept this hypothesis. It requires a one-sided hypothesis test, while 
SPSS calculates two-tailed significances. Therefore, it is divided by 2 prior to the 
hypothesis test.  
To evaluate H4, we need to look at the second column. There, we find a statistically 
significant negative association between the absolute value of the second bias and 
the effect of first-ranked bias, although our hypothesis states that this association 
should be positive. Therefore, we must reject H4. The association is negative: The 
more extreme the second cultural bias is, the less effect the first-ranked bias has.346 
This points toward an equal relationship between the first-ranked and second-
ranked biases. 
We can thus reject H3 and H4, both of which are components of the single effect 
hypothesis. The individual-level values of the first-ranked bias are not related to the 
effect at the sample level, and increasing the value of the second-ranked bias on the 
individual level has a negative effect on the first-ranked bias at the sample level. 
This goes against assuming that the first-ranked bias is a dominant bias. 
Individual-Level Check of the Weak Second Bias 
If dominance exists, the difference between the levels of the first- and second-
ranked biases should not have any influence on the effect of the first-ranked bias. 
On the other hand, if the strengths of the first- and second-ranked biases operate 
independently, we could get situations where the first-ranked bias is strong and the 
second-ranked bias is weak, and therefore the effects of the former resemble those 
of dominance. Fortunately, it is possible to evaluate this. We can formulate a 
parallel hypothesis about the weak second-ranked bias at the individual level. 
H5 Increasing the difference between the absolute values of the 
first- and second-ranked biases has no influence on the effect 
of the first-ranked biases. 
This hypothesis claims that the correlation is zero in the population. To evaluate 
H5, we must look at the third column in Table 54 above, where we can see that the 
relationship between the difference of the two first-ranked biases and the effect of 
the first one is statistically significant and positive: The larger the difference 
between the two biases, the larger the effect of the first bias alone. Thus, we must 
                                                     
346 It is possible to interpret this differently. The strength of this relationship is so weak that it would 
be possible to conclude that the test proves that a zero-level effect as the absolute value of second-
ranked bias barely influences the effect of the first-ranked bias. A correlation of -0.03 is 
comparable with 0.1 percent explained variance, which is negligible.  
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conclude that increasing the difference between two ranked biases does not 
influence the effect of the first-ranked bias. This shows us that the third 
independence hypothesis can be rejected, even if the effects are very small.  
At the individual level, all three hypotheses are rejected, which indicates that the 
dominant bias assumption does not receive empirical support. I have demonstrated 
that the absolute value of the second-ranked bias is negatively related to the effect 
of the first-ranked bias, and that the larger the difference between the absolute 
values of the first- and second-ranked biases, the larger is the effect of the first-
ranked bias. Both of these individual-level traits are the opposite of what the 
dominant bias fallacy would claim. None of the significant empirical findings fit 
with the dominant bias assumption, given that we reject cultural bias as an 
important individual-level trait.347  
To summarize, neither the sample-level findings nor the individual-level findings 
provide any support for the dominant bias assumption, thus indicating that we are 
better off when treating the dominant bias assumption as a fallacy in survey 
research.348 If the first assumption is a fallacy, then what about the second 
assumption, namely the additivity assumption? 
The Additivity Fallacy 
The additivity assumption states that the effects of two cultural biases are additive. 
In principle, the additivity should apply to the effects of all four biases. For the sake 
of brevity, however, I will here check only the additivity of the two first-ranked 
biases.  
The additivity assumption is dependent on the independence assumption. The 
independence assumption states that the effects of the biases are independent of 
the values of the other biases, thus making it possible to analyze them one by one. 
If the independence assumption fails, then we should also be cautious about 
trusting the summation of the effects. Nevertheless, in this section I will try to 
analyze the additivity assumption alone because analyzing them both together 
becomes messy. Hence, I will postpone the scrutiny of the independence 
assumption until the next section.  
The additivity assumption has following empirically verifiable prediction:  
                                                     
347 I have also checked these hypotheses by using the support version of cultural bias: H3 and H4 
were rejected, while H5 was retained. 
348 One methodological explanation for the lack of a dominant bias is the lack of social context in the 
survey situation. This explanation is valid only if the sequential individual approach to cultural 
theory is the most appropriate. In this case, people change their dominant bias from situation to 
situation. In a survey devoid of context, this type dominance would remain undetected. 
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H6 The sum of the effects from the first- and second-ranked 
biases, as measured one by one, equals the effect of the same 
biases measured in a combination.  
Combination in this context means that we use cultural combinations like He, Ef, 
and Eh to predict party preferences. An example based on data from the NEPS95 
general sample can be found in Table 91 (see page 556). Similar information from 
each sample is collected in Table 55 below, where we can see that in the NEPS95 
general sample, the combination of two first-ranked biases explains 21.9 percent of 
the differences in party preferences.349  
In Table 55, we can see the same effects of the first- and second-ranked bias as 
those presented in Table 52, but now they are added together. The sum of effects 
from the first- and second-ranked biases explains 13 percent of the total variation 
in party preferences in the sample from Norway. With a 95 percent confidence, we 
can estimate that the true value of the uncertainty coefficient in Norway means that 
the explained variance lies between 9.4 to 16.5 percent. The combination of the 
first- and second-ranked cultural biases explains 21.9 percent of the total variation 
in the sample, which is equal to the 19.7 to 24.2 percent explained variation in the 
population. We can see that in Norway, the confidence intervals do not overlap, 
and thus H6 can be rejected in the case of Norway. In Norway, the sum of the 
effects from the two first biases does not equal the effect of the two first-ranked 
biases, as the combination is a more potent explanation than the sum of first and 
second biases.  
The same applies to every country in the Nordic survey, but not when the five 
countries are analyzed together at the Nordic level. On the Nordic level, the 
difference is much smaller: The combination explains 9.0 percent while the sum 
explains 7.1 percent of party preferences, making the difference between these two 
to just below 2 percent in the sample. When NOS99 is analyzed country by 
country, the differences are much larger, ranging from 8.6 percent in Denmark to 
13.1 percent in Sweden. If the additivity hypothesis was correct, there should be a 
high degree of overlap between the confidence intervals.  
 
                                                     
349 There is one small difference. In the table in the appendix, combinations (rows) with less than 10 
respondents have been excluded because the percentages on very small samples are highly prone to 
sample errors. By contrast, these combinations are included in Table 55 because U takes sample 
size into account.  
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Table 55:  The Effect of the Combination of Two First Cultural 
Biases on Party Preference by Sample (Percent Explained 
Variance) 
Survey 
Sample 
Sum of first 
and second 
Lower limit 
U
pper limit 
Combination 
of two first- 
ranked biases 
Lower limit 
U
pper limit 
O
verlap 
Test 
NOS99 Norway 13.0 9.4 16.5 21.9 19.7 24.2 -3.16 Reject H6 
 Sweden 15.5 11.3 19.7 28.6 26.0 31.3 -6.31 Reject H6 
 Denmark 13.2 9.9 16.6 21.8 19.5 24.1 -2.96 Reject H6 
 Finland 10.9 7.5 14.3 22.1 19.9 24.4 -5.53 Reject H6 
 Iceland 20.8 14.9 26.6 32.5 28.6 36.3 -2.05 Reject H6 
 Nordic total 7.1 5.8 8.3 9.0 8.1 9.9 0.24  
Env. Org. 13.3 11.4 15.2 16.5 15.3 17.8 -0.12 Reject H6 
General 13.4 10.6 16.2 21.7 19.8 23.5 -3.65 Reject H6 
NEPS95 
NEPS Total 13.6 12.1 15.1 15.6 14.6 16.6 0.55  
The percent of explained variance is calculated by multiplying the uncertainty coefficients by 100. The sum of first 
and second is calculated from Table 52.  All uncertainty coefficients (sum and combination) have an approximate 
significance of .000.  The combination of the two first biases = CultBiasTriA2.   
Sampling error = 1.96 * standard errors * 100.  The lower limit = percent of explained variance – sampling error. 
The upper limit is percent of explained variance + sampling error. 
 
If we look at the results from NEPS95, we can see in the general sample a large 
improvement of 8.3 percentage points in the effect of using cultural combinations 
compared with the sum of single biases. In the sample consisting of members of 
environmental organizations, the difference is only 3.2 percentage points. It is 
possible that being a member of an environmental organization influences party 
preference through mechanisms other than cultural bias. Nevertheless, we must 
reject H6 in both of these samples. The effect from the combination is so much 
larger than the sum of effects from the two biases that it is not likely to be created 
by chance.350  
When compared to any of the single samples, the totals in both NOS99 and 
NEPS95 have smaller differences between the effects of the sums and the 
combinations. The fact that both surveys have the same pattern suggests that the 
combinations are more context sensitive than the first or second biases. As long as 
cultural biases carry meaning and cultural combinations carry even more meaning, it 
is easy to see that the meanings they carry will differ from one cultural context to 
another. We should therefore not expect cultural theory to work well in analyses 
where many different contexts are lumped together. The party preference questions 
in these surveys refer to national elections. Therefore, it should not be a surprise 
that the strongest patterns of meaning appear at the national levels.  
                                                     
350 The same test using the support version of cultural biases allows us to reject H6 in every one of the 
samples. 
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Cultural theory in its very general form can apply the same categories in different 
countries, but a closer attention to details would probably reveal that the content of 
these categories is no longer identical. The meaning carried by them will be 
different. Egalitarianism in one country is not necessary the same as it is in every 
other country. 
Overall, there is no empirical support for the additivity assumption when analyzed 
at the appropriate national level. However, the additivity hypothesis must also be 
examined at the individual level because it is possible to have sample-level findings 
that do not correspond with what is happening at the individual level, as I have 
already argued (see page 437). 
The Additivity Hypothesis at the Individual Level 
We have seen in Chapter 11, entitled Party Preference and Cultural Bias, how the 
effects from single cultural biases seem to change when they are analyzed as a 
combination.351 However, this could be just a random trait. I will therefore, test the 
additivity hypothesis at the individual level in an effort to reveal if it is a more 
general trait. I will do so by studying how individual-level characteristics are related 
to the additive effects of cultural biases at the sample level, as seen in Table 55. 
Given that the additivity assumption holds, the following empirical predictions 
should also be true: 
H7 When the first or the second bias increases at the individual 
level, the sum of the effects grows at the sample level 
This must be reformulated to fit the different operationalizations available: 
H7a There is a positive relationship between the absolute value of 
the first-ranked bias at the individual level and the additive 
effect at the sample level 
H7b There is a positive relationship between the absolute value of 
the second-ranked bias at the individual level and the additive 
effect at the sample level 
It is also possible to incorporate the relative levels of the additive effect and the 
combination into an empirical prediction that should be true if the additivity 
assumption holds:  
H8 When either the first or the second bias increases at the 
individual level, the effect of the combination does not grow 
more than the additive effect.  
                                                     
351 This is also visible in the decomposed effect in Table 91 on page 556. 
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This must be reformulated to fit the variables available: 
H8a When the absolute of value of the first-ranked bias increases, 
the effect of the combination does not grow more than the 
additive effect. 
H8b When the absolute value of the second-ranked bias increases, 
the effect of the combination does not grow more than the 
additive effect. 
If there is pure additivity, then the levels of the first and second biases in relation to 
each other should not matter. For example, if we add the effects of support for 
hierarchy and support for egalitarianism together, it should not make any difference 
which one of these two is the strongest. The difference between the levels should 
also be of no consequence. The effects should be additive as they are. Thus, if the 
additivity assumption holds, then we should obtain the highest levels of added 
effect when both biases have a high value. Moreover, when we have one small 
value (close to zero) and one large value, the additive effect should be smaller. In 
this case, the following prediction should be true:  
H9 The difference between the absolute values of the two first-
ranked biases at the individual level has a negative relationship 
with the additive effect at the sample level. 
The influence on the additive and combination effects should also be the same if 
the additivity assumption holds: 
H10 When the difference between the two first-ranked biases grows, 
the additive and combination effects diminish equally. 
These hypotheses can be evaluated with the same kind of analysis as was previously 
used to evaluate sample-level findings at the individual level (see Table 54 on page 
439). Hypotheses H7 and H9 can be evaluated by using significance tests, while H8 
and H10 refer to a relationship between two effects, and will be evaluated by 
comparing the confidence intervals for regression coefficients.  
In Table 56 below, we can see how the individual traits influence the sum of the 
effects of the two first biases (measured one by one). Each column is marked with 
the hypothesis that is tested by it.  
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Table 56:  Correlations between Individual CB traits and Additive 
Sample Effects. NOS99 and NEPS95. 
   Absolute value of 
first-ranked cb 
Absolute value of 
second-ranked cb 
Difference in 
absolute values 
Pearson correlation  .01 
  
-.04  .05 Additive effect 
 Sig. (1-tailed)352 .14 .00 .00 
 Test Reject H7a Reject H7b Reject H9 
All surveys are combined into one data file containing 7 895 cases. Statistically significant correlations are in bold (p 
≤ 0.01). Additive effect = the effect of the first- ranked bias + the effect of the second-ranked bias. 
 
We can quickly reject the hypotheses H7a and H7b because the relations are either 
non-significant or significant and negative. Thus, we know that the absolute value 
of second bias at the individual level has a statistically significant influence on the 
sample level additive effect, while the first bias does not have such an effect. 
However, the absolute value of the second bias has a negative effect: More extreme 
values of the second bias correspond with lower observed additive effects at the 
sample level. We can see that the absolute value of the second bias has a weak 
negative correlation (-.04) with the additive effect of the two first biases. Thus, the 
more extreme opinions the respondent has on the second bias, the weaker the 
additive effect becomes. Overall, the additivity assumption did not receive any 
empirical support from the testing of the two versions of H7. 
The next hypothesis, namely H9, states that the relationship is negative. In the last 
column, we can see a statistically significant, but weak positive relationship (.05) 
between the difference of the absolute values and the additive effects. We must 
therefore reject H9. The larger the difference between the absolute values of the 
two first ranked biases, the larger the additive effect is. The effect is largest when 
the difference is maximized (one extreme bias and one close to the average).  
Let us now take a step forward and look at H8. In Table 57 below, we can see the 
confidence intervals that are required for testing these hypotheses. Each row is a 
summary of one bivariate regression analysis, where the first column shows the 
dependent variable and the second column shows the independent variable. The 
standardized coefficients are equal to the Pearson coefficients in Table 56. The 
confidence intervals are calculated for each non-standardized regression 
coefficient.353  
                                                     
352 SPSS calculates two-tailed significance tests for Pearson correlations, while H7 and H9 have a 
specific direction. Therefore, the calculated significances are divided by two in order to get the 
correct value for these hypothesis tests. 
353 The underlying cultural bias variables are measured on the same scale, and their means and 
variations are similar enough to make them comparable as unstandardized coefficients. 
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Table 57:  Overview of Bivariate Regressions for Individual CB 
traits and Additive Sample Effects. NOS99 and NEPS95. 
   Unstandardized 
coefficients  
Std. 
coefficients 
  Confidence interval  
for b 
  
Independent Dependent b 
Std. 
Error Beta t  Sig. 
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Over-
lap Test 
Absolute 
value of 
first-ranked 
cb 
Additive 
effect .085 .078 .01 1.08 .278 -0.07 0.24  
Absolute 
value of 
first-ranked 
cb 
Combination 
effect 
.530 .152 .04 3.47 .001 0.23 0.83 -0.01 
Reject 
H8a 
Absolute 
value of 
second-
ranked cb 
Additive 
effect -.340 .108 -.04 -3.14 .002 -0.55 -0.13 
 
Absolute 
value of 
second-
ranked cb 
Combination 
effect 
-.365 .210 -.02 -1.74 .082 -0.78 0.05 -0.65 
Reject 
H8b 
Difference 
in absolute 
value 
Additive 
effect .46 .10 .05 4.39 .000 0.25 0.66  
Difference 
in absolute 
value 
Combination 
effect 
1.24 .20 .07 6.11 .000 0.84 1.64 0.18 
Keep 
H10 
All surveys are combined into one data file with 7 895 cases. The constants are not shown. The variables are the same as in 
Table 56. The 95 percent confidence interval = b ± 1.96 SE.  
 
In order to test these two H8 hypotheses, we must look at Table 57 above. First, 
the standardized coefficient for the combination should be smaller than the effect it 
is compared with. Second, and more importantly, when we compare population 
estimates for the unstandardized regression coefficients, they should not overlap. 
Overlap tells us that we do not know which one increases more. Therefore, any 
overlap will allow us to reject the hypothesis. According to the data, we can reject 
both versions of H8. In each pair of regression coefficients, the influence on the 
effect of the combination was larger than it was on the additive effect, which is the 
opposite of what the additivity assumption would predict. 
The structure of H10 is different. It states that the effects diminish equally. Thus, 
no overlap means that the hypothesis must be rejected. We can see in Table 57 how 
the confidence intervals for the third comparison do overlap, and therefore we 
should keep H10 (When the difference between the two first-ranked biases grows, 
the additive and combination effects diminish equally). 
Thus, the regression analysis gives us mixed answers. Some of the hypotheses that 
match the additivity assumptions seem to be valid for the population, while others 
are rejected.  
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In Table 58 below, we can see an overview of test results concerning the additivity 
of effects assumption. The sample-level analysis did not show any empirical 
support for the additivity assumption in any of the seven samples, while the 
individual-level tests were mixed. Nevertheless, out of the six hypothesis tests at the 
individual level, the additivity assumption was weakened five times and 
strengthened only once, which severely weakens our belief in the additivity 
assumption.354  
Table 58: Results of Hypothesis tests on Additivity of Biases  
Level Type of phenomenon Test result 
Sample Addition of first and second gives same effect as a 
combination of first and second bias  
Reject H6 in 
every sample 
   
Individual First grows and additive effects grow Reject H7a 
 Second grows and additive effects grow Reject H7b 
 Increasing distance between first and second reduces 
additive effect 
Reject H9 
 When first grows, the combination does not grow more 
than additive effect 
Reject H8a 
 When second grows, the combination does not grow more 
than the additive effect 
Reject H8b 
 When the difference between two biases grows, the 
additive and combination effects diminish equally 
Keep H10 
 
Even if the results are not strong enough to conclude with confidence that H10 
must be rejected for the population, the direction in the sample is the opposite of 
what we would expect to find if the additivity assumption holds. Overall, rather 
than relying on the notion of a dominant bias, we should try to find some other 
way to understand cultural biases at the individual level. After all, the superior 
performance achieved by the combination of the two strongest biases suggests that 
other factors are at play in the formation of political preferences. 
To summarize, the findings at the sample level did not demonstrate support for the 
assumption that effects of the biases can simply be added together. The additivity 
hypothesis was rejected in every sample. At the individual level, five of the six 
hypotheses were rejected. All in all, this indicates that we are better off when 
treating the assumption of additivity as a fallacy in survey research. If the two first 
assumptions are fallacies, what about the third one—i.e., the independence of 
effects assumption? 
                                                     
354 I have tested these same hypotheses by using the support version of cultural biases and received 
very similar results. The only difference was that H8b was accepted while H10 was rejected.  
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The Independence of Effects Fallacy  
The independence of effects assumption states that it is possible to analyze the 
effects of cultural biases one by one. If the cultural biases influence each other’s 
effects, analyses using just one cultural bias can become unreliable. In the next 
section, the analysis will use two top-ranked biases simultaneously in a 
combination. An example of an analysis of the influence that cultural combinations 
have on party preferences has already been presented in Chapter 11 (see page 391). 
The big difference is that this time we are trying to find out if the independence of 
effects assumption receives empirical support.  
The independence assumption and the dominance assumption rule each other 
out.355 If the dominant bias assumption was correct, then the other biases would 
not have independent effects, as their effects would be more or less canceled out by 
the dominant bias. Since we have just learned that the dominant bias assumption is 
a fallacy, we might be tempted to conclude that the independence assumption is 
correct. However, just because they both cannot be correct simultaneously does not 
mean that one of them is necessarily true. Therefore, the independence assumption 
must also be properly tested. 
The independence of effects is not the same as the independence of variables. In 
statistics, the concept of independence of variables is well established: “Two 
random variables are independent if the conditional distribution is identical to the 
marginal distribution of each variable” (Hanushek and Jackson 1977:330). This type 
of independence can be violated if the correlation between cultural biases becomes 
too high (see Table 33 on page 350). However, this type of independence is about 
the distribution of values, not about their effects, which is my current concern.  
If the independence assumption is correct, there should be no interaction effects.356 
There are a few empirically verifiable predictions that follow from the 
independence assumption: 
H11 The effect of a bias is the same no matter what kind of values 
the other biases have. 
From this, I infer the following testable predictions: 
                                                     
355 There is a theoretical exception when the effect of the second bias is zero. In this case, we can 
accept the dominance, additivity, and independence assumptions at the same time, but as we have 
already seen during the test in Chapter 2, the effects of the second biases are not zero.  
356 A generalized log-linear model with a multinomial independent variable could in theory be used to 
study the interaction effects between the four cultural biases and party preference as the 
independent variable. Unfortunately, this leads to a contingency table with 892 cells, and since each 
of my samples typically contains close to 1000 respondents, it is impossible to get reliable results 
(Goodman 1984). To put it simply, we cannot make one analysis that contains all interaction 
effects. The problem must be divided into sub-problems. In addition, I believe that a larger 
number of readers can more easily follow an analysis that uses cross tables rather than one that 
uses estimates from the generalized log-linear analysis. 
•    False Assumptions for Survey Research 
 
450 
H11a The effect of a combination of two biases is the same 
regardless of the order of the biases. 
H11b The effect of a combination of two biases is the same 
regardless of the order of the biases for every combination pair 
in a sample. 
Another verifiable prediction that follows from the independence assumption 
relates to changes of values in the first bias:357 
H12 The second-ranked bias has the same effect regardless of the 
the first-ranked bias is support or rejection. 
All tests will be performed with data from both NOS99 and NEPS95. I will 
compare the effects in small groups of people, thus bringing the analysis as close to 
the individual level as possible. 
The Order of Biases in a Combination Does Matter 
I will first test H11a because this test provides us with the evidence needed to test 
H11b. In order to test H11a, we can compare pairs of combinations that have the 
same biases, but ones arranged in different orders.  
Table 59 below contains an example of one such pair, eH vs. He, from the general 
population sample in NEPS95. I am comparing the effect of the order for two 
biases: rejection of egalitarian bias combined with support for hierarchical bias. The 
cultural bias with the largest absolute value is ranked first. We can see that there are 
only 11 respondents with an eH combination and 16 with a He combination. The 
biggest difference is that the Christian Party is preferred by He respondents while 
the Conservative Party is preferred by the eH respondents—ones that also have 
difficulties in deciding who to vote for. Are these small differences enough to make 
any conclusions? 
The differences in voting between these two groups are now reduced to only one 
difference: the order of the biases. We can see that the explained variance is 13.9 
percent, which is substantial. More importantly perhaps, it is also statistically 
significant (p<.05). We can thus conclude that even if the sample is very small, the 
difference is large enough for us to believe that we will also find a difference in the 
population. Therefore, we must reject H11a, and conclude that the order of the 
biases matters in this particular combination. 
 
                                                     
357 A theoretically parallel hypothesis that could be used instead of H12 is “the effect of the dominant 
bias does not change because of the second bias.”  
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Table 59:  Party Preference by CB pair (eH and He) in the 
NEPS95 General Sample. (Count and Directional Measures) 
Top two-
ranked 
biases SV DNA Sp V Krf H Frp Other 
Dont 
know 
Will 
not 
vote Total  
eH 0 2 2   0 4 2   1 0 11 
He 1 3 3   4 0 1   3 1 16 
Total 1 5 5   4 4 3   4 1 27 
 U = .139      Asymp. std. errora = .037  Approx. Tb = 3.642  Approx. sig.c = .040 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis. 
b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
c. Likelihood ratio chi-square probability. 
 
In order to be able to reach a conclusion on a more general basis, I have performed 
the same test for each pair where both combinations contained more than 10 
respondents, and for each sample in the NEPS95 data. The results from these tests 
are presented in Table 60 below, where we can find the same eH-He pair, which we 
just saw in Table 59 above. In addition, we can find the results for all 16 pairs of 
combinations for both the members of environmental organizations and for the 
general public. 
We can see in Table 60 below that there are several combinations, like eF, where 
changing the order makes a big difference. However, fH is the only combination 
that is significant in both samples.  
In the fourth column, we can see the results for the hypothesis test for each pair of 
combinations. In the sample of the general public, we can reject H11a 3 times out 
of 16. In the sample of environmental organization members, we can reject it 5 
times out of 16. If we combine these results, we are then rejecting one out of four 
hypothesis tests, which indicates that there is something wrong with H11a, while 
for three out of four combinations, the order of biases does not make much 
difference. Nevertheless, an assumption that is in error for a quarter of the pairs 
will guide us poorly and should be replaced. 
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Table 60:  Percent of Party Preferences Explained by Change in 
Order of CB pair. NEPS95. 
 Sample CB Pair 
Percent  
explained 
variance  
Asymp. 
std.error 
Approx. 
sig. Test H11a Test H11b 
Env.org. eH-He 8.6 2.99 .306 Keep H11a 
  eh-he 8.4 2.79 .024 Reject H11a 
  eI-Ie 4.8 2.54 .405 Keep H11a 
  eF-Fe 13.9 3.18 .034 Reject H11a 
  ef-fe 5.6 3.20 .196 Keep H11a 
  EH-HE 5.7 2.26 .404 Keep H11a 
  Eh-hE 2.1 .68 .005 Reject H11a 
  Ei-iE .8 .56 .734 Keep H11a 
  EF-FE 4.6 1.99 .355 Keep H11a 
  Ef-fE 1.9 .88 .279 Keep H11a 
  Hi-iH 5.9 3.13 .592 Keep H11a 
  hi-ih 1.9 .73 .010 Reject H11a 
  fi-if 3.6 1.56 .106 Keep H11a 
  fH-Hf 12.0 2.65 .002 Reject H11a 
  fh-hf 1.8 .93 .475 Keep H11a 
  Fh-hF 2.2 1.33 .338 Keep H11a 
  N 16 16 16  
Reject H11b 
General eH-He 13.9 3.70 .040 Reject H11a 
  eh-he 2.5 1.67 .877 Keep H11a 
  eI-Ie 2.8 1.85 .570 Keep H11a 
  eF-Fe 7.0 3.29 .100 Keep H11a 
  ef-fe 7.2 3.55 .117 Keep H11a 
  Eh-hE 5.6 2.30 .565 Keep H11a 
  Ei-iE 5.1 2.12 .247 Keep H11a 
  EF-FE 9.5 3.09 .248 Keep H11a 
  Ef-fE 6.2 3.14 .379 Keep H11a 
  Hi-iH 8.5 4.36 .285 Keep H11a 
  hi-ih 1.4 1.74 .961 Keep H11a 
  fi-if 5.2 2.67 .541 Keep H11a 
  fH-Hf 11.3 3.54 .025 Reject H11a 
  fh-hf 6.3 2.96 .152 Keep H11a 
  FH-HF 8.0 2.96 .040 Reject H11a 
  Fh-hF 7.7 2.81 .346 Keep H11a 
  N 16 16 16  
Reject H11b 
 
A statistician might point out that with repeated testing, there are likely to be some 
false rejections by chance. Therefore, we should instead be testing H11b: The effect 
of a combination of two biases is the same regardless of the order of the biases for 
every combination pair in a sample. There are several ways to do this, and I have 
decided not employ the commonly used Bonferroni correction because it is not the 
most efficient correction, and because it wastes some of the power of tests 
(Bonferroni correction  2011; Sheskin 2011:906). In addition, the Bonferroni correction 
only gives us significance values that are adjusted for multiple comparisons. I will 
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instead use a sequential test for the parameter of a Bernoulli population358 (Kanji 
2006:Test 70), which has the advantage of allowing us to calculate how many 
significant results will go to support or weaken the original hypothesis, or be 
inconclusive toward it. To put it simply, the sequential test for a Bernoulli 
population is more apt in solving the problem at hand and making the results easier 
to understand. 
In this case, it is sufficient with 2 rejections out of 16 tests to reject the hypothesis, 
while only one rejection would be inconclusive.359 We can see in Table 60 above 
that in the sample of environmental organization members, 5 tests are significant at 
the 0.05 level. Thus, H11b can be rejected in relation to the environmental 
organization members. Similarly, there are three significant results in the general 
population sample, thus allowing us to reject H11a three times. In other words, 
there are three pairs of combinations where order makes a difference. Given this, 
we can also reject H11b for the general population in NEPS95.  
In order to strengthen our trust in the results, the same tests are also performed on 
the NOS99 survey. The results are presented in Table 94, which is placed in the 
appendix because of its size (page 555).  
For Norway, H11a is rejected only once (eI-Ie). There are several combinations 
where the change in the order of the biases explains roughly 10 percent, but due to 
the small n, these are not statistically significant. Since we have performed 11 tests 
and got 1 rejection, based on the test by Kanji, the results are inconclusive for H11b 
as applied to Norway.  
As for Denmark, there are four statistically significant results: For the combinations 
eh-he, eI-Ie, ei-ie, and FH-HF, changing the order does matter in the population, 
which allows us to reject H11a 4 times out of 13. This result allows us to reject H11b 
as applied to Denmark. 
Moving on to Sweden, there is only one statistically significant result (fh-hf), which 
leads to the same conclusion as made for Norway concerning H11b: The results are 
inconclusive; based on this evidence it is not possible to decide with confidence what 
the status of H11b is. 
Finally, we turn our attention to Finland and Iceland. In the former, there are three 
statistically significant results (EH-HE, Ei-iE, and If-fI). We can reject H11b in the 
case of Finland due to having 3 rejections out of 15 tests. As for the latter case, 
there are 2 statistically significant results (ef-fe, fh-hf). We can reject H11b in the case 
of Iceland due to having 2 rejections out of 12 tests. 
Every Nordic country contained pairs where the order of two first-ranked biases 
makes a difference for party preferences. In samples from Denmark, Finland, and 
                                                     
358 This test requires that the tests are independent of each other, which these tests are since each one 
is done on a sub-sample containing only one combination pair. Each case can belong to only one 
test. 
359 For additional details behind this calculation, see Table 90 on page 554 in the appendix. 
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Iceland the number of pairs is high enough to conclude that the order of first-
ranked biases makes a difference in the population. However, in both the 
Norwegian and Swedish samples, there were just one such pair, thus making it 
impossible to confidently reject or accept H11b. 
The results from testing the independence assumption by looking at the effect of 
changing the order of the two first-ranked biases can be summarized as follows: 
First, there are many combinations of cultural bias pairs where the order of biases 
does make a difference. In the sample of members from environmental 
organizations, which is the largest sample available, H11a is rejected 5 times out of 
16 compared to 3 times out of 16 in the general sample. Among the Nordic 
countries, H11a is rejected four times in Denmark, three times in Finland, twice in 
Iceland, once in Norway, and once in Sweden. Second, in five samples out of seven 
we can reject the hypothesis that there are no pairs of cultural biases where the 
order of the two first biases makes a difference (H11b). In two of the samples, the 
results were inconclusive because there was just one pair of cultural biases where 
the order did make a difference. Even in these two cases, however, one cannot 
conclude that the results give support for the independence assumption. So far, the 
independence of effects assumption has not received any empirical support. 
The Second-Ranked Bias has a Larger Effect when the First-Ranked 
Bias is a Rejection  
The second hypothesis we need to assess is the independence of effects 
assumption, or H12. This hypothesis states that “The second-ranked bias has the 
same effect regardless of the the first-ranked bias is support or rejection.” As a 
necessary preparation for testing H12, I will first present a sample-by-sample 
analysis of the effects that the two biases have on party preferences. To study the 
effects that the two top-ranked biases have on party preferences, it is useful to do it 
on a sample-by-sample basis because the relationship between parties and culture 
varies from one country to the next. If we organize all respondents by sample and 
their first-ranked biases, we get roughly 100 respondents in each group. Thus, we 
can study how the second bias influences party preference while we keep the first 
bias constant.  
In Table 61 below, we can see the party preferences from the general NEPS95 
sample for those 156 respondents whose first-ranked bias is rejection of 
egalitarianism. Close to the bottom, we can see that in total, the Conservative party 
receives 46 percent of the vote in this group and the Labor party receives 12 
percent. When we also take into consideration the effect of the second bias, the 
preference for the Conservative party varies from 23 percent (ei) to 92 percent (eF). 
The cultural combination with the highest preference for the Labor party, namely 
ei, also has the lowest level of support for the Conservative party—at 23 percent. 
Conversely, the cultural combination with the highest level of support for the 
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Conservative party, namely eF, has the lowest level of support for the Labor party 
(0 percent). We can see how the inclusion of the second bias changes party 
preferences quite radically.  
Table 61:  Party Preference in Norway for Rejection of 
Egalitarian Bias as First-Ranked Bias controlled for by the 
Second-Ranked Bias. NEPS95. (Percent) 
First 
Ranked  
Second 
Ranked360  
Soc.left 
Soc.dem. 
A
grar. 
Lib. 
Christ. 
Cons. 
Progr. 
G
reens 
O
ther 
Total 
e   3.2 14.3 27.0 1.6 4.8 30.2 7.9 1.6 9.5 100.0 
 f .7 10.4 23.9 3.7 4.5 48.5 3.0 .7 4.5 100.0 
 F 7.7     92.3    100.0 
 h 3.4 16.9 12.4 4.5 2.2 50.6 2.2 3.4 4.5 100.0 
 H  16.7 19.0 4.8 9.5 33.3 14.3  2.4 100.0 
 i  20.6 29.4 2.9 5.9 23.5  2.9 14.7 100.0 
 I 1.6 7.1 16.5 7.9 2.4 54.3 3.9 .8 5.5 100.0 
  Total 1.8 12.2 19.7 4.6 4.0 46.2 4.4 1.4 5.8 100.0 
U = 0.09   Approx. sig. = 0.305 
The table contains only those 156 respondents from the general sample who have e as their first-ranked bias. 
 
On the bottom of Table 61, we can see that the effect of the second bias explains 9 
percent of variation in party preferences among these respondents. However, 
because of the small sample size, the results are uncertain and not statistically 
significant. The number of respondents is very small given the number of cells in 
the table, and we are pushing the limits of what is possible to analyze. In other 
words, we cannot be certain that the observed effect of the second bias (9 percent) 
exists in the population. There is a fair chance that in the population, there is no or 
even a negative effect. We can see that there are large differences in party 
preferences between the different cultural combinations, but we must remember 
that the number of respondents in each cell is small, thus making the results 
vulnerable to the influence of random effects.  
I have repeated this analysis for every country and every first-ranked bias in 
NOS99, and used the emerging pattern to examine how the relationship between 
the first-ranked and the second-ranked bias is dependent on the qualities of the 
first-ranked bias. Not all first-ranked biases are equal in their effects. 
In order to complete this analysis for all combinations in the seven samples, we 
need 40 tables like the one listed as Table 61.361 The necessary pieces of 
                                                     
360 On the first line, we can see that the second-ranked bias is presented as a blank entry. This 
indicates that the second bias is close to the sample average. To simplify the presentation, all weak 
biases like this are aggregated together (see Does Indifference Make Any Difference? on page 386). 
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information from these tables are collected into Table 62 below. We can see how 
the effect of the second bias is dependent on the content of the first-ranked cultural 
bias. On the first line in Table 62, we can see the same non-significant, 9 percent 
effect derived from adding the second bias for all the respondents in Norway who 
have e as their first bias. On the second line, we can see that when the first-ranked 
bias is E, the second bias has a statistically significant, 13 percent effect on party 
preferences. Thus, E as the first bias differentiates less between the parties than e 
does as the first bias. In addition, this is the only first bias where the second bias 
does have a statistically significant effect. 
In Sweden, the second bias has a significant effect when the first bias is f, h, i, or I. 
Similarly, f and i in Denmark, f in Finland, and e in Iceland are the first biases where 
second bias has a significant effect. One way to interpret this is that there are 
differences between the countries concerning which biases are on their own 
insufficient to explain party preferences, or which first biases benefit the most from 
adding the second bias. Cultural bias combinations do not influence the party 
preferences in the same way in every Nordic country. This should not be a surprise, 
as the each country has its own political history.  
Attempting to interpret the results for all Nordic countries as a whole brings us to 
the group labeled Nordic in Table 62 below. Because of the increased number of 
respondents in every cell, many of the effects are statistically significant, even if 
they are much smaller. We can see that the effect of the second bias is significant 
when the first bias is e, E, f, h, or i. Conversely, when the first bias is H, F, or I the 
second bias does not have a significant effect on party preferences. Notice how the 
second bias does not add that much when the first bias is a supportive one. 
However, the second-ranked bias is useful in explaining party preferences if the 
first bias is a rejection.  
If we aggregate together all the first biases, we can see that the second bias has a 2.6 
percent effect (Nordic total). We can compare this with the effects of the second 
bias for a particular value of the first bias. The effects range from a low 3.4 percent 
(first bias H) to a high 9.5 percent (first bias F). Thus, the effect of the second bias 
is higher for any given first bias versus the effect when all four different biases are 
aggregated together. This can only be interpreted as the second bias having a 
different influence on party preferences depending on which bias is ranked first. 
One cannot just add the effects together without losing the meaning of the cultural 
biases. 
Similarly, if we compare the effect of the second biases at the Nordic level, which is 
2.6 percent, to the effect these biases have in each country, we find that the effect 
in each country is larger than the effect at the Nordic level. Thus, Norway has 5.1 
percent, Sweden has 7.5 percent, Denmark has 5.7 percent, Finland has 4.8 percent, 
                                                                                                                                   
361 The row percentages from these 40 tables are collected in Table 93 in the appendix starting on 
page 558. This table gives a quite detailed view of how cultural combinations are related to party 
preferences country by country. The information is the same as that presented in Table 84 on page 
542, although it is organized somewhat differently and presented country-by-country. 
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and Iceland has 5.3 percent. This makes sense if the effects that the cultural biases 
have on party preferences are country dependent. We lose about half of the effect 
of the second biases when we analyze the data at the Nordic level. The lost effect 
tells us that there are country specific components at work, like historically 
determined differences between parties. Therefore, it is useful to analyze the data 
country by country. 
Finally, we are ready to test H12362. We will do so by comparing those tests where 
the first-ranked bias was rejection of a cultural bias with those tests where the first-
ranked bias was support for a cultural bias.  
In Table 62 below, we can see that among all the analyses done on the Nordic 
countries, only once were we able to obtain a significant effect from a second bias 
when the first bias is support (E in the sample from Norway). If we select those 
tests where the first bias is a rejection, the second bias had a statistically significant 
effect three times in sample from Sweden, and once in the samples from Denmark, 
Finland, and Iceland. The low statistical significances are closely connected with the 
high number of categories relative to the number of respondents. These analyses 
will now be repeated on the NEPS95 data in order to strengthen our trust in the 
results.  
Table 63 below is similar to Table 64, although in the former we are looking at the 
environmental organization members and general samples. We can see that in the 
general sample, the effect of the second bias is significant only when the first bias is 
f, while in the environmental sample, the effect of the second bias is significant 
when the first bias is E, f, h, or i.363 If we combine these samples, the effect of the 
second bias is significant when the first bias is e, E, f, F, h, or I. 
When aggregating together all the first biases, the effect of all second biases is 4.9 
percent in the environmental organization sample and 5.3 percent in the general 
sample. Given a particular first-ranked cultural bias, every single one of the effects 
of the second biases is higher than these values: These effects range from 7.9 
percent to 18.7 percent among environmentalists, and from 11.5 to 18.6 in the 
general sample. This difference can be interpreted as confirming that the cultural 
biases carry meaning in a way that does not allow for simple addition. You lose 
close to half of the effects from the second biases if you do not know which bias is 
the first-ranked cultural bias. Similarly, this confirms that the second biases do have 
an effect, contrary to what the dominant bias assumption claims. 
 
                                                     
362 H12: The second-ranked bias has the same effect regardless of the the first-ranked bias is support 
or rejection.. 
363 The environmental organization sample is twice as large as the general sample, which makes it 
more likely to find statistically significant effects. However, support for H, I, and F as first bias is 
not that common among environmentalists. Therefore, the lack of significant effects for H, I, and 
F cannot be given increased importance. See in Table 93 in the appendix starting on page 565. 
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Table 62:  The Effect of Second-Ranked Bias on Party 
Preferences when controlled for by First-Ranked Bias and 
Country  
Country First ranked CB  Second ranked CB Asymp. std. errorb Approx. Tc Approx. sig.d 
 Norway e 10.9 3.03 3.47 .305 
  E 13.2 2.79 4.48 .041 
  f 18.4 3.27 4.95 .201 
  F 6.8 1.99 3.14 .800 
  h 13.1 2.63 4.40 .340 
  H 9.6 2.84 3.12 .592 
  i 8.4 2.08 3.94 .142 
  I 8.6 3.04 2.64 .698 
  Total 5.1 0.78 6.50 .000 
 Sweden e 16.2 3.46 4.04 .153 
  E 23.5 3.47 5.65 .128 
  f 20.5 3.54 5.94 .000 
  F 16.8 3.29 4.68 .066 
  h 22.2 3.21 6.47 .002 
  H 12.5 3.92 3.01 .296 
  i 18.9 2.97 5.53 .006 
  I 22.4 4.82 4.19 .049 
  Total 7.5 1.01 7.38 .000 
Denmark  e 9.3 2.39 3.51 .591 
  E 11.2 2.86 3.54 .760 
  f 19.7 3.17 5.49 .074 
  F 12.3 2.89 3.84 .596 
  h 8.6 2.19 3.71 .654 
  H 10.0 2.44 3.73 .362 
  i 17.7 2.65 6.08 .000 
  I 14.7 3.55 3.26 .252 
  Total 5.7 0.79 7.10 .000 
Finland e 11.3 2.73 3.85 .133 
  E 20.6 3.16 5.96 .248 
  f 20.5 2.87 6.82 .032 
  F 15.6 3.07 4.62 .103 
  h 16.0 3.02 5.14 .130 
  H 10.2 2.15 4.44 .311 
  i 13.8 2.70 4.92 .172 
  I 12.0 3.82 2.86 .499 
  Total 4.8 0.81 5.84 .000 
Iceland e 45.8 7.14 3.72 .030 
  E 12.8 4.61 2.60 .704 
  f 19.1 5.38 3.02 .097 
  F 15.1 4.03 3.40 .130 
  h 9.3 4.40 1.97 .587 
  H 12.3 4.47 2.40 .581 
  i 10.3 3.34 2.94 .529 
  I 5.6 5.98 .92 .759 
  Total 5.3 1.20 4.33 .014 
Nordic e 5.1 0.97 5.23 .001 
  E 6.8 1.22 5.41 .005 
  f 9.5 1.27 7.43 .000 
  F 3.5 0.83 4.16 .126 
  h 4.8 0.96 4.97 .006 
  H 3.4 0.83 4.00 .184 
  i 4.7 0.87 5.30 .001 
  I 5.2 1.22 4.17 .142 
  Total 2.6 0.28 9.38 .000 
b. Not assuming the null hypothesis. c. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis.  
d. Likelihood ratio chi-square probability.     Statistically significant effects (=U*100) are in bold (p≤ 0.05) 
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Table 63:  Effect of the Second-Ranked Cultural Biases when 
controlled for by First-Ranked Bias and Sample. NEPS95.  
Sample First-ranked 
CB  
Second-ranked 
CB Asymp. std. errora Approx. tb 
Approx. 
significancec 
Env.Org. e 15.8 2.78 5.20 .089 
  E 8.6 1.27 6.43 .000 
  f 9.1 1.24 7.11 .000 
  F 12.9 2.02 6.21 .118 
  h 6.0 0.84 7.07 .000 
  H 14.3 2.51 5.31 .410 
  i 7.9 1.35 5.68 .020 
  I 18.7 3.32 5.17 .500 
  Total 4.9 0.42 11.64 .000 
General e 14.3 2.28 5.65 .136 
  E 16.8 2.62 5.73 .183 
  f 18.4 2.50 6.26 .001 
  F 11.5 1.95 5.41 .207 
  h 13.9 2.19 5.82 .182 
  H 12.1 2.18 5.09 .078 
  i 16.2 2.65 5.64 .096 
  I 18.6 3.05 5.04 .505 
  Total 5.3 0.63 8.19 .000 
Total e 10.2 1.56 6.18 .001 
  E 8.1 1.06 7.39 .000 
  f 8.5 1.05 7.80 .000 
  F 7.9 1.20 6.33 .006 
  h 6.0 0.75 7.95 .000 
  H 7.5 1.29 5.51 .074 
  i 7.6 1.09 6.79 .000 
  I 12.1 1.83 5.87 .176 
  Total 5.1 0.34 14.83 .000 
a. Not assuming the null hypothesis.  b. Using the asymptotic standard error assuming the null hypothesis. 
c. Likelihood ratio chi-square probability.  Statistically significant effects (=U*100) are in bold (p≤ 0.05) 
 
In order to test H12, I combine the results from Table 62 and Table 63. There are 
seven independent samples. In each sample, we can have four supportive first 
biases and four rejections. In total, this gives us the possibility to compare the 
effects of rejection and support in 28 cases. These are collected in Table 64 below, 
where we can see in the first column whether the bias is hierarchical, egalitarian, 
individualistic, or fatalistic, and whether the first bias is supported or rejected. In 
the sixth column, we can see the difference between support and rejection for each 
bias from Table 62 and Table 63. A negative difference tells us that the second bias 
has a larger effect when the first bias is rejection. In the first row, we can see that in 
Norway the effect of the second bias is 3.5 percentage points larger when the first 
bias is rejection. However, in order to draw any conclusion about whether the 
direction also applies to the population, we need to compare confidence intervals. 
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The next four columns show the lower and upper limits for the confidence 
intervals for the effect of second bias in the population, counted from the findings 
for the sample data in Table 62 and Table 63. If the smallest possible overlap 
between the confidence intervals is positive, we must accept H12. If the overlap is 
negative, we can reject H12. The results of this comparison are presented in the last 
column. 
Within the sample, there are 15 instances where the second bias has a larger effect 
when the first bias is rejection, but in only two of these instances do we find 
differences that large enough for allowing us to conclude that the differences also 
apply to the population. Similarly, there are 13 instances where the second bias has 
a smaller effect when the first bias is rejection in the sample. However, in only two 
of these instances do we find differences that are large enough for allowing us to 
conclude that the differences also apply to the population.  
As before, we must calculate how many rejections we need before we can trust that 
they are not created by random processes, like sampling for example. Using the 
same sequential test for the parameter of a Bernoulli population (Kanji 2006:Test 
70) to calculate how many significant results we must tolerate before we can reject 
the null hypothesis, we find out that 2 rejections out of 24 tests is sufficient.364 
Overall, Table 64 below shows four cases where the magnitude of the effect of the 
second bias is dependent on the value of the first bias. We would expect one of 
these to exist by chance even if the independence of effects assumption is correct. 
Nevertheless, 4 rejections out of 24 tests allow us to reject H12 and conclude that 
some of these are not likely to be simple random phenomena. It does make a 
difference whether the first bias is rejection or support.  
Overall, the independence of effects assumption has not received empirical 
support. We have tested H11 (The effect of a bias is the same no matter what kind 
of values the other biases have) and H12 (The second-ranked bias has the same 
effect regardless of the the first-ranked bias is support or rejection.). Both of these 
hypotheses are severely weakened because the empirical findings do not fit with the 
predictions. The order of biases matters, and it makes a difference whether the 
first-ranked bias is rejection or support for a particular cultural bias. Given these 
findings, we are better off by also treating the independence of effects assumption 
as a fallacy.  
 
                                                     
364 See Table 90 on page 554 in the appendix for details behind this calculation. 
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Table 64:  Comparing Confidence Intervals for the Effect of the 
Second Biases when the First Bias is Support or Rejection. 
Confidence 
interval for second 
bias when first is 
support  
Confidence interval for 
second bias when first is 
rejection 
Sample First 
bias 
support 
or 
rejection 
of   
Lower 
limit 
Upper 
limit 
Lower 
limit 
Upper  
limit 
Difference 
between 
effects of 
two 
second 
biases  
The 
smallest 
overlap 
Test of 
H12 
Norway H 4 15 8 18 -3.5 7.3 Keep 
 E 8 19 5 17 2.3 9.1 Keep 
 F 3 11 12 25 -11.5 -1.2 Reject 
 I 3 15 4 13 0.2 9.8 Keep 
Denmark H 5 15 4 13 1.4 7.7 Keep 
 E 6 17 5 14 1.8 8.4 Keep 
 I 8 22 12 23 -3.0 9.1 Keep 
 F 7 18 13 26 -7.3 4.5 Keep 
Sweden H 5 20 16 28 -9.7 4.3 Keep 
 E 17 30 9 23 7.4 6.2 Keep 
 I 13 32 13 25 3.5 11.7 Keep 
 F 10 23 14 27 -3.7 9.7 Keep 
Finland H 6 14 10 22 -5.7 4.4 Keep 
 E 14 27 6 17 9.4 2.2 Keep 
 I 4 19 9 19 -1.9 10.9 Keep 
 F 10 22 15 26 -4.9 6.8 Keep 
Iceland H 4 21 1 18 3.0 14.4 Keep 
 E 4 22 32 60 -33.0 -10.0 Reject 
 I -6 17 4 17 -4.8 13.5 Keep 
 F 7 23 9 30 -4.0 14.5 Keep 
Env.Org. H 9 19 4 8 8.3 -1.7 Reject 
 E 6 11 10 21 -7.3 0.7 Keep 
 I 12 25 5 11 10.8 -1.7 Reject 
 F 9 17 7 12 3.7 2.7 Keep 
General H 8 16 10 18 -1.8 6.8 Keep 
 E 12 22 10 19 2.5 7.1 Keep 
 I 13 25 11 21 2.5 8.7 Keep 
 F 8 15 13 23 -6.9 1.9 Keep 
The confidence intervals are calculated as second-ranked CB effect ± 1.96 standard errors from Table 62 and 
Table 63. The difference between two second biases = effect of second bias 1st support – effect of second bias 1st 
rejection. The smallest overlap is calculated by comparing the appropriate upper and lower limits, depending on which 
is larger – the effect of the second bias 1st support or the effect of the second bias 1st rejection. Cases where there is no 
overlap are marked with bold. 
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New Possibilities for Aggregating to the Level of Cultural 
Biases 
The dominance and additivity assumptions have been tested at the level of samples 
and individuals by aggregating together cultural biases with the same rank. Here, I 
will have a look at a new level of aggregation, where the effects that cultural biases 
have on party preferences are aggregated to the level of particular values of single 
cultural biases and to the level of cultural combinations.365 In addition, the effect on 
the preference for each party is recorded separately, while in the previous analyses 
the various preferences (parties) were aggregated together. 
This is a novel level of aggregation, and more research is required before we can be 
sure which findings are related to the mathematical properties of aggregation, and 
which ones reveal to us how cultural biases function at the individual level. 
Aggregation does remove individual-level variation and leaves us only with the 
main effects, which in many ways is what a good analysis is supposed to do. 
However, analyses at the wrong level of aggregation can yield results that have 
more to do with the process of aggregation itself than with the underlying patterns 
in the data. In addition, the removal of individual-level variation almost always leads 
to strong correlations. 
In this section, I will first show how I constructed the measurement of effects at 
this level of aggregation. Then, I will show a few tables containing correlations that 
indicate the possibility of additive effects when controlling for the cultural 
combinations. In other words, I suspect that the numerical properties of cultural 
biases exist within combinations, but not across combinations. 
Instead of the sample-level effects, as we saw in Table 53, we can see in Table 65 
and Table 66 an example of the effects on the level of the first ranked cultural bias. 
Each cell shows the effect that a particular cultural bias has on a particular party 
preference, as measured by standard deviations.366 These tables allow us to compare 
the effects while controlling for both cultural biases and for party preferences. 
These controls are necessary because the biases have different effects on each party.  
These aggregated effects are inserted back into the individual-level data file so that 
all those respondents who prefer the socialist left and have e as their first-ranked 
bias will get the value of -6.3 as the effect of that bias (see Table 65, second 
column). Using these standardized values removes some of the problems 
connected with the varying number of respondents in each cell (which corresponds 
                                                     
365 The particular values of the single biases used are CultRankTriA1 and CultRankTriSupp1. The 
cultural combinations used here are CultRankTriA2 and CultRankTriSupp2. 
366 These effects are measured as adjusted standard deviations, which take into account the number of 
respondents in each cell. A deviation is significant at the p ≤ 0.05 level when it is larger than 1.96 
standard deviations. 
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with the unit of aggregation in cross-level analysis), and with the relative size of 
parties. If I had used percentages instead of adjusted standardized residuals, the 
percentages would have been difficult to interpret because a two-point increase in 
the support for a small party is large, while the same increase for a large party is 
small.367 In many ways, in the individual-level data file the effects of cultural biases 
are now aggregated to the level of cells in the above tables. 
Table 65: The Effect of the Absolute Value of the First-Ranked CB 
on Party Family Preference. NOS99. (Adj.S.Res.) 
First-ranked Abs CB (tri)   
a e E f F h H i I 
Socialist left -1.8 -6.3 3.4 -.9 -2.2 3.3 -2.8 8.0 -1.9 
Social democrat 1.4 -7.6 2.9 -.8 3.8 .1 .9 2.4 -1.6 
Agrarian .8 1.1 -.4 .3 .7 -3.5 1.6 -2.1 2.4 
Liberal -.4 -.9 -1.6 .4 -1.4 5.1 -2.5 1.7 -1.1 
Christian .7 -1.8 -.7 1.7 -.4 -2.4 3.2 1.0 -1.0 
Conservative -.3 14.6 -5.3 1.4 -3.9 -1.6 -.1 -8.0 1.9 
Progress -1.6 -.5 -.3 -2.9 4.0 -1.0 1.2 -2.9 3.8 
Greens .9 -2.8 2.5 2.0 -1.6 1.2 -3.1 3.9 -2.5 
Other -.6 -.3 .8 -1.3 .6 1.6 .0 .1 -1.3 
Absolute value of first-ranked cultural bias = CultRankTriA1 with value a instead of blanks. 
 
Table 66: The Effect of Absolute Value of the Second-Ranked 
CB on Party Family Preference. NOS99. (Adj.S.Res.) 
Second-ranked Abs CB (tri)   
a e E f F h H i I 
Socialist left -2.3 -2.0 3.4 .4 -.9 3.4 -2.0 4.4 -3.9 
Social democrat 1.1 -1.6 5.0 -1.9 -.5 -.4 1.7 .7 -3.9 
Agrarian .6 1.5 -1.9 .0 1.4 -2.4 2.5 -1.0 -.5 
Liberal -1.0 .1 -.6 2.0 -.9 2.0 -2.3 .9 -.4 
Christian 1.3 -.6 -1.7 -.9 .7 -1.1 .5 1.5 .5 
Conservative -1.0 4.2 -6.5 3.3 -1.0 -.1 -2.1 -4.0 6.4 
Progress 1.4 -1.4 .0 -1.5 1.1 -2.6 3.0 -2.4 2.1 
Greens -.1 -2.4 2.4 -.8 -.5 3.4 -2.9 1.8 -.8 
Other .0 -.7 1.4 -1.6 1.0 -.4 -.1 .3 .3 
Absolute value of the second-ranked cultural bias = The second letter from CultRankTriA2 
with value a instead of blanks. 
 
                                                     
367 This is similar to the standardization recommended by Søren Lisberg-Thompson. I suspect that the 
cells in the above tables can be understood as the smallest possible functionally isomorphic units, 
which possibly makes them very suitable for making cross-level inferences. 
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Similar procedures are conducted for the effects that the two first-ranked cultural 
biases have on party preferences. Since these procedures divide the respondents 
into 513 cells, this analysis can only be performed at the Nordic level. Equally 
important, we can see that each cell corresponds with a unit of aggregation. In 
other words, the level of aggregation is not the same as the absolute values of first 
and second biases that operate with 81 units (cells). Analyses that combine different 
levels of aggregation are prone to several kinds of problems (Achen and Shively 
1995). Therefore, all of the following tables and analyses only suggest a possible 
approach; the merits and weaknesses of each approach are yet to be evaluated.  
In addition to the absolute value versions mentioned above, similar procedures are 
conducted for the support versions of all these variables.368 Now we have the data 
to explore the additivity and dominance assumptions at the level of cultural 
combinations. I will not check the independence assumption, nor will I trust these 
analyses enough to perform formal hypothesis testing. I will show two tables, one 
using support and the other using absolute values, that reveal interesting patterns 
when the correlations are organized by the first bias.  
Effects of Support Aggregated to the Level of Cultural Combinations 
In Table 67 below, we can see how the aggregated effect of the top two biases 
based on support correlates with several other traits. These correlations are 
reported separately for each first bias (E, F, H and I). On the first line, we have 
those 460 respondents with support for the egalitarian bias as their strongest 
cultural bias. We can see that for them, the effect of first bias is strong, while the 
second bias has no effect. This pattern supports the dominant bias assumption. The 
same pattern is present among those respondents whose strongest support goes to 
the individualistic bias. By contrast, for respondents whose strongest support goes 
to fatalistic or hierarchical biases, the effect of the second bias is stronger than the 
effect of the first bias. In other words, support for egalitarianism and individualism 
can act as the dominant biases at this level, while support for fatalism and hierarchy 
cannot. On the last row, we can see the correlations for all respondents. We can see 
that the second bias has a significant effect, which weakens the dominant bias 
assumption.369  
                                                     
368 All these tables containing the particular effects can be downloaded from 
http://eero.no/publ/False_assumptions_tables_Effect_of_Biases_on_voting.html 
369 The correlation between the first biases’ and the combinations’ effect is more than twice as strong 
than correlation between the second biases’ and the combionations’ effect. However, this is not a 
good picture of their relative contribution. By squaring these correlations, we can find out the 
proportion of variance of the combinations’ effect that can be explained by the effect from the 
first or second bias (comparable to a bivariate regression). This new measurement is then 
comparable to R2 and to U. The first biases’ effect explains 55 percent of the combinations’ effect 
(0.742 = 0.55), while second bias explains 9 percent (0.302=0.09). Thus, the effect of the first bias 
on this level is so much larger than the effect of the second bias that for some applications of 
cultural theory, the effect of the second bias can be ignored. 
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In the third column, we can see the correlation from the additive effect, which tells 
us whether the effects of first and second biases can be added together or if the 
combination of these biases has a different effect. We can see that for all groups of 
respondents, the additive effects are strong and significant, which suggests that the 
additivity assumption cannot be rejected.  
How big is the additive effect when compared with the non-additive effect of the 
biases? By squaring the Pearson correlations, we can make a rough estimate the 
additive proportion of the effect that the combination has on party preference.370 
Respondents with fatalism as their first bias have the smallest additive effect. In this 
case, however, the additive effect is 56 percent of the total effect of the 
combination.371 Roughly speaking, the same applies when hierarchy is the first bias. 
For respondents with individualism or egalitarianism as their first bias, the additive 
effect is close to 80 percent of the total effect of the combination.372 The 
unexplained portion that remains is the interaction effect between the biases, which 
ranges from 20 to 46 percent.  
The fourth and fifth columns show us the correlation between the aggregated effect 
of top two biases and the individual level of support for the first and the second 
bias. The only significant relationship between the effect of two first biases and the 
level of first bias appears when the egalitarian bias is ranked first. In other words, 
among those who most strongly support egalitarianism, the level of support 
influences party preferences. For all other first-ranked biases, the level of support 
does not make any difference beyond our knowledge of which bias the person 
supports.  
All in all, using support for cultural biases allows for an individualistic or egalitarian 
dominant bias, while dominance does not seem to be present if the hierarchical or 
fatalistic biases are ranked first. There also seems to be additivity within each 
cultural bias combination when we use the strongest support version of the cultural 
biases. How do these assumptions play out if we use an absolute value version of 
the cultural biases? 
                                                     
370 This could have been presented as a regression where the effect of top-two S biases = the effect of 
first CB S + the effect of second CB s, with explained variance = R2 = r2 = (Pearson correlation)2  
371 0.752 = 0.56. 
372 0.902 = 0.81 and 0.892 = 0.79.  
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Table 67: Correlations Between the Effect of the Support for Top 
Two Biases (Aggregated) and other Characteristics when 
controlled for by Support for First Bias (Aggr). NOS99. 
Support 
for first 
bias  
Effect of top-two  
biases S (aggregated) 
E
ffect of first bias 
Supp (aggregated) 
E
ffect of second  bias 
S (aggregated) 
A
dditive effect of first 
and second biases S 
(aggregated) 
Strength of the 
strongest bias 
  (individual. level) 
Strength of the second 
strongest bias  
(individual level) N 
E Pearson correlation .83 -.01 .89 .14 -.03 460 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .00 .79 .00 .00 .57  
F Pearson correlation .53 .77 .75 .03 .06 444 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .00 .00 .00 .56 .19  
H Pearson correlation .50 .73 .76 -.04 .01 510 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .00 .00 .00 .38 .84  
I Pearson correlation .83 -.02 .90 .05 -.01 467 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .00 .62 .00 .28 .91  
Total Pearson correlation .74 .30 .85 .02 -.01 1881 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .00 .00 .00 .49 .67  
All variables in this table use the support version of CB, and are marked with S or supp. 
Correlations significant at p ≤0.05 level are in bold.  
The additive effect S = effect of first bias S + effect of second bias S. 
 
Effects of Absolute Values Aggregated to the Level of Cultural 
Combinations 
Table 68 below contains corresponding variables and correlations, but is based on 
the absolute values of the cultural biases. The correlations are organized according 
to which bias is the first bias. Since rejections are also listed, more respondents are 
now included in the analysis.  
The patterns visible in Table 68 are different from those in Table 67. When using 
absolute values, the effect of the first bias and the effect of the second bias 
correlate significantly with the effect of the combination of the top two biases 
across all values of the first bias. No value of the first bias can claim to be a 
dominant bias.  
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On the bottom row, we can see that when we look at all respondents, the effect of 
second bias has a significant correlation with the effect of two top biases. When 
compared to the effect of the first bias, the effect of the second bias is large enough 
to be acknowledged. If the first bias is support for egalitarianism or individualism, 
then the effect of the second bias is weaker. In other words, support for 
egalitarianism or support for individualism also reduces the effect that the other 
biases have on the respondents’ party choices.  
In some cases, the absolute value version of the second bias has a larger effect than 
the first bias. If the first bias is rejection of fatalism, the effect from the second bias 
is almost twice as large as the effect of the first bias. This makes sense: Rejection of 
fatalism increases the likelihood of voting, but rejection alone does not provide and 
answer to the question about which party to vote for; instead, the second bias 
provides some guidance for selecting a party to support. Similarly, rejection of 
hierarchy on its own is not enough to determine a party preference. 
In the third column in Table 68, we can see how the additive effects of the two first 
biases strongly correlate with the effect of the combination of the top two biases, 
indicating that the additive component of the effect of the combination is 
substantial. Respondents who support individualism have the lowest additive effect 
(0.66). For them the additive component is 44 percent of the total effect of the 
combination (0.662=0.44), which gives a remaining non-additive interaction effect 
of 66 percent. Notice how the three lowest correlations with additive effects occur 
when the first bias is E, H, or I. The three highest additive effects are present when 
the first bias is e, h, or i. For these the additive component ranges from 76 to 90 
percent of the total effect of the combination.373 What remains is the non-additive 
interaction effect between the cultural biases, which ranges from 10 to 66 percent at 
this level of aggregation, depending on which bias is ranked first. The additive 
effects are thus large enough to be useful, while the effects of interaction between 
the biases are large enough to require their inclusion into the analyses. 
                                                     
373 0.922 = 0.90 and 0.872 = 0.76. 100 – 90 = 10 and 100 – 44 = 66. 
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Table 68: Correlations Between the Effect of Absolute value of 
Top Two Biases (aggregated) and other Characteristics when 
controlled for by First Bias A. NOS99. 
First bias A  
Effect of top two  
biases A (aggregated) 
E
ffect of first bias A
 
(aggregated)  
E
ffect of second  bias 
A
 (aggregated) 
A
dditive effect of first 
and second biases A
 
(comb level) 
A
bsolute value of 
first-ranked cb (ind. 
level) 
A
bsolute value of 
second-ranked cb  
(ind. level) N 
e Pearson correlation .88 .74 .95 .28 .21 502 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .00 .00 .00 .00 .00  
E Pearson correlation .69 .17 .73 .13 .02 293 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .00 .00 .00 .02 .69  
f Pearson correlation .41 .77 .82 .08 .14 355 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .00 .00 .00 .12 .01  
F Pearson correlation .73 .60 .86 .09 .15 380 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .00 .00 .00 .08 .00  
h Pearson correlation .67 .61 .89 .13 .12 394 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .00 .00 .00 .01 .02  
H Pearson correlation .44 .57 .71 .07 .06 378 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .00 .00 .00 .16 .27  
i Pearson correlation .79 .53 .87 .24 .23 468 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .00 .00 .00 .00 .00  
I Pearson correlation .66 .33 .66 .06 .00 257 
  Sig. (2-tailed) 
.00 .00 .00 .30 .99 
 
Total Pearson correlation .81 .55 .90 .24 .16 3039 
 Sig. (2-tailed) .00 .00 .00 .00 .00  
All variables in this table use the absolute values of cultural bias, and are marked with an A. 
Correlations significant at p ≤0.05 level are in bold.  
The additive effect A = effect of first A bias + effect of second A bias.  
Twelve cases with a as first bias are hidden. 
 
All in all, using the absolute value version of cultural bias combinations at this level 
of aggregation produces an effect from the second bias that is so large that ignoring 
it by relying on the dominant bias assumption does not seem wise. This is in 
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contrast to the results achieved when using the support version of cultural bias 
combinations, where the second bias has a much weaker effect. 
All in all, when using the absolute value version of cultural bias combinations at this 
level of aggregation, we should not rely only on the additive effects, as the 
interaction effects between the biases are substantial enough to warrant their 
inclusion into the analysis. The same applies for the support version of the cultural 
biases.  
Thus, the analyses at this level of aggregation confirm the previous analyses which 
show that the dominant bias assumption is a fallacy. However, the additivity 
assumption is not weakened at the level of combinations; even if it looks like it is 
weakened, the non-additive effects are large enough to warrant their inclusion into 
the analyses. These two explorative analyses close the empirical part of this chapter. 
Now it is time to summarize and see what we have learned in this chapter about the 
dominant bias, additivity, and independence assumptions. 
Summary 
In this chapter, we have seen that the dominant bias assumption, the additivity of 
effects assumption, and the independence of effects assumption are all fallacies. As 
long as we are working at the sample level, these common assumptions are fallacies, 
and we need to make some changes to our analytical strategies. In the beginning of 
this chapter, I listed eight consequences or implications that these false assumptions 
have at the sample level. I will not repeat these here, but merely note that changes 
in research practices seem to be required.  
Some researchers have previously insisted upon the categorical nature of cultural 
biases, and treated them as one variable with four values. This practice allows us to 
classify people as hierarchical, egalitarian, individualistic, or fatalistic. While others 
have insisted upon the continuous nature of cultural biases, as four dimensions that 
behave as scale-level variables that can be analyzed one by one according to their 
additive effects, I believe that both of these positions are sometimes wrong and 
sometimes right.  
As the dominant bias assumption seems to be a fallacy at many different levels of 
analysis, the practice of classifying people as hierarchical, egalitarian, fatalistic, or 
individualist should be abandoned for most purposes. I believe a single cultural bias 
is best understood as an ordinal-level variable. However, to describe individuals, we 
should use combinations of cultural biases, which are best understood as nominal-
level categories. Thus, it looks like some researchers were right concerning the 
categorical nature of cultural biases at individual level, even if they operated with 
too few categories because they failed to account for cultural combinations. 
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Since the additivity assumption looks like a fallacy, it is safe to say that cultural 
biases do not behave like proper scale-level variables at the individual level. This 
statement of course has many consequences for the analytical techniques that can 
be used. Nevertheless, based on my exploratory attempt to aggregate the effects at 
the level of cultural combinations, it seems that within a cultural bias combination, 
the effects are additive at the individual level. Perhaps the numerical properties are 
there, but only within cultural combinations. The numerical properties are thus 
quite particular rather than general properties that are valid for all respondents in a 
survey, as survey researchers normally expect scale-level variables to be. However, 
the possibility of additivity at the level of combinations is based on a new type of 
analysis and should be viewed with some caution. 
The independence assumption did not receive any support in any of the seven 
samples. When choosing a party to support, people rely on several biases rather 
than just one bias. One way to understand the independence fallacy is that the 
numerous possible effects that are born out of the interaction between cultural 
biases mask the effects of single biases to the point where we cannot trust analyses 
of only one bias at time. Analyzing only the effect of one bias will thus give a poor 
image of the true effect of a bias. By using cultural combinations rather than four 
continuous cultural bias variables, the interaction effects between the cultural biases 
become visible for each particular combination.  
The combination of lacking additivity and lacking independence suggests that we 
should avoid using multivariate regressions and other related techniques that 
depend on these assumptions. The critical reader might now wonder if I follow my 
own suggestions. After all, in Chapter 10 I used a multivariate regression analysis to 
show which assumptions seem to work best. However, this analysis steers clear of 
these three fallacies because the data analyzed does not pertain to individual-level 
behavior. The cases are cross tables, each representing a combination of cultural 
biases, and the data describes the strength of the relationship in these tables. The 
regression analysis is thus not undertaken at the individual level, but instead looks 
more like a meta-analysis of individual-level analyses. 
I have one reservation concerning the generalizability of the analyses in large parts 
of the present chapter. I have been working with representative samples from 
different countries and members of environmental organizations. Each measure of 
association (U) is calculated across all parties and all values of first or second biases, 
or the top two cultural biases. It is thus a very gross simplification. It is possible 
that a different picture would emerge if we were to move closer to the individual 
level and look at only one party at the time, or one cultural combination at time. 
Perhaps biases are additive in certain situations or under certain conditions. 
In order to address this issue, I presented an exploratory analysis which suggested 
that there are new possibilities for analysis at the level of cultural combinations, 
where the effects of cultural biases were aggregated to the level of cultural 
combinations. One must remember that combinations constitute fictive groups that 
consist of people with similar cultural biases. So even if this looks like a promising 
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avenue for further research, we must remember that these are not institutions, only 
categories. Respondents with the same bias do not know each other, nor do they 
influence each other. To truly understand how cultural biases work at the individual 
level, we need multilevel analyses in order to study the way institutions influence 
people’s cultural biases, choices, and behaviors. One important lesson to be learned 
from this chapter is that the results are dependent on the level we are using to study 
the effects. In statistical terms, this is a situation parallel to changing the level of 
aggregation. Different levels of aggregation usually have different functional forms, 
even if this is often ignored (Achen and Shively 1995).  
We have also seen some indications that the rejection of cultural bias is also 
important. Rejected biases influence our political views by limiting our choices. 
Politics is often about compromises, and these rejections inform the voters about 
the kinds of organizing principles that might be inferior. Is rejection of a cultural 
bias just a consequence of support for another bias, or is it a trait of its own? This 
question is answered in the next chapter, which is devoted to the rejection of 
cultural bias. 
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C h a p t e r  1 3   
 WHAT IS REJECTION OF A 
CULTURAL BIAS?  
What is rejection of a cultural bias? Is it something important or just a 
methodological artifact best ignored? What kind of role does it have among 
households and in individuals? How common is it? What are its effects? I will 
discuss these questions both in relation to the households study and in relation to 
the surveys.  
The previous chapter cannot solve these issues, even if the hypothesis tests used 
information about about rejection of cultural biases. These tests were designed to 
test three assumptions and do not give us answers to the above questions.  
In the previous chapter, we saw how these three common assumptions are more 
likely to be fallacies. My solution for overcoming these fallacies is to use 
combinations of cultural biases. Theoretically, these combinations could work 
without accounting for the rejection of bias, but analyses in Chapter 10 show that 
combinations relying on rejection seem to work better. However, a discussion 
about the rejection of cultural bias is required since the concept is not a well-
established part of quantitative applications in cultural theory.  
This chapter will start by taking a look at the theoretical aspects of rejection. Then I 
will present some examples and findings from the household study. Since the 
controversy regarding rejection is about rejection of cultural bias at the individual 
level, most of this chapter will deal with this. First, I will discuss how rejection is 
intrinsically connected to the way cultural biases are measured. Second, I will look 
at how rejection is a common trait among individuals. Third, I will ask whether all 
possible combinations of cultural biases are present. Fourth, I will look at the 
effects that rejection has on party preferences. Fifth, I will show how rejection in a 
cultural bias combination can carry meaning that helps us to understand party 
preferences.  
Rejection is Different than Support  
Theoretically, rejecting a way of organizing is different from supporting a way of 
organizing. First, there is a difference concerning how it applies to the components 
of a stable way of organizing—i.e. cultural biases, social relations, and behavioral 
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patterns (see page 11). As we have seen in the survey data, rejection is important 
when we are studying cultural biases. However, rejection does not apply in the 
same way to social relations versus patterns of behavior. In social relations, 
rejecting a particular way of life, A for example, could follow from supporting way 
of life B. However, simply observing support for B does not necessarily provide 
access to knowledge about the rejection of A. What one can observe is the lack of 
type A social relations, but not the rejection of A. Similarly, it is unlikely that 
rejection is a central component of the behavioral patterns. Again, what one 
normally can observe is a person’s lack of type A behavior, not the rejection of 
A.374 However, it is possible to imagine situations where another person engages in 
behaviors that are attributed to A by which the supporter of B must confront, for 
example by rejecting the proposed interaction.  
A second potential theoretical difference concerns cultural stability. Can the same 
mechanisms that create enduring support for a cultural bias also create an enduring 
rejection of a cultural bias? I think that as long as we accept that rejection is not the 
dominant bias in an institution, but is instead just a component of the cultural bias 
in that institution, then there should be no reason for why the same mechanisms 
cannot be operating. Support for a particular cultural bias does not automatically 
determine who your adversaries are, even if sometimes cultural theorists define the 
cultures as always in opposition to each other. Institutions have some leeway in 
their choice of adversaries, and observing rejection of cultural bias allows us to 
capture this.  
Traditionally in cultural theory, rejection has followed from support. Rejection can 
be seen in issues like taboos, witchcraft, and leprosy (Douglas 1992). The source of 
rejection lies in institutions and the manners of thinking that the institutions make 
possible.  
Individuals, as they pick and choose among the analogies from 
nature those they will give credence to, are also picking and 
choosing at the same time their allies and opponents and the pattern 
of their future relations. Constituting their version of nature, they 
are monitoring the constitution of their society. In short, they are 
constructing a machine for thinking and decision-making on their 
own behalf. (Douglas 1986: 63) 
                                                     
374 Pondy describes how latent conflicts can become manifest conflicts with conflictful behavior. 
However, deciding what is conflictful behavior is not easy since sometimes just a lack of behavior is 
conflictful behavior.  
Knowledge of the organizational requirements and of the expectations and motives of 
the participants appears to be necessary to characterize the behavior as conflictful. 
This suggests that behavior should be defined to be conflictful if, and only if, some or 
all of the participants perceive it to be conflictful (Pondy 1967: 303). 
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Little by little, the grid-group typology became a systems theory,375 but the typology 
still sees rejection as following from support for something else. Contradictory 
certainties are a concept that summarizes the manner in which rejection has been 
treated in the theory.  
A culture builds legitimacy on its own foundation of 'certainties' 
which contradict the 'certainties' of other cultures. Thus cultures are 
self-defined adversially. ... they need the adversary in order to know 
who they are and what they stand for ... The theory now assumes 
that in any community all four kinds of culture are actualized and in 
continual conflict. Their adversary relation is the essence of 
democracy (Douglas 1999: 413)376 
The conflict between the ways of organizing is presented as a central aspect of the 
theory,377 and much of the empirical research centers on political conflicts.378 
Nevertheless, rejection of a way of organizing has not been given a independent 
role. I believe that a good start would be to analytically distinguish between degrees 
of rejection. For example, we should not take it for granted that all hierarchical 
institutions reject with equal intensity egalitarian ways of organizing. We need to 
separate degrees of rejection by differentiating between the roles rejection has in an 
institution. Only a minority of institutions actively combat a particular way of life. 
There are institutions that are partly defined by their adversaries, for example 
environmental organizations who often promote egalitarian solutions to poorly 
executed hierarchical regulations and individualistic profit maximization (Schwarz 
and Thompson 1990). In such an institution, with a manifest rejection of a way of 
life, we expect to find lasting anti-individualistic or anti-hierarchical behaviors with 
more or less symbolic purposes. However, most institutions, like households, are 
much less political and less interested in changing anything beyond their own 
borders. In such institutions, it is difficult to imagine that rejection of a bias would 
manifest itself into strong behavioral patterns. 
Given that some institutions actively reject particular ways of life while others do 
not, it seems like we should attempt to describe degrees of rejection when we 
describe institutions. The focus on political conflicts can give us a biased view of 
how rejection works in institutions. In some ways, the household is the universal 
institution since we are all part of one, whether it is a private household or an 
                                                     
375 Thompson has been central in bringing the systems theoretical perspective into cultural theory 
(Thompson 1985; Schwarz and Thompson 1990; Thompson 1990; Thompson 1995, 2008) 
376 At this stage, Mary Douglas had taken on board the systems thinking adopted by Thompson and 
Gyawali (personal communication with Michael Thompson). 
377 The organization of each way of life relies on opposition or conflict with other ways of life 
(Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990:4) 
378 See (Wildavsky 1987; Thompson, Ellis, and Wildavsky 1990, 1992; Ellis 1993; Coyle and Ellis 1994; 
Ellis 1994; Rayner and Malone 1998; Thompson, Grendstad, and Selle 1999; Ney 2006; Verweij 
and Thompson 2006; 6 2011). 
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institutional household.379 Therefore, knowing how rejection is dealt with in 
households can teach us something important about rejection in general. We must, 
however, remember that households as institutions are different from political 
institutions, where rejection is likely to have a more prominent place. 
Rejection of Cultural Bias in the Households Interviews 
Rejection was not my main focus when I conducted the household interviews. The 
interviews looked toward in depth coverage of the households’ internal 
organization and social relations, as well as their views of society and politics. 
Therefore, the interviews were not looking to solicit accounts of rejection, nor were 
questions asked that systematically explored rejection. The accounts of rejection 
were instead initiated by the households themselves, which shows that rejection is a 
salient trait in the households.  
In Figure 8 on page 257, we can see an overview of each household’s internal 
organization and their social relations. Every dark block is one trait that either 
supports or rejects a particular way of organizing. The figure has been dealt with 
previously, but there are some observations concerning rejection that we can draw 
from it. 
First, the internal organization and social relations in six of the eight households 
exhibited characteristics that spoke to rejections of particular ways of organizing. 
More specifically, a majority of the households rejected a particular way of 
organizing internally or building helping relations.380 The characteristics that were 
counted were quite similar. In terms of helping relations, four households rejected 
reciprocity, which is the basis of individualistic solidarity. This rejection could be 
observed in hierarchical, egalitarian, and fatalistic households, but not in any of the 
individualistic households.381 Rejection of the hierarchical way of organizing did 
come in two different versions. In both the egalitarian Garcia and individualistic 
Lorca households, there was a distinct rejection of traditional gender-based 
divisions of labor. In both the individualistic Maheswaran and the fatalistic Truong 
households, there were clear rejections of using fixed time schedules as a method 
for structuring the households’ internal organizations. We can see that the same 
rejection is observed in households with different ways of organizing.  
                                                     
379 Retirement homes, army units, convents, and correctional facilities are all institutional households. 
Furthermore, single person households could be interpreted and researched as institutions. They 
have their routines, justifications, and helping relations just like other households, even if they lack 
division of labour. 
380 Helping relations are the solidarities, or the obligations to and rights for both material and 
immaterial help, and those social relations out of which these arise. See page 74 for a discussion. 
381 The Natan, Garcia, Herrera, and Truong households rejected reciprocity as an principle in their 
helping relations. 
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Second, the remaining two households, Nguyen and Nga, did not show any signs of 
rejection, neither in their internal organization nor in their views of politics and 
society. Both of these households are from Vietnam, and the Vietnamese are 
known to avoid saying no because it is impolite (Cultural etiquette in Vietnam  2011). 
There is a similarity between rejecting a way of life and responding negatively to a 
statement. Therefore, it is difficult to know if they privately reject particular ways of 
organizing, but kept those rejections hidden from me, or if they genuinely do not 
reject any ways of organizing.  
Third, as I have already pointed out on page 258, I did not observe traits indicating 
rejection of the household’s dominant way of organizing in any of the households. 
In all eight households, there was a dominant way of organizing, and the rejected 
way of organizing served to clarify or strengthen support for the dominant way of 
organizing.  
I believe that the interpretation of rejection is more valid in the household 
interviews than in the survey because here the rejection is part of the social 
interaction in the interview situation. The households actively presented stories 
about rejection and tried to ensure that I would understand what kind of household 
they did not want to be seen as. The way these stories were conveyed came with 
meanings behind each rejection, which gives a stronger face validity to each 
account. The stories about rejection were a way to make sure I understood what 
kind of households they were. For example, the egalitarian Garcia household told 
stories about their condemnation of hierarchical and individualistic behaviors, 
which clarified which type of household they were not. In surveys, measurements 
are not connected to a particular social institution or setting.  
In the households interviewed, rejection was sometimes connected to the reasons 
for leaving their original homes. In particular, some of the Chilean households, who 
had to flee from a hierarchical despot, were very clear in their rejection of hierarchy 
as a way of life. Rejection is not just the lack of support or a way to emphasize what 
they are supporting. Instead, rejection can be based on previous experiences and 
can be so strong that it cannot be easily changed.  
The lack of findings can also teach us something about the households. I have not 
seen any traits supportive of hierarchy in any of the Chilean households. Similarly, I 
did not encounter any traits within any of the Vietnamese households that 
supported an egalitarian bias.382 Perhaps this is due to the fact that these 
households fled a regime that espoused an egalitarian ideology. The above parallel 
suggests that in some situations, forcing a way of life into an oblivion can be seen 
as a form of rejection. However, deliberately avoiding talk about a particular way of 
life can be interpreted in many ways.  
                                                     
382 See Figure 8 on page 257. 
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Consequences of Rejecting a Way of Organizing. 
Does rejection have any consequences for the households? In Figure 9 on page 
261, we can see a count of the rejections of and supports for particular ways of 
organizing in each household. In the left-hand column, which is identical to Figure 
8, we can see the count of traits within each household’s internal organization and 
social relations. One way to find consequences is to compare this with their views 
of politics and society, as presented in the right-hand column.  
There are four households, Nguyen, Nga, Truong, and Herrera, that did not display 
a rejection of cultural bias in their views of politics and society during the 
interviews. Thus, in none of the Vietnamese households could I observe the 
rejection of a cultural bias. Again, this could be the result of the Vietnamese 
avoiding the presentation of negative statements or my insensitivity to their way of 
dealing with these issues.  
The four remaining households, Natan, Garcia, Lorca and Maheswaran, did show 
some rejection of cultural biases in their views of politics and society. Are these 
somehow connected to the rejected ways of organizing internally in the household 
(the left-hand column in Figure 9)? In some of the households, some 
commonalities can be observed. The hierarchical Natan household rejects 
reciprocity in their helping relations and they reject the view that competition is a 
healthy organizing principle for society. The egalitarian Garcia household rejects 
traditional divisions of labor in the household, and they are critical of the 
headmaster who failed to act according to his role. The individualistic Maheswaran 
household is critical of relatives that look to control other family members, and 
they think that there are too many rules and regulations in the society. Nevertheless, 
in none of the households can we observe rejection of a way of organizing causing 
changes in their view of politics and society. The observed traits of rejected cultural 
biases could just as well be a result of vocalizing and displaying support for their 
dominant cultural bias.  
Rejecting a way of organizing internally in the households does not appear to 
correspond with a similar rejection in their views of politics and society. However, 
the rejected cultural biases help the households to make political choices. When the 
Natan household rejects competition and supports hierarchy, and the Maheswarans 
reject rules and regulations and support individualism, this will allow both 
households to reach quite different conclusions on many political issues. Rejection 
strengthens the dominant bias of the household and limits the available options 
when confronted with political issues. 
None of the households in my sample are organized around rejection. However, 
this does not allow us conclude that rejection fails to play a central organizing role 
in other households. Rejected ways of organizing always have the potential for 
political mobilization. If a household’s surroundings change, and its way of 
organizing is threatened by external forces, it could very well mobilize around a 
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rejection of the organizing principles behind those external forces.383 To study how 
rejection works in an institution, one should probably start with a sample of 
politically active organizations with clear adversaries. Nevertheless, the households 
in my sample all have one supportive dominant cultural bias, which is not the case 
in individuals, or so it seems when measured in surveys. 
Rejection of Cultural Bias in the Surveys 
What kind of properties does rejection of cultural biases have a the individual level? 
How common is it? Can we find all the possible combinations of support and 
rejection? What kind of effects does rejection have? Can rejection carry meaning? 
How important is rejection in relation to support? Here, I will try to answer these 
questions. 
While the household interviews provide information about behavior and social 
relations, the surveys available to me provide very little information on these.384 
Within the surveys, the discussion concerning rejection is narrowed to only 
rejection of cultural bias. 
We have already seen in Chapter 11 and Chapter 12 that combinations of cultural 
biases can utilize information about both rejection and support. In this section, I 
will try to settle the question of whether or not an operationalization using rejection 
really is necessary and better, or if information concerning support is sufficient.385 I 
will do so first by showing how the presence of rejection is dependent on how we 
measure cultural biases in surveys. Second, a few new figures and tables will show 
how common rejection is and what kind of balance there is between rejection and 
support in the different samples. Third, the effects of rejection are dealt with 
through examples from other parts of the thesis and a hypothesis test where the 
effects of operationalizations based on rejection and support are compared. Fourth, 
examples of rejection as a carrier of meaning are presented. Finally, I argue that 
while rejection is important enough to have a role in the analysis, it is still less 
important than support. 
                                                     
383 Based on the Unilever household study, Michael Thompson has given me examples of egalitarian 
households where rejection of other ways of organizing was a central component (personal 
communication).  
384 In NOS99, there is no such information, while the NEPS95 environmentalist sample contains 
information concerning participation in the environmenal organization and its activities and some 
information concerning behaviors that are relevant for evaluating commitments to 
environmentalism. 
385 If rejection of cultural biases is important, we should select our two strongest cultural biases on the 
basis of the absolute values so that a strong rejection can be ranked above mild support. If 
rejection of cultural biases is not important, we should select our two cultural biases on the basis of 
the strength of support so that any support is always prior to rejection (see pages 360 and 384). 
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Measurement of Rejection in Surveys 
In surveys, the rejection of cultural bias is a tricky topic because its existence is 
largely determined by how we measure the dimensions. There are two competing 
measurement models today. In most surveys using cultural theory, the 
measurement of cultural biases is based on or inspired by Dake and Wildavsky’s 
approach that measures support for biases as four independent cultural dimensions. 
The positive end of each dimension points toward a cultural bias, but there have 
been discussions over what the negative end of each dimension points to. If you 
use the grid-group dimensions as the main dimension, then each cultural bias points 
toward the further corner: Negative hierarchical biases point toward individualistic 
biases in the opposite corner of grid-group diagram, negative egalitarian biases 
point toward fatalistic biases, and so forth (see a more thorough discussion on 
pages 283 to 294).  
The other commonly used measurement model is the two dimensional 
operationalization composed by Kahan and associates, where the grid is measured 
with the hierarchical-egalitarian dimension and the group is measured with the 
individualistic-communitarian dimension. In this case, strong support for one bias 
can only be achieved by the rejection of the second bias on the same dimension 
(Kahan 2012). Therefore, support for hierarchical bias always equals rejection of 
egalitarian bias, and vice versa. By definition, there is no difference between 
support for hierarchy and rejection of egalitarian bias.  
Thus, if you have extreme scores on two opposing cultural biases, like hierarchy 
and egalitarianism, you end up with the mean of these two and close to the middle 
(Kahan 2012; Kahan, Braman, Gastil, et al. 2007; Kahan et al. 2008). Despite their 
promising results, I believe it is too early to rule out the possibility that individuals 
relate simultaneously to several cultural biases. Even if they have shown that 
cultural cognition performs better than traditional social background variables or 
party identification in explaining risk perception on several topics, this does not rule 
out the possibility that a different operationalization would work even better. 
If you abandon a two-dimensional grid-group model and choose the four 
solidarities, ways of organizing, or cultures as the main theoretical unit, then 
negative cultural bias does not point toward another bias by default. It becomes an 
empirical question over how the four cultures have positioned themselves in the 
society, and how the composition of each individual’s institutional affiliation 
influences the makeup of his or her cultural bias.  
Measurement of Cultural Biases in this Thesis 
As we have seen in Chapter 8, each cultural bias in the Nordic survey is measured 
with a five-item Likert-scale. We have also seen that this approach comes with 
problems of acquiescence since every item has same direction - namely support (see 
page 327). However, sometimes what seems like a methodological flaw can also be 
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used as a benefit. Being prone to acquiescence comes with risks of overestimating 
support and underestimating rejection. Thus, more trust can be placed in those who 
say they are rejecting a bias than can be placed in those who say they are supporting 
one. 
As we have seen in Chapter 9 and in NEPS95, the cultural bias scales include a 
selection of supportive Likert-type items, but in addition to these, I have included 
some items with reversed direction and some forced choice questions, thus making 
them less prone to acquiescence. The new items refer to a broader range of topics 
than those found in NOS99, including trust, wealth, and environmental items (see 
page 343). 
It is possible to construct egalitarian and individualistic biases with or without the 
questions on the environment.386 Inclusion or exclusion, however, significantly 
alters how the biases correlate with each other. When environmental questions are 
included in the cultural bias scales, E and I correlate by -0.5. Thus, we know that 
support for one bias often occurs together with rejection of the other. For example, 
E-I is the strongest political conflict dimension in Norwegian politics. Therefore, it 
should not be surprising to find consistency in peoples’ responses that fits well into 
this dimension.  
                                                     
386 The environmental protection items show an underlying dimensionality that does not seem to fit 
with cultural theory as predicted. The pro-environmental protection end of the dimension is clearly 
linked with support for egalitarianism, but the other end of the dimension is linked to the three 
other biases. Thus I, H, and F become somewhat lumped together, and the scales correlate with 
each other more than they would if the views on the environment had several underlying 
dimensions.  
NEPS95 was constructed to study environmental protection. This influences the variables available 
for analysis as well as the context or frame of references the respondents are put into during the 
survey. This also affects the samples chosen for study. Thus, there are several possible ways to 
interpret the correlation between the environmental items. Perhaps these constitute an accurate 
description of society, and the environmental views that cultural theory predicts do not exist in 
Norway. However, we must remember that cultural theory predicts these at the level of cultures, 
and the inability to find four separate groups of respondents can be explained in many ways. First, 
it can either be caused by a dominant ideological debate in Norway, where not all four 
environmental views described by cultural theory are present. Second, their absence might be 
caused by the weaknesses of these four voices within the Norwegian debate, which obstructs their 
ability to clarify their positions to a wider audience. It could also be that people simply do not pay 
enough attention to these debates, thus making it difficult to distinguish between these four views 
of nature. The environmentalists are likely to pay attention, but the items ask about respondents 
own views, and the environmentalists, with their support for egalitarianism and tendency to see 
nature as fragile, do not share the same views as others. Third, it is also possible that people do not 
keep these different views separate in the survey because surveys attempt to be context free. We do 
not know what people would have said in a different institutional context. Fourth, it is possible, but 
not likely, that the questions used are not well enough adapted to the Norwegian context. Given the 
above possibilities, it is difficult to know if a negative correlation between E and I is a good thing or 
a bad thing.   
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Factor analysis 
The choice between the two different measurement models is difficult. Should we 
use a two-dimensional measure of grid and group or a four dimensional measure of 
cultural biases? Using the data available to me, it is possible to find empirical 
evidence that can both strengthen and weaken the four-dimensional model. There 
are two competing propositions. First, the rejection of cultural bias is an important 
trait, thus each of the four biases should appear in the factor analysis as a separate 
factor. Second, the rejection of a cultural bias is actually nothing more than support 
for another bias. Thus, a two-dimensional solution should emerge in the factor 
analysis even when we have collected information for all four biases. If support for 
hierarchy equals rejection of egalitarianism, as the model used by Kahan and 
associates suggests, then these two biases should emerge as one factor. Similarly, 
fatalism and individualism should come out on the same factor.  
A factor analysis of the cultural bias items in NOS99 can tell us if there are two or 
four dimensions present in the data. In Table 23 on page 324, we can identify four 
separate factors, each linked to their own cultural bias. This would not have been 
the case if rejection of one bias automatically equals support for a second bias. This 
strengthens the case for the four-dimensional model and weakens the case for the 
two-dimensional model.  
To increase our trust in this finding, it is repeated on our second dataset. In Table 
69 below, we can see a corresponding factor analysis of the items used to measure 
cultural bias in NEPS95, where some new items, including views of trust, nature, 
and the distribution of wealth, are added to the items composed by Dake and 
Wildavsky. The new items have a different wording and different structures of 
possible responses. These differences influence the covariance matrix so that it is 
not directly comparable with the factor analysis in Table 23. The factor analysis 
shows the seven oblimin-rotated factors. In the structure matrix, we can identify 
the factors as no ecological catastrophe, trust/anti-fatalistic, hierarchical, wealth, 
egalitarian, modify nature, and anti-individualistic.387 Even if this factor analysis 
should be viewed with some skepticism, as the new items of nature, trust/anti-
fatalistic, and wealth became their own factors, we can see that all four cultural 
biases came out as their own factors.388 According to the two-dimensional 
measurement model, the egalitarian and hierarchical factors should have emerged as 
been the opposite ends of one factor, and similarly, the anti-fatalistic and anti-
individualistic factors should have been the opposite ends of a second factor. The 
                                                     
387 We can identify the same factors in the same order in an orthogonal rotation. Using a oblique 
rotation allows the factors to correlate with each other, which strengthens our interpretation 
(DeVellis 2003: 124). 
388 Some of the new items are forced choice items where the respondent is asked to choose from the 
four biases. This gives a very different covariance matrix from Likert-type items. Therefore, they 
should not be expected to come out on the same factors as the Likert-type items. Even if this 
somewhat muddles the mathematical properties of the cultural bias scales, the increased content 
validity and decreased acquiescence makes up for this. 
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findings resemble more of what I would expect to find in the four-dimensional 
model than in the two-dimensional model. 
Table 69: Factor Analysis of CB items used in NEPS95. 
Total variance explained 
Initial eigenvalues 
Extraction sums of squared 
loadings 
Rotation sums of 
squared loadingsa 
Component Total
% of 
variance
Cumu-
lative % total
% of 
variance
Cumu-
lative % Total 
1 3.5 14.8 14.8 3.5 14.8 14.8 2.5
2 2.7 11.1 25.8 2.7 11.1 25.8 2.6
3 2.3 9.5 35.3 2.3 9.5 35.3 2.1
4 1.7 6.9 42.3 1.7 6.9 42.3 2.2
5 1.3 5.5 47.7 1.3 5.5 47.7 1.8
6 1.1 4.7 52.5 1.1 4.7 52.5 1.6
7 1.1 4.4 56.9 1.1 4.4 56.9 2.3
Extraction method: principal component analysis. 
a. When components are correlated, the sums of squared loadings cannot be added to obtain a total variance. 
Component 
Structure matrix 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
H1 authority .21  .53      -.36
H2 preserve customs     .58  .21  -.34
Trust: Church of Norway M272   .37 .65        
Trust: Norwegian defense forces (military) M273   .46 .46        
Humans meant to rule over nature M199 .22  .52    .41  
E1 justice in the world -.28    -.27 .66  .20
E2 tax shift         .74    
E3 divide work -.23    -.21 .71    
Wealth E - equal       -.90 .21    
Growth E - environment -.48  -.21      .36
Trust: Environmental organizations M269m -.26 .68          
nature_e -.83      .27 -.24  
I1 chance to succeed             -.71
I2 ability       .31 -.36 .30 -.46
Wealth I - by contribution       .91      
Trust: Business and companies M271   .43 .21  -.44  -.33
Right to change environment for human needs M189 .36    .20  .63  
Skill and wisdom will keep earth fine M192 .49    .20  .39 -.37
NOT on our way to ecological catastrophe M202r .85            
OK to tamper with human genome M253r         -.23 .73  
F1 whichever party   -.25        -.52
F2 cooperation   -.26 .53      -.37
Trust F - Count of distrust   -.76 -.21        
Trust F2 NO- Party, EnvOrg, EnvGov, PolSys, UN   -.88          
Extraction Method: principal component analysis. Rotation method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. Values 
below 0.2 are hidden. Values >|0.5| are in bold. 
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Component correlation matrix 
Component 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1 1.00 -.03 .14 .16 -.13 .20 -.09
2 -.03 1.00 .07 -.10 -.09 -.03 .04
3 .14 .07 1.00 .06 .05 .02 -.20
4 .16 -.10 .06 1.00 -.16 .18 -.14
5 -.13 -.09 .05 -.16 1.00 -.10 .02
6 .20 -.03 .02 .18 -.10 1.00 -.04
7 -.09 .04 -.20 -.14 .02 -.04 1.00
Extraction method: principal component analysis.  Rotation method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
In the component correlation matrix, we can see that none of the components 
correlate strongly with each other, which suggests that the distribution behind the 
cultural bias items does not give any reason to treat the four cultural biases as only 
two dimensions. We should be cautious by measuring and using the cultural biases 
separately. 
The factor analyses of NOS99 and NEPS95 both result in a factorial solution 
where four (more than two) factors are clearly linked to cultural biases. 
Nevertheless, the presence of rejection is a choice made by the researcher. Given 
an operationalization similar to Kahan’s, the rejection of a cultural bias is not 
treated as an independent phenomenon nor can it be detected. That might be a 
useful simplification—one that keeps the measurement and subsequent analysis as 
simple as possible without losing empirical parsimony. However, a four-
dimensional measurement of cultural biases allows us to see that the rejection of a 
cultural bias is a trait in individuals that does not automatically follow from 
supporting something else. This opens up for a new question, namely how 
common is the rejection of a cultural bias?  
Rejection of One or Two Cultural Biases is Common  
The rejection of one or more cultural biases is quite common. In Figure 44 below, 
we can see how the number of cultural biases rejected varies from survey to survey. 
On the left-hand side of the diagram (NOS99), we have a very tight pattern; the 
five countries are remarkably similar in this regard.389 As represented by the solid 
line, Norway somewhat deviates from the others by having fewer respondents who 
do not reject cultural biases and several who reject one. Otherwise, there are very 
small differences between the countries. This distribution can be summed up as 
follows: One-quarter of the respondents reject none of the cultural biases; one-
third reject one cultural bias; one-quarter reject two cultural biases, and the small 
remainder reject three or four cultural biases.  
                                                     
389 The cultural biases are standardized country by country, which of course creates a mean of 0 for 
each country. Standardization on the Nordic level would have differentiated countries more, but 
would not change the logic of the argument. 
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The proportion of people rejecting one cultural bias is dependent on where the cut-
off point that defines rejection is placed.390 Nevertheless, even if the cut-off point 
determines the level of rejection for one bias, the pattern in Figure 44 is the result 
of how an individual relates to several cultural biases simultaneously.  
On the right-hand side of Figure 44, we can see how rejection is distributed among 
the general population and among the environmental organization member sample 
(NEPS95). Norway has been measured twice: The Norwegian general population 
sample from 1995 (dotted line on the right) can be compared with the Norwegian 
sample from 1999 (solid line on the left). This will show us how differences in 
measurement influence our results. We can see how in the 1995 general population 
sample, there are fewer who reject none, and several who reject one or two of the 
biases, which is different than what is found in the 1999 Norwegian sample. The 
main reason for this is likely to be the different items included in the scales, which 
are tailored to be less influenced by acquiescence and to include a wider range of 
domains.391 The four–year time span between these two surveys should not 
produce marked differences in this pattern.  
Figure 44: Proportion of Respondents by Count of Rejected 
Cultural Biases. NOS99 and NEPS95. 
                                                     
390 In Chapter 10, we saw that a useful placement of the cut-off points are at the bottom 35 percent of 
the respondents as rejecting a bias, the top 35 percent as supporting a bias, and all those in 
between as indifferent. See the description of the process behind choice of cut-off points starting 
on page 366. To facilitate comparisons, the cut-off points used for the environmentalist sample are 
the same as those in the general sample. 
391 The content of cultural bias items used here is different and the acquiescence effect has been 
reduced by including some forced choice questions and some items with reversed order (see page 
344-355).  
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The most remarkable trait in Figure 44 is the high level of rejection found among 
members of environmental organizations, where almost half of them reject two 
cultural biases while very few reject none of the cultural bias. It seems like many 
environmental organization members have clear visions of what they do not want 
when compared with the general population.  
Based on previous findings, cultural theory predicts that many environmental 
organizations promote egalitarian solutions and reject hierarchical, individualistic, 
and fatalistic ones (Schwarz and Thompson 1990; Hendriks 1994: 55; Thompson 
1997b).392 What we have here is empirical evidence showing that the members of 
environmental organizations have cultural biases that match the expectations 
derived from cultural theory. This match is to some extent surprising. I would have 
expected that only elites or those people who engage deeply in environmental 
organizations have cultural biases like these. This is especially the case because Ellis 
and Thompson found that, “in each of the three environmental groups surveyed ... 
the more active members consistently express greater antipathy to individualism, 
greater support for egalitarianism, and more distrust of hierarchical authority 
relations” (Ellis and Thompson 1997: 183). 
The large majority of the environmental organization members that participated in 
NEPS95 are passive members who have no social contact with the other members. 
I interpret this as evidence of membership to these organizations as being of little 
importance in their lives when compared with the rest of their social relations and 
institutional attachments. In addition, some of the environmental organizations 
included in this sample are quite mainstream. This shows how important social 
context is for individual cultural biases: It influences not only which cultural biases 
are supported, but also which biases are rejected.  
Can We Find all Combinations of Support and Rejection? 
There are a limited number of possible combinations of rejection and support, and 
if they all occur, then support for one bias does not always create the same rejection 
response. If all possible combinations are present, this suggests that rejection is not 
fully determined by support. There is at least a possibility that the four cultural 
biases are true dimensions, where both ends of the scale can carry meaning.  
In Figure 34 on page 395, we were able to see how the Nordic respondents are 
distributed within a cultural space consisting of all possible combinations of 
                                                     
392 I am not saying that all environmental organiations are egalitarian. There are also other kinds of 
environmental organizations, like the long-established conservationists groups, that are more 
hierarchical, and some organic farming associations are individualistic (Rayner 1992) 
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rejection and support.393 Each bar shows the count of respondents with a particular 
combination of all four cultural biases. There are no empty cells, thus indicating 
that all combinations of support and rejection exist. However, we can see that the 
distribution of cultural biases is not even. Some combinations, like support for all 
four cultural biases (144) or rejection of all four cultural biases (235) are common, 
while others have less than 30 people within them. 
We need to check this on a sample-by-sample basis because a combination could be 
missing in only one of the countries. Since these tables are rather large, they are 
presented in the appendix. In Table 95 (on page 567), we find no empty cells in any 
of the countries surveyed in NOS99. There are respondents in every combination 
of the four biases, even if the distribution is far from even. In Table 96, we can see 
the same distributions in NEPS95. With one exception, there are at least a few 
respondents in every possible combination of the support and rejection of cultural 
biases. In the general sample, there are no respondents with combination EIFh.  
To sum up, in six of our seven samples, we found respondents in every one of the 
81 combinations defined by rejection of, indifference to, and support for 
hierarchical, egalitarian, individualistic, and fatalistic cultural biases. In addition, in 
the seventh sample, which is the general sample from Norway, there was only one 
empty combination out of 81 combinations. In every sample, the distributions are 
not even, and some combinations are much more frequent than others are.  
The Balance between Rejection and Support 
In order to understand how rejection is distributed, it is useful to see rejection in 
relation to support. In Table 70 below, we can see a summary of information from 
Table 95, which contains the total from NOS99, and Table 96, which contains both 
samples from NEPS95. 394 Now we are counting only how many cultural biases the 
respondent supports and rejects. Information concerning indifference and which 
cultural bias is supported or rejected is not included. In Table 70, we can see for 
each survey the counts and the total percent of the distribution. We can see that a 
large proportion of the respondents support a few and reject a few in every sample.  
If the classical view of individuals as having only one cultural bias (see coherent 
individual model on page 294) were correct, we should expect that each respondent 
would have one, and only one, supported bias. Since 31 percent of the respondents 
in NOS99 support only one bias, we can easily deduce that 69 percent of 
respondents do not fit this description. Similarly, 64 percent in the general sample 
from NEPS95 and 75 percent in the environmentalist sample fail to fit with a 
description that would directly support the coherent individual view of the 
individual-culture relationship. 
                                                     
393 More details can be found in the Chapter entitled Combinations of Cultural Biases. Only respondents 
with four valid cultural biases are included. 
394 Figure 44 demonstrated that the five countries have similar distributions in NOS99. Therefore, 
Table 70 only deals with these as the Nordic total. 
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Table 70: Count of Rejected by Count of Supported CBs. NOS99 
and NEPS95. (Count and total percent) 
Count of supported CBs 
Count 0 1 2 3 4 Total 
0 55 195 307 349 223 1129 
1 187 472 485 231  1375 
2 330 563 245   1138 
3 362 335    697 
Count of 
rejected CBs 
4 142     142 
Total 1076 1565 1037 580 223 4481 
       Count of supported CBs 
Total percent 0 1 2 3 4 Total 
0 1 4 7 8 5 25 
1 4 11 11 5   31 
2 7 13 5     25 
3 8 7       16 
N
O
S9
9 
all
 sa
mp
les
 
Count of 
rejected CBs 
4 3         3 
 Total 24 35 23 13 5 100 
Count of supported CBs 
Count 0 1 2 3 4 Total 
0 8 38 60 54 14 174 
1 43 101 137 43  324 
2 49 157 79   285 
3 42 78    120 
Count of 
rejected CBs 
4 5     5 
Total 147 374 276 97 14 908 
       
Count of supported CBs 
Total percent 0 1 2 3 4 Total 
0 1 4 7 6 2 19 
1 5 11 15 5   36 
2 5 17 9     31 
3 5 9       13 
N
E
PS
95
 G
en
er
al 
sa
m
pl
e 
Count of 
rejected CBs 
4 1         1 
 Total 16 41 30 11 2 100 
Count of supported CBs 
Count 0 1 2 3 4 Total 
0 9 33 32 19 2 95 
1 58 212 168 44  482 
2 130 477 335   942 
3 84 288    372 
Count of 
rejected CBs 
4 14     14 
Total 295 1010 535 63 2 1905 
       
Count of supported CBs 
Total percent 0 1 2 3 4 Total 
0 0 2 2 1 0 5 
1 3 11 9 2   25 
2 7 25 18     49 
3 4 15       20 N
E
PS
95
 E
nv
iro
nm
en
ta
lis
t s
am
pl
e 
Count of 
rejected CBs 
4 1         1 
 Total 15 53 28 3 0 100 
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Cultural theory must somehow deal with these distributions. People relate to 
cultural biases in a more complicated ways than what is assumed by the coherent 
individual model. As long as we insist upon the coherent individual model, which 
tells us that a dominant cultural bias is the norm at the individual level, distributions 
like these are a problem for cultural theory. Some of the problem can be solved, as 
I have suggested previously, by understanding individuals’ relations to cultural 
biases not as belonging to one dominant culture, but rather as individuals having 
competence and positive and negative preferences toward particular cultural biases, 
in addition to the social relations and behaviors that cultural theory already deals 
well with (see page 299).  
The distribution of support and rejection tells us a static story. By looking at the 
effects of rejection, we learn more about how cultural biases influence people’s 
choices and political preferences. 
The Effects of Rejection on Party Preferences in Surveys 
For rejection to have an independent interpretation in surveys, it must have a 
meaningful effect that can be observed. A rejection of hierarchy, for example, must 
thus mean something other than just a very low score on the hierarchical bias. Since 
the idea of rejection has been one of the red threads in this thesis, it has been dealt 
with several times previously.  
Earlier, starting on page 384, I discussed if measuring support is sufficient or if 
rejection matters based on data from NOS99. In that analysis, hundreds of rather 
similar cross tables were compared in an effort to illuminate their abilities to explain 
party preferences, as measured by support for ideological party families at the 
Nordic level or by support for national parliamentary parties on a country-by-
country basis. This was thus an extremely broad test. The results presented in 
Figure 32 on page 386 show that tables using absolute values differ significantly 
from tables using only support, and particularly that the absolute values of cultural 
biases explain national party preferences well. In this test, however, different 
operationalizations are compared simultaneously: the number of cultural biases 
needed, the different ways to order the included biases, the number of categories 
for each bias, the importance of the indifferent neutral category, and the absolute 
values versus support only. While all options were still kept open in Figure 32, now 
it is time to make a test specific to the two top- ranked biases, which is the 
operationalization I favor.  
How can we observe the independent effect of rejection? We classify the 
respondents either by giving support a priority or by giving support and rejection 
an equal priority during classification. Afterwards, we will see which classification 
best explains party preferences. In other words, we create cultural combinations by 
using two different methods. We rank the two strongest biases in two different 
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ways. First, we can prioritize support, in which case we use cultural bias scales as 
they are: Zero equals the sample mean, positive values are counted as support, and 
negative values are counted as rejection. Two highest values are selected as the 
cultural bias combination that represents the respondent. Second, we can prioritize 
rejection equally by using absolute values during ranking: Zero is still the sample 
mean, and positive values are still counted as support; but negative values are 
converted into positive values. In this case, a strong rejection gets a higher value 
than weak support. For example, respondent X scores +2 on the hierarchical bias, 
+1 on the individualistic bias, -2.5 on the egalitarian bias, and 0 on the fatalistic 
bias. When ranking by strength, respondent X’s cultural combination is HI, while 
ranking by absolute values, would yield eH (see page 360 for more details). An 
example of the cultural combinations using the top two absolute values can be seen 
in Table 41. 
Since I believe rejection is important, I have formulated a null hypothesis which 
claims that the support version of the classification is better: 
H13  The ability of the top two-ranked biases explain party 
preferences is equal to or higher when ranked by support than 
when ranked by absolute values. 
In Table 71 below, we can see that in every sample, the ranking by absolute values, 
which utilize information about rejection, perform much better than a combination 
that only uses information about support. We can compare the first column, which 
shows how well the combination of top-two biases ranked by absolute values 
explains party preferences, with the sixth column, which shows how well the 
combination of the top two biases ranked by support explains party preferences. In 
the environmental organization members sample, the difference between these two 
is only 6 points. However, in the sample from Sweden, the difference moves up to 
17 points. In many of the samples, the increase is comparable to doubling the 
ability of cultural biases to explain party preferences. 
Can we get this large improvement just by chance? We can test this directly by 
calculating the confidence intervals for the ability of the cultural combinations to 
explain party preferences and then check to see if the confidence intervals overlap. 
The absence of overlap is indicated by inscribing reject  in the last column. We can 
see in Table 71 below that the hypothesis can be rejected in every one of the seven 
samples as well as in the Nordic total and in the NEPS95 total. The situation is the 
same in every sample: The population estimate for support is lower than the 
population estimate for the effect based on absolute values. Thus, our trust in the 
opposite of H13 increases. We have every reason to believe that the absolute values 
version of cultural biases performs better than versions based on support. This 
indicates that rejection is important, and information about rejection should be utilized whenever 
possible. However, until we understand the meaning of rejection, it is difficult to 
know what kind of theoretical consequences this has. 
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Table 71:  The Two Top Biases Ranked by Support and Absolute 
values. NOS99 and NEPS95. (U) 
  Combination of 
two top biases 
ranked by 
 absolute values. 
95 Percent 
confidence 
interval 
Combination of 
two top biases 
ranked by  
support 
95 Percent 
confidence 
interval 
 
Sample 
Percent 
explained 
A
sym
p. SE
 
A
pprox. 
Sig. 
low
 lim
it 
upper lim
it 
Percent 
explained 
A
sym
p. SE
 
A
pprox. 
Sig. 
low
 lim
it 
upper lim
it 
Test of 
H
13 
Norway 23.6 1.2 .000 21.3 26.0 14.7 1.2 .000 12.4 16.9 Reject 
Sweden 32.3 1.4 .000 29.5 35.0 15.3 1.3 .000 12.8 17.9 Reject 
Denmark 22.0 1.2 .000 19.7 24.3 14.7 1.1 .000 12.4 16.9 Reject 
Finland 22.4 1.2 .000 20.1 24.7 11.0 1.1 .000 8.8 13.2 Reject 
Iceland 32.5 2.0 .000 28.6 36.3 18.3 1.9 .000 14.5 22.1 Reject 
Total 9.5 0.5 .000 8.6 10.4 6.9 0.4 .000 6.0 7.8  
Env.org. 16.5 0.6 .000 15.3 17.8 10.9 0.6 .000 9.7 12.1 Reject 
General 21.7 0.9 .000 19.8 23.5 11.8 0.9 .000 10.0 13.6 Reject 
Total 15.6 0.5 .000 14.6 16.6 10.6 0.5 .000 9.7 11.6  
NOS99 is weighted. Percent explained = U*100. By calculating the value ± 1.96 std, we can calculate the 
population estimates for U and compare absolute values with support.  
 
Rejection as a Carrier of Meaning 
Everybody would agree that cultural biases are packages of meaning. However, 
there is no agreement over how we should understand rejection as carrier of 
meaning. Here, I will first show examples of how the meaning carried by the 
cultural combinations can be made understandable. Afterwards, I will refer to a 
more general analysis. 
The effects that cultural biases have on party preferences was discussed in Chapter 
11. Because this is an analysis where the Nordic countries are analyzed as one, 
parties are lumped together into Nordic party families where the national 
idiosyncrasies of the parties are downplayed, and the commonalities between 
cultural biases and the political positions of the party families are highlighted. In 
Table 72 below, we can see which cultural bias combinations give significantly 
increased support to a particular party family. We can see that 15 of these 
combinations consist of two rejections, 10 consist of support for two biases, and 5 
consist of one rejection and one support. Therefore, rejection of a cultural bias is a 
common cause for selecting a particular party. 
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Table 72: Cultural Combinations by Preferred Party Family. 
NOS99 (CultRankTriA2) 
Socialist 
 left Liberal  Green  
Social 
democratic Agrarian Christian Conservative Progress 
ih hf iE FE IH HI eI FH 
iE hi Ih If Ef HF ef FI 
hi ih Fh HE   eh HI 
if  fI FH   fe  
EH  Hi    fI  
hf        
These combinations are the statistically significant positive deviations collected from Table 43 to Table 51.395 
 
For the sake of simplicity, I will refer to respondents who have statistically 
significantly increases in tendencies to prefer a party family as voters for the parties 
within these families. For several party families, rejection is a defining characteristic 
of their voters. We can see that the conservative party family’s voters are 
characterized by support for individualism and rejection of everything else. The 
liberal party family voters are characterized by their rejection of hierarchical, 
individualistic, and fatalistic biases. The socialist left voters reject individualistic and 
support hierarchical bias. The green party voters reject hierarchical bias. For many 
voters, rejection of a bias or two makes it easier to choose a party. 
Some party families are mainly defined by support. The supporters of social 
democratic party family are in favor of both egalitarian and fatalistic cultural biases. 
The supporters of the Christian party family are in favor of hierarchical cultural 
bias. The supporters of the progress party family are in favor of everything other 
than the egalitarian cultural bias.  
It is the rejection of hierarchical bias that predominately differentiates between 
voters for green parties and those that vote for the socialist left. Rejection of 
individualistic bias differentiates socialist left voters from social democratic voters. 
Similarly, it is the rejection of the egalitarian bias that separates conservative voters 
from other voters on the right. These differences make sense and help us to 
understand what differentiates the various party families. 
Overall, the party family preferences can be better understood when we consider 
the rejection of cultural biases.396 Without information about rejection, it is difficult 
                                                     
395 These tables demonstrate how the two top-ranked cultural biases can make sense of party families. 
Those cultural combinations that give strong support to a party family are identified and presented 
through a set of tables starting on page 412. 
396 Using cultural combinations is a novel way to describe the political ideology in a population that 
makes sense to me. If the reader finds the above argument too brief, they are invited to make up 
their own mind. It may be helpful to look at party preferences according to the two top-ranked 
biases from NEPS95 in  Table 92 (on page 557) and from NOS99 in Table 93 (on page 558). Each 
country has a full page table that lists cultural combinations. If you have previous knowledge of 
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to understand how cultural biases influence the preferences that respondents have 
for particular political parties.  
Rejection is Still Less Important than Support  
To summarize, in this chapter we have seen that rejection in cultural theory applies 
differently to social relations, behavioral patterns, and cultural biases. In social relations and 
behavioral patterns, rejection does not need to be visible, which makes rejection a 
bit difficult to establish empirically. At the same time, rejection of a cultural bias 
should be easily observable both in interviews and in surveys. 
In the household interviews presented in this thesis, rejection was present both in 
the households’ internal organizations and social relations, and in their views on 
politics and society. However, it is difficult to claim that rejection internally causes 
any rejection in their cultural biases, as the same rejection of cultural biases can also 
be explained by the dominant cultural bias in the household. Rejection in these 
households seems to serve as a way to clarify and strengthen the dominant cultural bias.  
These findings in institutions need to be contrasted with the findings at the 
individual level. We have seen that a factor analysis of the cultural bias items gives 
us more than two factors, which indicates that the two-dimensional measurement 
model does not give an adequate picture of the variation in the data. A four-
dimensional model where every cultural bias has its own dimension with both support and rejection 
fits the data better. 
The distribution of support and rejection tells us that rejection of one or more cultural 
biases is very common in all samples. Similarly, we saw that we normally could find all 
possible combinations of rejection of and support for cultural biases. Support for one 
bias can go together with the rejection of any other bias.  
We have established that the top-two cultural biases, ranked as absolute values that 
equalizes the importance of rejection and support, explains party preferences far better 
than the top-two cultural biases ranked according to support. This is so far the best evidence 
we have for the importance of rejection. This cultural bias combination can explain 
roughly 20 to 25 percent of the variation in party preferences within the national 
samples.  
In addition, we have seen which cultural bias combinations are overrepresented 
among the different party family supporters. Rejection is an important element in 
most of these families. Rejection of cultural bias helps us to differentiate between 
the socialist left and the greens, between the socialist left and the social democrats, 
and between the conservatives and other right-wing parties. Rejection of cultural bias 
thus seems to carry meaning that helps respondents to choose a party.  
                                                                                                                                   
one of the parties in one of the countries, I recommend looking that country up and trying to see 
what kind of political conflicts and puzzles cultural biases make sense of.  
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So far, I have argued for the importance of rejection. However, there is also 
evidence that limits the importance of rejection. At the end of the discussion on the 
independence of effects fallacy on page 459, we learned that the second bias has a 
larger effect when the first ranked bias is rejection. Conversely, this means that the 
second bias has a smaller effect when the first ranked bias is support. In short, 
support is still more important than rejection in determining people’s party preferences, but the 
difference is small.  
None of my arguments concerning the existence and importance of rejection 
should be interpreted as implying that support for cultural biases has lost its 
importance. However, the effect of rejection is present and large enough to warrant 
its inclusion into cultural theory.  
In sample surveys, the measurements of cultural bias can be constructed so that 
rejection does not apply. However, during my household interviews, rejection of 
cultural bias appeared without being solicited. The choice of including rejection in 
the measurement of cultural bias on the individual level opens up for a study of 
how individuals and their cultural biases relate to institutions, which I believe has a 
large potential for generating useful knowledge. It is possible that rejection of a 
cultural bias has a strong influence on what kind of social relations or institutions 
we reject or do not want to be part of, what we see as the biggest political 
problems, which policies and political parties we abhor, and what kind of cultural 
alliances we are willing to enter into.  
If we do not include rejection, we are left with two main options for developing 
cultural theory. First, we stay with institutions and drop individuals. More 
specifically, we use the coherent individual model, observe how this model does not 
fit with the multiple roles and cultural biases that people have, and conclude that 
cultural theory does not work on individuals, who ‘flit like butterflies from context 
to context and chant the nature of their arguments as they do so’ (Rayner 1992:108-
109). Second, we can drop institutions and stay with people. More specifically, we 
can use the two-dimensional cultural biases model, as developed by Kahan and 
associates (see presentation on page 286), and explain the patterns of cultural biases 
through cognitive psychology, thus arriving at a cultural theory without institutions 
(Kahan 2012). 
My firm belief is that cultural theory, in its present form, is developed well enough 
to deal with institutions, and it has great potential for developing toward a theory 
that also accounts for individual choices and behaviors by incorporating at the 
individual level the idea of rejecting cultural biases. I have several suggestions for 
how this can be done. First, we should use a measurement model where individuals 
have varying degrees of knowledge and preferences toward ways of organizing. 
Second, we should measure all four cultural biases independently of each other. 
Third, individual-level combinations of cultural biases ranked by their absolute 
values allow us to use information concerning the rejection of cultural bias without 
relying on the independence of effect or additivity assumptions. Fourth, we should 
drop the dominant cultural bias assumption at the individual level and keep it at the 
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institutional level since the assumption seems to work fine in households. I hope 
creating a theoretical opening for the rejection of cultural biases at the individual 
level allows us to utilize the present developments in cognitive and social 
psychology without giving away the importance of institutions.  
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C h a p t e r  1 4   
FINAL REMARKS 
The main research problem of how we should understand the relationship between 
individuals, social structures, and cultural biases has been approached from two different 
angles: from a study of migrant households as institutions and from several surveys 
that used cultural biases at the individual level. Both of these have brought us a 
little further along in our understanding of cultural theory. In what follows, I will 
first summarize the issues from all parts of the thesis that are relevant to cultural 
theory. I will then focus on cultural theory as it relates to migration issues. 
Household research and Cultural Theory 
Since the findings from the household study have already been presented in 
Chapter 6, I will only repeat the main points of that study. The research problem 
for the household study was formulated as follows: How is a household’s way of 
organizing related to its views on politics and society?  
In order to answer to the research question, I had to find an operationalization that 
could be used on households in Norway. Cultural theory, after all, is a rather 
abstract theory that needs to be operationalized for a particular context. In doing 
so, I build upon the British household study, modified it a bit to make it 
transferable to a Norwegian context, and limited its scope to internal organization 
and helping relations. In addition, I made a list of predictions about how political 
views are connected to each of the four ways of organizing.  
The operationalization of the four ways of life allowed me to describe and analyze 
the internal organization and helping relations of the eight households. Every 
household had a dominant way of organizing, even if they sometimes borrowed a 
few traits from another way of organizing. Moreover, within each household, the 
research found no indication that the dominant way of organizing was  
contradicted. On some occasions, households did express rejection of ways of life 
other than their dominant way of organizing. This allowed them to strengthen their 
dominant way of organizing, and to communicate to me what kind of household 
they were.  
My research confirms one of the findings from the British household study: Even if 
households are very small and informal institutions, the categories of cultural theory can 
be successfully used to describe households (Dake, Thompson, and Neff 1994; Dake and 
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Thompson 1999). For cultural theorists, this might sound like saying that the sky is 
blue, but it is still an important statement and something that should not be taken 
for granted. Households are the most common institution around, and we all 
participate in one. Therefore, developing a better understanding of what happens 
inside households is the first step in understanding how individuals relate to 
institutions. The choice of migrant households from three different cultural spheres 
increases our trust in this finding, even if the number of households in this study is 
small. Cultural theory is not just for the studies of political conflicts, but something 
that can be used on households. 
Household Research and Political Views 
Some 2500 years ago, Herodotus, the father of ethnography and history, observed a 
fundamental type of connection between local beliefs and local institutions, despite 
all the variability between them: 
If one were to order all mankind to choose the best set of rules in 
the world, each group would, after due consideration, choose its 
own customs; each group regards its own as being the best by far. 
(Herodotus 1998:185) 
Similarly, today’s migrant households seem to believe that their own way of 
organizing also provides for the best rules and customs for society. However, the 
lack of a correlation between country of origin and belief demonstrates that the 
national origin of the household does not determine what they believe is best for 
society. Instead, the evidence suggests that the household’s internal organization 
and their helping relations with other households is connected with their views on 
politics and society. In each of the eight households analyzed, their political views 
matched their internal way of life to a surprising degree. At the very least, this confirms 
that there is a linkage between the way a household is organized as an institution 
and the political views held by its members, as predicted by cultural theory.  
Political views are also quite consistent when interpreted in light of cultural theory, 
which contradicts a common understanding of the electorate as inconsistent. I 
suggest that political science would benefit from a greater emphasis on the social 
origins of political views. Political science, since the developement of survey 
methodologies, has only in a minor degree been interested in households as a 
source of political views (Zuckerman 2005). My research on households shows that 
the similarity between a household’s internal organization and their political views is 
greater than what is comme-il-faut in political science. 
Out from the household data, I cannot make conclusions about the causal 
direction. Either people create their own households based on their deepest values 
and beliefs about human nature and institutions, or they learn these at home and 
believe that what works at home should work for society too. Nevertheless, the 
connection is strong and the political views are culturally consistent, which suggests 
Rejection of Cultural Bias in the Surveys     • 
 
499 
that household structures can be used to predict political views, at least in a 
statistical sense. 
Overall, the household study shows that social structure and political views are 
intimately connected at the household level. Moreover, this connection is stronger 
than the connection between their national origins and their political views.  
Survey Research and Cultural Theory 
My main goal for part II was to create a working operationalization at the individual level 
by using available survey data. I believe I have succeeded in this goal.  
I identified some issues related to the lack of clarity in the individual-culture 
relationships, and methodological problems concerning the measurement, 
operationalization, and statistical analysis of cultural biases. First, we still do not 
have a good method for measuring cultural biases, social relations, or behavioral 
patterns in surveys. Second, the measurement of cultural biases is intrinsically 
interwoven with our understanding of the individual-culture relationship. Third, it 
is very easy to confuse descriptions and analyses of individuals and institutions in 
statistical analyses. Fourth, cultural biases are not numbers; they are instead patterns 
of meaning that do not permit the use of a wide variety of statistical calculations.  
I have previously presented the Coherent, Sequential, and Synthetic Individual 
approaches as alternative ways of operationalizing cultural theory at the individual 
level. The main difference between these is found in their various understandings 
of how institutions influence an individual’s cultural bias. If we do not know how 
institutions influence individual cultural biases, then it is almost impossible to 
describe institutions by using the results from measurements of people’s four 
cultural biases.  
In order to test my ideas, I first had to create four continuous scales for measuring 
the four cultural biases in two different large-scale surveys: the Nordic Cultures 
Survey from 1999 (NOS99) and the Norwegian Environmental Protection Survey 
from 1995 (NEPS95).  
I suggest that cultural biases should be analyzed as individual-level cultural 
combinations. This avoids the problems connected with the meaning carried by 
cultural biases (lack of additivity and lack of independence), as well as avoids 
confusion about the levels. The great advantage of using simple cross tabulations is 
that they can be used on nominal-level variables and are not dependent on those 
assumptions I want to test. As it was unclear which assumptions give the best 
results, I explored a large number of different sets of assumptions and then selected 
for further use the variable that gave the best explanation of political views. The 
small choices made during operationalization end up making a big difference in the 
explanation of party preferences: Employing a poor method for combining cultural 
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biases explains nothing, while a robust method behind the cultural bias 
combinations can explain up to one third of the variation in party preferences, as 
measured country by country.397  
The winner of the race between variables was the two top-ranked biases approach, 
which operates under the following assumptions: First, a person’s relation to a 
particular cultural bias can be divided into three relational types: support, 
indifference, and rejection. Second, those 35 percent with highest score in each 
country relate to cultural biases by supporting them, whereas those 35 percent with 
the lowest score on the scale relate to cultural biases by rejecting them. Third, the 
30 percent in the middle are labeled as indifferent, and are thus ignored in this 
variable. Fourth, information concerning rejection is as almost as important as 
information concerning support, and therefore rejection should be used as a 
variable that describes respondents’ cultural biases. Fifth, including several cultural 
biases in the variable increases the variable’s ability to explain party preferences up 
to the point where the data is too scant to support our findings. In a common 
sample size with 1000 respondents, using two biases strikes a good balance between 
richness of description and having enough respondents in each category. Sixth, 
ranking people and ranking biases keeps these labels as close to the individual level 
as possible (without the use of means). At the national level, this variable can 
explain from 21 to 28 percent of the party preferences in the Nordic countries.  
For larger samples, it is possible to use all four biases as cultural space. This variable 
includes a label for the respondents in the neutral category, while it ignores rank 
because the biases are in a fixed order. At the national level, this variable can 
explain from 19 to 32 percent of party preferences in the Nordic countries. 
I demonstrated how both the cultural space and the two top-ranked biases variables 
can be used to explain preferences for particular ideological party families at the 
Nordic level. The categories available in these variables help to make sense of 
preferences for ideological party families, and they open up for some new insights. 
We learned how socialist left, liberal, and green party families are culturally similar. 
Likewise, even if the progress party family is sometimes located to the right of the 
conservative party on the left-right scale, culturally it has much more in common 
with the social democratic party family. Given this demonstration, I feel confident 
that my operationalization of cultural biases as individual-level combinations is 
useful and works as well as one can expect. 
Discussing the Individual-Culture Relation 
Finally, in Part III, the previously developed research was reapplied to cultural 
theory in order to tell us more about the individual-culture relationship. Survey 
                                                     
397 See Table 38 on page 381. 
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research within cultural theory has used some assumptions that I believe are 
fallacies. In order to falsify these assumptions, I test a multiplicity of different 
hypotheses for each fallacy—often on the sample and individual levels—in seven 
different samples taken from NOS99 and NEPS95. One hypothesis test is not 
enough to falsify a common assumption. However, when I can repeatedly show the 
lack of empirical support for any of the assumptions in any of the countries, it 
becomes increasingly difficult to believe that these assumptions are sound.  
It has often been assumed that people have a dominant cultural bias, just as the 
households in Part I were found to have. However, a scrutiny of this assumption 
shows that the best candidate for the dominant bias is not the only bias with an 
effect, as the second strongest bias also has a clear effect. The dominant bias 
assumption did not receive empirical support and should be regarded a fallacy. This 
also means that the coherent individual approach lacks empirical support. 
Therefore, we should avoid labeling people as hierarchical, egalitarian, 
individualistic, or fatalistic.  
In variable-oriented survey research, it is commonly assumed that the effects of two 
biases can be added together, which I call the additivity assumption. Similarly, it is 
commonly assumed that each bias has its own independent effect, which I call the 
independency assumption. Hypothesis tests show that these assumptions do not receive 
empirical support. Therefore, we should avoid statistical techniques, such as 
correlations and regressions, that require these assumptions. 
The above findings are hard to deal with. The lack of a dominant cultural bias 
means that the tendency to divide people into four cultural types is wholly 
inadequate. The lack of additivity makes it difficult to study the effects of more 
than one bias at a time. At the same time, the lack of independence makes it 
difficult to study the effects of only one bias. I suggest that individual-level 
combinations of cultural biases can be a way forward because it is not dependent 
on these assumptions.  
Based on these findings, I suggest that the breach of these assumptions is a 
methodological explanation for why, despite the promises made by Wildavsky 
(1987), individual-level cultural theory has been met with little or no success when 
applied to surveys. By using the combination of the two top-ranked biases, a 
reanalysis of the data from this research tradition might provide for better results 
and show that cultural biases can predict political preferences, behaviors, and risk 
perceptions.  
Little by little, it looks like some of the unfinished business of cultural theory can be 
settled, at least for the versions that rely on Dake’s four-dimensional measures of 
cultural biases: The knowledge model of cultural theory allows the individual to 
have different knowledge of and preferences towards each of the ways of 
organizing. The rejection of cultural bias is a phenomenon we need to relate to, 
both in households and in surveys, but it is still less important when compared to 
support. It is also possible to include new domains into the cultural bias 
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measurements. We have seen how the dominant bias assumption at the individual 
level is a fallacy, the additivity of effects assumption is a fallacy, and the 
independency of effects assumption is fallacy. The combination of two top-ranked 
cultural biases avoids these problems and opens up for the possibility of using 
cultural theory on individual-level applications. 
Individuals seem to have a more complex relationship with culture than what has 
been recognized by cultural theorists. Even if this seems novel in the context of 
cultural theory, it is old news for those who work with migrants, identities, and 
other individual-level aspects of cultural phenomena. Even if people should not be 
labeled by a ways of organizing, I can imagine that in any given particular context, 
individuals can present themselves in coherent manner for other participants, if 
they are competent in the particular way of organzing. We should not confuse 
being and behavior. 
One of the most important findings in this thesis is that rejection applies differently 
in institutions versus individuals. In households, rejection seems to serve as a way 
to clarify and strengthen the dominant way of organizing. Rejection does not apply 
the same way to social relations, behavioral patterns, and cultural biases because the 
rejected social relations are visible only in their absence, while rejection can be 
observed directly both in behavioral patterns and in cultural biases.  
With respect to individuals and survey data pertaining to cultural biases only, 
maintaining each of the four biases as its own dimension while accounting for both 
support and rejection produces a more robust fit with the data when compared to 
the fit from the two-dimensional model. The rejection of one or more biases was 
quite common in all samples. The findings show that support for one bias can go 
together with the rejection of any other bias. In other words, rejection seems to 
carry meaning that helps respondents to choose a party, although the effect of 
rejection is smaller than the effect of support. Nevertheless, the effect is large 
enough to warrant its inclusion in cultural theory because it is needed if we are to 
make sense of how cultural biases work at the individual level.  
The Migration Research 
There is a large among of uncertainty among many people, governmental bodies, 
and professionals when it comes to questions on how to deal with migrants. This 
uncertainty provided me with the opportunity to obtain public funding for Part I of 
the thesis. My answer to the question is novel among migration researchers, but old 
news among cultural theorists. I suggest that the categories from cultural theory can 
be used to describe migrant households in a way that helps to break down 
nationality-based stereotypes. Even if the four ways of organizing are themselves 
stereotypes, they are still beneficial insofar as they do not follow the old 
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stereotypes, they give guidance on how to behave, and they activate our existing 
social competences. 
While the migrant households originated from a variety of different countries, the 
similarities in the ways that some of them were organized, regardless of their 
origins, coincided with very similar views on politics and society. By contrast, 
households that were organized differently, even when coming from the same 
country, had divergent views on politics and society. Indeed, migrant households 
are as diverse as the households among the Norwegian majority. We should be 
more attentive to this diversity and not assume that households from one country 
are similar, just as we do not assume that all Norwegian households are the similar.  
I suggest that knowledge about the four different ways of organizing a household 
can be very beneficial for those professionals who need to build repertoires with 
unfamiliar households. The four ways of organizing are crude simplifications, but 
they are solid enough to serve as foundations for interactions (Olli 2007).  
I suggest that our ability to deal with migrants is better than most of us believe. Most of us 
are competent in several of the four ways of organizing. A lot of literature and 
academic prestige has been devoted to explaining differences between cultures. 
However, I believe that the majority and minority households are much more 
similar than some of us like to think, and it is here where academic research should 
focus. We can use our own knowledge of the ways of organizing as the social 
competence required to create working interactions with migrants. At least one 
requisite for friendly social interaction is present when participants can agree upon 
using the same cultural bias.  
Directions for Future Research 
My original intention was to allow qualitative and quantitative methods to clash and 
compete with each other, as I expected to find a plethora of incompatibilities 
between these two methods. Little by little, however, I realized that it is possible to 
create a bridge between the institutionally-oriented, qualitative cultural theory and 
the individually-oriented, quantitative cultural theory. At present, the bridge is still 
fragile, but hopefully it can strengthened in the future. 
Cultural theory is developing into two different directions—an institutionalist 
theory and a cognitive theory of risk. These two directions seem to be further from 
each other now than ever before. I hope my research can provide a link between 
these two strains of cultural theory. 
The cognitive theory of risk has its starting point in individuals, and it explains the 
formation of cultures through cognitive and psychological processes, without the 
need for evoking the role of institutions (Kahan 2012). While this might solve some 
of the problems with functional explanations in cultural theory, the main problem 
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lies in the rejection of institutions as the main arena of cultural learning (Grimen 
1997). Institutions are replaced by a generalized popular debate, and people’s views 
are simply averaged together. Hodgson has given an insightful analysis of the 
necessary role of institutions in all explanations of social phenomena and gives a 
warning to those, mainly economists, who believe that they can do social science 
without accounting for institutions:  
This problem has a parallel in biology: It is like to trying to talk 
about the effects of genes without environments, and commonly 
recognized to be a dead end. Social scientists should likewise 
acknowledge that consideration of individuals without an 
institutional context is also a non-starter. (Hodgson 2007:219) 
Cultural theory has excelled as a theory of institutions, and these strengths should 
be developed further. The household study shows that even those institutions that 
are common in our everyday lives do indeed matter. I believe it is possible to build 
a bridge from the institutional theory towards the more psychological version of 
cultural theory by using the knowledge model of the individual-culture relationship, 
where individuals have knowledge of and positive or negative preferences toward 
cultural biases. The rest of cultural theory can largely remain the way it has been. By 
allowing for this bridge that relates individuals to institutions, we can incorporate 
the findings from experiments that demonstrate how cultural theory works in and 
between individuals. I would like to bring the insights from the cognitive theory of 
risk to the institutional version of cultural theory. 
Even if Kahan and associates approach avoids the problem of functional 
explanation often attributed to cultural theory, they do this with the cost of loosing 
the institutional level (Kahan and Braman 2006; Grimen 1997). Verweij, Luan, and 
Nowacki have articulated a cultural theory research program that contains nine 
important hypotheses that can and should be tested. I share their belief in that the 
testing of cultural theory should focus on its structural rather than its functionalist 
roots (2011). Therefore, research should focus on the connection between 
individuals and institutions. 
Cultural theory still works rather poorly in surveys, and I believe I have pushed the 
limits for what can be done with Dake and Wildavsky’s approach to measuring 
cultural bias. Even if combinations of cultural biases can be a solution, it probably 
is not the most efficient and elegant solution. Moreover, while I have proposed 
several models for the individual-culture relationship, these models need to be 
confirmed so that we can start trusting at least one of them. 
Another aspect still in need of development is the interaction between the cultural 
biases, which probably causes the lack of additivity. Using the two top-ranked bias 
combinations either solves or hides the interaction problem, depending on your 
view, by allowing each combination to have its own effect (effect of first bias + 
effect of second bias + their interaction effect). These interaction effects should be 
analyzed in greater detail. After all, we know very little about how these 
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combinations actually work. Under which conditions do combinations become 
important? Under which conditions do biases operate alone? Are the effects of 
these combinations connected to particular domains, particular issues, particular 
biases, or particular institutional contexts? Will an individual rely on the same 
combination when he or she is faced with many different situations? There are at 
least two possible approaches for engaging in more detailed analysis: One can study 
the cultural bias combinations as configurations (Rihoux and Ragin 2009) or one 
can study the interaction effects through statistical procedures like UNIANOVA. 
Based on some of my explorations that employed these techniques, I believe that 
one should analyze a small subset of combinations rather than analyzing all 
combinations at once. 
During the research process, I have become more aware of the possibilities in 
cross-level inference and believe that we should check how the additivity and 
independence assumptions operate with respect to cultural combinations (Achen 
and Shively 1995). It is possible that by moving closer to the individual and keeping 
the different cultural combinations separate, cultural biases start to behave more 
like numbers. This is a method for controlling for the interaction effects between 
the biases.398  
Another task is to assess how old results change and new insights might arise if we 
were to reanalyze the data, but this time by using cultural combinations. For 
example, by using data from Sweden and Brazil, Sjöberg has shown the limited 
ability of cultural biases to explain variations in the perceptions of risk (in the 5 
percent range). However, he used both correlations and multivariate regressions, 
each of which rely on the false assumptions of independence and additivity 
(Sjöberg 1995). This otherwise excellent article has been quite important, at least in 
the Nordic countries, for the debate concerning the value of cultural theory in 
quantitative research. Perhaps Sjöberg’s conclusions would be different if we 
analyzed the same data by using cultural combinations.  
Suggestions for Better Ways of Measuring Cultural Biases 
What is the best way to measure cultural biases? Kahan and associates use a two-
dimensional model of cultural biases, while the more common approach is to use a 
four-dimensional model. Kahan and associates are studying individual-level 
cognition and perceptions related to moral and political controversies that take 
place within the national media. They jump over the meso-level, or the institutions 
that provide people with the chance to find out what to mean. It would be useful to 
have a research project that compares the two- and four-dimensional 
measurements, particularly in relation to respondents’ institutional attachments.  
                                                     
398 A webpage with an example of detailed effects can be seen at 
http://eero.no/publ/False_assumptions_tables_Effect_of_Biases_on_voting.html.  
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Even if experimental research has great potential for clarifying theory, there is 
always the problem of transferring the results from experiments to real-life 
situations.399 In political science, rational choice theory has been extensively tested 
with experiments, but real people in real-life situations do not always behave 
according to the models. In particular, I suspect that these experiments are not well 
suited for dealing with the role that institutions have in people’s lives.  
A standard battery of cultural theory items for survey research should be developed 
by using well-established methods (DeVellis 2003). For theoretical improvements, 
better measurements of the central concepts are required. In previous research, the 
selection of questions has been heavily guided by attempts to utilize existing survey 
data, and I believe that by now this path has been adequately explored. New 
questions should be created that focus on justifications of contextualized issues 
rather than on agreements or disagreements with abstract statements. If we want to 
increase our understanding of the linkages between individuals and institutions, we 
need measurements that allow us study the level of consistency in people’s views 
across different domains. 
The Relationship Between Individuals and Institutions 
Research tailored to unraveling some of the secrets of individuals in institutions is 
needed if we are to further develop cultural theory. Qualitative research is needed 
for developing new hypothesis about the mechanisms involved. Quantitative 
research is needed for testing and confirming the existence of these mechanisms. 
Instead of lofty dreams, I will here give two concrete examples of what kind of 
research could provide new answers concerning the relationship between 
individuals and institutions. 
Environmentalists in their Organizations  
Previous research has shown how social contact among members of environmental 
organizations increases private recycling behavior as much as the increases obtained 
from all attitudinal variables combined (Olli, Grendstad, and Wollebæk 2001). A 
more detailed analysis of the cultural biases and behaviors among environmentalists 
can teach us a lot about how important these institutions are for their attitudes and 
the way cultural biases propel their behaviors.  
Even if I have treated the environmentalist sample in NEPS95 as one large sample, 
it is actually a sample of member lists from 12 environmental organizations. This 
                                                     
399 Kahan, Braman, Gastil, et al. 2007; Kahan, Braman, Slovic, et al. 2007; Kahan et al. 2008; Kahan, 
Braman, et al. 2010; Kahan 2010a; Kahan, Cohen, et al. 2010; Kahan 2012; Verweij and Nowacki 
2010. 
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gives us a possibility of comparing organizations and their members, even if the 
number of members in each organization is small (see page 343).  
The data also contains information about how much time the members spend in 
the organizations’ activities, about their social contacts with others within the same 
organization, and about the multiple organizational memberships. If organizations 
have a central place in the lives of the members, then the organizations should also 
influence the cultural biases of their members. Similarly, if the members select an 
organization to join on the basis of their cultural biases, then the members should 
be expected to have similarities with other members from the same organization, 
but differences with members from other organizations. However, one should not 
assume that individuals have similar cultural patterns simply because the 
organizations they belong to can be described as having particular cultural patterns 
(Hofstede 2001:399).  
The NEPS95 data is rich but underutilized because of the original researchers’ 
disappointment with the performance of the cultural bias scales.400 However, my 
thesis has shown that by including some new items into the scales, the cultural bias 
scales can still be useful. This opens up for many new possibilities, particularly the 
use of multilevel analyses.  
The data also contains several questions about behavior, which also opens up for a 
study of the relative importance of institutions, versus cultural biases, as a basis for 
behavior. What is the relationship between the hard-core activist and the passive 
members? How similar are the hard-core activists across organizations? 
It would strengthen the possibilities of analysis if the ways in which organizations 
are structured could be established from information other than the data found in 
surveys. There are some books written about environmentalism and environmental 
organizations from this period, and these can provide information about each 
organization (Berntsen 1994; Strømsnes and Selle 1996). In addition, publications 
by the organizations and other written materials can help to establish knowledge on 
how they organize their activities and what kind of arguments they use. Interviews 
with a few central figures could be used to validate the interpretation based on 
written sources.  
Individuals in Institutions: More Household Research 
Households are a miniature institution that everyone has experience with, and 
therefore households should have a prominent position in cultural theory research 
that focuses on the relationship between institutions and individuals. One of the 
main contributions of this thesis is that we now have a slightly better understanding 
of how individuals deal with cultural biases, which in turn will allow for research on 
individuals in institutions by using both the institutional and individual levels at the 
same time. This can teach us several new things about the individual-institutional 
                                                     
400 Personal communication. 
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relationship. To do so, we need to collect data that can describe individuals’ cultural 
biases, social relations, and behaviors within each household, and we need to 
describe the household as a unit.  
Additional research into households might focus on several interesting and fruitful 
research questions. For example, how do households compartmentalize or deal 
with multiple cultures that are present in one household? How do households and 
individuals deal with changes? How do individuals deal with multiple ways of 
organizing within the household? Finally, what is the nature of the interaction 
between the various cultural biases at the individual level? Multilevel analyses will 
make it possible to search for the correct functional form of the relationship 
between the different levels of data, which is needed if we ever want to use cross-
level inference. Without cross-level inference, we will always need to collect data on 
both levels. A proper understanding of the functional form makes it possible to use 
survey data to describe institutions and, for example, to predict behavior at the level 
of institutions or cultural bias combinations.  
Because individuals have institutional attachments outside their households, one 
can study how individuals deal with the multiple roles that come from these 
attachments and how these multiple roles can become sources conflict. If the 
sequential individual model is correct, then we should expect that people are very 
good at keeping their roles separate and never see the multiplicity of roles as a 
problem. If the synthetic individual approach is correct, then we should expect that 
individuals have various strategies for dealing with conflicting roles that arise out 
from varying organizational practices within institutions. 
Creating changes in institutions just for research purposes is ethically dubious. 
However, it is still possible to sample households that are in a state of flux. 
Examples of these might be new households consisting of people who have just 
moved in together, or ones that recently moved to a new city or new country, or 
couples that are considering divorce. Each of these has enough potential for change 
so that we can study the dynamics within the household and the household’s 
relationship with its environment. 
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A p p e n d i x  I  -  t h e  H o u s e h o l d  S t u d y  
Interview Guides and Schema 
One Example of the Many Tailored Versions of My Letter 
of Introduction: 
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Interview Guide for the First Interview 
I would like to perform an interview with two adults in the household. I would 
expect that spouses have different connections, and are able to provide the 
household with different types of resources. Therefore, the interview must be 
adjusted to fit the informant. Alternatively, some topics are covered very briefly. 
By the time of the first interview, the informants have already received a letter with 
information about the project, with information required by Datatilsynet. 
Unfortunately, the information is relatively technical and detailed. In addition, 
because I prefer to do at least one of the interviews at peoples’ homes I already 
have either an oral or a written confirmation of their willingness to participate in 
the project. 
 
Before the Interview 
Present the project and myself.  
Check that they have information about the project (Letter of introduction). 
Agree upon a time frame for the interview  
Sign the declaration of professional secrecy in front of them (front) 
Let them sign the consent for participation (back) 
Is it OK if I make a recording? 
 
Household 
Ask everybody to present him or herself to help 
transcription.  
Can you shortly describe to me who are you?  
Who lives in this household?  
 
Schemas 
Fill in life-history schema. This takes most of the interview.  
Fill in housing and work-history schemas if needed. 
 
Life now:  
How is life now? Job? Housing?  
What is important in life?  
 
Old ambitions and dreams:  
Did life turn out the way you had hoped for?  
How did you think life in Norway would be?  
How would you like your future to look like? Dreams 
How do you try to fill these dreams? 
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Resource management:  
Income and expenses:  
Give them a few stories of people who have 
difficulties with making their ends meet.  
Who is in control of the economy?  
Do you have the overview? (Who has?) 
Where does the income come from? Is that steady?  
How do the expenses look like? Are they steady or 
do they vary?  
 
 
If you will get something expensive, how will you 
do it? How do you know if you can by something 
expensive? 
What expensive things have you bought lately? 
Why?  
Why would you not buy it? 
How could you afford it? What about 
holidays? 
Do you save money? For what? Why?   
What are the regular expenses? (Housing, food, 
clothes, travel, gifts, family obligations, 
entertainment) 
Who knows? Who decides? 
Have you had any big economic surprises? How did 
you solve these? 
From whom can you borrow money? 
Whom are you helping? 
How does a normal day look like? Are there some 
weekdays that are different? 
How does a normal day look for your spouse? 
 
 
Cultural theory -traits  
Decision-making How do you make big decisions in the 
family? 
 
 
House-work 
How do you divide the work at home? 
(Cleaning, cooking, shopping, reparations, 
childcare) 
Why? (Principle for 
division of work) 
Check for regularity 
(same person, same day,)  
 
Round up 
Thank you for participating. 
I would like to come back for a second interview after a few weeks. 
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Schemas for Life-, Work- and Housing-History  
Life-History Schema (Original in A3 size) 
Confidential  Household:_____________  Date of Interview:__________ 
  Interview person:___________________________ 
 
Year Important happenings 
Housing: His Work/Studies Her 
Work/Studies: 
1978     
1979     
1980     
1981     
1982     
1983     
1984     
1985     
1986     
1987     
1988     
1989     
1990     
1991     
1992     
1993     
1994     
1995     
1996     
1997     
1998     
1999     
2000     
2001     
2002     
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Work-History Schema (A4 size) 
Job history for  ___________________________________ Given by  ___ interview 
subject ___ partner 
Date of interview:______________________ 
Job  Short description 
of content, tasks, 
positive sides… 
How did 
you get the 
job? Who 
helped?  
Where? 
Distance?  
For how 
long? 
Start & 
end.  
Why 
did 
you 
leave 
the 
job? 
What else 
happened 
the same 
time? 
    
 
 
 
 
   
 
Housing-History Schema (A4 size) 
Housing history for  ___________________________________ Given by  ___ interview 
subject ___ partner 
Date of interview:______________________ 
Place Short 
description: 
how was it, 
location, size, 
type, N of 
rooms  
How did 
you get 
the place?  
Who 
helped?  
Who used to live 
there? 
Friends/family  
For 
how 
long? 
Start 
& 
end.  
Why did 
you leave 
the place? 
What else 
happened 
the same 
time? 
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Interview Guide for the Second Interview 
Before starting up  
Check timeframe for the interview 
Can I make a recording? 
Please, introduce yourself by name for the transcription.  
 
Follow up from first interview—justifications  
Find the missing justification from the 1st intervew. 
Draw a social map—Social networks 
Who are important people?  
Who is helping whom? 
Justice and fairness—get quotes that show connection between judgements 
and specific people.  
Changes? How was this 5-10 years a go?  
Follow up questions 
Which organizations are you a member of? Participation?  
Who are the people you meet regularly? 
Who are the people you help? 
Who are the people that help you? 
Who do you trust?  
Conflicts 
Always follow up on conflicts mentioned. 
Have you experienced conflicts in Norway? 
What was it about?  Who were involved?  How did it start? How did it end? 
Social relations 
Relationship to the rest of the society 
Positive and negative feelings to social relations. 
Symmetry—asymmetry ,  Support—burden 
Stereotypes 
How do you belive Norwegians think of you? In which category do they 
put you? How are you treated? Can you influence how you are treated and 
looked upon?  
What do you think Norwegians think about immigrants and 
Tamils/Vietnamese/Chileans? 
Relationship to the welfare state and the public authorities 
What kind of experiences do you have with:  
The Welfare State 
Politics and parties 
Schools 
Mother tongue education 
•    Appendix I - the Household Study  
 
518 
Becoming Norwegian 
The police 
UDI 
The Municipality 
The Social welfare office 
Discussing politics 
Where do you get your information from? Who do you discuss politics 
with?  
Citizenship  
What does citizenship mean to you? 
What have you learnt in Norway?  
Closing up 
Picture? Pseudonym? 
Thanks for participation! 
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Social Relations Schema (Size A3) 
 
While the author alone filled in the other schemas, the Social Relations Schema was 
typically drawn under the supervision of the interview subject.  
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Equipment Used in Transcription 
All interviews are recorded on a Minidisk player in mono mode. This allows for 145 
minutes of continuous recording with excellent sound quality. These are then 
transferred to a computer as wav-files. We used pedals by Start-Stop Universal 
Transcription System to control the playback of the sound, hence freeing both hands 
for writing. This system delivers much better sound quality than traditional 
dictation systems and with better control during transcription. The price of this 
system is also lower than other professional recording and transcription systems, 
because the system is built around the most expensive part of the equipment 
needed—a regular desktop computer—which I already possessed.  
I also had plans to use a sound based analysis system called Qualitative Media 
Analyzer (QMA).401 This program allows attachment of codes and notes directly to 
these sound files. In other words, one is not analyzing text, but rather the sound 
from the interview. It is a system with great potential, because it reduces the need 
of transcription. After coding the material (dividing into categories or by giving 
values to variables) the researcher, can select quotes based on this coding. Thus, I 
could have asked for all positive statements about the police by the highly educated, 
and played them one by one.  
After some serious use, I decided against the use of QMA, even if I had put lots of 
time and effort in it early in the process (Datatilsynet put stricter requirements on 
research, because of the search possibilities). The main reason was that I had 
difficulties with understanding my informants’ statements when they were 
separated from the rest of the interview. When one listened to a whole interview, 
one or several times, one learned about the peculiarities of accent and wording used 
by members of one household. Little by little, more details and nuances become 
understandable and these can be worked into the transcription. When the interview 
is divided and rearranged during analysis, speech becomes harder to understand, 
while the quotes retain their legibility, as quotes are transferred to a more 
standardized language. I am thus counseling against the use of this system if 
interviews are conducted in a second language, and not in the participant’s mother 
tongue. However, I am equally convinced that for other types of interviews this 
system can prove to be most useful, when one becomes accustomed to analyzing 
speech instead of the transcriptions of it.  
                                                     
401 In late 2004 the support and distribution of the program seems to have been discontinued. 
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Scores for Each Household 
These scores are based counts of items in the summaries of each household, which 
is also used to create Figure 9 (see page 261). However, there is one difference, as 
in Figure 9 both contra and pro counts are drawn into the figure. Here the contra 
traits are given negative values, pro traits positive values, and then simply added 
together. For example, the Natan household shows one contra and one pro 
individualistic trait internally for the household, which gives the value zero for 
individualistic way of organizing.  
Each way of organizing is represented by two values. The first one consists of traits 
related to the household’s internal organization and helping relations. The second one of 
traits related to the household’s view of politics and society. If these two values are close to 
each other, they correspond with expectations based on cultural theory. 
Table 73: Indicators for Ways of Organizing in each Household. 
(Count) 
Household pseudonym 
 
H
ierarchical 
internally 
H
ierarchical 
politics 
E
galitarian 
internally 
E
galitarian 
politics 
Individualistic 
internally 
Individualistic 
politics 
Fatalistic 
internally 
Fatalistic politics 
Nguyen 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Natan 5 6 1 2 0 0 0 0 
Garcia -1 -1 6 6 -1 0 0 0 
Herrera 0 0 5 4 -1 1 1 0 
Nga 0 1 0 0 5 5 0 0 
Lorca -1 -1 1 0 6 5 0 -1 
Maheswaran -2 -1 0 0 6 4 0 0 
Truong -1 0 0 0 0 0 6 3 
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Correlation Matrix—Household vs. Society by Bias 
The correlation matrix below is calculated based on the scores presented on the 
previous page. The variables are divided into two different sets: household refers 
to traits of internal way of organizing and their external helping social relations; 
politics refers to traits of views of politics and society. 
Table 74: Internal and External CB Traits in Households. 
Correlation Matrix. 
 
  
H
ierarchical 
internally
H
ierarchical 
politics
E
galitarian 
internally
E
galitarian 
politics
Individualistic 
internally
Individualistic 
politics
Fatalistic 
internally
Fatalistic politics 
Hierarchical 
internally Pearson Correlation 1.00 .98 -.23 -.10 -.42 -.49 -.25 -.14 
  Sig. (2-tailed)   .00 .59 .81 .30 .22 .54 .74 
Hierarchical 
politics Pearson Correlation .98 1.00 -.33 -.18 -.37 -.46 -.20 -.06 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .00   .42 .66 .37 .25 .64 .89 
Egalitarian 
internally Pearson Correlation -.23 -.33 1.00 .97 -.54 -.36 -.18 -.21 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .59 .42   .00 .17 .39 .67 .61 
Egalitarian 
politics Pearson Correlation -.10 -.18 .97 1.00 -.63 -.48 -.19 -.16 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .81 .66 .00   .10 .23 .65 .71 
Individualistic 
internally Pearson Correlation -.42 -.37 -.54 -.63 1.00 .95 -.30 -.38 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .30 .37 .17 .10   .00 .47 .36 
Individualistic 
politics Pearson Correlation -.49 -.46 -.36 -.48 .95 1.00 -.35 -.46 
  
Sig. (2-tailed) .22 .25 .39 .23 .00   .40 .26 
Fatalistic 
internally Pearson Correlation -.25 -.20 -.18 -.19 -.30 -.35 1.00 .95 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .54 .64 .67 .65 .47 .40   .00 
Fatalistic  
politics Pearson Correlation -.14 -.06 -.21 -.16 -.38 -.46 .95 1.00 
  Sig. (2-tailed) .74 .89 .61 .71 .36 .26 .00   
 
All Pearson correlations (r) are calculated based on the same eight cases. Values of 
significance are 2-tailed. Items marked with bold are significant on p<0.01 level 
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A p p e n d i x  I I  -  t h e  S u r v e y s  
Statistical Software Used 
I have used SPSS 15, SPSS 18 (PASW), and IBM SPSS 19 with the Python 
programmability extensions for all statistical data analysis and prepration. For SPSS 
15 Python 2.4 is required and for SPSS 18 and 19 Python 2.6 is required. In 
addition, pywin32-214.win32-py2.6.exe is installed, in order to give python the 
ability to read and write files through windows (win32api).  
The author will provide the scripts used in this thesis by request.  
The Sampling procedures used for NOS99  
In the final report describing the Nordic Cultures Survey the sampling procedures 
are described as following (Grendstad et al. 1999): 
Denmark  
The country was stratified to ensure representation of all 
geographical regions. A random sample of telephone numbers was 
then obtained. When telephone contact with a household was 
established, the interviewer asked for the person of aged 15 or 
above with the most recent birthday. Recalls were limited to seven 
attempts. For the final sample, weights were estimated with 
considerations to sex, age, and size of household and county. The 
sample is representative of the population aged 15 or above. The 
fieldwork was done between 22 and 28 March. The sample size is 
1.015.  
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Finland  
The whole country was divided into regions from each of which a 
random sample of telephone numbers was drawn in proportion to 
the region’s population size. When telephone contact was obtained, 
the respondent was picked by quota selection based on sex and age. 
The survey was conducted in the Finnish language only. The final 
sample is representative of the Finnish-speaking population aged 15 
or above. The final sample includes weights by sex and age. The 
fieldwork was done between 23 March and 5 April. The sample size 
is 1.003.  
Iceland  
An adjusted gross sample of 1.160 individuals, ranging between 16 
and 75 years of age, was randomly drawn from National Population 
Register covering the whole country. A predicted response rate of 
about 70 percent yielded a sample size of 817 respondents. Weights 
were not estimated for the final sample because sample bias was 
accounted for in the gross sample. The fieldwork was done between 
27 March and 8 April.  
Norway  
A random sample of telephone numbers was drawn from private 
households proportional to the number of inhabitants in all 
Norwegian municipalities. The interviews were further made 
proportional to gender and to the 19 counties. When telephone 
contact with a household was obtained, the interviewer asked for 
the person aged 15 or above with the most recent birthday. If a 
person meeting these conditions was found, the interview was 
carried out immediately. If not, an appointment was made for an 
interview later. Recalls were limited to eight attempts. After the 
sampling, weights were estimated to account for county, sex and 
four age groups. The fieldwork was done between 15 and 21 March. 
The sample size is 997.  
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Sweden  
The country was divided into 70 geographical regions from which a 
quota of random telephone numbers was drawn. The selection of 
respondents was based on the request to speak to, on an alternating 
basis, the youngest/oldest man/woman of the household aged 15 
or above. Recalls were limited to five attempts. For the final sample, 
weights were estimated with considerations to sex and age. The 
sample is representative of the population aged 15 and above. The 
fieldwork was done between 15 and 21 March. The sample size is 
1.000.  
 
Questions used in the 1999 Survey 
This list of questions is not complete. It contains all cultural bias questions, and a 
few other questions concerning risk, environmental crisis, and political preference. 
The questions in English, Norwegian, Swedish, Danish, Finnish and Icelandic are 
from Nordic cultures measurement, consequences and comparisons : study description and 
frequencies (Grendstad et al. 1999). 
English items  
Hierarchy  
AH1 One of the problems with people today is that they challenge authority too often.  
AH2 The best way to provide for future generations is to preserve the customs and practices of our past.  
AH3 Society works best when people obey all rules and regulations.  
AH4 Respect for authority is one of the most important things that children should learn.  
AH5 Different roles for different sorts of people enable people to live together more harmoniously.  
Egalitarianism  
AE1 The world would be a more peaceful place if its wealth were divided more equally among nations.  
AE2 What our country needs is a fairness revolution to make the distribution of goods more equal.  
AE3 I support a tax shift so that burden falls more heavily on corporations and people with large incomes.  
AE4 We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between men and women.  
AE5 Decisions in business and government should rely more heavily on popular participation.  
Individualism  
AI1 Everyone should have an equal chance to succeed and fail without government interference.  
AI2 If people have the vision and ability to acquire property, they ought to be allowed to enjoy it.  
AI3 People who are successful in business have a right to enjoy their wealth as they see fit.  
AI4 Competitive markets are almost always the best way to supply people with things they need.  
AI5 In a fair system, people with more ability should earn more.  
Fatalism  
AF1 It seems that whichever party you vote for things go on pretty much the same.  
AF2 Cooperation with others rarely works.  
AF3 The future is too uncertain for a person to make seriouos plans.  
AF4 Most people make friends only because friends are useful for them.  
AF5 I feel that life is a lottery.  
Environmentalism  
AM1 The so-called 'ecological crisis' facing humankind has been greatly exaggerated.  
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AM2 The balance of nature is strong enough to cope with the impacts of modern industrial nations.  
Strongly agree, Mildly agree, Neither, Mildly disagree, Strongly disagree  
Risk  
R1 How great a risk do you think there is that you personally will suffer an injury stemming from genetic  
A engineering?  
R2 How great a risk do you think there is that people in [country] in general will suffer injuries stemming from  
A genetic engineering?  
No significant risk, little risk, moderate risk, considerable risk, great risk  
Politics  
AP1 Which party would you vote for if there was a general election tomorrow?  
P2 In political matters, people talk of 'the left' and 'the right'. On a scale where the value of 1/0 indicates 'left' 
and the  
A value of 9/10 indicates 'right', where would you place your views on this scale, generally speaking? 
 
Norwegian items  
Hierarchy  
NH1 Et av problemene med folk i dag er at de altfor ofte setter seg opp mot autoritetene.  
NH2 Vi tar best vare på de kommende generasjoner ved å holde fast på våre seder og skikker.  
NH3 Samfunnet fungerer best når folk følger alle lover og regler nøye.  
NH4 Respekt for autoriteter er en av de viktigste tingene barn bør lære seg.  
NH5 Folk lever mer harmonisk sammen, når forskjellige slags mennesker har hver sin plass i samfunnet.  
Egalitarianism  
NE1 Det ville bli fredeligere i verden dersom rikdommen var fordelt mye jevnere mellom landene.  
NE2 Vårt land trenger en langt større grad av rettferdighet slik at rikdommen kan fordeles jevnere.  
NE3 Du er tilhenger av en skattereform som legger den største belastningen på selskaper og personer med høye 
inntekter.  
NE4 Vi må drastisk redusere ulikhetene mellom menn og kvinner.  
NE5 Beslutninger i næringslivet og i politikken bør i større grad baseres på folkelig deltakelse.  
Individualism  
NI1 Alle bør ha like muligheter til å lykkes eller feile uten at myndighetene blander seg inn.  
NI2 Dersom noen har visjoner og evner til å skaffe seg eiendom, burde de ha mulighet til å nyte den.  
NI3 Folk som har suksess i forretningslivet har rett til å bruke rikdommen sin slik de selv har lyst til.  
NI4 Markedskonkurranse er nesten alltid den beste måten å dekke folk sine behov.  
NI5 I et rettferdig system vil de som er flinkest tjene mest penger.  
Fatalism  
NF1 Uansett hvilket parti man stemmer på, så fortsetter alt som før.  
NF2 Samarbeid med andre mennesker fungerer sjelden.  
NF3 Framtiden er for usikker til at det er mulig å legge reelle planer.  
NF4 De fleste mennesker skaffer seg venner bare fordi de har nytte av dem.  
NF5 Jeg føler at livet er et lotteri.  
Environmentalism  
NM1 Den såkalte 'økologiske krisen' menneskeheten står overfor er sterkt overdrevet.  
NM2 Naturens balanse er stabil nok til å motstå påvirkningen fra moderne industriland.  
Helt enig, Litt enig, Hverken enig eller uenig, Litt uenig, Helt uenig, (Ubesvart/vet ikke)  
Risk  
NR1 Hvor stor tror du risikoen er for deg personlig for å bli skadet av genmanipulasjon?  
NR2 Hvor stor tror du risikoen er for folk i Norge generelt for å bli skadet av genmanipulasjon?  
Ubetydelig; Liten; Moderat; Stor; Meget stor  
Politics  
NP1 Hvilket parti ville du stemme på dersom det var Stortingsvalg i morgen?  
P2 I politikken snakkes det ofte om ’høyre-siden’ og ’venstre-siden’. Tenk deg en skala der 1 betyr venstre og 
9 betyr høyre. Generelt sett, hvor vil du plassere ditt eget politiske syn?  
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Swedish items  
Hierarchy  
SH1 Ett av problemen med dagens människor är att de alldeles för ofta ifrågasätter auktoriteter.  
SH2 Bästa sättet att stödja kommande generationer är att behålla det förgångnas seder och bruk.  
SH3 Samhället fungerar bäst när människor noga följer alla regler och bestämmelser.  
SH4 Respekt för auktoriteter är en av de viktigaste sakerna som barn bör lära sig.  
SH5 Människor lever mera harmoniskt tillsammans när de får olika roller.  
Egalitarianism  
SE1 Världen skulle vara fredligare om välståndet fördelades mera jämlikt mellan olika länder.  
SE2 Vad vårt land behöver är en starkt ökad rättvisa som skulle göra fördelningen av välståndet mera jämn.  
E3 Jag är anhängare av en skatteförändring som leder till att bördan läggs mer på företag och folk med mycket  
S pengar.  
SE4 Vi måste drastiskt minska skillnader mellan män och kvinnor.  
SE5 Beslut i näringslivet och politiken bör tas under större folkligt inflytande.  
Individualism  
SI1 Alla bör ha lika möjligheter att lyckas eller misslyckas utan att myndigheterna blandar sig i.  
SI2 Om människor har vision och förmåga att skaffa sig egendom så bör de få chansen att njuta av den.  
SI3 De som lyckas i affärer har rätt att njuta av sin förmögenhet på det sätt de själva vill.  
SI4 Konkurrens på marknaderna är nästan alltid det bästa sättet att förse människor med vad de behöver.  
SI5 I ett rättvist system bör de som har större förmåga också tjäna mera pengar.  
Fatalism  
SF1 Oavsett vilket parti man röstar på så förblir allt som förut.  
SF2 Samarbete med andra fungerar sällan.  
SF3 Framtiden är alltför osäker för att man på allvar ska kunna göra upp planer.  
SF4 De flesta skaffer sig vänner bara för att de har nytta av dem.  
SF5 Jag tycker livet är ett lotteri.  
Environmentalism  
SM1 Den s k ’ekologiska krisen’ som mänskligheten står inför är starkt överdriven.  
SM2 Naturens balans är stabil nog för att motstå de moderna industriländernas påverkningar.  
Instämmer helt, Instämmer i stort sett, Varken/Eller, Tar avstånd i stort sett, Tar helt avstånd  
Risk  
SR1 Hur stor tror Du risken är för Dig personligen att skadas av genmanipulation?  
SR2 Hur stor tror Du risken är för folk i allmänhet i Sverige att skadas av genmanipulation?  
Obefintlig; Liten; Måttlig; Stor; Mycket stor  
Politics  
SP1 Vilket parti skulle du rösta på om det vore val til riksdagen idag?  
P2 I politiken talar man om vänster och höger. Tänk dig en skala där 1 betyder att dina politiske åsikter ligger 
till S vänster och 9 att de ligger til höger. Var skulle du, allmänt sett, placera in dig själv?  
 
Danish items  
Hierarchy  
DH1 Et af problemerne med nutidens mennesker er at de udfordrer autoriteterne for meget.  
DH2 Den bedste måde at sikre fremtidens generationer på, er at bevare vores skikke og traditioner.  
DH3 Samfundet virker bedst, når borgerne nøje efterlever alle regler og forskrifter.  
DH4 Respekt for autoriteter er en af de vigtigste ting, som børn skal lære.  
DH5 Folk lever mere harmonisk sammen, når forskellige slags mennesker har hver deres plads i samfundet.  
Egalitarianism  
DE1 Verden ville være fredeligere hvis goderne var fordelt mere ligeligt mellem nationerne.  
DE2 Vores land bør indrettes mere retfærdigt, så goderne fordeles mere ligeligt.  
E3 Jeg går ind for reformer i skattesystemet, der pålægger større byrder på virksomheder og folk med høje  
D indkomster.  
DE4 Vi har stærkt behov for at reducere uligheder mellem mænd og kvinder.  
DE5 Beslutninger i forretningslivet og i politik burde underlægges en stærkere folkelig kontrol og deltagelse.  
Individualism  
DI1 Alle bør have lige chance for succes og fiasko uden at det offenlige skal blande sig i det.  
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DI2 Hvis folk har evnen til at erhverve sig materiell velstand, skal de have lov at nyde det.  
DI3 Folk, som har succes i erhvervslivet, har ret til at nyde deres rigdom som de selv har lyst til.  
DI4 Markedsmekanismen er næsten altid den bedste måde at forsyne folk med det de behøver.  
DI5 I et retfærdigt system, vil de dygtigste tjene flest penge.  
Fatalism  
DF1 Det er lige meget hvilket parti jeg stemmer på - det ændrer ikke noget.  
DF2 Samarbejde med andre mennesker fungerer sjældent.  
DF3 Fremtiden er for usikker til at det nytter at planlægge den for alvor.  
DF4 De fleste knytter kun venskaber fordi det er til nytte for dem selv.  
DF5 Jeg synes livet er et lotteri.  
Environmentalism  
DM1 Den såkaldte ’økologiske krise’, som menneskeheden står overfor, er kraftigt overdrevet.  
DM2 Naturens egne balance er stærk nok til at modstå påvirkningen fra de moderne industrinationer.  
Meget enig, Delvist enig, hverken enig eller uenig, Delvist uenig, Meget uenig.  
Risk  
DR1 Hvor stor tror De Deres personlige risiko er for at blive skadet af genmanipulation?  
DR2 Hvor stor tror De, at risikoen for at blive skadet af genmanipulation er for danskerne generelt?  
Ubetydelige, lille, jævn, stor, meget stor  
Politics  
DP1 Hvilket parti ville De stemme på, hvis der var Folketingsvalg i morgen?  
P2 I politikken taler man ofte om en højre-venstre skala. Hvor ville De generelt placere Dem selv på en skala 
fra 1  
D til 9, hvor 1 var venstre og 9 var højre?  
Finnish items  
Hierarchy  
FH1 Yksi tämän päivän ihmisten ongelmista on se, että he kääntyvät liian usein esivaltaa vastaan.  
FH2 Paras tapa luoda perustaa tuleville sukupolville on perinteisten tapojemme ja tottumustemme 
säilyttäminen.  
FH3 Yhteiskunta toimii parhaiten silloin kun ihmiset tottelevat kaikkia sääntöjä ja määräyksiä.  
FH4 Esivallan kunnioittaminen on yksi tärkeimpiä asioita, joita lasten tulisi oppia.  
FH5 Ristiriidaton kanssakäyminen helpottuu kun erilaisilla ihmisillä on kullakin oma paikkansa 
yhteiskunnassa.  
Egalitarianism  
FE1 Maailma olisi huomattavasti rauhaisampi paikka, jos rikkaudet olisi jaettu tasaisemmin kansakuntien 
kesken.  
E2 Maamme tarvitsee ennen kaikkea oikeudenmukaisuuden selvää vahvistumista, mitä kautta varat ja resurssit  
F voitaisiin jakaa tasavertaisemmin.  
E3 Kannatatte sellaista verouudistusta, jolla nykyistä suurempi osa verotaakasta siirretään suuryhtiöiden ja  
F suurituloisten kansalaisten kannettavaksi.  
FE4 Meidän on dramaattisesti tasattava miesten ja naisten välisiä eriarvoisuuksia.  
FE5 Elinkeinoelämän ja politiikan päätöksenteon tulisi nykyistä enemmän perustua kansalaisten 
osallistumiseen.  
Individualism  
FI1 Kaikilla tulisi olla samat mahdollisuudet onnistua tai epäonnistua ilman että julkinen valta puuttuu asiaan.  
FI2 Jos ihmisillä on taito ja kyky hankkia omaisuutta, heillä pitää olla oikeus nauttia siitä.  
FI3 Elinkeinoelämässä menestyneillä ihmisillä on oikeus nauttia varallisuudestaan parhaaksi katsomallaan 
tavalla.  
FI4 Kilpailuun perustuvat markkinat ovat melkein aina paras tapa tuottaa ihmisille sitä mitä he tarvitsevat.  
FI5 Oikeudenmukaisessa järjestelmässä kyvykkäillä ihmisillä pitäisi olla muita suuremmat tulot.  
Fatalism  
FF1 Vaikuttaa siltä, että äänestipä mitä puoluetta tahansa asiat jatkuvat suurin piirtein samaan malliin.  
FF2 Yhteistyö muiden kanssa kantaa harvoin hedelmää.  
FF3 Tulevaisuus on niin epävarma, että vakavien suunnitelmien tekeminen ei juuri kannata.  
FF4 Useimmat ihmiset solmivat ystävyyssuhteita pelkästään sen vuoksi, että ystävistä on heille hyötyä.  
FF5 Mielestäni elämä on kuin arpajaispeli.  
Environmentalism  
FM1 Ihmiskuntaa joidenkin mielestä uhkaavaa “ekologista kriisiä” on liioiteltu huomattavasti.  
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FM2 Luonnon tasapaino on niin vankka, että se kestää nykyajan teollisuusvaltioiden taholta tulevat 
vaikutukset.  
Täysin samaa mieltä, Jokseenkin samaa mieltä, Ei samaa eikä eri mieltä, Jokseenkin eri mieltä, Täysin eri  
mieltä (Ei vastausta)  
Risk  
FR1 Kuinka suureksi arvioitte Teille henkilökohtaisesti geenimanipulaatiosta aiheutuvan vahinkoriskin?  
FR2 Kuinka suureksi arvioitte suomalaisille ylipäätään geenimanipulaatiosta aiheutuvan vahinkoriskin?  
Olematon, Vähäinen, Kohtalainen, Suuri, Hyvin suuri  
Politics  
FP1 Mitä puoluetta äänestäisitte, jos eduskuntavaalit pidettäisiin huomenna?  
P2 Poliittisessa keskustelussa puhutaan usein “vasemmistosta” ja “oikeistosta”. Mihin sijottaisitte itsenne 
asteikolla F joka ulottuu nollasta kymmeneen vasemmalta oikealle?  
Icelandic items  
Hierarchy  
IH1 Einn gallinn vi folk i dag er ad thad setur sig of oft upp a moti yfirvoldunum.  
IH2 Thad er best fyrir komandi kynslodir ad vardveita sidi og venjur fortidarinnar.  
IH3 Samfelagid gengur best thegar folk fer nakvaemlega eftir reglum og fyrirmaelum.  
IH4 Virding fyrir yfirvaldi er eitt thad mikilvaegasta sem born eiga ad laera.  
IH5 Thegar hver hefur sinn stad i samfelaginu gengur folki betur ad lifa saman i satt og samlyndi.  
Egalitarianism  
IE1 Thad vaeri fridvaenlegra i heiminum ef audaefum vaeri skipt jafnar milli thjoda.  
IE2 Her a landi tharf ad storauka rettlaeti med jafnari dreifingu lifsgaeda.  
IE3 Eg styd breytingu a skattkerfinu, sem faerir skattbyrdina meira yfir a fyrirtaeki og hatekjufolk.  
IE4 Vid thurfum ad draga storlega ur ojofnudi milli karla og kvenna.  
IE5 Venjulegt folk aetti a taka meiri thatt i akvordunum i atvinnulifi og stjornsyslu.  
Individualism  
II1 Allir aettu ad hafa somu taekifaeri til ad na arangri eda mistakast i lifinu an thess ad stjornvold skipti ser af 
thvi.  
II2 Ef folk hefur hugmyndir og haefileika til ad safna eignum a thad ad fa ad njota thes.  
II3 Folk sem naer arangri i vidskiptum a rett a ad njota audaefa sinna eins og thad kys sjalft.  
II4 Samkeppnismarkadir eru naestum alltaf besta adferdin vid ad utvega folki thad sem vantar.  
II5 I sanngjornu kerfi aettu their haefari ad hafa meiri tekjur.  
Fatalism  
IF1 Thad er sama hvada flokk madur kys, thad breytist ekkert.  
IF2 Samvinna vid adra skilar sjaldan arangri.  
IF3 Framtidin er of oviss til a folk geti gert raunhaefar aaetlanir.  
IF4 Flestir eignast bara vini tkil ad hafa gagn af theim.  
IF5 Mer finnst lifid vera einsog happdraetti.  
Environmentalism  
IM1 Umhverfisvandamalin sem mannkynid stendur frammi fyrir eru storlega ykt.  
IM2 Jafnvaegi natturunnar er naegilega oflugt til ad standast ahrifin fra idnadarthjodum nutimans.  
Mjög sammala, frekar sammala, hvorki sammala ne osammala, frekar osammala, Mjög osammala (svarar  
ekki/veit ekki)  
Risk  
IR1 Hversu mikil haetta finnst ther a ad thu verdir sjalf/ur fyrir skada vegna erfdabreyttra lifvera?  
IR2 Hversu mikil haetta finnst ther a ad almenningur a Islandi skadist vegna erfdabreyttra lifvera?  
Mjög litil, Frekar litil, Hvorki mikil ne litil, Frekar mikil, Mjög mikil.  
Politics  
IP1 Hvada stjornmalaflokk myndir thu kjosa ef thad vaeru althingiskosningar a morgun?  
P2 I stjornmalum er talda um haegri og vinstri. Hvar myndir thu almennt talad stadsetja thinar skodanir a 
kvarda  
I thar sem 1 er lengs til vinstri og 9 er lengst til haegri? 
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Cultural Bias Questions used in Norway 
Only questions intended to measure cultural biases are included in this overview. 
Sometimes, like for NEPS95 it is possible to find additional questions that can 
be included in the scales.  
 
 
Likert type items ISSP 
Env 
1993 
NEPS 
1995 
NOS 
1999 
ISSP 
Env 
2000 
Hierarchy      
H1 One of the problems with people today is that they challenge 
authority too often.  
ch1 rh1 rh1 x 
H2 The best way to provide for future generations is to preserve the 
customs and practices of our past.  
ch2 rh2 rh2  
H3 Society works best when people obey all rules and regulations.    rh3  
H4 Respect for authority is one of the most important things that 
children should learn.  
  rh4  
H5 Different roles for different sorts of people enable people to live 
together more harmoniously.  
  rh5  
H6 Considering everything, the world is becoming a better place.    reverse 
Egalitarianism      
E1 The world would be a more peaceful place if its wealth were divided 
more equally among nations.  
  re1  
E2 What our country needs is a fairness revolution to make the 
distribution of goods more equal.  
ce1  re2  
E3 I support a tax shift so that burden falls more heavily on 
corporations and people with large incomes.  
ce2 re2 re3  
E4 We need to dramatically reduce inequalities between men and 
women.  
  re4  
E5 Decisions in business and government should rely more heavily on 
popular participation.  
  re5  
E6 We must redistribute wealth more evenly to get more justice in the 
world. 
 re1   
E7 Multinational corporations are to blame for most of the evil in the 
world. 
ce3    
E8 Authorities should redistribute income from people with high 
income to those less fortunate.  
   x 
E9 Private businesses needs to be controlled in order to secure 
everybodys needs 
   x 
In order to reduce unemployment we must divide the work better 
between us 
 re4   
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Individualism      
I1 Everyone should have an equal chance to succeed and fail without 
government interference.  
ci1 ri1 ri1  
I2 If people have the vision and ability to acquire property, they ought 
to be allowed to enjoy it.  
ci2 ri2 ri2  
I3 People who are successful in business have a right to enjoy their 
wealth as they see fit.  
  ri3  
I4 Competitive markets are almost always the best way to supply people 
with things they need.  
  ri4  
I5 In a fair system, people with more ability should earn more.  ci3  ri5  
I6 People with money ougth to be allowed to enjoy it    x 
I7 In some cases people should follow their concious even if it is a 
breach of law. 
   x 
I8 All societies have inequalities that are best not to infere with.     x 
Fatalism      
F1 It seems that whichever party you vote for things go on pretty much 
the same.  
cf2 rf1 rf1  
F2 Cooperation with others rarely works.  cf1 rf2 rf2  
F3 The future is too uncertain for a person to make seriouos plans.    rf3  
F4 Most people make friends only because friends are useful for them.    rf4  
F5 I feel that life is a lottery.    rf5  
F6 There is little people can do to change their lives    x 
 
Forced Choice between Cultural Biases  ISSP 
Env 
1993 
Env 
1995 
Nordic 
1999 
ISSP 
Env 
2000 
We use the concept “Equality” in different ways when it comes to 
division of wealth in society. Which one of the following forms of 
equality is most fair and should apply for the society? 
     
a. Everybody should be distributed an equal amount of 
wealth in the Society 
 Wealth_e   
b. Everybody should distributed wealth by their contribution 
to the Society 
 Wealth_h   
c. Everybody should be distributed wealth by their position 
in the Society  
 Wealth_i   
 
Dataset: Environment, 2000, Norwegian part of ISSP  
“This survey is carried out on the basis of the research collaboration in "The 
International Social Survey Programme" (ISSP). ISSP is an international 
organization that prepares and coordinates annual surveys in its member countries, 
mainly within the fields of political science and sociology. The topic of the surveys 
varies, but are repeated at intervals of a few years. In this way, changes in 
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behavioral patterns and attitudes over time as well as differences between countries 
and cultures, are possible to be detected and measured.  
The Norwegian Social Science Data Services (NSD) became a member of ISSP in 
1989 and have since been responsible for carrying out the surveys in Norway. In 
connection to the survey, Norwegian researchers are invited to add supplementary 
questions to the Norwegian respondents.  
In 2000, the objective was to collect data on the perceptions of and attitudes 
towards values, nature and environment, environmental efficacy, knowledge of 
environment and science, risks of certain environmental problems, the 
environmental effort and involvement of individuals, business and state, trust in 
environmental information from different groups/sources and individual individual 
participation in environmental issues. NSD and ISSP conducted a similar survey in 
1993. 
The Norwegian additional part was in 2000 developed in collaboration with Pål 
Kjetil Botvar, KIFO (Centre for Church Research) og Gunnar Grendstad, 
Department of Comparative Politics, UiB. The questions in the Norwegian part 
deals with (among other issues) popular religiousity and New Age-influenced 
religiousity.” (nsddata.nsd.uib.no) 
Dataset: The ISSP 1993 Survey on environmentalism  
This survey is conducted by NSD as the Norwegian part of the 1993 ISSP survey 
on environmental attitudes. The questionnaire was mailed to 2300 respondents 
aged from 16 to 79 years based on a single random sample. After three reminders 
1414 of the returned questionnaires were accepted for the datafile. The response 
rate, corrected for dropout for natural reasons, is 63.4 percent. (Kalgraf-Sjåk and 
Bøyum 1994). 
The Norwegian survey contained additional questions, including 10 of Dake’s 20 
cultural theory items.  
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Party Family Preference 
In Table 75, below, we can see the Nordic party families as defined by Grendstad 
(2003b:Appendix 1).There are a few minor differences in how I have treated the 
parties. Basically the very small parties are moved to Other parties, because they 
will be too small to give a reliable picture of the national party. These parties are: 
The Red Ellectoral Alliance (Rød Valgallianse), Pensioner’s Party (Pensjonistpartiet) 
and Coastal Party (Kystpartiet), Young Finns (Nuorsuomaliset) and True Finns 
(Perussuomaliset). 
Table 75:  National Parties by Nordic Party Family 
 Iceland Norway Denmark Sweden Finland 
Conser-
vative 
Independence 
Party (Sjálfstðis-
flokkurinn) 
Conservative 
Party (Høyre) 
Conservative 
Party 
(Konservative 
Folkeparti) 
Conservative Party 
(Moderata 
samlingspartiet) 
Conservative 
National Coalition 
Party (Kansallinen 
Kokoomus) 
Liberal Liberal Party 
(Frjálslyndi 
flokkurinn) 
Liberal Party 
(Venstre) 
Social-Liberal 
Party 
(Radikale 
Venstre) 
Liberal Party 
(Folkpartiet 
liberalarna) 
Swedish People's 
Party 
(Ruotsalainen 
Kansanpuolue) 
Social 
Demo-
cratic 
The Alliance 
(Samfylkingin) 
Labour Party 
(Arbeiderpartiet) 
Social 
Democratic 
Party (Social-
demokratiet) 
The Social 
Democrats 
(Arbetarepartiet 
social-
demokraterna) 
Social Democratic 
Party (Suomen 
Sosiali-
demokraattinen 
Puolue) 
Agrarian 
/ 
Centrist 
Progressive Party 
(Framsóknar-
flokkurinn) 
Centre Party 
(Senterpartiet) 
Liberal Party 
(Venstre) 
Centre Party 
(Centerpartiet) 
Centre Party 
(Suomen 
Keskusta) 
Left  
Socialist 
 Socialist Left 
Party 
(Sosialistisk 
Venstreparti) 
Socialist 
People's Party 
(Socialistisk 
Folkeparti) 
Left Party 
(Vänsterpartiet) 
Left-Wing 
Alliance 
(Vasemmistoliitto) 
Christian  Christian 
People's Party 
(Kristelig 
Folkeparti) 
Christian 
People's Party 
(Kristeligt 
Folkeparti) 
The Christian 
Democrats 
(Kristdemokratiska 
samhällspartiet) 
Christian League 
(Suomen 
Kristillinen Liitto) 
Progress  Progressive 
Party 
(Fremskritts-
partiet) 
Progress Party 
(Fremskridts-
partiet); 
Danish 
People's Party 
(Dansk 
Folkeparti) 
 True Finns 
(Perussuomalaiset) 
Environ-
mental 
Left-Green 
Movement 
(Vinstrihreyfingin-
grænt framboð) 
 Unity List 
(Enhedslisten) 
Green Party 
(Miljöpartiet de 
gröna) 
Green League 
(Vihreä Liitto) 
Other / 
Centrist 
  Centre 
Democratic 
Party 
(Centrum-
Demokratene) 
 Reform Group 
(Remonttiryhmä) 
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Cut-off points Used for Labeling Cultural Biases 
In Table 76 we can see how the selected cut-off points, 50 for Binary and 40&60 
for the Trichotomous and Neutral approaches are converted to cultural bias scales 
country by country. The differences between countries are not large, but sufficient 
to make difference.  
Table 76: Cut-off Points in Cultural Bias Scales By Country and 
Percentiles. NOS99. 
Country  Cut-off points in 
Percentiles Norway Sweden Denmark Finland Iceland 
50 .01 -.03 .03 .07 .02 
35 -.27 -.31 -.24 -.18 -.16 
Hierarchy 
65 .29 .26 .31 .33 .24 
50 .09 .09 .04 .14 .14 
35 -.22 -.19 -.19 -.18 -.12 
Egalitar 
65 .31 .32 .35 .36 .32 
50 .09 .09 .12 .11 .07 
35 -.16 -.19 -.18 -.18 -.19 
Individu 
65 .36 .31 .33 .32 .29 
50 -.12 -.04 -.04 -.04 -.07 
35 -.36 -.30 -.33 -.30 -.30 
Fatalism 
65 .18 .21 .19 .18 .20 
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Combinations of Cultural Biases 
Table 77: Count of Respondents and categories by Variable. 
NOS99.  
  Norway Sweden Denmark Finland Island Nordic 
  NC NR NC NR NC NR NC NR NC NR NC NR 
CoherentS1 4 995 4 999 4 1013 4 1003 4 813 4 4823 
CultFixSupp1 4 873 4 893 4 896 4 890 4 733 4 4285 
CultFixSupp2 10 879 10 896 10 899 10 896 10 740 10 4310 
CultFixSupp3 14 880 14 896 14 899 14 898 14 740 14 4313 
CultFixSupp4 15 880 15 896 15 899 15 898 15 740 15 4313 
CultRankSupp1 5 880 5 896 5 899 5 898 5 740 5 4313 
CultRankSupp2 21 880 21 896 21 899 21 898 21 740 24 4313 
CultRankSupp3 48 880 46 896 47 899 47 898 47 740 57 4313 
CultRankSupp4 68 880 70 896 70 899 71 898 70 740 82 4313 
CultFixBinA1 8 995 8 999 8 1013 8 1003 8 813 8 4823 
CultFixBinA2 26 995 24 999 25 1013 26 1003 25 813 30 4823 
CultFixBinA3 39 995 41 999 39 1013 37 1003 36 813 55 4823 
CultFixBinA4 39 995 47 999 37 1013 33 1003 30 813 69 4823 
CultRankBinA1 8 995 8 999 8 1013 8 1003 8 813 8 4823 
CultRankBinA2 50 995 48 999 49 1013 50 1003 49 813 54 4823 
CultRankBinA3 190 995 193 999 197 1013 191 1003 192 813 221 4823 
CultRankBinA4 341 995 364 999 345 1013 350 1003 332 813 496 4823 
CultFixTriA1 9 995 9 999 9 1013 9 1003 9 813 9 4823 
CultFixTriA2 39 995 37 999 39 1013 38 1003 38 813 43 4823 
CultFixTriA3 87 995 90 999 88 1013 86 1003 84 813 106 4823 
CultFixTriA4 106 995 124 999 104 1013 101 1003 95 813 160 4823 
CultRankTriA1 9 995 9 999 9 1013 9 1003 9 813 9 4823 
CultRankTriA2 57 995 57 999 57 1013 57 1003 57 813 57 4823 
CultRankTriA3 217 995 221 999 222 1013 225 1003 224 813 249 4823 
CultRankTriA4 342 995 358 999 357 1013 374 1003 337 813 567 4823 
CultRankTriA1_3 238 997 250 1000 229 1015 240 1003 222 817 321 4832 
CultFixNeutA1 12 995 12 999 12 1013 12 1003 12 813 12 4823 
CultFixNeutA2 56 995 54 999 54 1013 54 1003 54 813 61 4823 
CultFixNeutA3 112 995 118 999 113 1013 113 1003 109 813 138 4823 
CultFixNeutA4 106 995 126 999 107 1013 102 1003 95 813 176 4823 
CultRankNeutA1 12 995 12 999 12 1013 12 1003 12 813 12 4823 
CultRankNeutA2 89 995 82 999 83 1013 88 1003 81 813 105 4823 
CultRankNeutA3 318 995 319 999 320 1013 321 1003 318 813 440 4823 
CultRankNeutA4 472 995 496 999 482 1013 491 1003 454 813 913 4823 
Hierarch_Supp 2 989 2 974 2 1001 2 998 2 806 2 4768 
Egalitar_Supp 2 984 2 984 2 998 2 987 2 808 2 4761 
Individu_Supp 2 986 2 989 2 1004 2 995 2 807 2 4781 
Fatalism_Supp 2 983 2 989 2 1009 2 998 2 809 2 4788 
Hierarch_bin 2 989 2 974 2 1001 2 998 2 806 2 4768 
Egalitar_bin 2 984 2 984 2 998 2 987 2 808 2 4761 
Individu_bin 2 986 2 989 2 1004 2 995 2 807 2 4781 
Fatalism_bin 2 983 2 989 2 1009 2 998 2 809 2 4788 
Hierarch_tri 3 989 3 974 3 1001 3 998 3 806 3 4768 
Egalitar_tri 3 984 3 984 3 998 3 987 3 808 3 4761 
Individu_tri 3 986 3 989 3 1004 3 995 3 807 3 4781 
Fatalism_tri 3 983 3 989 3 1009 3 998 3 809 3 4788 
Hierarch_mid 3 989 3 974 3 1001 3 998 3 806 3 4768 
Egalitar_mid 3 984 3 984 3 998 3 987 3 808 3 4761 
Individu_mid 3 986 3 989 3 1004 3 995 3 807 3 4781 
Fatalism_mid 3 983 3 989 3 1009 3 998 3 809 3 4788 
NC is the number of categories. NR  is the number of  the respondents in these categories.  
The table above shows how many categories each variable divides the respondents into, and how 
many respondents have valid values using this variable. No limits have been applied. Compare with 
limited data in Table 37 (on page 377). 
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Table 78: The Ability to Predict Party Preference by Support vs. 
Absolute value. NOS99 limited. (U) 
  Ideological Party Families  All Parliamentary Parties 
Variables use: Mean SD Valid N Mean SD Valid N 
Support .04 .033 130 .09 .061 65 
Absolute value .06 .042 190 .16 .074 92 
U with sign<=0.05 and at least 50% of responents 
When combining all cases the difference between support and absolute value: 
F= 43.3  Significance = 0.000 
 
Table 79: The Ability to predict Party preference by Tricho-
tomous vs. Neutral versions. NOS99 limited (U) 
  Ideological Party Families  All Parliamentary Parties 
Variables use:  Mean SD Valid N Mean SD Valid N 
Supp. - indiff. - rejection .07 .051 80 .17 .083 39 
Supp. - neutral - rejection .05 .045 100 .12 .092 48 
U with sign<=0.05 and at least 50% of responents 
When combining all cases the difference between support and absolute value: 
F = 10.8    Significance = 0.001 
 
Table 80: Respondents in Cultural Space in NOS99. (Count) 
    Reject I 
 
indiff Support I 
H
ierarchy 
Fatalism
 
Reject E
 
Indiff 
Supp. E
 
Reject E
 
indiff 
Supp. E
 
Reject E
 
indiff 
Supp. E
 
Total 
Reject F 144 129 133 116 53 44 122 46 24 811 
Indiff 82 54 77 46 41 38 68 32 29 467 h 
Supp. F 58 43 50 48 29 44 42 29 25 368 
Reject F 53 52 55 80 47 31 88 39 26 471 
Indiff 55 52 44 58 57 49 72 44 37 468 Indiff 
Supp. F 29 59 76 47 59 48 37 42 60 457 
Reject F 28 22 39 30 36 33 71 32 62 353 
indiff 30 32 53 40 55 52 58 60 88 468 H 
Supp. F 28 56 83 37 81 115 72 102 235 809 
Total  507 499 610 502 458 454 630 426 586 4672 
This table shows how the Nordic Population is distributed into cultural space. This 
contains the same data as Figure 34 on page 395 . 
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Table 81: Explanatory power of N of Categories by type of Party 
Preference. NOS99. (Cubic Regression Model Parameters) 
 
Model Summary  Parameter Estimates  Dependent 
Variable: U R Square F df1 df2 Sig. Cons-
tant 
b1 b2 b3 
Ideological 
Party Families 
.842 883.0 3 496 .000 .022 .001 -8.79E-007 4.59E-010 
All 
Parliamentary 
Parties 
.985 5517.5 3 246 .000 .031 .004 -8.72E-006 8.66E-009 
The independent variable is Number of categories. Both models are cubic. 402 
 
 
 
                                                     
402 Datafile used is Nordic1999_OMS_Crosstabs_CB_fin1_tri3565_bin50.sav 
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Cultural Space 
Table 82 shows party preference by cultural space in the Nordic countries in row 
percent. These numbers are used to draw the four dimensional figures in Chapter 
11. Most of these cells contain enough respondents to give quite solid population 
estimates, but some of them have small N, making it difficult to generalize from the 
sample to the population (See Table 80 on page 536). The N is too small to present 
the information country by country. 
Table 82: Party Preference by Cultural Space. NOS99 (Row 
percent)  
Cultural  
Space  
Socialist 
Left 
Social 
D
em
ocrat 
A
grarian 
Liberal 
Christian 
Conservativ 
Progress 
G
reens 
O
ther 
Total 
Hedf 4.8 13.3 20.5 6.0 1.2 43.4 6.0 2.4 2.4 100.0 
hedF 3.8 23.1 30.8     26.9   3.8 11.5 100.0 
hEdf 18.2 33.3 9.1 6.1 6.1 6.1   6.1 15.2 100.0 
hEdF 12.0 36.0 16.0 8.0   12.0 8.0 4.0 4.0 100.0 
Hedf 4.8 19.0 28.6 4.8 4.8 28.6 4.8   4.8 100.0 
HedF 7.1 21.4 14.3 7.1 7.1 35.7 7.1     100.0 
HEdf 10.0 30.0 20.0 5.0 5.0 15.0   10.0 5.0 100.0 
HEdF 8.3 44.4 16.7 2.8 5.6 8.3 4.2 1.4 8.3 100.0 
hedt 9.4 12.5 9.4 3.1 3.1 46.9 6.3 3.1 6.3 100.0 
hEdt 12.0 32.0 20.0     8.0 4.0 8.0 16.0 100.0 
Hedt   25.0 29.2   4.2 33.3 4.2   4.2 100.0 
HEdt 7.7 61.5 7.7   3.8 11.5     7.7 100.0 
heif 10.3 31.8 14.0 7.5 9.3 18.7 0.9 3.7 3.7 100.0 
heiF   34.3 17.1 14.3 8.6 14.3 2.9 2.9 5.7 100.0 
heIf 1.1 8.6 12.9 7.5   62.4 1.1   6.5 100.0 
heIF 6.7 16.7 10.0 6.7 6.7 40.0 6.7 3.3 3.3 100.0 
hEif 38.5 27.9 2.9 6.7 1.0 1.9   15.4 5.8 100.0 
hEiF 31.3 15.6 3.1 21.9 6.3 6.3   9.4 6.3 100.0 
hEIf 21.4 28.6 7.1 14.3 7.1 14.3 7.1     100.0 
hEIF   38.9     11.1 11.1 11.1 11.1 16.7 100.0 
Heif   27.8 16.7 11.1   44.4       100.0 
HeiF 14.3 28.6 19.0   4.8 9.5 9.5   14.3 100.0 
HeIf 1.7 13.8 27.6 3.4 3.4 41.4 3.4 1.7 3.4 100.0 
HeIF 2.0 16.0 20.0 4.0 6.0 26.0 16.0   10.0 100.0 
HEif 16.0 40.0 12.0 8.0 16.0     4.0 4.0 100.0 
HEiF 7.7 17.3 28.8 1.9 7.7 13.5 9.6 5.8 7.7 100.0 
HEIf 10.8 21.6 29.7     21.6 10.8 2.7 2.7 100.0 
HEIF 8.0 38.0 19.0 2.2 8.0 11.7 5.1 2.2 5.8 100.0 
heit 4.4 26.7 22.2 8.9   26.7   2.2 8.9 100.0 
heIt   7.0 16.3 7.0   53.5 9.3 2.3 4.7 100.0 
hEit 32.0 20.0 16.0 4.0 2.0 2.0   10.0 14.0 100.0 
hEIt 25.0 31.3 12.5 12.5   6.3 6.3   6.3 100.0 
Heit 5.0 15.0 20.0 10.0 10.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 10.0 100.0 
HeIt 2.6 15.8 21.1 5.3 10.5 31.6 5.3   7.9 100.0 
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HEit 18.2 33.3 27.3   15.2 3.0   3.0   100.0 
HEIt 4.8 38.7 16.1 3.2 1.6 17.7 6.5 3.2 8.1 100.0 
hgdf 14.3 25.0 14.3 10.7 3.6 17.9 7.1 3.6 3.6 100.0 
hgdF 7.7 30.8 23.1   7.7 23.1     7.7 100.0 
Hgdf   24.0 16.0 4.0 4.0 32.0 4.0   16.0 100.0 
HgdF 6.8 29.5 18.2 4.5 9.1 22.7 6.8 2.3   100.0 
hgdt   38.5 15.4 11.5 3.8 11.5 3.8 7.7 7.7 100.0 
Hgdt 10.0 26.7 16.7 3.3 20.0 13.3 3.3   6.7 100.0 
hgif 17.6 30.8 11.0 19.8 4.4 5.5 1.1 8.8 1.1 100.0 
hgiF 22.2 18.5 18.5 7.4   11.1 7.4 3.7 11.1 100.0 
hgIf 3.7 7.4 25.9 7.4   48.1   3.7 3.7 100.0 
hgIF   14.3 28.6   14.3 14.3 14.3   14.3 100.0 
Hgif   14.3 35.7   28.6 21.4       100.0 
HgiF 3.0 33.3 24.2 6.1 12.1 9.1 3.0 3.0 6.1 100.0 
HgIf 4.2 12.5 33.3 4.2 4.2 33.3     8.3 100.0 
HgIF 2.7 17.8 20.5 5.5 4.1 16.4 24.7 1.4 6.8 100.0 
hgit 9.8 29.3 14.6 17.1 4.9 9.8 4.9 4.9 4.9 100.0 
hgIt 14.3 35.7 7.1   7.1 7.1 7.1   21.4 100.0 
Hgit 4.5 27.3 22.7 9.1 13.6 18.2     4.5 100.0 
HgIt 7.0 16.3 23.3   7.0 30.2 7.0 2.3 7.0 100.0 
redf 1.7 13.6 27.1 1.7 8.5 45.8 1.7     100.0 
redF 3.8 19.2 34.6 7.7 3.8 15.4 11.5   3.8 100.0 
rEdf 9.1 54.5 18.2     9.1 4.5   4.5 100.0 
rEdF 9.5 23.8 14.3 9.5   23.8 9.5 4.8 4.8 100.0 
redt 2.5 12.5 22.5   5.0 37.5 7.5 2.5 10.0 100.0 
rEdt 12.0 40.0 20.0   4.0 4.0 12.0   8.0 100.0 
reif 5.6 25.0 8.3 2.8 22.2 13.9 2.8 2.8 16.7 100.0 
reiF   8.3 16.7   25.0 33.3     16.7 100.0 
reIf 2.8 8.5 19.7 2.8 4.2 57.7   1.4 2.8 100.0 
reIF   25.0 8.3 8.3 4.2 41.7 12.5     100.0 
rEif 27.9 34.9 11.6   7.0 7.0 2.3 7.0 2.3 100.0 
rEiF 19.0 42.9 16.7   2.4 2.4 2.4 4.8 9.5 100.0 
rEIf   26.3 26.3 10.5 5.3 26.3     5.3 100.0 
rEIF 7.7 38.5 10.3 2.6 5.1 12.8 7.7 5.1 10.3 100.0 
reit 9.4 21.9 28.1 9.4 3.1 15.6   6.3 6.3 100.0 
reIt 4.2 16.7 14.6 6.3 2.1 43.8 4.2 2.1 6.3 100.0 
rEit 26.9 30.8 19.2 3.8     7.7 3.8 7.7 100.0 
rEIt 5.3 26.3 26.3   5.3 15.8 21.1     100.0 
rgdf   26.5 23.5 2.9 8.8 23.5 2.9 5.9 5.9 100.0 
rgdF 3.2 22.6 19.4 6.5 6.5 25.8 6.5   9.7 100.0 
rgdt 2.9 25.7 25.7 2.9 8.6 20.0   8.6 5.7 100.0 
rgif 7.7 35.9 23.1 10.3 5.1 7.7 2.6 5.1 2.6 100.0 
rgiF 18.8 40.6 6.3 3.1 9.4 12.5 3.1 3.1 3.1 100.0 
rgIf 3.7 7.4 33.3 3.7 18.5 18.5 3.7 11.1   100.0 
rgIF 7.1 25.0 21.4   10.7 25.0 7.1   3.6 100.0 
rgit 3.3 40.0 10.0 6.7 10.0 16.7 3.3 3.3 6.7 100.0 
rgIt 5.9 20.6 20.6 8.8 2.9 20.6 17.6   2.9 100.0 
 Total 9.1 25.6 18.0 5.5 5.7 21.7 4.9 3.5 6.1 100.0 
Valid N = 3015. All Nordic countries and all 81 categories of Cultural Space are included. 
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Table 83: Party Preference by Cultural Space. NOS99. (Adj. s. 
res.). 
  SocL SocD Agr Lib Chr Cons Prog Gr Oth 
hedf -1.4 -2.6 .6 .2 -1.8 4.9 .5 -.5 -1.4 
hedF -.9 -.3 1.7 -1.2 -1.3 .6 -1.2 .1 1.2 
hEdf 1.8 1.0 -1.3 .1 .1 -2.2 -1.3 .8 2.2 
hEdF .5 1.2 -.3 .6 -1.2 -1.2 .7 .1 -.4 
Hedf -.7 -.7 1.3 -.1 -.2 .8 .0 -.9 -.3 
HedF -.3 -.4 -.4 .3 .2 1.3 .4 -.7 -1.0 
HEdf .1 .5 .2 -.1 -.1 -.7 -1.0 1.6 -.2 
HEdF -.2 3.7 -.3 -1.0 .0 -2.8 -.3 -1.0 .8 
hedt .1 -1.7 -1.3 -.6 -.6 3.5 .4 -.1 .0 
hEdt .5 .7 .3 -1.2 -1.2 -1.7 -.2 1.2 2.1 
Hedt -1.6 -.1 1.4 -1.2 -.3 1.4 -.2 -.9 -.4 
HEdt -.3 4.2 -1.4 -1.2 -.4 -1.3 -1.2 -1.0 .3 
heif .4 1.5 -1.1 .9 1.7 -.8 -1.9 .1 -1.0 
heiF -1.9 1.2 -.1 2.3 .7 -1.1 -.6 -.2 -.1 
heIf -2.7 -3.8 -1.3 .9 -2.4 9.7 -1.7 -1.9 .2 
heIF -.5 -1.1 -1.1 .3 .2 2.4 .5 .0 -.6 
hEif 10.6 .6 -4.1 .6 -2.1 -5.0 -2.3 6.7 -.1 
hEiF 4.4 -1.3 -2.2 4.1 .1 -2.1 -1.3 1.8 .0 
hEIf 1.6 .3 -1.1 1.5 .2 -.7 .4 -.7 -1.0 
hEIF -1.3 1.3 -2.0 -1.0 1.0 -1.1 1.2 1.8 1.9 
Heif -1.3 .2 -.1 1.1 -1.0 2.3 -1.0 -.8 -1.1 
HeiF .8 .3 .1 -1.1 -.2 -1.4 1.0 -.9 1.6 
HeIf -2.0 -2.1 1.9 -.7 -.7 3.7 -.5 -.7 -.8 
HeIF -1.8 -1.6 .4 -.5 .1 .7 3.7 -1.4 1.2 
HEif 1.2 1.7 -.8 .6 2.2 -2.6 -1.1 .1 -.4 
HEiF -.4 -1.4 2.1 -1.1 .6 -1.5 1.6 .9 .5 
HEIf .4 -.6 1.9 -1.5 -1.5 .0 1.7 -.3 -.9 
HEIF -.5 3.4 .3 -1.7 1.2 -2.9 .1 -.8 -.1 
heit -1.1 .2 .7 1.0 -1.7 .8 -1.5 -.5 .8 
heIt -2.1 -2.8 -.3 .4 -1.6 5.1 1.4 -.4 -.4 
hEit 5.7 -.9 -.4 -.5 -1.1 -3.4 -1.6 2.5 2.4 
hEIt 2.2 .5 -.6 1.2 -1.0 -1.5 .3 -.8 .0 
Heit -.6 -1.1 .2 .9 .8 -.7 1.1 .4 .7 
HeIt -1.4 -1.4 .5 -.1 1.3 1.5 .1 -1.2 .5 
HEit 1.8 1.0 1.4 -1.4 2.4 -2.6 -1.3 -.1 -1.5 
HEIt -1.2 2.4 -.4 -.8 -1.4 -.8 .6 -.1 .7 
hgdf 1.0 -.1 -.5 1.2 -.5 -.5 .6 .0 -.6 
hgdF -.2 .4 .5 -.9 .3 .1 -.8 -.7 .2 
Hgdf -1.6 -.2 -.3 -.3 -.4 1.3 -.2 -1.0 2.1 
HgdF -.5 .6 .0 -.3 1.0 .2 .6 -.4 -1.7 
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hgdt -1.6 1.5 -.3 1.4 -.4 -1.3 -.2 1.2 .3 
Hgdt .2 .1 -.2 -.5 3.4 -1.1 -.4 -1.0 .1 
hgif 2.8 1.2 -1.8 6.1 -.5 -3.8 -1.7 2.8 -2.0 
hgiF 2.4 -.8 .1 .4 -1.3 -1.3 .6 .1 1.1 
hgIf -1.0 -2.2 1.1 .4 -1.3 3.3 -1.2 .1 -.5 
hgIF -.8 -.7 .7 -.6 1.0 -.5 1.2 -.5 .9 
Hgif -1.2 -1.0 1.7 -.9 3.7 .0 -.8 -.7 -1.0 
HgiF -1.2 1.0 .9 .1 1.6 -1.8 -.5 -.1 .0 
HgIf -.8 -1.5 2.0 -.3 -.3 1.4 -1.1 -.9 .5 
HgIF -1.9 -1.5 .6 .0 -.6 -1.1 7.9 -1.0 .3 
hgit .1 .5 -.6 3.3 -.2 -1.9 .0 .5 -.3 
hgIt .7 .9 -1.1 -.9 .2 -1.3 .4 -.7 2.4 
Hgit -.7 .2 .6 .7 1.6 -.4 -1.1 -.9 -.3 
HgIt -.5 -1.4 .9 -1.6 .4 1.4 .6 -.4 .3 
redf -2.0 -2.1 1.8 -1.3 .9 4.5 -1.1 -1.5 -2.0 
redF -.9 -.7 2.2 .5 -.4 -.8 1.6 -1.0 -.5 
rEdf .0 3.1 .0 -1.1 -1.2 -1.4 -.1 -.9 -.3 
rEdF .1 -.2 -.4 .8 -1.1 .2 1.0 .3 -.3 
redt -1.5 -1.9 .7 -1.5 -.2 2.4 .8 -.3 1.0 
rEdt .5 1.7 .3 -1.2 -.4 -2.2 1.7 -1.0 .4 
reif -.7 -.1 -1.5 -.7 4.3 -1.1 -.6 -.2 2.7 
reiF -1.1 -1.4 -.1 -.8 2.9 1.0 -.8 -.7 1.5 
reIf -1.9 -3.3 .4 -1.0 -.5 7.4 -1.9 -1.0 -1.2 
reIF -1.6 -.1 -1.2 .6 -.3 2.4 1.7 -.9 -1.3 
rEif 4.3 1.4 -1.1 -1.6 .4 -2.4 -.8 1.3 -1.0 
rEiF 2.3 2.6 -.2 -1.6 -.9 -3.1 -.8 .5 .9 
rEIf -1.4 .1 .9 1.0 -.1 .5 -1.0 -.8 -.1 
rEIF -.3 1.9 -1.3 -.8 -.1 -1.4 .8 .6 1.1 
reit .1 -.5 1.5 1.0 -.6 -.8 -1.3 .9 .0 
reIt -1.2 -1.4 -.6 .2 -1.1 3.7 -.2 -.5 .1 
rEit 3.2 .6 .2 -.4 -1.3 -2.7 .7 .1 .3 
rEIt -.6 .1 .9 -1.1 -.1 -.6 3.3 -.8 -1.1 
rgdf -1.9 .1 .8 -.7 .8 .3 -.5 .8 .0 
rgdF -1.1 -.4 .2 .2 .2 .6 .4 -1.1 .8 
rgdt -1.3 .0 1.2 -.7 .7 -.2 -1.3 1.7 -.1 
rgif -.3 1.5 .8 1.3 -.1 -2.1 -.7 .6 -.9 
rgiF 1.9 2.0 -1.7 -.6 .9 -1.3 -.5 -.1 -.7 
rgIf -1.0 -2.2 2.1 -.4 2.9 -.4 -.3 2.2 -1.3 
rgIF -.4 -.1 .5 -1.3 1.2 .4 .6 -1.0 -.6 
rgit -1.1 1.8 -1.1 .3 1.0 -.7 -.4 .0 .1 
rgIt -.7 -.7 .4 .9 -.7 -.2 3.5 -1.1 -.8 
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Two Top-Ranked Biases 
Table 84: Party Family Preference by Two Top-Ranked Biases. 
NOS99 limited. (Adj.s. res.) 
  SocL SocD Agr Lib Chr Cons Prog Gr Oth 
ef -3.7 -4.1 2.1 -1.2 -.3 7.4 -.9 -1.9 -.7 
eh -2.1 -1.9 -1.2 -.6 -1.2 6.5 -1.1 -.2 -.5 
eI -3.2 -4.9 -.2 .9 -1.4 8.8 -.3 -1.8 -.1 
EF -.9 1.4 .9 .6 -1.0 -1.8 .5 .8 -.5 
EH 3.1 1.4 -.1 -1.9 1.5 -2.7 -1.0 -.7 .5 
EI -.9 .5 -.2 -1.2 1.0 -1.1 .6 .9 1.4 
fe -1.7 -2.7 .7 .2 .1 4.8 -1.4 -1.7 -.2 
fh .6 1.2 -1.1 1.1 1.0 -1.5 -1.8 2.3 -1.0 
fI -1.5 -3.0 .7 -.1 1.5 3.0 -.9 2.2 -1.2 
FE -.5 3.4 -.5 -1.0 -.1 -3.6 .6 -.1 2.4 
FH -2.0 2.2 1.6 -.8 -.8 -2.5 4.1 -1.7 -.2 
FI -2.1 1.0 .0 -.8 .7 -1.0 2.8 -.1 .4 
he .1 .0 -.1 .8 -1.8 .8 .2 -.8 -.2 
hE .4 1.7 -1.9 1.8 -1.2 -2.1 -1.1 1.2 2.5 
hf 2.2 -.2 -1.6 3.4 -.7 -.4 -.5 -.8 -1.0 
hi 3.5 -.2 -1.5 2.4 .2 -2.9 -1.7 1.9 .7 
HE -1.3 2.3 1.2 -1.9 .9 -2.2 .1 -.7 1.0 
HF -2.2 .9 1.4 -1.5 1.7 -.4 2.0 -1.6 -.9 
HI -1.5 -.4 1.4 -1.6 2.1 -.3 2.0 -2.0 .3 
iE 6.0 1.8 -1.4 -1.2 -1.3 -4.3 -.1 3.6 -1.5 
if 3.5 2.5 -1.2 1.2 .9 -4.6 -1.3 .7 -.3 
ih 5.8 -.5 -1.2 2.3 -.2 -3.9 -2.3 2.6 .3 
IH -2.2 -.4 2.2 -1.5 -.6 1.0 2.0 -.9 -.8 
Nordic 80 limit is used. Adjusted standardized residuals ≤ |1.0| are in gray. Adjusted 
standardized residuals ≤ |2.0| are statistically significant deviations (on significance level 
0.02) are in bold. 
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Table 85: Party Family Preference by Two Top-Ranked Biases. 
NOS99 limited (Row percent.) 
  SocL SocD Agr Lib Chr Cons Prog Gr Oth Total 
ef 0.7 10.4 23.9 3.7 4.5 48.5 3.0 0.7 4.5 100.0 
EF 6.0 34.0 22.0 8.0 2.0 12.0 6.0 6.0 4.0 100.0 
eh 3.4 16.9 12.4 4.5 2.2 50.6 2.2 3.4 4.5 100.0 
EH 22.2 33.3 16.7   9.3 7.4 1.9 1.9 7.4 100.0 
eI 1.6 7.1 16.5 7.9 2.4 54.3 3.9 0.8 5.5 100.0 
EI 6.1 28.6 16.3 2.0 8.2 16.3 6.1 6.1 10.2 100.0 
fe 4.0 12.0 20.0 6.7 5.3 45.3 1.3   5.3 100.0 
FE 8.1 40.7 15.1 3.5 4.7 7.0 5.8 3.5 11.6 100.0 
fh 12.1 31.8 12.1 9.1 7.6 15.2   9.1 3.0 100.0 
FH 4.3 33.9 22.6 4.3 3.5 13.0 12.2 0.9 5.2 100.0 
fI 3.8 7.5 20.8 5.7 9.4 39.6 1.9 9.4 1.9 100.0 
FI 1.7 31.0 17.2 3.4 6.9 17.2 12.1 3.4 6.9 100.0 
he 10.2 25.4 16.9 8.5   27.1 5.1 1.7 5.1 100.0 
hE 11.5 34.4 8.2 11.5 1.6 11.5 1.6 6.6 13.1 100.0 
HE 5.8 36.0 22.1 1.2 7.0 12.8 4.7 2.3 8.1 100.0 
hf 16.7 24.4 11.1 14.4 3.3 21.1 3.3 2.2 3.3 100.0 
HF 1.6 30.2 23.8 1.6 9.5 20.6 9.5   3.2 100.0 
hi 20.2 24.5 11.7 11.7 5.3 10.6 1.1 7.4 7.4 100.0 
HI 5.4 23.7 22.6 2.2 9.7 21.5 8.6   6.5 100.0 
iE 28.0 33.3 11.8 3.2 2.2 4.3 4.3 10.8 2.2 100.0 
if 19.8 35.6 12.9 8.9 6.9 4.0 2.0 5.0 5.0 100.0 
ih 25.9 23.1 13.0 11.1 4.6 7.4   8.3 6.5 100.0 
IH 1.6 23.0 27.9 1.6 3.3 27.9 9.8 1.6 3.3 100.0 
  9.8 25.3 17.2 6.1 5.0 22.6 4.5 3.8 5.7 100.0 
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Table 86: Party Family Preference by Two Top-Ranked Biases 
and Country. NOS99 limited. (Row percent)  
Norway SocL SocD Agr Lib Chr Cons Prog Gr Oth Total 
ef   21.4   7.1 3.6 53.6 14.3     100 
eh 5.6 22.2 5.6 5.6 5.6 44.4 11.1     100 
eI   8.7   8.7 8.7 56.5 17.4     100 
EF   35.7 7.1 14.3   21.4 21.4     100 
EH 9.1 72.7     18.2         100 
EI   33.3       16.7 33.3   16.7 100 
fe   30.0     10.0 50.0 10.0     100 
fh 9.1 36.4 18.2 9.1 18.2 9.1       100 
fI   66.7       16.7 16.7     100 
FE 8.3 45.8 8.3 4.2 8.3   20.8   4.2 100 
FH   33.3 6.7   6.7 10.0 43.3     100 
FI   45.0 5.0   5.0 10.0 35.0     100 
he 15.4 46.2 7.7     7.7 23.1     100 
hE 21.4 42.9   7.1   7.1 7.1   14.3 100 
hf 15.8 42.1   5.3   15.8 15.8   5.3 100 
hi 29.4 29.4 11.8 5.9     5.9   17.6 100 
HE   55.0 10.0   15.0   20.0     100 
HF   25.0 6.3   18.8 12.5 37.5     100 
HI 5.3 21.1 5.3   21.1 10.5 36.8     100 
iE 25.0 25.0 25.0   5.0 5.0 15.0     100 
if 21.9 31.3 6.3 9.4 18.8 3.1 6.3   3.1 100 
ih 23.3 26.7 10.0 16.7 6.7 6.7     10.0 100 
IH   33.3 6.7   6.7 13.3 40.0     100 
  9.1 33.7 6.5 4.8 8.2 16.1 18.8   2.9 100 
Sweden SocL SocD Agr Lib Chr Cons Prog Gr Oth Total 
ef   21.7 8.7 4.3 13.0 52.2       100 
eh 4.8 19.0   4.8   61.9   9.5   100 
eI 3.4 6.9   10.3 3.4 72.4   3.4   100 
EF 14.3 28.6 14.3 14.3       14.3 14.3 100 
EH 25.0 37.5     25.0 12.5       100 
EI 7.1 21.4 7.1 7.1 28.6 21.4   7.1   100 
fe   14.3   7.1 14.3 64.3       100 
fh 9.1 50.0   13.6 4.5 13.6   9.1   100 
fI         20.0 66.7   13.3   100 
FE 10.0 50.0 10.0   10.0 10.0   10.0   100 
FH 12.0 40.0 8.0 12.0 4.0 24.0       100 
FI   22.2     33.3 22.2   22.2   100 
he   25.0       68.8     6.3 100 
hE 8.3 25.0 16.7 8.3 8.3 16.7   8.3 8.3 100 
hf 27.3 4.5 4.5 18.2 13.6 31.8       100 
hi 29.4 35.3     17.6 5.9   11.8   100 
HE   54.5 18.2   9.1 18.2       100 
HF 10.0 40.0 20.0   10.0 20.0       100 
HI 7.1 21.4 7.1   28.6 28.6     7.1 100 
iE 38.9 50.0   5.6 5.6         100 
if 27.8 44.4 5.6   5.6     16.7   100 
ih 26.7 33.3 13.3 6.7   6.7   13.3   100 
IH   66.7 16.7     16.7       100 
  11.8 28.7 5.3 5.9 10.1 31.5   5.6 1.1 100 
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Denmark SocL SocD Agr Lib Chr Cons Prog Gr Oth Total 
ef 2.8 5.6 63.9 5.6 2.8 11.1     8.3 100 
eh   20.0 45.0   5.0 20.0     10.0 100 
eI   3.4 55.2     17.2 3.4   20.7 100 
EF 14.3 42.9 21.4 7.1   7.1     7.1 100 
EH 30.0 10.0 40.0       10.0   10.0 100 
EI 13.3 26.7 33.3       6.7   20.0 100 
fe 8.7 13.0 39.1 13.0   17.4     8.7 100 
fh 36.4 18.2 18.2   18.2       9.1 100 
fI 9.1   72.7   18.2         100 
FE 9.1 31.8 18.2   4.5 4.5   9.1 22.7 100 
FH 3.8 38.5 34.6       3.8   19.2 100 
FI 10.0 20.0 50.0     10.0     10.0 100 
he 21.1 5.3 42.1 21.1   5.3     5.3 100 
hE 11.1 22.2 22.2 11.1         33.3 100 
hf 22.2 22.2 25.9 18.5   7.4   3.7   100 
hi 25.0 20.8 25.0 12.5   4.2   4.2 8.3 100 
HE 17.4 26.1 30.4     4.3     21.7 100 
HF   28.6 42.9 7.1 7.1 14.3       100 
HI 6.9 31.0 34.5   3.4 6.9 3.4   13.8 100 
iE 50.0 17.9 14.3     3.6 3.6 10.7   100 
if 30.0 45.0 15.0 5.0         5.0 100 
ih 45.5 15.2 9.1 12.1   3.0   12.1 3.0 100 
IH 8.3 16.7 41.7 8.3   16.7     8.3 100 
  16.8 20.6 34.0 5.6 1.9 7.1 1.3 2.4 10.3 100 
                   
Finland SocL SocD Agr Lib Chr Cons Prog Gr Oth Total 
ef   3.3 23.3   3.3 56.7   3.3 10.0 100 
eh 5.0 10.0 5.0 10.0   55.0   5.0 10.0 100 
eI 4.0 12.0 20.0 16.0   44.0     4.0 100 
EF   33.3 55.6   11.1         100 
EH 40.0 6.7 20.0   6.7 6.7     20.0 100 
EI   33.3 33.3     16.7     16.7 100 
fe 7.7 7.7 23.1   7.7 38.5     15.4 100 
fh 8.3 25.0 8.3 16.7   8.3   25.0 8.3 100 
fI 10.0   10.0 30.0   10.0   30.0 10.0 100 
FE 11.1 38.9 22.2 5.6         22.2 100 
FH 6.3 25.0 37.5 12.5 6.3     6.3 6.3 100 
FI   9.1 18.2 18.2   27.3     27.3 100 
he   12.5 12.5 12.5   37.5   12.5 12.5 100 
hE 18.2   9.1 36.4       18.2 18.2 100 
hf   7.7 15.4 23.1   38.5   7.7 7.7 100 
hi 12.5 8.3 12.5 29.2 8.3 8.3   16.7 4.2 100 
HE 4.8 23.8 28.6 4.8 9.5 23.8   4.8   100 
HF   23.1 38.5   7.7 15.4     15.4 100 
HI 4.5 13.6 36.4 9.1   31.8     4.5 100 
iE   40.0   20.0       20.0 20.0 100 
if 13.3 13.3 20.0 33.3   6.7     13.3 100 
ih 10.0 15.0 25.0 10.0 15.0 5.0   15.0 5.0 100 
IH   12.5 43.8   6.3 25.0   6.3 6.3 100 
  7.0 15.1 22.6 12.0 3.9 22.6   6.7 10.1 100 
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Iceland SocL SocD Agr Lib Chr Cons Prog Gr Oth Total 
ef           100       100 
eh   10.0       90.0       100 
eI   4.8   4.8   90.5       100 
EF   16.7 16.7     33.3   33.3   100 
EH   50.0 20.0     20.0   10.0   100 
EI   37.5       37.5   25.0   100 
fe     20.0 6.7   73.3       100 
fh   10.0 30.0     50.0   10.0   100 
fI     18.2     81.8       100 
FE   41.7 16.7 8.3   33.3       100 
FH   27.8 38.9     33.3       100 
FI   50.0 25.0     25.0       100 
he   100               100 
hE   66.7       26.7   6.7   100 
hf   66.7       22.2     11.1 100 
hi   41.7       50.0     8.3 100 
HE   27.3 18.2     27.3   9.1 18.2 100 
HF   40.0 10.0     50.0       100 
HI   33.3 11.1     55.6       100 
iE   47.1 11.8     11.8   29.4   100 
if   43.8 25.0     12.5   12.5 6.3 100 
ih   40.0 10.0     30.0     20.0 100 
IH   8.3 25.0     66.7       100 
    29.6 13.3 1.1   47.8   5.6 2.6 100 
 
 
Directional 
Measures 
Party Families Dependent       
Country Uncertainty 
Coefficient  
Asymp. Std. 
Error 
Approx. 
T 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Norway .20 .015 12.6 .000 
Sweden .24 .017 13.0 .000 
Denmark  .19 .014 11.9 .000 
Finland  .20 .016 12.1 .000 
Iceland  .30 .025 10.4 .000 
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Table 87: Party Preference by Two Top-Ranked Biases and 
Country. NOS99 limited. (Adj.s.res.) 
This table uses CultRankTri2 and Nordic limit n≥80.  
 Norway SocL SocD Agr Lib Chr Cons Prog Gr Oth 
ef -1.7 -1.4 -1.4 .6 -.9 5.6 -.6   -.9 
eh -.5 -1.0 -.2 .2 -.4 3.3 -.8   -.7 
eI -1.6 -2.6 -1.3 .9 .1 5.4 -.2   -.9 
EF -1.2 .2 .1 1.7 -1.1 .6 .3   -.7 
EH .0 2.8 -.9 -.8 1.2 -1.5 -1.6   -.6 
EI -.8 .0 -.7 -.6 -.7 .0 .9   2.0 
fe -1.0 -.2 -.8 -.7 .2 3.0 -.7   -.6 
fh .0 .2 1.6 .7 1.2 -.6 -1.6   -.6 
fI -.8 1.7 -.7 -.6 -.7 .0 -.1   -.4 
FE -.1 1.3 .4 -.2 .0 -2.2 .3   .4 
FH -1.8 .0 .0 -1.3 -.3 -.9 3.6   -1.0 
FI -1.5 1.1 -.3 -1.0 -.5 -.8 1.9   -.8 
he .8 1.0 .2 -.8 -1.1 -.8 .4   -.6 
hE 1.6 .7 -1.0 .4 -1.1 -.9 -1.1   2.6 
hf 1.0 .8 -1.2 .1 -1.3 .0 -.3   .6 
hi 3.0 -.4 .9 .2 -1.3 -1.8 -1.4   3.7 
HE -1.5 2.1 .7 -1.0 1.1 -2.0 .1   -.8 
HF -1.3 -.7 .0 -.9 1.6 -.4 2.0   -.7 
HI -.6 -1.2 -.2 -1.0 2.1 -.7 2.1   -.8 
iE 2.5 -.8 3.4 -1.0 -.5 -1.4 -.4   -.8 
if 2.6 -.3 -.1 1.3 2.3 -2.1 -1.9   .1 
ih 2.8 -.8 .8 3.2 -.3 -1.5 -2.7   2.4 
IH -1.3 .0 .0 -.9 -.2 -.3 2.1   -.7 
Sweden SocL SocD Agr Lib Chr Cons Prog Gr Oth 
ef -1.8 -.8 .7 -.3 .5 2.2   -1.2 -.5 
eh -1.0 -1.0 -1.1 -.2 -1.6 3.1   .8 -.5 
eI -1.5 -2.7 -1.3 1.1 -1.2 5.0   -.5 -.6 
EF .2 .0 1.1 1.0 -.9 -1.8   1.0 3.3 
EH 1.2 .6 -.7 -.7 1.4 -1.2   -.7 -.3 
EI -.6 -.6 .3 .2 2.3 -.8   .3 -.4 
fe -1.4 -1.2 -.9 .2 .5 2.7   -.9 -.4 
fh -.4 2.3 -1.1 1.6 -.9 -1.9   .7 -.5 
fI -1.4 -2.5 -.9 -1.0 1.3 3.0   1.3 -.4 
FE -.2 1.5 .7 -.8 .0 -1.5   .6 -.3 
FH .0 1.3 .6 1.3 -1.1 -.8   -1.3 -.6 
FI -1.1 -.4 -.7 -.8 2.3 -.6   2.2 -.3 
he -1.5 -.3 -1.0 -1.0 -1.4 3.3   -1.0 2.0 
hE -.4 -.3 1.8 .4 -.2 -1.1   .4 2.4 
hf 2.3 -2.6 -.2 2.5 .6 .0   -1.2 -.5 
hi 2.3 .6 -1.0 -1.1 1.1 -2.3   1.1 -.5 
HE -1.2 1.9 1.9 -.8 -.1 -1.0   -.8 -.4 
HF -.2 .8 2.1 -.8 .0 -.8   -.8 -.3 
HI -.6 -.6 .3 -1.0 2.3 -.2   -.9 2.2 
iE 3.7 2.1 -1.0 -.1 -.7 -2.9   -1.1 -.5 
if 2.2 1.5 .0 -1.1 -.7 -2.9   2.1 -.5 
ih 1.8 .4 1.4 .1 -1.3 -2.1   1.3 -.4 
IH -.9 2.1 1.2 -.6 -.8 -.8   -.6 -.3 
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Denmark SocL SocD Agr Lib Chr Cons Prog Gr Oth 
ef -2.3 -2.3 3.9 .0 .4 1.0 -.7 -1.0 -.4 
eh -2.1 -.1 1.1 -1.1 1.0 2.3 -.5 -.7 .0 
eI -2.5 -2.4 2.5 -1.4 -.8 2.2 1.1 -.9 1.9 
EF -.3 2.1 -1.0 .3 -.5 .0 -.4 -.6 -.4 
EH 1.1 -.8 .4 -.8 -.4 -.9 2.5 -.5 .0 
EI -.4 .6 -.1 -1.0 -.6 -1.1 1.9 -.6 1.3 
fe -1.1 -.9 .5 1.6 -.7 2.0 -.6 -.8 -.3 
fh 1.8 -.2 -1.1 -.8 4.0 -.9 -.4 -.5 -.1 
fI -.7 -1.7 2.7 -.8 4.0 -.9 -.4 -.5 -1.1 
FE -1.0 1.3 -1.6 -1.2 .9 -.5 -.5 2.1 2.0 
FH -1.8 2.3 .1 -1.3 -.7 -1.5 1.2 -.8 1.5 
FI -.6 -.1 1.1 -.8 -.4 .4 -.4 -.5 .0 
he .5 -1.7 .8 3.0 -.6 -.3 -.5 -.7 -.7 
hE -.5 .1 -.8 .7 -.4 -.8 -.3 -.5 2.3 
hf .8 .2 -.9 3.0 -.8 .1 -.6 .5 -1.8 
hi 1.1 .0 -1.0 1.5 -.7 -.6 -.6 .6 -.3 
HE .1 .7 -.4 -1.2 -.7 -.5 -.6 -.8 1.8 
HF -1.7 .7 .7 .3 1.4 1.1 -.4 -.6 -1.3 
HI -1.5 1.4 .1 -1.4 .6 .0 1.1 -.9 .6 
iE 4.9 -.4 -2.3 -1.3 -.8 -.7 1.1 3.0 -1.9 
if 1.6 2.8 -1.8 -.1 -.6 -1.3 -.5 -.7 -.8 
ih 4.6 -.8 -3.1 1.7 -.8 -.9 -.7 3.8 -1.4 
IH -.8 -.3 .6 .4 -.5 1.3 -.4 -.5 -.2 
Finland SocL SocD Agr Lib Chr Cons Prog Gr Oth 
ef -1.6 -1.9 .1 -2.1 -.2 4.7   -.8 .0 
eh -.4 -.7 -1.9 -.3 -.9 3.6   -.3 .0 
eI -.6 -.4 -.3 .6 -1.0 2.6   -1.4 -1.0 
EF -.8 1.5 2.4 -1.1 1.1 -1.6   -.8 -1.0 
EH 5.1 -.9 -.2 -1.5 .6 -1.5   -1.1 1.3 
EI -.7 1.3 .6 -.9 -.5 -.4   -.7 .5 
fe .1 -.8 .0 -1.4 .7 1.4   -1.0 .7 
fh .2 1.0 -1.2 .5 -.7 -1.2   2.6 -.2 
fI .4 -1.4 -1.0 1.8 -.6 -1.0   3.0 .0 
FE .7 2.9 .0 -.9 -.9 -2.4   -1.2 1.8 
FH -.1 1.1 1.5 .1 .5 -2.2   -.1 -.5 
FI -.9 -.6 -.4 .6 -.7 .4   -.9 1.9 
he -.8 -.2 -.7 .0 -.6 1.0   .7 .2 
hE 1.5 -1.4 -1.1 2.5 -.7 -1.8   1.5 .9 
hf -1.0 -.8 -.6 1.3 -.7 1.4   .1 -.3 
hi 1.1 -1.0 -1.2 2.7 1.2 -1.7   2.0 -1.0 
HE -.4 1.2 .7 -1.1 1.4 .1   -.4 -1.6 
HF -1.0 .8 1.4 -1.4 .7 -.6   -1.0 .7 
HI -.5 -.2 1.6 -.4 -1.0 1.1   -1.3 -.9 
iE -.9 2.2 -1.7 .8 -.6 -1.7   1.7 1.1 
if 1.0 -.2 -.2 2.6 -.8 -1.5   -1.1 .4 
ih .5 .0 .3 -.3 2.6 -1.9   1.5 -.8 
IH -1.1 -.3 2.1 -1.5 .5 .2   -.1 -.5 
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Iceland SocL SocD Agr Lib Chr Cons Prog Gr Oth 
ef   -2.8 -1.7 -.5   4.5   -1.0 -.7 
eh   -1.4 -1.3 -.3   2.7   -.8 -.5 
eI   -2.6 -1.9 1.7   4.1   -1.2 -.8 
EF   -.7 .2 -.3   -.7   3.0 -.4 
EH   1.4 .6 -.3   -1.8   .6 -.5 
EI   .5 -1.1 -.3   -.6   2.4 -.5 
fe   -2.6 .8 2.1   2.0   -1.0 -.7 
fh   -1.4 1.6 -.3   .1   .6 -.5 
fI   -2.2 .5 -.4   2.3   -.8 -.6 
FE   .9 .3 2.4   -1.0   -.9 -.6 
FH   -.2 3.3 -.5   -1.3   -1.1 -.7 
FI   1.3 1.0 -.3   -1.3   -.7 -.5 
he   2.7 -.7 -.2   -1.7   -.4 -.3 
hE   3.2 -1.6 -.4   -1.7   .2 -.7 
hf   2.5 -1.2 -.3   -1.6   -.7 1.6 
hi   .9 -1.4 -.4   .2   -.9 1.3 
HE   -.2 .5 -.4   -1.4   .5 3.3 
HF   .7 -.3 -.3   .1   -.8 -.5 
HI   .2 -.2 -.3   .5   -.7 -.5 
iE   1.6 -.2 -.5   -3.1   4.4 -.7 
if   1.3 1.4 -.4   -2.9   1.3 .9 
ih   .7 -.3 -.3   -1.1   -.8 3.5 
IH   -1.7 1.2 -.4   1.3   -.9 -.6 
 
Cultural bias combinations, Age and Gender 
Very little research explores the relationships between the common social 
background variables like age, gender, educational level, occupation, location, and 
cultural bias. There is one article by Grendstad that presents does this, and presents 
an overview of what others have found (2000). And there is one article by 
Grendstad and Sundback looking at socio-demographic effects on cultural biases 
based on the Nordic 1999 survey (2003).  In addition, “older respondents were 
more likely to be hierarchs and less likely to be egalitarians” (Jenkins-Smith and 
Smith 1994:27). 
According to cultural theory, cultural biases are strongly connected to institutions, 
and therefore there should not be a clear relation between age and gender, unless 
there are some mechanisms that select people into the different institutions. 
Nevertheless, my findings in this survey indicate that that there might be some 
connections between common social background variables and cultural bias 
combinations. 
Age and education are dealt already under the heading Acquiescence starting from 
page 326. Here I will shortly demonstrate how age and gender are related to cultural 
bias combinations. 
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In Figure 45 we can see how average age and gender vary by cultural bias 
combination. According to cultural theory this should not happen, because cultural 
biases are connected to institutions, not personal background characteristics. 
 
Figure 45: Average Age and Gender by Cultural Bias 
Combination (Fixed Abs Tri 3) NOS99. 
Figure 46: Average Age and Gender by Cultural Bias 
Combination (Two Top-ranked Abs) NOS99. 
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For some of these groups the deviation in gender proportion is large enough to be 
statistically significant.403 Combinations that are below 0.42 or above 0.65 deviate 
statistically significantly: those with more men than expected are e-f, eIf, eIF, he-, He-, 
heF, heI, and HIf; those with more females than expected are HEF, hif, Eif, EIf, and 
h-f.  
However, the connection we can observe between age and gender inFigure 45, 
above, is less obvious if we use the two strongest cultural biases ranked into a 
combination, as in Figure 46 above. In this figure there is some obvious clustering 
round the 0.5 gender average, which tells us that these cultural combinations are 
not connected to gender. Nevertheless, there are some combinations that have 
fewer women (ef, eh, eI, Fe, he, He, hI, Ie, If) and some combinations that have many 
women (Ef, EF, EH, Ei, FE, fh, hi, if, ih). 
The Alternative S3 Coding Scheme  
It is possible to keep Support and Rejection as equal principles and code them as 
similarly as possible, and make variables that are blue copies of each other in all 
other ways. I call this coding for the S3 coding scheme, because it differentiates 
between three different levels of support, just as we differentiate between three 
different levels of rejection.  
I will not present any testing related to choice of cut-off points, as the results are 
very similar as what we saw in the empirical search of cut-off points on page 367. 
The same cut-off points are used here as in the rest of the thesis. I have also 
applied a national limit of 10 respondents and a Nordic limit of 40 respondents per 
category. Categories with fewer respondents are considered missing. This increases 
the comparability across variables. 
In Table 88, below, we can se how the different variables using degrees of support 
or degrees of rejection perform. Each cell is the explanatory power of one 
contingency table (uncertainty coefficient * 100).  
Even if this coding scheme is not used in Part III the variable CB Tri Ranked– top 2 
biases - Absolute, is identical to the one used in Part III to the analysis of fallacies and 
rejection. This variable is marked in bold. We can se that also in this coding 
scheme, it performs quite well, and even if there are other variables with even 
higher explained variance, they have many more categories, making them more 
difficult to use. 
                                                     
403 Pairwise comparison of gender proportions, two-sided tests with significance level 0.05 with 
Boniferroni correction for multiple comparisons.  
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Table 88: The Explanatory Power of Cultural Combinations by 
Country. S3 NOS99 limited. (Percent explained variance). 
D
enm
ark 
Finland 
Iceland 
N
orw
ay 
Sw
eden 
D
enm
ark 
Finland 
Iceland 
N
orw
ay 
Sw
eden 
Dependent variable: 
National Party Preference 
Absolute values Support  
 CB Bin Fixed - 1  8 6 8 8 7 8 7 6 6 9 
 CB Bin Fixed - 2  15 13 12 13 17 14 13 10 13 15 
 CB Bin Fixed - 3  18 18 14 16 20 18 17 14 16 19 
 CB Bin Fixed - 4  13 11 9 11 13 13 11 9 11 13 
 CB Bin Ranked - top 1  8 6 8 8 7 8 7 6 6 9 
 CB Bin Ranked - top 2  22 19 17 18 24 17 15 12 16 19 
 CB Bin Ranked - top 3  34 30 4 29 37 28 28 14 27 33 
 CB Bin Ranked - top 4  31 20 0 33 23 31 30 11 30 34 
 CB Tri Fixed - 1  9 6 8 8 8 7 5 5 6 8 
 CB Tri Fixed - 2  17 16 13 15 20 13 11 8 13 15 
 CB Tri Fixed - 3  25 24 14 22 28 20 20 10 20 24 
 CB Tri Fixed - 4  26 26 12 25 30 26 26 12 25 30 
 CB Tri Ranked - top 1  9 6 8 8 8 7 6 5 6 8 
 CB Tri Ranked - top 2  22 22 18 19 27 19 21 14 19 23 
 CB Tri Ranked - top 3  33 35 3 27 35 33 33 7 32 38 
 CB Tri Ranked - top 4  21 32 1 23 34 33 34 4 29 37 
 CB Neut Fixed - 1  8 6 8 8 7 9 8 6 7 10 
 CB Neut Fixed - 2  16 15 12 14 20 17 17 11 17 21 
 CB Neut Fixed - 3  24 23 12 21 26 24 26 8 23 31 
 CB Neut Fixed - 4  26 26 12 25 30 26 26 12 25 30 
 CB Neut Ranked - top 1  8 6 8 8 7 9 8 6 7 10 
 CB Neut Ranked - top 2  22 22 16 19 26 20 20 11 21 25 
 CB Neut Ranked - top 3  37 34 1 27 36 33 33 4 34 39 
 CB Neut Ranked—top 4           38 . 1 . . 
 CB Tri Pref + 3 in HEIF-order 10 8 3 10 10 16 13 6 13 17 
Average 19 18 9 17 21 20 18 8 18 22 
Country limit 10 and Nordic limit 40 for each category,  
and cutpoints bin 50 and trichotomous 35&65 are used.  
Percent explained variance  = U*100. 
Results for the variable identical to the one used in Part III are in bold. 
 
Some variables have too low number of respondents, even if they do seem to 
provide a high explained variance. 
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A p p e n d i x  I I I  -  t h e  D i s c u s s i o n s  
Multiple tests of hypothesis on the same data 
When multiple hypothesis tests on same data are performed, the possibility of 
finding statistically significant results created by chance increases. In Table 89 we 
can se calculated probability of getting at least one statistically significant test result 
when we perform several tests. If alpha (probability of type I error) is set to 0.05 
and we perform 10 statistical tests, then there is 40 percent chance of getting at 
least one significant result just by chance. 
Table 89: Probability of Getting at least one Significant Result 
N of tests Alpha 
 0.05 0.01 
1 0.05 0.01 
2 0.10 0.02 
5 0.23 0.05 
7 0.30 0.07 
10 0.40 0.10 
16 0.56 0.15 
20 0.64 0.18 
 
Therefore, some authors suggest that an adjusted alpha value is used. The most 
common correction is Bonferroni correction, but wastes some of the power (it is 
too conservative) (Sheskin 2011:914). An easily calculated alternative is the Šidák 
correction, which can be used to calculate the corrected alpha value for each test so 
that whole family of tests as a collective will have the alpha value set by the 
researcher (Bonferroni correction  2011) 
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Table 90: Conclusions when Repeating Hypothesis Tests 
n of  
trials Count of Rejected Hypothesis 
 0 1 2 3 4 5 
2 More trials More trials Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 
4 More trials More trials Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 
5 More trials More trials Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 
7 More trials More trials Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 
12 More trials More trials Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 
15 More trials More trials Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 
16 More trials More trials Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 
18 More trials More trials More trials Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 
20 More trials More trials More trials Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 
24 Keep H0 More trials More trials Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 
28 Keep H0 More trials More trials Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 
30 Keep H0 More trials More trials Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 
35 Keep H0 More trials More trials Reject H0 Reject H0 Reject H0 
40 Keep H0 More trials More trials More trials Reject H0 Reject H0 
 
Interpretation of Table 90: Given 16 tests, two rejections are needed before we can 
reject H0; one rejection requires us to conclude that more trials are needed; and 
with no rejections, we cannot reject H0. Given 18 tests, three rejections are needed 
before we can reject H0. Given that, it is impossible to increase the number of 
trials, “more trials” can be interpreted as inconclusive overall result. 
These conclusions are based on Test 90: Sequential test for the parameter of a 
Bernoulli population in (Kanji 2006). This test balances type I errors against type II 
errors, and allows us to make the right conclusions using multiple tests, while 
keeping as high power as possible. 
We must preselect several values for this test. The probability for type I error for 
this test is set to 0.05 and type II error to 0.1.  
Alpha Propability of type I error 0.05  
Beta Propability of type II error 0.1  
    
P0 true proportion rejections lower limit 0.001  
P1 true proportion rejections upper limit 0.1  
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False Assumptions 
Dominant Bias Assumption 
The next tables (Table 91 - Table 92) are from NEPS95, and show how party 
preference is influenced by cultural combination. Common for these is that cultural 
bias combinations with less than 10 respondents in each sample or with less than 
20 respondents in both samples together, have been removed.  
The variables used are CultBiasTriA1 for the first bias, and called 
Rem_Dominant_CultRankTriA2 for the second ranked bias. The second ranked 
bias is not constructed from ranks directly, but by removing the first letter from 
CultBiasTriA2, which leaves us with an indicator for the second ranked bias, with 
same missing as CultBiasTriA2, which is needed for the comparison of percent 
explained variance in Table 55 (on page 443). The party preference variable 
includes only expressed party preferences. Respondents who do not express a 
preference to one of the given party alternatives or who reply that that they would 
not vote are excluded. The difference is that in Table 55 also small combinations 
(n<10) are included. 
Table 91 and Table 92 are examples of the tables that are the basis for calculating 
the percent explained variance. The uncertainty coefficient for the se tables is give 
below. 
  Uncertainty Coefficent  Approx. Sign. 
Table 91 Environmental 
organisation member 
sample 
.177 .000 
Table 92 General Population Sample .233 .000 
 
In Table 91 we can see how party preference in the environmentalist sample is 
influenced by cultural bias combinations. For example, 48.1 percent of those who’s 
strongest bias is rejection of egalitarianism vote for Høyre (on the row e total), and 
if we add support for individualism as the second bias, a whole 62 percent of 
respondents vote for Høyre (on the row eI). If we combine rejection of 
individualism with indifference to all the other biases, a whole 30.8 percent of the 
environmentalists would vote for Frp. Similarly, if the dominant bias is rejection of 
hierarchy, combined with rejection of individualism 24.4 percent of the 
respondents would vote for RV  
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Table 91: Party Preference by the Two Strongest CB. Env Org 
Sample from NEPS95. (Row percent.) 
First 
ranked 
CB 
Second 
Ranked 
CB Vote if today Total Count 
    RV SV DNA Sp V Krf H Frp Other     
   SocL SocD Agr Lib Chr Cons Prog Oth Total  
  0.0 0.0 15.4 7.7 7.7 7.7 23.1 30.8 7.7 100 13 
f 0.0 0.0 25.0 12.5 6.3 0.0 50.0 0.0 6.3 100 16 
F 0.0 0.0 18.8 18.8 18.8 0.0 25.0 18.8 0.0 100 16 
h 0.0 5.6 22.2 5.6 0.0 0.0 55.6 5.6 5.6 100 18 
H 0.0 0.0 5.9 11.8 5.9 0.0 58.8 11.8 5.9 100 17 
I 0.0 0.0 20.8 12.5 0.0 0.0 62.5 4.2 0.0 100 24 
e  
Total 0.0 1.0 18.3 11.5 5.8 1.0 48.1 10.6 3.8 100 104 
E   4.3 8.7 30.4 13.0 30.4 0.0 8.7 4.3 0.0 100 23 
  f 3.2 47.6 9.5 14.3 14.3 6.3 3.2 0.0 1.6 100 63 
  F 0.0 41.2 5.9 17.6 23.5 0.0 0.0 11.8 0.0 100 17 
  h 13.9 48.5 10.9 10.9 11.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.0 100 101 
  H 5.3 10.5 21.1 31.6 10.5 15.8 0.0 0.0 5.3 100 19 
  i 5.6 42.1 7.5 21.5 10.3 9.3 1.9 0.0 1.9 100 107 
  Total 7.3 40.9 11.2 16.7 13.6 5.2 1.8 0.9 2.4 100 330 
f   0.0 13.0 34.8 13.0 21.7 0.0 17.4 0.0 0.0 100 23 
  e 0.0 0.0 51.9 3.7 14.8 0.0 29.6 0.0 0.0 100 27 
  E 0.0 37.8 23.2 13.4 14.6 7.3 2.4 0.0 1.2 100 82 
  h 1.8 33.9 25.0 5.4 16.1 1.8 14.3 0.0 1.8 100 56 
  H 0.0 4.8 38.1 0.0 14.3 14.3 23.8 4.8 0.0 100 21 
  i 1.9 15.1 26.4 18.9 26.4 5.7 3.8 1.9 0.0 100 53 
  I 0.0 12.5 37.5 9.4 6.3 3.1 25.0 3.1 3.1 100 32 
  Total 0.7 22.4 30.3 10.5 16.7 4.8 12.6 1.0 1.0 100 294 
F   0.0 0.0 25.0 0.0 12.5 12.5 12.5 25.0 12.5 100 8 
  e 0.0 0.0 0.0 9.1 27.3 0.0 54.5 0.0 9.1 100 11 
  E 0.0 25.0 10.0 15.0 10.0 15.0 5.0 15.0 5.0 100 20 
  h 13.8 13.8 10.3 10.3 10.3 0.0 6.9 17.2 17.2 100 29 
  H 0.0 0.0 28.6 14.3 28.6 0.0 0.0 14.3 14.3 100 7 
  i 0.0 11.8 11.8 23.5 0.0 11.8 11.8 11.8 17.6 100 17 
  Total 4.3 12.0 12.0 13.0 12.0 6.5 13.0 14.1 13.0 100 92 
h   5.6 22.2 22.2 11.1 22.2 0.0 11.1 5.6 0.0 100 18 
  e 0.0 15.4 34.6 3.8 23.1 3.8 11.5 0.0 7.7 100 26 
  E 14.9 50.5 4.8 5.3 10.6 1.1 2.1 0.5 10.1 100 188 
  f 5.6 34.7 30.6 4.2 9.7 0.0 9.7 2.8 2.8 100 72 
  F 14.5 25.5 5.5 9.1 12.7 0.0 14.5 1.8 16.4 100 55 
  i 24.4 33.3 11.3 4.8 13.7 1.2 2.4 0.0 8.9 100 168 
  Total 15.6 37.6 12.5 5.5 12.7 0.9 5.3 0.9 8.9 100 527 
H   4.3 4.3 30.4 13.0 8.7 13.0 21.7 4.3 0.0 100 23 
  e 0.0 0.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 10.0 60.0 0.0 0.0 100 10 
  E 0.0 0.0 18.2 27.3 18.2 18.2 18.2 0.0 0.0 100 11 
  f 0.0 5.0 35.0 30.0 10.0 5.0 15.0 0.0 0.0 100 20 
  i 0.0 10.0 20.0 20.0 20.0 30.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 10 
  Total 1.4 4.1 27.0 20.3 10.8 13.5 21.6 1.4 0.0 100 74 
i   4.8 33.3 28.6 14.3 4.8 4.8 9.5 0.0 0.0 100 21 
  E 7.0 28.2 12.7 25.4 9.9 9.9 4.2 1.4 1.4 100 71 
  f 8.3 33.3 11.1 13.9 25.0 8.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 36 
  h 6.2 47.7 10.8 9.2 15.4 4.6 0.0 0.0 6.2 100 65 
  H 0.0 0.0 11.1 33.3 11.1 22.2 11.1 11.1 0.0 100 9 
  Total 6.4 34.7 13.4 17.3 13.9 7.9 3.0 1.0 2.5 100 202 
I   0.0 8.8 26.5 8.8 11.8 0.0 38.2 5.9 0.0 100 34 
  e 0.0 0.0 16.7 11.1 11.1 0.0 50.0 11.1 0.0 100 18 
  Total  0.0 5.8 23.1 9.6 11.5 0.0 42.3 7.7 0.0 100 52 
Grand total  7.8  29.8   16.3   11.7   13.1  4.2   10.0  2.2  5.0  100  1675 
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Table 92: Party Preference by the Two First Ranked CB. General 
Sample from NEPS95. (Row percent.) 
First 
Ranked 
CB 
Second  
Raned CB 
Vote if today 
Total 
Count 
    RV SV DNA Sp V Krf H Frp Other    
   SocL SocD Agr Lib Chr Cons Prog Oth Total  
e   0.0 0.0 21.4 28.6 0.0 14.3 28.6 7.1 0.0 100 14 
  f 0.0 5.9 17.6 17.6 11.8 0.0 47.1 0.0 0.0 100 17 
  F 0.0 0.0 20.0 30.0 0.0 10.0 0.0 40.0 0.0 100 10 
  h 0.0 0.0 30.8 7.7 0.0 7.7 38.5 7.7 7.7 100 13 
  H 0.0 0.0 20.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 40.0 20.0 0.0 100 10 
  I 0.0 0.0 22.0 7.3 0.0 0.0 43.9 24.4 2.4 100 41 
  Total 0.0 1.0 21.9 15.2 1.9 3.8 37.1 17.1 1.9 100 105 
E   0.0 0.0 55.0 10.0 5.0 5.0 20.0 0.0 5.0 100 20 
  f 0.0 23.5 41.2 5.9 0.0 17.6 5.9 5.9 0.0 100 17 
  F 0.0 9.1 45.5 36.4 9.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 11 
  H 0.0 33.3 44.4 11.1 0.0 0.0 11.1 0.0 0.0 100 9 
  I 0.0 34.8 26.1 26.1 0.0 4.3 4.3 4.3 0.0 100 23 
  Total 0.0 20.0 41.3 17.5 2.5 6.3 8.8 2.5 1.3 100 80 
f   0.0 0.0 42.1 15.8 15.8 5.3 15.8 5.3 0.0 100 19 
  e 0.0 0.0 40.9 9.1 0.0 0.0 50.0 0.0 0.0 100 22 
  E 0.0 5.3 47.4 5.3 5.3 21.1 15.8 0.0 0.0 100 19 
  h 0.0 26.1 65.2 4.3 0.0 0.0 4.3 0.0 0.0 100 23 
  H 0.0 6.3 50.0 6.3 0.0 12.5 25.0 0.0 0.0 100 16 
  i 0.0 26.3 57.9 5.3 5.3 5.3 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 19 
  I 0.0 6.7 60.0 13.3 0.0 0.0 20.0 0.0 0.0 100 15 
  Total 0.0 10.5 51.9 8.3 3.8 6.0 18.8 0.8 0.0 100 133 
F   0.0 3.4 27.6 27.6 0.0 6.9 6.9 20.7 6.9 100 29 
  e 0.0 0.0 47.8 21.7 0.0 0.0 13.0 17.4 0.0 100 23 
  E 8.3 0.0 33.3 25.0 0.0 8.3 16.7 8.3 0.0 100 12 
  h 0.0 7.1 50.0 14.3 0.0 0.0 7.1 7.1 14.3 100 14 
  H 0.0 11.1 33.3 22.2 0.0 5.6 5.6 22.2 0.0 100 18 
  i 0.0 0.0 44.4 44.4 0.0 0.0 0.0 11.1 0.0 100 9 
  Total 1.0 3.8 38.1 24.8 0.0 3.8 8.6 16.2 3.8 100 105 
h   0.0 14.3 42.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 28.6 14.3 0.0 100 14 
  e 0.0 7.1 28.6 14.3 0.0 7.1 35.7 7.1 0.0 100 14 
  E 10.0 25.0 50.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 5.0 5.0 0.0 100 20 
  f 0.0 16.0 40.0 12.0 4.0 4.0 24.0 0.0 0.0 100 25 
  F 20.0 10.0 40.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 20.0 10.0 0.0 100 10 
  i 5.3 36.8 21.1 5.3 5.3 15.8 5.3 0.0 5.3 100 19 
  Total 4.9 19.6 37.3 5.9 2.9 4.9 18.6 4.9 1.0 100 102 
H   0.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 11.1 22.2 22.2 11.1 0.0 100 9 
  e 0.0 8.3 25.0 25.0 0.0 33.3 0.0 8.3 0.0 100 12 
  E 0.0 0.0 53.8 30.8 3.8 11.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 26 
  f 0.0 10.0 35.0 10.0 0.0 40.0 0.0 5.0 0.0 100 20 
  F 0.0 0.0 48.1 25.9 3.7 14.8 3.7 3.7 0.0 100 27 
  i 0.0 0.0 30.0 10.0 0.0 60.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 10 
  I 0.0 0.0 33.3 25.0 0.0 12.5 20.8 8.3 0.0 100 24 
  Total 0.0 2.3 39.8 21.1 2.3 23.4 6.3 4.7 0.0 100 128 
i   0.0 19.0 28.6 19.0 4.8 14.3 9.5 0.0 4.8 100 21 
  E 3.2 12.9 29.0 32.3 6.5 12.9 0.0 3.2 0.0 100 31 
  f 5.9 17.6 58.8 5.9 0.0 11.8 0.0 0.0 0.0 100 17 
  h 11.8 29.4 23.5 5.9 11.8 5.9 5.9 0.0 5.9 100 17 
  H 0.0 0.0 41.7 8.3 0.0 33.3 16.7 0.0 0.0 100 12 
  Total 4.1 16.3 34.7 17.3 5.1 14.3 5.1 1.0 2.0 100 98 
I  4.0 4.0 52.0 6.0 2.0 2.0 22.0 8.0 0.0 100 50 
  e 0.0 0.0 29.4 11.8 0.0 5.9 41.2 11.8 0.0 100 17 
  Total 3.0 3.0 46.3 7.5 1.5 3.0 26.9 9.0 0.0 100 67 
Grand total  1.4   9.6   39.0   15.6   2.7   9.2   15.3   6.4   0.8  100 818  
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Table 93: Party Prefrence by Two First Ranked Biases by 
Country NOS99 (Row percent) 
Nordic total 
First Second Soc.Left Soc.Dem. Agrar. Lib. Christ. Cons. Progr. Greens Other Total 
a   2.1 34.0 23.4 4.3 8.5 19.1  4.3 4.3 100.0 
    2.1 34.0 23.4 4.3 8.5 19.1   4.3 4.3 100.0 
e   3.2 14.3 27.0 1.6 4.8 30.2 7.9 1.6 9.5 100.0 
 f .7 10.4 23.9 3.7 4.5 48.5 3.0 .7 4.5 100.0 
 F 7.7     92.3    100.0 
 h 3.4 16.9 12.4 4.5 2.2 50.6 2.2 3.4 4.5 100.0 
 H  16.7 19.0 4.8 9.5 33.3 14.3  2.4 100.0 
 i  20.6 29.4 2.9 5.9 23.5  2.9 14.7 100.0 
 I 1.6 7.1 16.5 7.9 2.4 54.3 3.9 .8 5.5 100.0 
  Total 1.8 12.2 19.7 4.6 4.0 46.2 4.4 1.4 5.8 100.0 
E   13.6 30.3 16.7 4.5 6.1 7.6 12.1 3.0 6.1 100.0 
 f 3.6 42.9 14.3 3.6  14.3  14.3 7.1 100.0 
 F 4.7 34.9 23.3 7.0 2.3 14.0 7.0 4.7 2.3 100.0 
 h 16.0 40.0 8.0 8.0  4.0  12.0 12.0 100.0 
 H 22.2 33.3 16.7  9.3 7.4 1.9 1.9 7.4 100.0 
 i 35.3 26.5 17.6   2.9  8.8 8.8 100.0 
 I 7.0 27.9 18.6 2.3 9.3 16.3 2.3 7.0 9.3 100.0 
  Total 14.7 32.8 17.1 3.4 4.8 9.6 4.4 6.1 7.2 100.0 
f   3.1 23.4 25.0 3.1 7.8 25.0 3.1 6.3 3.1 100.0 
 e 4.0 12.0 20.0 6.7 5.3 45.3 1.3  5.3 100.0 
 E 22.2 37.0 7.4 11.1 3.7  3.7 3.7 11.1 100.0 
 h 12.1 31.8 12.1 9.1 7.6 15.2  9.1 3.0 100.0 
 H  42.3 30.8   15.4   11.5 100.0 
 i 15.6 33.3 13.3 4.4 15.6 4.4 2.2 8.9 2.2 100.0 
 I 3.8 7.5 20.8 5.7 9.4 39.6 1.9 9.4 1.9 100.0 
  Total 7.9 23.9 18.5 5.9 7.6 24.4 1.7 5.6 4.5 100.0 
F   5.4 21.6 18.9 5.4 8.1 23.0 8.1 2.7 6.8 100.0 
 e 5.6 33.3 33.3  5.6 5.6 11.1  5.6 100.0 
 E 8.1 40.7 15.1 3.5 4.7 7.0 5.8 3.5 11.6 100.0 
 H 4.3 33.9 22.6 4.3 3.5 13.0 12.2 .9 5.2 100.0 
 i 17.2 48.3 13.8 3.4 3.4 13.8    100.0 
 I 1.7 31.0 17.2 3.4 6.9 17.2 12.1 3.4 6.9 100.0 
  Total 6.1 33.7 19.2 3.9 5.3 13.9 8.9 2.1 6.8 100.0 
h   6.0 26.0 16.0 8.0 6.0 12.0 6.0 4.0 16.0 100.0 
 e 10.7 21.4 17.9 8.9  28.6 5.4 1.8 5.4 100.0 
 E 11.5 34.4 8.2 11.5 1.6 11.5 1.6 6.6 13.1 100.0 
 f 16.7 24.4 11.1 14.4 3.3 21.1 3.3 2.2 3.3 100.0 
 F 25.0 16.7 16.7 8.3  16.7  8.3 8.3 100.0 
 i 20.2 24.5 11.7 11.7 5.3 10.6 1.1 7.4 7.4 100.0 
 I 3.2 29.0  6.5  41.9 12.9 3.2 3.2 100.0 
  Total 13.7 25.9 11.7 10.9 3.0 18.5 3.8 4.6 7.9 100.0 
H   7.3 25.6 15.9 4.9 14.6 22.0 2.4  7.3 100.0 
 e 9.1 22.7 27.3  4.5 36.4    100.0 
 E 5.8 36.0 22.1 1.2 7.0 12.8 4.7 2.3 8.1 100.0 
 f 3.0 18.2 15.2 6.1 3.0 36.4 9.1 3.0 6.1 100.0 
 F 1.6 30.2 23.8 1.6 9.5 20.6 9.5  3.2 100.0 
 I 5.4 23.7 22.6 2.2 9.7 21.5 8.6  6.5 100.0 
  Total 5.3 27.4 20.8 2.6 9.2 21.6 6.1 .8 6.1 100.0 
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First 
Ranked  
Second 
ranked  Soc.Left Soc.Dem. Agrar. Lib. Christ. Cons. Progr. Greens Other 
Total 
i   9.6 27.4 19.2 4.1 11.0 9.6 4.1 2.7 12.3 100.0 
 e 2.4 26.8 19.5 4.9 9.8 24.4  4.9 7.3 100.0 
 E 28.0 33.3 11.8 3.2 2.2 4.3 4.3 10.8 2.2 100.0 
 f 19.8 35.6 12.9 8.9 6.9 4.0 2.0 5.0 5.0 100.0 
 F 15.6 31.3 15.6 6.3 6.3 9.4  9.4 6.3 100.0 
 h 25.9 23.1 13.0 11.1 4.6 7.4  8.3 6.5 100.0 
 H 10.0 40.0 15.0 10.0 15.0  5.0  5.0 100.0 
  Total 19.0 30.1 14.5 7.1 6.6 7.7 2.1 6.6 6.2 100.0 
I   5.6 23.3 21.1 3.3 1.1 27.8 11.1  6.7 100.0 
 e 8.3 25.0 27.8 5.6 8.3 13.9 5.6  5.6 100.0 
 E 11.5 30.8 3.8 3.8 3.8 26.9 15.4 3.8  100.0 
 f 2.9 11.4 37.1 5.7 2.9 28.6 8.6  2.9 100.0 
 F 12.5 25.0 6.3 6.3 18.8 31.3    100.0 
 H 1.8 18.2 29.1 1.8 3.6 29.1 10.9 1.8 3.6 100.0 
  Total 5.8 21.7 23.3 3.9 4.3 26.4 9.7 .8 4.3 100.0 
Total   6.4 24.8 20.2 4.3 7.6 20.0 6.4 2.5 7.9 100.0 
 e 6.5 21.0 22.2 5.6 5.2 29.8 3.2 1.2 5.2 100.0 
 E 14.2 35.9 13.5 4.7 4.0 9.2 5.0 5.5 7.9 100.0 
 f 9.3 22.3 18.3 7.6 4.3 27.1 3.6 3.1 4.5 100.0 
 F 7.8 27.9 18.4 4.5 6.7 22.9 5.0 3.4 3.4 100.0 
 h 14.9 24.7 12.2 8.3 4.2 22.2 .7 7.3 5.6 100.0 
 H 6.4 29.8 22.4 3.2 5.8 17.0 9.0 1.0 5.4 100.0 
 i 18.2 28.8 15.7 6.4 6.4 10.6 .8 6.4 6.8 100.0 
 I 3.5 18.3 17.5 4.9 6.2 34.6 6.4 3.0 5.7 100.0 
  Total 9.2 25.6 17.9 5.4 5.7 21.7 4.8 3.5 6.1 100.0 
 
Continues on next page 
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Norway 
First 
Ranked   
Second 
ranked  
Soc.Left Soc.Dem. Agrar. Lib. Christ. Cons. Progr. Other Total 
a  54.5 9.1  18.2 18.2   100.0 
  Total   54.5 9.1   18.2 18.2     100.0 
e    38.5  7.7 7.7 15.4 30.8  100.0 
 f  21.4  7.1 3.6 53.6 14.3  100.0 
 h 5.6 22.2 5.6 5.6 5.6 44.4 11.1  100.0 
 H  38.5  7.7 7.7 7.7 38.5  100.0 
 i  25.0   25.0 50.0   100.0 
 I  8.7  8.7 8.7 56.5 17.4  100.0 
  Total 1.0 23.3 1.0 6.8 7.8 41.7 18.4   100.0 
E   7.4 25.9 7.4 3.7 11.1 11.1 25.9 7.4 100.0 
 F  35.7 7.1 14.3  21.4 21.4  100.0 
 H 9.1 72.7   18.2    100.0 
  Total 5.8 38.5 5.8 5.8 9.6 11.5 19.2 3.8 100.0 
f    35.7 14.3 7.1 21.4 7.1 14.3  100.0 
 e  30.0   10.0 50.0 10.0  100.0 
 E 20.0 40.0  10.0 10.0  10.0 10.0 100.0 
 h 9.1 36.4 18.2 9.1 18.2 9.1   100.0 
 i 23.1 38.5  7.7 23.1  7.7  100.0 
 I  66.7    16.7 16.7  100.0 
  Total 9.4 39.1 6.3 6.3 15.6 12.5 9.4 1.6 100.0 
F   5.3 36.8 5.3 5.3 15.8 5.3 26.3  100.0 
 e  50.0 10.0  10.0 10.0 20.0  100.0 
 E 8.3 45.8 8.3 4.2 8.3  20.8 4.2 100.0 
 H  33.3 6.7  6.7 10.0 43.3  100.0 
 I  45.0 5.0  5.0 10.0 35.0  100.0 
  Total 2.9 40.8 6.8 1.9 8.7 6.8 31.1 1.0 100.0 
h    44.4  11.1 11.1 11.1 22.2  100.0 
 e 15.4 46.2 7.7   7.7 23.1  100.0 
 E 21.4 42.9  7.1  7.1 7.1 14.3 100.0 
 f 15.8 42.1  5.3  15.8 15.8 5.3 100.0 
 i 29.4 29.4 11.8 5.9   5.9 17.6 100.0 
 I 7.7 38.5    23.1 30.8  100.0 
  Total 16.5 40.0 3.5 4.7 1.2 10.6 16.5 7.1 100.0 
H    38.9 5.6 5.6 27.8 11.1 11.1  100.0 
 E  55.0 10.0  15.0  20.0  100.0 
 f  36.4   9.1 18.2 27.3 9.1 100.0 
 F  25.0 6.3  18.8 12.5 37.5  100.0 
 I 5.3 21.1 5.3  21.1 10.5 36.8  100.0 
  Total 1.2 35.7 6.0 1.2 19.0 9.5 26.2 1.2 100.0 
i   15.8 15.8 5.3 10.5 10.5 21.1 15.8 5.3 100.0 
 E 25.0 25.0 25.0  5.0 5.0 15.0  100.0 
 f 21.9 31.3 6.3 9.4 18.8 3.1 6.3 3.1 100.0 
 h 23.3 26.7 10.0 16.7 6.7 6.7  10.0 100.0 
 H 10.0 50.0  10.0 20.0  10.0  100.0 
  Total 20.7 27.9 9.9 9.9 11.7 7.2 8.1 4.5 100.0 
I   4.2 25.0   4.2 25.0 41.7  100.0 
 e 25.0 25.0  8.3 8.3 16.7 16.7  100.0 
 E 7.1 42.9   7.1 14.3 28.6  100.0 
 f  22.2  11.1 11.1 22.2 33.3  100.0 
 H  33.3 6.7  6.7 13.3 40.0  100.0 
  Total 6.8 29.7 1.4 2.7 6.8 18.9 33.8   100.0 
Total   4.5 32.5 5.2 5.2 13.6 14.3 22.7 1.9 100.0 
 e 11.1 37.8 4.4 2.2 6.7 20.0 17.8  100.0 
 E 12.7 42.2 8.8 2.9 7.8 3.9 17.6 3.9 100.0 
 f 10.1 30.3 2.0 7.1 9.1 23.2 15.2 3.0 100.0 
 F  30.0 6.7 6.7 10.0 16.7 30.0  100.0 
 h 15.3 27.1 10.2 11.9 8.5 18.6 3.4 5.1 100.0 
 H 2.5 41.8 3.8 2.5 10.1 7.6 31.6  100.0 
 i 21.1 31.6 5.3 5.3 13.2 10.5 5.3 7.9 100.0 
 I 2.5 29.6 2.5 2.5 8.6 25.9 28.4  100.0 
  Total 8.2 34.1 5.2 4.9 10.0 15.3 19.9 2.3 100.0 
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Sweden 
First 
Ranked  
Second 
ranked  
Soc.Left Soc.Dem. Agrar. Lib. Christ. Cons. Greens Other Total 
a  16.7 8.3 8.3 16.7 50.0   100.0 
  Total   16.7 8.3 8.3 16.7 50.0     100.0 
e    16.7   33.3 33.3 16.7  100.0 
 f  21.7 8.7 4.3 13.0 52.2   100.0 
 F 16.7     83.3   100.0 
 h 4.8 19.0  4.8  61.9 9.5  100.0 
 H    20.0 40.0 40.0   100.0 
 I 3.4 6.9  10.3 3.4 72.4 3.4  100.0 
  Total 3.3 13.3 2.2 6.7 8.9 61.1 4.4   100.0 
E   25.0 41.7 8.3 8.3   8.3 8.3 100.0 
 f  85.7     14.3  100.0 
 h  60.0    20.0 20.0  100.0 
 H 25.0 37.5   25.0 12.5   100.0 
 i 41.7 50.0     8.3  100.0 
 I 7.1 21.4 7.1 7.1 28.6 21.4 7.1  100.0 
  Total 19.0 44.8 3.4 3.4 10.3 8.6 8.6 1.7 100.0 
f   7.1 42.9  7.1 14.3 21.4 7.1  100.0 
 e  14.3  7.1 14.3 64.3   100.0 
 h 9.1 50.0  13.6 4.5 13.6 9.1  100.0 
 i 9.1 36.4   27.3  27.3  100.0 
 I     20.0 66.7 13.3  100.0 
  Total 5.3 30.3   6.6 14.5 32.9 10.5   100.0 
F    20.0   30.0 40.0 10.0  100.0 
 E 10.0 50.0 10.0  10.0 10.0 10.0  100.0 
 H 12.0 40.0 8.0 12.0 4.0 24.0   100.0 
 i 33.3 33.3 16.7 16.7     100.0 
 I  22.2   33.3 22.2 22.2  100.0 
  Total 10.0 35.0 6.7 6.7 13.3 21.7 6.7   100.0 
h   14.3 14.3 14.3  28.6 14.3 14.3  100.0 
 e  25.0    68.8  6.3 100.0 
 E 8.3 25.0 16.7 8.3 8.3 16.7 8.3 8.3 100.0 
 f 27.3 4.5 4.5 18.2 13.6 31.8   100.0 
 F    33.3  33.3 33.3  100.0 
 i 29.4 35.3   17.6 5.9 11.8  100.0 
  Total 16.9 19.5 5.2 7.8 11.7 29.9 6.5 2.6 100.0 
H   23.1 15.4   38.5 23.1   100.0 
 e 9.1 36.4   9.1 45.5   100.0 
 E  54.5 18.2  9.1 18.2   100.0 
 F 10.0 40.0 20.0  10.0 20.0   100.0 
 I 7.1 21.4 7.1  28.6 28.6  7.1 100.0 
  Total 10.2 32.2 8.5   20.3 27.1   1.7 100.0 
i l 8.3 50.0   25.0 16.7   100.0 
 e  30.0   20.0 50.0   100.0 
 E 38.9 50.0  5.6 5.6    100.0 
 f 27.8 44.4 5.6  5.6  16.7  100.0 
 F 14.3 42.9 7.1 7.1 14.3  14.3  100.0 
 h 26.7 33.3 13.3 6.7  6.7 13.3  100.0 
  Total 21.8 42.5 4.6 3.4 10.3 9.2 8.0   100.0 
I   11.8 41.2 11.8 5.9  29.4   100.0 
 E 40.0   20.0  20.0 20.0  100.0 
 f   20.0 20.0  60.0   100.0 
 F 20.0 30.0  10.0 30.0 10.0   100.0 
  Total 16.2 27.0 8.1 10.8 8.1 27.0 2.7   100.0 
Total   10.7 31.1 4.9 3.9 18.4 25.2 4.9 1.0 100.0 
 e 2.0 25.5  2.0 9.8 58.8  2.0 100.0 
 E 19.6 41.1 8.9 5.4 7.1 10.7 5.4 1.8 100.0 
 f 14.7 26.7 6.7 8.0 9.3 29.3 5.3  100.0 
 F 14.0 30.2 7.0 7.0 14.0 20.9 7.0  100.0 
 h 11.1 36.5 3.2 7.9 1.6 28.6 11.1  100.0 
 H 13.2 34.2 5.3 10.5 13.2 23.7   100.0 
 i 28.3 39.1 2.2 2.2 13.0 2.2 13.0  100.0 
 I 3.7 12.3 2.5 4.9 18.5 49.4 7.4 1.2 100.0 
  Total 12.2 29.7 4.5 5.6 12.2 29.0 6.1 .7 100.0 
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Denmark 
First 
Ranked  
Second 
ranked  
Soc.Left Soc.Dem. Agrar. Lib. Christ. Cons. Progr. Greens Other Total 
a   8.3 41.7 33.3      16.7 100.0 
  Total 8.3 41.7 33.3           16.7 100.0 
e   5.6 11.1 61.1   5.6 5.6  11.1 100.0 
 f 2.8 5.6 63.9 5.6 2.8 11.1   8.3 100.0 
 h  20.0 45.0  5.0 20.0   10.0 100.0 
 H  8.3 58.3  8.3 8.3 8.3  8.3 100.0 
 i   45.5   18.2   36.4 100.0 
 I  3.4 55.2   17.2 3.4  20.7 100.0 
  Total 1.6 7.9 56.3 1.6 2.4 13.5 2.4   14.3 100.0 
E   23.5 29.4 29.4 5.9   5.9  5.9 100.0 
 F 14.3 42.9 21.4 7.1  7.1   7.1 100.0 
 h 30.0 30.0 10.0 10.0    10.0 10.0 100.0 
 H 30.0 10.0 40.0    10.0  10.0 100.0 
 i 45.5 18.2 27.3     9.1  100.0 
 I 13.3 26.7 33.3    6.7  20.0 100.0 
  Total 24.7 27.3 27.3 3.9   1.3 3.9 2.6 9.1 100.0 
f   8.3 8.3 50.0   8.3  8.3 16.7 100.0 
 e 8.7 13.0 39.1 13.0  17.4   8.7 100.0 
 E 22.2 33.3 11.1 11.1     22.2 100.0 
 h 36.4 18.2 18.2  18.2    9.1 100.0 
 H  37.5 50.0      12.5 100.0 
 i 25.0 25.0 25.0   12.5   12.5 100.0 
 I 9.1  72.7  18.2     100.0 
  Total 14.6 17.1 39.0 4.9 4.9 7.3   1.2 11.0 100.0 
F   10.5 21.1 36.8 10.5  5.3 5.3  10.5 100.0 
 e 12.5 12.5 62.5      12.5 100.0 
 E 9.1 31.8 18.2  4.5 4.5  9.1 22.7 100.0 
 H 3.8 38.5 34.6    3.8  19.2 100.0 
 i 14.3 71.4 14.3       100.0 
 I 10.0 20.0 50.0   10.0   10.0 100.0 
  Total 8.7 31.5 33.7 2.2 1.1 3.3 2.2 2.2 15.2 100.0 
h   14.3 7.1 28.6 21.4   7.1  21.4 100.0 
 e 21.1 5.3 42.1 21.1  5.3   5.3 100.0 
 E 11.1 22.2 22.2 11.1     33.3 100.0 
 f 22.2 22.2 25.9 18.5  7.4  3.7  100.0 
 F 33.3 22.2 22.2   11.1   11.1 100.0 
 i 25.0 20.8 25.0 12.5  4.2  4.2 8.3 100.0 
  Total 21.6 16.7 28.4 15.7   4.9 1.0 2.0 9.8 100.0 
H   12.5 37.5 25.0   6.3   18.8 100.0 
 e 9.1 9.1 54.5   27.3    100.0 
 E 17.4 26.1 30.4   4.3   21.7 100.0 
 F  28.6 42.9 7.1 7.1 14.3    100.0 
 I 6.9 31.0 34.5  3.4 6.9 3.4  13.8 100.0 
  Total 9.7 28.0 35.5 1.1 2.2 9.7 1.1   12.9 100.0 
i   8.7 21.7 43.5  8.7    17.4 100.0 
 e  36.4 45.5 9.1 9.1     100.0 
 E 50.0 17.9 14.3   3.6 3.6 10.7  100.0 
 f 30.0 45.0 15.0 5.0     5.0 100.0 
 h 45.5 15.2 9.1 12.1  3.0  12.1 3.0 100.0 
  Total 32.2 24.3 21.7 5.2 2.6 1.7 .9 6.1 5.2 100.0 
I   4.5 22.7 59.1      13.6 100.0 
 e  21.4 64.3 7.1 7.1     100.0 
 f 9.1 9.1 81.8       100.0 
 H 8.3 16.7 41.7 8.3  16.7   8.3 100.0 
  Total 5.1 18.6 61.0 3.4 1.7 3.4     6.8 100.0 
Total   10.5 22.2 41.8 3.9 1.3 2.6 2.6 .7 14.4 100.0 
 e 9.3 15.1 48.8 10.5 2.3 9.3   4.7 100.0 
 E 25.3 25.3 19.8 2.2 1.1 3.3 1.1 5.5 16.5 100.0 
 f 14.9 19.1 44.7 8.5 1.1 6.4  1.1 4.3 100.0 
 F 13.5 32.4 29.7 5.4 2.7 10.8   5.4 100.0 
 h 29.7 18.9 20.3 6.8 4.1 6.8  6.8 6.8 100.0 
 H 7.4 25.0 42.6 1.5 1.5 4.4 4.4  13.2 100.0 
 i 23.0 23.0 27.9 4.9  6.6  3.3 11.5 100.0 
 I 6.4 17.0 46.8  3.2 8.5 3.2  14.9 100.0 
  Total 14.9 21.2 37.2 4.7 1.8 5.9 1.5 1.8 10.8 100.0 
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Finland 
First 
Ranked  
Second Soc.Left Soc.Dem. Agrar. Lib. Christ. Cons. Greens Other Total 
a    25.0 41.7 8.3  8.3 16.7  100.0 
  Total   25.0 41.7 8.3   8.3 16.7   100.0 
e   5.6 5.6 33.3   33.3  22.2 100.0 
 f  3.3 23.3  3.3 56.7 3.3 10.0 100.0 
 h 5.0 10.0 5.0 10.0  55.0 5.0 10.0 100.0 
 i  40.0 20.0 10.0  20.0  10.0 100.0 
 I 4.0 12.0 20.0 16.0  44.0  4.0 100.0 
  Total 2.9 10.7 20.4 6.8 1.0 45.6 1.9 10.7 100.0 
E    50.0 25.0  25.0    100.0 
 f 10.0 30.0 20.0 10.0  10.0 10.0 10.0 100.0 
 F  33.3 55.6  11.1    100.0 
 h 10.0 40.0 10.0 10.0   10.0 20.0 100.0 
 H 40.0 6.7 20.0  6.7 6.7  20.0 100.0 
 i 22.2  33.3   11.1 11.1 22.2 100.0 
 I  33.3 33.3   16.7  16.7 100.0 
  Total 15.9 23.8 27.0 3.2 4.8 6.3 4.8 14.3 100.0 
f     33.3   44.4 22.2  100.0 
 e 7.7 7.7 23.1  7.7 38.5  15.4 100.0 
 E 25.0 37.5 12.5 12.5   12.5  100.0 
 h 8.3 25.0 8.3 16.7  8.3 25.0 8.3 100.0 
 H  36.4 27.3   18.2  18.2 100.0 
 i 7.7 30.8 30.8 7.7 7.7 7.7 7.7  100.0 
 I 10.0  10.0 30.0  10.0 30.0 10.0 100.0 
  Total 7.9 19.7 21.1 9.2 2.6 18.4 13.2 7.9 100.0 
F   6.7 20.0 26.7   26.7  20.0 100.0 
 E 11.1 38.9 22.2 5.6    22.2 100.0 
 H 6.3 25.0 37.5 12.5 6.3  6.3 6.3 100.0 
 i 33.3 16.7 16.7  16.7 16.7   100.0 
 I  9.1 18.2 18.2  27.3  27.3 100.0 
  Total 9.1 24.2 25.8 7.6 3.0 12.1 1.5 16.7 100.0 
h    10.0 30.0   10.0 10.0 40.0 100.0 
 e  12.5 12.5 12.5  37.5 12.5 12.5 100.0 
 E 18.2  9.1 36.4   18.2 18.2 100.0 
 f  7.7 15.4 23.1  38.5 7.7 7.7 100.0 
 i 12.5 8.3 12.5 29.2 8.3 8.3 16.7 4.2 100.0 
 I    33.3  50.0 16.7  100.0 
  Total 6.9 6.9 13.9 23.6 2.8 19.4 13.9 12.5 100.0 
H   5.6 16.7 27.8 16.7 11.1 5.6  16.7 100.0 
 E 4.8 23.8 28.6 4.8 9.5 23.8 4.8  100.0 
 f 10.0  20.0 10.0  40.0 10.0 10.0 100.0 
 F  23.1 38.5  7.7 15.4  15.4 100.0 
 I 4.5 13.6 36.4 9.1  31.8  4.5 100.0 
  Total 4.8 16.7 31.0 8.3 6.0 22.6 2.4 8.3 100.0 
i   8.3 33.3 8.3 8.3 8.3  8.3 25.0 100.0 
 e 6.7 13.3 20.0 6.7 6.7 26.7  20.0 100.0 
 E  40.0  20.0   20.0 20.0 100.0 
 f 13.3 13.3 20.0 33.3  6.7  13.3 100.0 
 F 30.0 10.0 30.0 10.0    20.0 100.0 
 h 10.0 15.0 25.0 10.0 15.0 5.0 15.0 5.0 100.0 
 H 10.0 30.0 30.0 10.0 10.0   10.0 100.0 
  Total 10.9 20.7 19.6 14.1 6.5 6.5 6.5 15.2 100.0 
I   7.1 14.3 21.4 14.3  21.4  21.4 100.0 
 e  30.0 10.0  10.0 30.0  20.0 100.0 
 f  10.0 30.0   50.0  10.0 100.0 
 H  12.5 43.8  6.3 25.0 6.3 6.3 100.0 
  Total 2.0 16.0 28.0 4.0 4.0 30.0 2.0 14.0 100.0 
Total   4.5 17.0 27.7 6.3 3.6 17.9 5.4 17.9 100.0 
 e 4.3 15.2 17.4 4.3 6.5 32.6 2.2 17.4 100.0 
 E 10.3 27.9 17.6 13.2 2.9 7.4 8.8 11.8 100.0 
 f 4.5 9.1 21.6 11.4 1.1 37.5 4.5 10.2 100.0 
 F 9.4 21.9 40.6 3.1 6.3 6.3  12.5 100.0 
 h 8.1 19.4 12.9 11.3 4.8 21.0 12.9 9.7 100.0 
 H 11.8 20.6 32.4 4.4 5.9 10.3 2.9 11.8 100.0 
 i 12.9 17.7 21.0 14.5 6.5 11.3 9.7 6.5 100.0 
 I 3.8 11.3 22.5 16.3  32.5 5.0 8.8 100.0 
  Total 7.3 17.2 23.3 9.9 3.7 20.7 6.0 12.0 100.0 
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Iceland 
First Second Soc.Dem. Agrar. Lib. Cons. Greens Other Total 
e      100.0   100.0 
 f    100.0   100.0 
 F    100.0   100.0 
 h 10.0   90.0   100.0 
 H 8.3 8.3  83.3   100.0 
 i 20.0 60.0   20.0  100.0 
 I 4.8  4.8 90.5   100.0 
  Total 5.0 5.0 1.3 87.5 1.3   100.0 
E   16.7 33.3  33.3 16.7  100.0 
 f 27.3 18.2  27.3 18.2 9.1 100.0 
 F 16.7 16.7  33.3 33.3  100.0 
 H 50.0 20.0  20.0 10.0  100.0 
 i 50.0     50.0 100.0 
 I 37.5   37.5 25.0  100.0 
  Total 32.6 16.3   27.9 18.6 4.7 100.0 
f   20.0 33.3  46.7   100.0 
 e  20.0 6.7 73.3   100.0 
 h 10.0 30.0  50.0 10.0  100.0 
 H 57.1 14.3  28.6   100.0 
 I  18.2  81.8   100.0 
  Total 13.8 24.1 1.7 58.6 1.7   100.0 
F    18.2 9.1 63.6 9.1  100.0 
 E 41.7 16.7 8.3 33.3   100.0 
 H 27.8 38.9  33.3   100.0 
 i 60.0 10.0  30.0   100.0 
 I 50.0 25.0  25.0   100.0 
  Total 33.9 23.7 3.4 37.3 1.7   100.0 
h   60.0   30.0  10.0 100.0 
 E 66.7   26.7 6.7  100.0 
 f 66.7   22.2  11.1 100.0 
 i 41.7   50.0  8.3 100.0 
 I 33.3   58.3  8.3 100.0 
  Total 53.4     37.9 1.7 6.9 100.0 
H   17.6 17.6  64.7   100.0 
 E 27.3 18.2  27.3 9.1 18.2 100.0 
 f 16.7 25.0 8.3 50.0   100.0 
 F 40.0 10.0  50.0   100.0 
 I 33.3 11.1  55.6   100.0 
  Total 25.4 16.9 1.7 50.8 1.7 3.4 100.0 
i   28.6 28.6  14.3 14.3 14.3 100.0 
 e 40.0   20.0 40.0  100.0 
 E 47.1 11.8  11.8 29.4  100.0 
 f 43.8 25.0  12.5 12.5 6.3 100.0 
 F 37.5 12.5  37.5 12.5  100.0 
 h 40.0 10.0  30.0  20.0 100.0 
  Total 41.3 15.9   19.0 17.5 6.3 100.0 
I   7.7 7.7  84.6   100.0 
 E 28.6 14.3  57.1   100.0 
 F 16.7 16.7  66.7   100.0 
 H 8.3 25.0  66.7   100.0 
  Total 13.2 15.8   71.1     100.0 
Total   18.4 17.2 1.1 57.5 3.4 2.3 100.0 
 e 10.0 15.0 5.0 60.0 10.0  100.0 
 E 45.2 11.3 1.6 27.4 11.3 3.2 100.0 
 f 27.7 13.8 1.5 46.2 6.2 4.6 100.0 
 F 24.3 10.8  56.8 8.1  100.0 
 h 20.0 13.3  56.7 3.3 6.7 100.0 
 H 27.1 23.7  47.5 1.7  100.0 
 i 44.8 13.8  31.0 3.4 6.9 100.0 
 I 21.7 7.2 1.4 65.2 2.9 1.4 100.0 
  Total 26.9 14.2 1.1 50.0 5.2 2.6 100.0 
Appendix III - the Discussions     • 
 
565 
Independency of Effects Assumption 
Table 94: Percent Party Preference Explained by Change of 
Order of CB pair. NOS99. 
Country 
Table 
Number 
Percent variance 
explained by change of 
rank 
Asymp.  
Std. Error 
Approx. 
Sig. 
Test of  
H11a 
Denmark eh-he 13.0 3.53 .010 Reject   
  eI-Ie 15.0 3.30 .009 Reject 
  ei-ie 25.6 3.03 .005 Reject 
  ef-fe 3.4 2.55 .448 Keep 
  EH-HE 5.2 3.45 .374 Keep 
  Ei-iE 1.9 1.78 .840 Keep 
  EF-FE 5.5 2.65 .441 Keep 
  hi-ih 3.1 2.43 .425 Keep 
  fi-if 5.6 3.93 .470 Keep 
  HI-IH 4.2 2.56 .578 Keep 
  If-fI 12.4 4.77 .239 Keep 
  fh-hf 10.1 2.92 .056 Keep 
  FH-HF 12.3 2.67 .038 Reject 
  N 13 13 13  
Finland eh-he 2.2 2.69 .924 Keep 
  eI-Ie 8.6 3.87 .134 Keep 
  ei-ie 5.0 3.61 .626 Keep 
  ef-fe 3.9 2.75 .592 Keep 
  EH-HE 12.6 4.39 .017 Reject 
  Ei-iE 23.8 3.94 .010 Reject 
  EF-FE 12.5 4.16 .081 Keep 
  hi-ih 2.4 2.25 .760 Keep 
  Fi-iF 12.8 4.49 .306 Keep 
  fi-if 9.1 3.98 .220 Keep 
  HI-IH 5.9 2.21 .421 Keep 
  If-fI 21.1 5.77 .020 Reject 
  fH-Hf 15.0 4.39 .092 Keep 
  fh-hf 7.5 4.82 .331 Keep 
  FH-HF 8.5 2.81 .284 Keep 
  N 15 15 15  
Iceland ei-ie 23.7 9.24 .101 Keep 
  ef-fe 23.5 6.17 .035 Reject 
  EH-HE 5.5 3.88 .488 Keep 
  EI-IE 12.6 5.61 .218 Keep 
  Ei-iE 12.8 7.63 .164 Keep 
  EF-FE 11.7 5.96 .195 Keep 
  hi-ih 5.3 4.79 .445 Keep 
  Fi-iF 5.4 5.00 .535 Keep 
  HI-IH 6.1 7.43 .307 Keep 
  fH-Hf 8.4 7.36 .275 Keep 
  fh-hf 24.0 8.25 .016 Reject 
  FH-HF 4.8 5.11 .229 Keep 
  N 12 12 12  
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Norway eh-he 8.9 4.74 .168 Keep 
  eI-Ie 10.2 4.64 .047 Reject 
  ef-fe 2.2 2.11 .722 Keep 
  EH-HE 10.9 3.20 .102 Keep 
  EF-FE 9.2 2.93 .103 Keep 
  hi-ih 4.3 1.97 .385 Keep 
  fi-if 1.9 1.02 .884 Keep 
  HI-IH 2.9 2.68 .695 Keep 
  If-fI 10.1 7.14 .375 Keep 
  fh-hf 11.5 3.38 .089 Keep 
  FH-HF 1.3 2.06 .789 Keep 
  N 11 11 11  
Sweden eh-he 8.2 2.55 .267 Keep 
  ef-fe 2.8 2.15 .641 Keep 
  EH-HE 12.6 5.41 .149 Keep 
  EI-IE 11.3 5.19 .235 Keep 
  Ei-iE 6.2 2.76 .421 Keep 
  hi-ih 7.9 2.55 .211 Keep 
  Fi-iF 6.8 4.10 .501 Keep 
  fi-if 6.1 4.68 .288 Keep 
  If-fI 19.3 5.57 .076 Keep 
  fh-hf 12.3 4.38 .004 Reject 
  FH-HF 3.0 2.29 .652 Keep 
  N 11 11 11  
Total eh-he 2.5 1.29 .132 Keep 
  eI-Ie 5.1 1.83 .001 Reject 
  ei-ie 1.5 1.29 .787 Keep 
  ef-fe .8 .66 .699 Keep 
  EH-HE 2.1 1.21 .219 Keep 
  EI-IE 4.9 2.13 .105 Keep 
  Ei-iE 2.2 .98 .290 Keep 
  EF-FE 1.7 1.11 .421 Keep 
  hi-ih .4 .37 .927 Keep 
  Fi-iF 3.9 1.73 .300 Keep 
  fi-if .9 .80 .768 Keep 
  HI-IH 1.4 .90 .463 Keep 
  If-fI 3.8 1.70 .157 Keep 
  fH-Hf 8.3 2.76 .032 Reject 
  fh-hf 1.8 .94 .194 Keep 
  FH-HF 1.2 .81 .458 Keep 
  N 16 16 16  
Total 78 78 78 78  
 
Appendix III - the Discussions     • 
 
567 
What is Rejection of A Cultural Bias?  
Table 95: Count of Respondents in Cultural Space by Country. 
NOS99. 
     Reject I  indiff  Support I  
 H
ierarc
hy 
Fatalism
 
Reject E 
Indiff 
Supp. E 
Reject E 
indiff 
Supp. E 
Reject E 
indiff 
Supp. E 
Reject F 37 26 32 25 11 10 22 14 7 
Indiff 16 11 17 13 8 3 12 6 5 Reject H  
Supp. F 8 8 8 7 4 5 9 4 4 
Reject F 12 9 19 12 11 7 13 3 4 
Indiff 11 7 8 12 11 5 16 16 7 Indiff  
Supp. F 7 8 14 12 13 12 10 7 16 
Reject F 4 5 8 8 11 3 7 1 9 
indiff 6 6 9 7 8 11 14 11 23 
N 
Supp. H 
Supp. F 6 12 16 5 16 23 16 30 49 
Reject F 29 31 30 22 9 10 22 8 4 
Indiff 10 9 13 9 6 9 15 4 7 Reject H  
Supp. F 13 8 7 7 5 6 10 8 4 
Reject F 13 8 7 19 6 6 20 9 4 
Indiff 5 9 14 10 12 11 14 5 10 Indiff  
Supp. F 9 13 15 8 9 7 6 12 11 
Reject F 5 3 3 5 2 4 20 7 8 
indiff 3 8 8 8 15 16 11 6 14 
D 
Supp. H  
Supp. F 3 14 19 4 21 25 19 14 36 
Reject F 34 29 29 23 14 5 19 9 4 
Indiff 13 11 26 9 8 8 13 5 5 Reject H  
Supp. F 15 10 11 12 8 9 3 5 4 
Reject F 7 12 14 18 9 4 22 11 6 
Indiff 11 8 6 14 13 11 16 11 7 Indiff 
Supp. F 3 10 18 10 11 4 7 9 4 
Reject F 5 3 3 4 2 8 19 7 10 
indiff 7 6 13 8 8 4 18 17 10 
S 
Supp. H  
Supp. F 8 7 11 4 10 36 14 26 56 
Reject F 28 22 19 24 9 8 29 8 4 
Indiff 20 15 11 8 9 10 11 7 6 Reject H  
Supp. F 10 9 15 14 5 11 13 3 4 
Reject F 15 13 6 16 12 8 11 7 6 
Indiff 14 15 4 11 12 10 15 6 8 Indiff  
Supp. F 4 11 11 6 12 7 8 5 14 
Reject F 6 3 14 7 7 6 10 13 15 
indiff 6 6 9 6 9 10 6 12 21 
F 
Supp. H  
Supp. F 3 13 20 7 12 17 16 15 50 
Reject F 14 15 22 18 6 10 28 6 3 
Indiff 17 8 7 7 9 8 15 7 6 Reject H  
Supp. F 10 6 7 8 6 12 7 8 9 
Reject F 4 9 9 12 7 6 21 6 5 
Indiff 12 7 8 9 7 9 10 5 4 Indiff  
Supp. F 5 13 12 7 10 16 4 9 14 
Reject F 7 5 8 4 9 9 14 3 16 
indiff 7 6 11 9 11 7 6 12 16 
I 
Supp. H  
Supp. F 7 10 12 13 18 11 5 9 32 
4481 respondents with four valid cultural biases and a valid response to the party preference 
question are included.  
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Table 96: Count of Respondents in Cultural Space by Sample. 
NEPS95. 
     Reject I  indiff  Support I  
 H
ierarchy 
Fatalism
 
Reject E 
Indiff 
Supp. E 
Reject E 
indiff 
Supp. E 
Reject E 
indiff 
Supp. E 
Reject 14 38 240 20 28 45 27 9 12 
Indiff 16 43 220 14 16 46 22 2 10 Reject H  Supp. 18 37 241 17 15 29 13 11 5 
Reject 10 21 73 16 21 30 22 19 10 
Indiff 8 10 41 11 9 11 15 9 5 Indiff  
Supp. 5 9 33 8 6 6 4 2 4 
Reject 3 15 41 8 12 15 24 11 7 
indiff 4 6 24 9 7 8 14 3 6 
E
nv O
rg 
Supp. 
H  Supp. 4 3 22 4 8 6 10 3 2 
Reject 5 14 38 12 10 9 20 12 5 
Indiff 8 6 32 7 9 8 12 6 6 
Reject 
H  Supp. 10 16 23 15 5 8 15 9 0 
Reject 8 9 22 12 17 8 14 7 2 
Indiff 5 6 14 11 8 9 13 6 6 Indiff  
Supp. 8 3 14 9 13 7 23 8 7 
Reject 10 7 12 9 12 12 20 7 7 
indiff 1 9 11 7 10 8 23 15 15 
G
eneral 
Supp. 
H  Supp. 4 10 12 12 16 15 24 17 14 
2813 respondents with four valid cultural biases and valid response to the party preference 
Table 97: References by Original Year of Publication 
In Table 97, we can see that 43 per cent of 
the referenced material is originally 
published year 2000 or later. In text, the 
references are to the edition of the work I 
happened to have at hand. The original year 
of publishing is included in the list of 
references. For example, (Douglas 1996c) is 
a new edition of a book first published in 
1979. In the list of references it is presented 
as  
Douglas 1996c. The world of goods. 2 ed. 
London: Routledge. Original publ. 
1979. 
 
 Frequency Valid  
Percent 
<= 1949 6 1,2 
1950 - 1979 33 6,8 
1980 - 1984 31 6,4 
1985 - 1989 28 5,8 
1990 - 1994 68 14,0 
1995 - 1999 110 22,7 
2000 - 2004 89 18,4 
2005+ 120 24,7 
 
Total 485 100,0 
 
Missing  1  
Total 486  
  
569 
569 
R e f e r e n c e s   
 
All sources are sorted alphabetically based on English language rules; however, the 
date format used is Scandinavian. My own research interviews, which have been 
quoted (i.e., not interviews used only for background information), are listed here 
under each pseudonym used, and marked as research interviews.  
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http://www.ssb.no/emner/02/rapp_200724. 
———. 2008. Innvandrere og kommunestyrevalget i 2007.  2008/47. SSB. 
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